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INTRODUCTION 
The increasing economic and political power of labor 
1 
unions has raised highly significant questions. Should 
labor unions be confined to their customary economic activi-
ties, or should the function of labor unions also include 
political activities? Should this decision be left to the 
judgment of the union membership as a matter of internal 
labor union policy, or does it involve an issue of public 
policy to be determined by the electorate through legisla-
tion? Further, even if it is decided that political activi-
ty is properly within the scope of labor union functions, 
or that political action is an issue to be determined by 
the unions themselves, the question still arises as to what 
form that action should take, what regulations of that acti-
vity are desireable for the protection of. the union member, 
or in the public interest? Does the importance of the 
group in our present day social structure and political 
system cloak labor unions with a multiple-purpose character 
which must include freedom of di .scussion in the electoral 
and legislative processes? Can there be any attempt con-
sistent with the principles of our democracy or the realit-
ies of American politics to prohibit such political action? 
1 I have used the words "labor union" in this thesis 
to include any organization of workers, irrespective of its 
structure, which has as its major purpose and activity col-
lective bargaining with employer·s ·or management representa-
tives ~rincerning grie~an6es, wages, hours, conditions of 
work, and related issues. 
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These are vexing issues created by organized labor's deci-
sion to take a more active part in politics and about which 
2 
there has been fundamental disagreement. 
In this country, labor union political activity is a 
much-discussed but little-analyzed "problem" which has only 
recentl1 b~ought_ forth much attention from Congress. The 
principal purpose of this thesis is to analyze the success-
es or failures, the legal and practical consequences of 
attempted limitations or prohibitions, general and specific, 
on the political activities of labor unions. I hope to 
show some of the real reasons for these results, why these 
attempts have largely failed. This has been done from a 
study of the historical background in Great Britain and the 
United States, the legislative process~ the explicit and 
implicit -policy considerations of the legislative intention, 
and the judicial interpretation, together with their politi-
cal effects. Thus, I have not confined my interest to the 
statutes and decisions alone and, where pertinent, I have 
also discussed .electoral campaign3, including the political 
activities and objectives of the British and American labor 
unions. A review of corrupt practices legislation is also 
pertinent to an understanding of the development of these 
limitations, and leads legically into our study of such 
attempted controls on unions. 
2 -Louise Overacker, Presidentail Campaign Funds, 
pp. 66-69. 
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Included in this material is corrupt practices legi-
alation and court rulings relating to or affecting in some 
way the political activities of labor unions. I have 
attempted to be as complete as possible on this aspect 
without detailing every single state. To my knowledge 
there is no other work which has concentrated entirely on 
legislation and judicial decisions or this type, and I be-
lieve that this thesis may be a contribution to the field 
of political regulation or campaign activities, especially 
attempts to limit or prohibit organized labor's political 
activities. The subject matter of this thesis has been 
divided into three chapters, each being self-contained and 
. -
representing a study capable or standing alone as independ-
ent research on a particular topic. Therefore, it coua d be 
said that this paper is actually three separate theses 
brought together because of their special relationship 
. . - . - . 
which brings a unification of theme. I have made the 
· thesis topical and have combined the British experience 
with that of the United States for purposes of comparison. 
The arrangement of chapters has been to take up the 
British and American background first as to the development 
of labor union political activities. Then, in the second 
chapter, follows an analysis of general legislation, 
commonly known as the corrupt practices statutes, such as 
the Hatch Acts, and judicial decisions controlling over-all 
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political activities in the two countries, including that 
of labor unions. The third chapter is a more detailed 
analysis of specific legislation and judicial decisions 
controlling labor union political activities, especially 
the House and Senate debate and court cases on Section 304. 
Also included in this chapter are related legislation and 
decisions. The evaluative conclusions of the last chapter 
summarize the legislative, judicial, and historieal study 
of the background, policy, law, and consequences of attempt-
ed limitations on the political activities of labor unions, 
particularly Section 304. Under recommendations, I take 
the liberty of proceeding slightly beyond the immediate 
scope of this study to offer the opinion that the solution 
to the problems of labor union political action still lies 
in the future - and that, in addition to other suggestions, 
the answer reached in Great Britain may be recommended as 
the most satisfactory policy for the United States. 
From the viewpoint of policy are the stated and 
assumed justifications for the various attempts by law to 
prohibit or limit the political activities of labor unions. 
The _ Parliamentary Debates are basic information for an ade-
quate understanding of the policy considerations involved. 
' - ·- . . . - . 
Tn the United States, the Seaate debate on Section 304, a 
transcript of which appears in the Appendix, is 11must" 
reading for ascertaining the legislative policy. The policy 
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theme running through the debates, both in Great Britain and 
the United States, is that prohibitions such as Section 304 
are needed to protect the union minority from the union 
majority, to secure equality of treatment for labor unions 
and business corporations, and to guard against the dangers 
of corruption and undue influence. As opposed to these 
arguments, it is urged that the minority can be protected 
in other ways than by penalizing the majority, that labor 
unions and business corporations are not comparable, and 
that democracy demands full participation by all associa-
. . ' . 
tions of citizens in the electoral and legislative process, 
including labor unions. There should be an attempt to meet 
alleged labor union abuses as such, rather than to resort 
to prohibitions. 
The study of the law evaluates the current status, 
such as their constitutionality, of the statutes in Great 
Britain and in the United States. The law is intimately 
connected with policy in that the determination of the 
proper statutory interpretation is often dependent upon the 
legislative history, and the legislative debate is frequent-
ly relied upon to support judicial decisions. The law in 
Great Britain has gone from the 1909-1910 Osborne judgment's 
absolute prohibition of political activities by organized 
3 
labor to the "contracting-out" law of 1913, to the 
3 "Contracting-out" is the procedure whereby those 
union members who do not desire to contribute to the politi-
- xiv -
4 
"contracting-in" statute of 1927, and back again in 1946 
to the 1913 provisions. With the passage in 1943 of the 
war Labor Disputes Act (the Smith-Connally Act) and its 
prohibition on the political contributions of labor unions 
came the first national legislation in the United States 
aimed specifically at limiting the poll tical a _cti vi ties of 
labor unions. A year after Great Britain finally discarded 
such attempts, the Congress of the United States enacted the 
Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, the Taft-Hartley 
Act, Section 304 of which expanded the ban on contributions 
by prohibiting labor union political expenditures. 
Both the latest and most outstanding example of 
statutory attempts to limit the political activities of 
labor unions, the clear intention of Section 304, as reveal-
ed by the question-and-answer Senate debate, was a design to 
totally forbid unions from every kind of political activity, 
a blanket proqibition on all the political activities of 
labor unions~ including in its ban non-commercial labor 
union newspapers and radio broadcasts. Among their other 
aims, the authors of the Taft-Hartley Act wanted to confine 
labor union activity to pure and simple collective bargain-
cal fund of the union so indicate 'in writing, and this 
relieves them of the political assessment. 
4 "Contracting-in" reverses the procedure by requir-
ing those union members who do desire to contribute to the 
political fund to so indicate in writing, and "" all those who 
do not so indicate are relieved of the political assessment. 
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ing. They intended that Section 304 would be an effective 
prohibition against labor union political action. Thus, 
Section 304 is of major significance in its public policy 
implications for the present and future of democratic 
electoral and legislative processes. rt will be observed 
that so sweeping a ban would seem to conflict with the 
guarantee~ of political rights contained in the First 
5 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. But 
•6 
the Supreme Court has not so ruled. By rejecting a care-
ful reading of the C()ng ressional _Record, it has chosen by 
non-enforcement to ignore the expre ss legislative intent. 
Other court decisions, and recent judicial pronouncements, 
. -- ~ . . . 
also indicate that if interpreted as intended by its 
. .. . - . - -
authors, Section 304 would be unconstitutional. 
On the basis of the developments and the cases 
following the c.r.o. ruling, however, under any interpreta-
tion of the law~ Sectio~ 304 is completely ineffective be-
cause any serious attempt to enforce it would be in viola-
tion of the First Amendment. This lack of legal enforce-
ability leads us to the next point of study. The practical 
5 "Corigr~ss shall ~aka rio law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or· prohibiting the free exercise 
the~eof; or ~bridging the f~eedom of speech; or of the 
~ress; or the right of th~ people peacefully to assemble, 
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." 
6 United States v. Congress "of Industrial Organiza-
tions, 335 u.s. 106, 68 s.ct. 1349,~2 L.Ed. 1849 (1948). 
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consequences of attempted limitations or prohibitions on 
labor union political activities are examined in regard to 
whether subsequent events have fulfilled the expectations 
of the authors of such attempts. In this connection, the 
earlier background of the British experience serves as an 
interesting introductory insight into the situation in the 
United States, and, inasmuch as similar issues were in-
volved, should be of value to our study. The legislative 
history and the practical results in the two countries 
permit of certain parallels, as in the striking similarity 
in the origins, provisions, and consequences of the 1927 
Act in Great Britain, and the 1947 Act in the United States. 
It will be found that efforts to strike at the economic and 
political sources of union strength, both in Great Britain 
and the United States, have not only failed to fulfill the 
expectations of their authors, but that such attempted 
limitations have had quite the opposite effect by spurring 
labor to increase its political activities. 
The sources used in the preparation of this research 
p~per may be classified into three groups. The first in-
eludes judicial decisions, statutues, official documents, 
legislative debates, congressional investigations and hear-
ings, committee reports, books, law review articles, var-
ious pamphlets, newspapers, and general information. 7 Sec-
7 The Bibliography -contains- references to all the 
available material in this first group, and there is at 
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ond, I have drawn upon the knowledge obtained while secur-
8 
ing degrees in economics, law, and government. Third, the 
writer has been aided by his personal activity, experiences, 
conversations, and observations in many features of local 
politics, including election in 1951 to a four-year term on 
the Waltham School Committee. I have been guided by an in-
tensive interest and concern in wha~ I regard to be the im-
portant and inherently stimulating practical and legal iss-
ues arising from electoral conduct in general, labor union 
political activities in particular, and the attempts to deal 
with these questions through "corrupt practices" statutes, 
incl~ding _the ju~icial decisions, and, finally! the politi-
cal consequences. I have sought to make the opportunity of 
exploring this subject enjoyable to the reader without mini-
. . 
mizing its seriousness or at the sacrifice of an accurate 
report. I hope that my efforts constitute a useful examina-
tion of this aspect of legislation, that I have written an 
acceptable evaluation contributing to the understanding and 
9 
appreciation of a facinating but as yet unsettled problem. 
least one citation in the text of the thesis itself for 
every source listed in the Bibliography. 
8 Additionally, on October 19, 1954, the v~iter was 
admitted to practice as an Attorney-at-Law of the Massachu-
setts Bar. 
9 In delineating the issues and in organizing the 
material, I wish to acknowledge the helpful advice which I 
received from Prof. John L. Fletcher Jr. and Prof. Everett 
J. Burtt Jr. 
- xviii -
Frederick w. Parkhurst Jr. 
March, 1955 
- xix -
I 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF LABOR UNION POLITICAL ACTIVITIES 
Chapter Introduction 
The topical arrangement of this thesis makes it 
necessary, I believe, to provide a framework of reference 
as to the correct order of events. For example, to 
compare the types of control over labor union political 
activities in Great Britain and the United States tends 
to reverse the chronological experience of the two 
countries. That is, Great Britain at first prohibited, 
then regulated; the United States first regulated, then 
attempted to prohibit. To combine these two countries 
under the types of control, as has been done in this 
thesis, may lead to confusion or be misleading unless 
the reader is acquainted with the natural sequence. 
Therefore, this preliminary chapter summarizes the 
over-all development of labor union political activities 
in Great Britain and the United States. Further, there 
is no other way under a topical arrangement to include 
some of the historical background. Of course, details 
of particular statutes, and so forth, will not be taken 
up under this chapter but will be discussed in the 
various topical sections of the thesis. 
- 1 -
Great Britain 
Rise of the Labor Party 
Seventy-five years ago there was no indication 
that the workers of Great Britain would ever reject the 
old parties and create a party of their own. The growth 
of the idea of a separate Labor Party was at first slow. 
In 1892 Kier Hardie sat alone as the first independent 
worker to be elected to the House of Commons. He helped 
to organize the Independent Labor Party, a group of 
vigorous young socialists whose goal was to interest the 
labor unions in political action. In 1900 their efforts 
saw success in the appointment of a Labor Representation 
Committee by the Trade Union Congress. From that time 
the power of British labor in politics has steadily grown 
until today it is the major political force of Britain, 
the Labor Party polling more popular votes than any 
other party. 
1 
The !!f! Vale ~· It has been said that the 
growth of the Labor Party was influenced more than any 
other single factor by the ~ !!!! case. Contrary to 
previous assumptions based on the fact that the unions 
were unincorporated associations, Taff Vale Ry v. 
Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, (1901} A.C. 426, 
1 V. Henry Rothschild 2nd, Government Regulation 
of Trade Unions In Great Britain: II, p. l346. 
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at pp. 430 1 431 1 444-445, rev'g (1901) 1 K.B. 170 (C.A.), 
imposed features of compulsory incorporation upon trade 
unions. It was held that the 1871 registration statute 
had constituted unions an entity which the law wou1d 
recognize as a defendant in an action at law or in an 
equity proceeding for an injunction. Labor unions were 
now to be liable to law suits by employers. "The 
decision was a smashing blow to trade union activity ••• 
In a very short time unions had paid l200 1 000 in 
2 
litigation." 
The trade union answer to the Taff Vale case was 
--
to increase its political activities. In the election of 
1906 1 the year that the Labor Party was officially formed, 
labor's political strength was demonstrated in the defeat 
of the Conservatives, and by the election of 54 working-
class members to Parliament. The new Labor Party startled 
the country by electing 29 of its candidates to Parliament. 
Moreover, of the 376 Liberals elected, a majority were 
3 
completely pledged to support pro-union legislation. As 
a result the Trade Disputes Act of 1906 abolished the 
conspiracy doctrine in labor disputes, legalized peaceful 
picketing, and freed unions from law actions for breach of 
contract. Labor unions could not be sued for damages for 
any reason, and were not subject to injunction. Experience 
2 Loc.eit. 
3 Ibid, PP• 1346-1347. 
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has demonstrated a generally statesmanlike attitude on 
the part of British labor which has prevented the abuse 
4 
of this immunity. 
The Trade Disputes Act of 1906 was a demonstration 
of the successful effectiveness of labor's political 
activity, both in its own independent Labor Party and in 
supporting pro-labor Liberal candidates. The Conserva-
tives had been defeated on the legislative front, and now 
turned their attention to instituting judicial proceedings 
designed to cut off the sources of Labor Party funds. 
This attempt to impede further development of the Labor 
Party was financed by opponents of the Labor Party who 
5 
induced a trade union member to bring an action at law. 
This was done in the famous case of Osborne v. Amalgamated 
Society of Railway Servants, 1 Law Re.Ch.Div. 163, 
1 British Ruling Cases 56 (1909), affirmed A.C. 87 (1910) • 
.. 
The case held that it was illegal for trade unions to 
give financial support to a political party or candidates. 
The Osborne judgment was followed by an outburst 
of strikes, coupled with a general demand for a national 
strike. Although many within the unions advocated the 
abandonment of political action in favor of the general 
strike, the Secretary of the Labor Party, Ramsay MacDonald, 
4 ~~ pp. 1351-1353. 
5 Ibid, P• 1353. 
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persuaded the unions to continue political action in dis-
6 
regard of the Osborne judgment. Thus~ despite the judg-
ment~ 42 Members of Parliament received financial aid and 
were elected in the two general elections of 1910~ 
retaining the Labor Party parliamentary representation. 
Where the Labor Party had no candidates of its own~ it 
had supported the Liberals in order to secure repeal of 
the Osborne judgment. The Liberal candidates had~ for 
7 
the most part, pledged themselves to legislation making it 
8 
legal for the unions to engage in political action. 
11 Contracting-out" Labor 1 s reaction to the Osborne 
judgment had caused many to feel it evident that the 
decision would have to be modified. In 1910 the first 
act of the Liberal Prime Minister Asquith was to obtain 
an appropriation for payment to members of the House of 
Commons for a salary of i400 a year together with traveling 
9 
expenses. The measure was acceptable to the trade unions 
as a partial remedy only, since pro-labor candidates still 
had no effective legal means for raising a campaign fund. 
Thus~ the Trade Union Act of 1913 legalized political 
expenditures by the unions with the provision that any 
6 Ibid, p. 1360. 
7 Ibid; Paul Blanchard~ An Outline of the British 
Labor Movement~ p. 22. -- ---
8 G.D.H. Cole~ ! History £! the Labour Party ~ 
1914~ p. 2. 
9 Rothschild~ op.cit.~ p. 1360. 
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trade union member who objected should be allowed to sign 
a form .. contracting-out" of payment of the political con-
10 
tribution. Although not amounting to a total repeal of 
the Osborne judgment, the 1913 law greatly aided the new 
Labor Party, opening the way to its future expansion. 
The First World War. The First World War, 1914-
1918, brought with it a sharp break in the history of the 
Labor Party. Up to 1914 the Labor Party had been only a 
small fourth party in a Parliament still dominated by 
Liberals, Conservatives, and Irish Nationalists. Prior 
to 1914, the Labor Party neither stood, nor professed to 
stand, for Socialism. There were, of course, Socialists 
in its ranks and Socialist Societies affiliated to it 
playing a large part in its work. In fact, most of the 
Labor Party leaders, and a majority of its members, were 
Socialists. But there were still quite a number who 
neither were nor called themselves Socialists, and behind 
these men were the trade unions who were not ready to 
11 
insist that their candidates must profess Socialism. 
This was so mainly because the labor leaders did not wish 
12 
to risk a break with the Liberals who supported them. 
When, in the summer of 1914, war with Germany 
10 G.D.H. Cole, op.cit., p. 2; Florence Peterson, 
Survey of Labor Economics, p. 647. 
11 Cole, op.cit., p. 2-3. 
12 Ibid, p. 6. 
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became a certainty~ leaders of all parties entered into 
a truce designed to shelve controversial matters and to 
atop partisan activities of every sort for as long as 
the conflict should last. A coalition plan was adopted 
to give ministerial posts to Liberals~ Conservatives~ 
and Laborites. However. some of the Liberals formed an 
Independent opposition and in the early summer of 1918 
the Labor Party decided to repudiate its agreement of 
four years previously and to begin working independently 
13 
toward the goal of a Labor government. 
New Labor Party Constitution. A new Labor Party 
Constitution was approved in 1918. Its essential purpose 
was to reconstruct and transform the Labor Party from a 
federation able to act only through its affiliated 
societies, trade unions~ and socialist organizations, 
into a nationally organized party with a local party of 
14 
ita own in every parliamentary constituency. The new 
Labor Party Constitution not only opened the doors wide 
to individual members but strengthened trade union 
domination over the Labor Party by means of the Socialist 
Societies losing their separate position aa a group. 
This change was obviously proposed in order to get the 
13 Frederick Austin Ogg, European Governments And 
Politics, pp. 274-275. 
14 Cole, op.cit.~ p. 44. 
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15 
support of the big trade unions. Thus, not only did 
the Labor Party have Socialist leadership, energy, and 
spirit, but the support, funds, and votes of the trade 
unions. The Labor Party now had the extra money which 
it needed but the new constitution made it clear that 
"workers by brain" were no less welcome than "workers by 
hand 11 • 
It was during the First World War years that the 
Labor Party adopted officially the Socialist policy which 
it has maintained from that time until now. It was during 
the First .World War also that the Labor Party took over 
the Daily Herald as the official party publication. From 
1918 onwards the Labor Party steadily built up its local 
organization. By 1924 there were only three constituen-
cies in Great Britain in which no sort of Local Labor 
1.6 
Party was in existence. In 1918, the election results 
gave a majority to the wartime coalition of Conservatives 
and Liberals, the Labor Party (with about 70 M.P.'s} and 
17 
Independent Liberals in opposition. In 1922, the 
Conservatives left the coalition and were elected on a 
platform of "tranquility and stability'• in the face . of 
18 
growing economic distress. 
15 ~, pp. 48-49. 
16 Ibid, pp. 140, 151. 
17 Blanchard, op.cit., p. 22. 
18 Ogg, op.cit., p. 278. 
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Responsibility without power. In the 1923 
election the Labor Party increased its seats from 144 to 
191. The Conservatives secured 258 seats and the Liberals 
158. The Liberal Party supported the Laborites, giving 
Ramsay MacDonald the Prime Ministership. Measures for 
unemployment relief were defeated, however, due to lack 
of Liberal support, as were other such measures. Thus, 
the Labor Party had responsibility without power. However, 
in the field of foreign affairs, MacDonald had more 
success. The Zinoviev Letter was used by the Conserva-
tives in the 1924 election as an attempt to paint the 
Labor Party with the Red brush. Labor seats fell from 
191 in 1923 to 151 in 1924. The largest casualties in 
the Labor ranks were from the non-trade union representa-
tives. The Liberals fell from 158 to 42 and the Gonserva-
19 
tives rose from 258 to 414. The 1924 result confirmed 
the Conservatives and the Labor Party as the principal 
opponents of the future. 
ncontracting-in" A general strike in 1926 failed. 
Its immediate aftermath was the Trade Disputes and Trade 
Unions Act of 1927--a vindictive law enacted by the 
Conservatives for the purpose not only of curbing strike 
action and trade union bargaining power, but also of 
crippling the Labor Party by hitting at the main source 
19 Cole, op.eit., pp. 152-153, 161, 163, 170, 192. 
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of its funds. The Act drastically restricted the 
political activities of the trade unions. Under the 
Trade Union Act of 19131 which followed upon the 
Osborne judgment, trade unions had been authorized to 
engage in political activities, within certain limitations. 
The 11 contracting-out" procedure was now reversed and the 
unions' political funds could be raised only from members 
who positively ncontracted-in·" by signing a form express-
ing their desire to pay. The purpose of course was to 
make carelessness, lukewarmness, and inertia act against 
contributing, instead of in its favor, and thus to 
reduce the funds at the disposal of the unions for 
helping the Labor Party or for financing their own 
20 
candidates in either parliamentary or local elections. 
Political consequences. The effect of this change in 
the law was considerable. The Labor Party's affiliated 
membership fell sharply from 3,388,000 in 1926 to 
2,077,000 two years later. It speaks well for the 
efficiency of the Labor Party's organization and for the 
loyalty of the trade unions to the Labor Party that the 
affiliated membership did not fall much further. The 
passing of the 1927 Act aroused widespread resentment. 
It was felt that, even if there were a case for legislat-
ing against general strikes, it was a piece of quite 
20 Ibid, pp. 190, 193, 195; Peterson, op.cit., 
p. 647. 
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unjustifiable sharp practice to use the occasion for a 
manoeuvre designed to put the Labor Party in a financial 
21 
quandary. 
Actually, between 1927 and 1929 the Labor 
Party lost over a quarter of its total income from 
affiliation fees; and the Local Labor Parties also 
suffered heavy losses. The unions had to restrict their 
financing of candidates. The Labor Party wa:s working 
under very serious financial handicaps deliberately 
imposed on it by its political enemies, As against this, 
the resentment felt at this Act of 1927 tended to increase 
trade union support for the Labor Party, within the limits 
set upon trade union political action. The Conservatives 
in effect over-reached themselves: so far from smashing 
the Labor Party, they compelled it to strengthen itself 
22 
by building up its individual membership. 
The general election of 1929 was the first to be 
23 
fought on the basis of full voting rights for women. 
21 Cole, op.cit., p. 195; Overacker, op.cit., p. 53. 
22 Cole, op.cit., p. 195. It is interesting to note 
the remarkable similarity, in their origins, provisions, 
and consequences, between the British Trade Disputes and 
Trade Unions Act of 1927 and, 20 years later, the Labor-
Management Act (Taft-Hartley Act) of 1947 in the United 
States. This comparison will be . discussed in connection 
with the development of labor union political activity in 
the United States. 
23 Cole, op.cit., p. 217. 
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As the result of their inability to cope with the economic 
situation, the Conservatives fell from 400 to 269. The 
Liberals gained 12 seats over 1924. Labor rose from the 
depths to achieve the greatest triumph in its history to 
that time. It garnered 289 seats, only 19 short of a 
24 
majority. The Labor government which was formed with 
Liberal backing never attempted to apply a Socialist policy 
or even to deal with social reform and unemployment, 
because of the vaccilating attitude of MacDonald who hoped 
to hold office by not offending the Liberals. MacDonald 
formed a National Party coalition which, in the general 
election of 1931, resulted in a drop of Labor Party seats 
to 46 plus 6 other pro-Labor candidates. The Liberals 
25 
rose from 59 to 72 and the Conservatives had 471 seats. 
The general election of 1935 gave the Labor Party 154 
seats. The Liberals got 54 and the Conservatives 387. 
Labor victory. A coalition was formed in 1940 to 
fight the war against Hitler and the next election did not 
come until 1945, when Labor won 399 seats, the Conservatives 
202, the Liberals 25, and 14 from all other parties. This 
gave a clear majority over all other parties of 158 for 
Labor. The program on which the Labor Party won called 
for full employment at good wages, social services and 
24 Ogg, op.cit., p. 281. 
25 Cole, op.cit., p. 262. 
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insurance including a National Health Service, taxation 
on the upper income groups, control of rents and prices, 
planned government investments and erection of factories 
in depressed areas, public ownership of the Bank of England, 
increased industrial efficiency, public control of monopolies, 
priorities in scarce materials, extensive housing programs, 
aid to agriculture, and socialization of fuel, power, 
26 
inland transport, iron and steel. One of the first acts 
of the Labor government was to repeal the hated Act of 
1927 and replace it with the Trade Disputes and Trade 
Unions Act of 1946 which re-instated the 1913 provisions. 
Parliamentary elections held in October, 1951, 
returned 321 Conservatives, 294 Labor Party M.P.'s, 6 
Liberals, and 3 others. The vote was 13,948,985 for 
Labor, 12,660 1 071 for the Conservatives, 1,830,551 for 
Liberals of all kinds, 21,640 for Communists, and 177,329 
27 
for all others. A heavy concentration of Labor support 
in industrial areas with a fairly even Conservative vote 
throughout the entire nation accounts for the slight 
Conservative margin in seats, even though the Labor Party 
received more popular votes in the total vote cast. 
Thus, the Labor Party still remains the majority party 
in Great Britain. 
26 ~. pp. 310-311, 424-425, 428. 
27 1953 Information Please Almanac, p. 470 • 
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Policies of the Labor Party 
Strike and ballot. The British labor movement, 
which has twice as many labor union members in proportion 
to population as there are in the United States, has two 
great weapons. These weapons are the strike and the 
ballot. In the early days of the labor movement, it was 
natural that the ballot should be of little importance in 
accomplishing the aims of the unions. What the workers 
wanted then was a living wage, shorter hours, and better 
working conditions. The strike was the popular method 
of accomplishing these ends. But as the movement grew in 
power, the desires broadened. They wanted a transformation 
of the capitalist system into . a co-operative system. How 
should this change be accomplished? By the strike or by 
the ballot? In general, the leaders of British labor 
28 
would reply, nBy both.u 
The result has been that the British labor movement 
has developed its political activity side by side with its 
industrial activity. The history of the British labor 
movement shows that the pendulum of popularity swings back 
and forth from industrial action to political action, 
depending upon the economic situation of the country. In 
the period of frantic commercial expansion immediately 
28 Blanchard, op.cit., pp. 49, 64. 
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after the First World War, industrial action was universally 
popular. Strikes were uniformly successful because the 
employers were willing to pay higher wages to keep their 
employees at work so as to secure a competitive share of 
the profits to be had. In the great economic depression 
which later engulfed Great Britain and the Western World, 
however, strikes fell into disfavor and the pendulum swung 
29 
toward political action for a Labor Parliament. 
Co-operative Party. Hostility to co-operatives 
before and during the First World War, in the form of 
taxation which the co-operatives considered unfair, led 
the whole co-operative movement into politics. They have 
a political party of their own called the Co-operative 
Party. Almost all its aims are included in the program 
of the Labor Party and it has no real independence of its 
own, being affiliated with or absorbed by the Labor Party 
30 
in every election contest. During strikes, the Co-operative 
stores extend credit to union members and often loan money 
to unions. In the railway strike of 1919 the Co-operative 
Bank advanced over $1,450,000 to the National Union of 
Railwaymen. In this nine-day strike elaborate preparations 
were made to feed the workers' families through the 
co-operative factories, farm, and transport service in 
29 ~. pp. 65-66. 
30 ~. pp. 123-124. 
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case the strike continued to prevent the shipment of food 
on the railways. In the event of the spread of this 
strike, the transport workers agreed not to strike in the 
31 
co-operative industries. 
Labor union leadership. The process by which a 
British labor leader rises from the ranks is not unlike 
the process by which an American worker rises into power, 
with one exception. He takes an active part in the 
campaign of the Labor Party. He educates himself, by 
means of labor pamphlets, etc., and passes on his infor.ma-
tion. As an officer in the union his term of service is 
likely to be longer than in American unions. His position 
in the community is somewhat higher because in Britain 
unions are more universally recognized and respected. 
Today unions are led by responsible executives of great 
administrative ability who compare favorably with the 
industrial leaders of any nation. They do not need to 
turn elsewhere for counsel; they are quite self-sufficient 
except in statistical matters which are handled by the 
32 
union's research experts. 
Labor Party leadership. In the political field 
the national labor leaders also play a leading part. Most 
of the leaders of the Labor Party are union leaders, and 
31 ~~ p. 125. 
32 ~~ pp. 131-133. 
- 16 -
the speeches made at the Trade Union Congress are often 
practically the same speeches made by the same men who 
dominate the Labor Party conferences. The chief differ-
ence in leadership is that the intellectuals play a much 
larger part in the Labor Party. But although the balance 
of power in the Parliamentary Labor Party rests with the 
trade union officials, particularly the miners, there 
has been no fundamental clash of interests between the 
trade union leaders and the intellectuals. Teachers, 
authors, journalists, clergymen, doctors, lawyers, 
economic experts, professors and college graduates of 
many types are strong in Local Labor Parties and in the 
Labor Party delegation in Parliament. Labor seats in the 
House of Commons also include representatives of the 
Co-operative Party which, as has been observed, for all 
33 
practical purposes acts as a branch of the Labor Party. 
Difference in leadership. The reason for this 
difference in leadership in the labor unions and the 
Labor Party is obvious. The problema of politics are 
often far removed from the workshop in which the union 
leader has had his training, but they are quite familiar 
to the trained student of economics and politics from the 
university. The moment that labor entered politics, the 
union leaders found that they could not cope single handed 
33 ~~ PP• 27-28, 133-134. 
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with the strategy of the Conservative political experts. 
The Labor Party lacked able parliamentarians to combat 
the Conservative leaders. So they turned to those 
intellectuals who had 1 indeed, forced them into politics, 
to the socialists and reformers who shared their aims and 
34 
had won their confidence. 
Constitutional socialism. Only since the Labor 
Party appeared upon the scene have party creeds in Great 
Britain really differed in fundamentals. Conservatives 
and Liberals always took much the same view of the social 
order and its implications, differing mainly upon secondary 
questions of emphasis and methods. Labor injected a body 
of thought and a program of objectives which gave the 
voter a chance to say whether he wanted to perpetuate a 
more or less reformed capitalist system, or a new and 
basically different social order in its place, constitut-
35 
ional socialism. 
Significance for America 
The discerning reader will inquire not only as to 
the relevancy of the British experience with attempted 
controls over labor union political activities, which this 
writer asserts, but also as to the significance for America 
34 Ibid, pp. 27, 133-134. 
35 Ogg, op.cit., pp. 295-296. 
- 18 -
in the rise of the British Labor Party. Therefore~ 
before proceeding to a discussion of the development of 
labor union political activities in the United States, 
we will quickly examine whether it is probable, or 
possible~ that American labor will take the same road 
as British labor. The labor movements of the two 
countries have much in common. There were in 1947 over 
7,500 1 000 members in unions affiliated to the British 
Trade Union Congress~ and the total membership for all 
36 
unions was 8~714~000. There are in the American 
Federation of Labor~ the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations, the Railroad Brotherhoods, and independent 
or non-affiliated unions well over 15~000~000 members out 
of a population three times the size. 
In their structure and operations the unions of 
Great Britain and the United States are similar. Both 
include craft and industrial unions. Collective bargain-
ing~ the provision of union welfare benefits for sickness, 
unemployment and old age, and the union struggle to win 
legal status are all comparable in the two English-speaking 
countries. Yet in Great Britain the unions form the base 
37 
of the Labor Party with its 5~000,000 dues-paying members~ 
which in 1945 became the party in control of the British 
36 Mark Starr, Labour Politics in U.S.A., p. 6. 
37 Loc.cit. 
- 19 -
government; while in the United States the unions face 
restrictive legislation in the form of the Taft-Hartley 
Act which has a provision outlawing labor union political 
action. What are the differences which have brought 
about this contrast? 
Difference in unity. The obvious differences 
between Great Britain and the United States are many. 
The British labor movement has a unity which the American 
labor movement cannot obtain. It has the unity of race 
and geography. Practically all the workers are British~ 
born and bred in Great Britain~ with a common education 
and conception of life. They speak the same language~ 
read the same newspapers~ and attend the same schools. 
There is little opportunity for employers to play one 
national group against the other. There are no racial 
38 jealousies to divide the unions into quarreling factions. 
The United States increased its population from 20 
million in 1847 to over 140 million in 1947~ largely the 
result of the rapid mass immigration at the turn of the 
century. In round figures there are in the United States 
14~000~000 Negroes, 11~000,000 of Slavic descent~ 5~000 1 000 
Jews, 5 1 000 1 000 of Italian descent~ 2~000~000 Latin 
Americans~ 3701 000 American Indians, and 300 1 000 Orientals. 
""The differences between the English, Scottish, Welch, 
38 Blanchard, op.cit.~ p. 19. 
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IriSh, and Jewish elements in British Labour are 
39 
insignificant in comparison." 
Difference in area. The smallness of Great ~~~~~ -- ----
Britain is also an important factor in maintaining the 
unity of the labor movement. Employers cannot run away 
from the unions because there is no place to go. All 
the mines and factories are within a few hours' journey 
of each other. The contagion of a strike or organizing 
campaign may spread rapidly over the whole of Great 
Britain. The industrial conditions which are won in one 
40 
district are usually applicable to the other districts. 
The United States is a great continental area of 
3,000,000 square miles. The differences between Maine 
and California, between the farmers of Wisconsin and the 
cattle ranchers of Texas, are greater than those of 
widely-separated peoples of other countries. One might 
as well expect a uniform cultural and political pattern 
throughout the continent of Europe. And While the 
territorial area of the United States is nearly 55 times 
greater than that of England, its population of many 
varying racial stocks is only about three times as big. 
This means large areas are sparsely populated and the task 
of political organization is thereby made more difficult. 
39 Starr, op.cit., p. 7. 
40 Blanchard, Ibid. 
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The task is relatively easier in the East, and particularly 
in New York, because one-tenth of the total population of 
the United States lives within 100 miles of the Empire 
41 
State Building. 
Difference ~ development. Then, too, the United 
States is still in the process of settling down owing to 
the relative newness of its development. The fact that in 
1776 the thirteen colonies on the Eastern shore rebelled 
against the British Monarchy and insisted on the right to 
run their own affairs is only part of the American story. 
It took many years before the interland of the continent 
was conquered. The first transcontinental railroad line 
was finished only in 1859. It needed the mass production 
of Ford automobiles as an incentive to public road-building, 
to break up the vast land mass and to penetrate the last 
42 
frontiers of rural America. These factors, sometimes 
under-estimated, have led to sectional and other differences 
which destroy any easily understood pattern of political 
behavior. Yet it should be noted that these differences 
are being undermined by powerful business interests, 
standardized methods of production and transport and the 
mass media of communication, the newspaper, radio, 
television, and motion picture. 
41 Starr, Ibid. 
42 Loc.cit. 
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Difference ,!!! ~ of farmers. Another difference 
is the great role played by the farmers in the politics 
of the United States. Their importance cannot be overrated. 
The agrarian states are over-represented politically 
relative to their population, in the Senate and the 
Electoral College. These farmers have strong organizations 
such as the Farm Bureau Federation, the Farmers• 
Educational and Cooperative Union, the National Farm Labor 
Union (affiliated with the A.F.L.), and the Food, Tobacco, 
Agricultural, and Allied Workers Union of America which 
was organized by the c.r.o. for workers on truck farms 
and in canneries. nunlike its British counterpart, 
organized labour in the United States cannot succeed 
politically without an alliance with the farmers and farm 
43 
workers in the agricultural States." 
Difference in psychology. Another powerful force 
working against a Labor Party being established in the 
United States is the strong feeling, even among laborers, 
that there is freedom and equal opportunity to succeed 
and get to the top if one only has enough energy and luck. 
The average American citizen still thinks in the psychology 
of the "gold rush" days. He feels no need for special 
protection against the upper classes. There is no class 
struggle concept. But, in Great Britain, on the contrary, 
43 ~. p. s. 
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there is a distinct psychology of working class interests. 
The concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a 
few compelled labor to seek to correct this central wrong 
of the social order. 
Difference in conditions. Thus, the answer to 
why there is no American political party of organized 
workers and progressives as in Great Britain is rooted in 
the history and in the basic economic condition of the 
American working class. In the early United States there 
was never any landed nobility and feudal caste system, or 
any established church. Class consciousness has never 
been well developed among the mass of workers, although 
there were periods of bitter class struggle in labor 
union history and large-scale attempts to smash the labor 
unions by alternating the cruelty of strong-ar.m thugs 
with the kindness of company union welfare work. In 
Britain the hangover of caste distinctions from the 
feudal hierarchy welded labor into a group consciousness 
which is absent in the United States. 
One of the fundamental reasons why the American 
labor movement has not taken on the task of forming a 
political party aimed at changing the social order is 
the relatively high standards of living enjoyed by trade 
unionists in the United States. This high productivity 
has been due to the natural riches of the United States, 
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plus the high degree of mechanization and standardization 
of American industry. But whatever the cause, the majority 
of workers are reasonably content with the existing social 
order, seeking only its improvement. Thus, American labor 
functions against a political background which is very 
different from that obtaining in Great Britain where the 
political parties are largely instruments of definite 
social classes, specific economic groups having their own 
political expressions. In the United States, therefore, 
a political party does not stand rigidly by fixed 
principles but freely seeks votes all over the varied 
social-economic-political spectrum. 
Difference in political systems. Further, the 
American government itself is continuously under the 
influence of sectional pressure groups and that, too~ 
complicates the building up of a general class or 
community point of view. As if the natural and social 
divergencies were not enough, there are the complications 
created by a written Constitution and the rivalries among 
48 semi-independent states, each jealous of its own rights 
and each with its own Constitution, statute law, courts, 
legislative bodies, and political rulers. 
In addition, there is the peculiarly American 
concentration of interest and political activity on the 
election of a president. In Great Britain, under the 
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parliamentary system, it was possible for labor to build 
strength gradually in the Parliament, becoming a balance 
of power until victory could be achieved. In the United 
States, however, a political party without hope of 
capturing the presidency does not attract electoral 
support. This seems to be an overwhelming obstacle in 
the path of a Labor Party which would seek a gradual 
building up of congressional strength. 
These differences in unity, in area, in development, 
in the role of farmers, in psychology, in conditions, and 
in political systems combine to cause most observers to 
discount the possibility, let alone the probability, of a 
Labor Party for the United States• It seems more probable 
that the American labor unions will seek to exert their 
political influence within the existing parties, especially 
within the Democratic Party. But this discussion and any 
speculation as to the future of labor's role in American 
politics will be deferred until we have taken up the 
development of labor union political activities in the 
United States. 
Summary 
Concluding this British background, it may be 
observed that the British labor movement is the product of 
150 years of growth. Many of the issues which are today 
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vital in the American labor movement, such as na tional 
labor unity, were disposed of many years ago in Great 
Britain. When America was still predominantly an 
agricultural country Great Britain had passed through 
the first and worst stages of the Industrial Revolution. 
Step by step, workers won the right to organize, to 
strike, to political power in the state, to great 
improvements in working conditions, and a measure of 
joint control over economic life. Each of these forward 
steps taken by the British workers has been bitterly 
fought by the employing classes and has been conceded 
only when labor demonstrated its superior economic or 
44 
political power. 
In summary, then, it can be pointed out that the 
British labor unions succeeded in repealing the Osborne 
judgment in favor of ncontracting-out" only to find that 
the increased economic and political strength of the 
labor movement led to the vindictive 1927 provisions for 
"contracting-in." Although this was at first a serious 
handicap to labor's political action, it also so 
antagonized and spurred the workers that the Labor Party 
finally swept into undisputed power and repealed the 
obnoxious anti-union political restrictions, going back 
again to ''contracting-out." Thus in Great Britain today 
44 Blanchard, op.cit., p. 17. 
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the labor unions are an accepted part of the national 
economic, political, and social life to an extent as yet 
unheard of in the United States. 
United States 
Early problems 
Conspiracy. During the late years of the eighteenth 
century and most of the nineteenth century, in the absence 
of statute law concerning union activities, court cases 
were based on the common law. Following the early English 
45 
precedents, the law courts in the United States at first 
declared unions to be illegal conspiracies. Between 1806 
and 1815 unions of shoemakers were prosecuted in six court 
cases, and in four of these cases the unions were found 
guilty under the English common law doctrine of conspiracy. 
Between 1821 and 1842 there were twelve additional prose-
cutions of unions for conspiracy, five of which resulted 
46 
in convictions. The famous decision of the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court in 1842 by Chief Justice Shaw 
helped to restrict future conspiracy cases. Commonwealth 
v. Hunt, 4 Mete. 111, 45 Mass. 111, held that a union was 
indictable as a conspiracy only if the goal of the concerted 
45 Edwin Emil Witte, The Government In Labor 
Disputes, pp. 313-314. --- --
46 Richard A. Lester, Labor And Industrial 
Relations, pp. 298-299. 
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action or the means used to attain it were unlawful, and 
that a strike was legal if conducted in a peaceful manner. 
This was the beginning of a slow change to a limited 
recognition of strikes and picketing. 
Injunctions. From the Massachusetts decision in 
1842 to 1880, a total of twenty-one additional conspiracy 
cases were reported. Between 1869 and 1884, six states 
enacted laws to nulli£y the conspiracy doctrine, but 
these laws were not effective. In Pennsylvania alone, 
for example, following passage of a aeries of laws in 
1869, 1872, and 1876, legalizing unions, at least four-
teen conspiracy eases occurred in the 1880's, and it was 
in the l880 1 s that the first court injunctions were issued. 
in labor disputes. Thereafter, criminal prosecutions of 
unions under the conspiracy doctrine were practically 
47 
replaced by the labor injunction. An injunction con-
trasts advantageously with a law suit in that it can be 
obtained quickly and forestalls action by the union. It 
is a judicial command issued under the contempt power to 
prevent injuries so that damage suits are avoided. 
For many years, employers applied for and obtained 
from friendly judges injunctions which made it dangerous 
for a union to strike. The number of injunctions increased 
rapidly each decade from the 1880's until the passage of 
47 Ibid, p. 299. 
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the Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act in 1932 and 
similar state acts limiting court issuance of such 
restraining orders in labor disputes. Because most 
injunctions are issued by courts whose decisions are not 
noted in any series of official or unofficial reports, 
the exact number of injunctions in labor disputes is not 
ascertainable. Edwin Emil Witte, who has made a study of 
injunctions in labor disputes, estimates that the 
unreported oases exceed the reported oases in the ratio 
48 
of five to one. He has definite references to 508 
cases in federal courts in which injunctions were issued 
prior to May 1, 1931, at the request of employers, and 
1,364 oases in all state courts except South Carolina, 
with the great industrial states, particularly New York, 
Massachusetts, and Illinois, predominating. Of the 
grand total of 1845 labor injunctions reported, 28 were 
issued in the 1880's, 122 in the l890 1 s, 328 from 1900 to 
1909, 446 from 1910 to 1919, and 921 between January 1, 
49 
1920 and May 1, 1930. 
Political consequences. The direct result of 
this experience with labor injunctions was a strong 
union reaction against the courts, believing that the 
judges had allied themselves with the embloyers in a 
48 Witte, op.oit., p. 84. 
49 Loc.cit. 
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partisan struggle. Labor leaders and workingmen generally 
bitterly denounced injunctions as unfair, prejudiced, and 
as a menace to labor. Certainly the anti-union injunction 
was a large factor in weakening the position of unions and 
very effective in hampering labor's self-betterment activ-
ities. Union leaders would often defy the injunction and 
face jail. Objecting to what was considered the abuse of 
injunctions in industrial disputes, organized labor sought, 
through political activity, both to obtain legislation 
curbing the power of the courts to issue injunctions in 
labor cases, and to influence the election or appointment 
50 
of judges. 
The principal attraction drawing labor into politics, 
therefore, was its resentment against the courts. Labor's 
foremost legislative demand was to secure relief from the 
injunction, and it was the consistent effort of the unions 
to elect anti-injunction legislators. Naturally, this was 
countered by the employers' associations. The National 
Association of Manufacturers, the United States Chamber of 
Commerce, and other organizations representing the employer 
point of view actively attempted to prevent anti-injunction 
and similar legislation. These employer groups often 
51 
employed coarse methods 11of the most pernicious kind" in 
50 Lester, op.cit., p. 300; Witte, op.cit., PP• 
122-123. 
51 Witte, op.cit., p. 124. 
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lobbying for their own interests~ and were equally concerned 
with labor in the selection of judges. 
For many years, organized labor in many industrial 
communities fought the re-election of injunction judges, 
and endorsed judicial candidates whom it considered friendly. 
These campaigns have grown less frequent but~ nevertheless, 
52 
one or more still occur somewhere every year. Illustrative 
of the situation which prevails in many industrial communit-
ies are the advertisements of judicial candidates with which 
the labor papers are filled before every judicial election. 
The unions of Minneapolis ran the following endorsement as 
53 
an advertisement in their labor paper in 1914: 
John R. Coan is a candidate for municipal 
judge. As a lawyer of ability he has fought 
many battles for labor. His sympathies are 
with the men who toil. With Coan acting as 
judge and jury in our municipal court there 
would be one law for the employer and the same 
law for the employee. If Coan happened to 
make a mistake it would .probably be in our 
favor. Remember John R. Goan election day and 
you will have done your part in securing justice for yourself and organized labor. 
At times, the election of judges in industrial 
centers has developed into a regular show-down fight 
between labor and employer interests~ centering upon the 
attitude of the candidates on injunctions in labor disputes. 
Of course, both aides insist that all that is desired is 
52 ~~ p. 125. 
53 Ibid, p. 126. 
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the election of "fair11 judges. Somewhat different tactics 
have been found necessary to influence the federal 
judiciary, Which is appointed. The most noteworthy 
instance of such activities was the successful fight which 
organized labor made in 1930 against the confirmation of 
Judge John T. Parker as a justice of the United States 
Supreme Court. The principal cause for the rejection of 
Judge Parker was his concurrence in a decision sustaining 
an injunction premised upon a yellow-dog contract. 
Similar efforts have been made by organized employers', 
as when they fought President Wilson's Supreme Court 
nominee, Louis D. Brandeis, who, however, unlike Parker's 
defeat, was confirmed. Also, at least four federal judges 
who have resigned while under investigation to determine 
whether they should be impeached, were charged as one of 
the points in the attempted impeachment that they were 
54 
ninjunction judges • 1' 
Naturally, the judicial reaction to the bitter 
criticisms to which they have been subjected and to the 
efforts which unions and employer associations have made 
to secure "friendly" judges, have dif'fered with the 
individual judge. Some have thereby been made blind 
partisans, incapable thereaf'ter of' impartiality. Others 
have been made af'raid of injunction cases, long delaying 
54 ~~ pp. l27-128. 
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their findings and sometimes reaching conclusions clearly 
opposite to the decisions of the highest court of the 
jurisdiction. However, an authority on injunction cases 
believes that, considering the limited understanding of 
industrial problems of the average judge, the majority of 
judges decide labor cases fairly and impartially. Most 
judges are anxious to follow strictly the decisions of the 
supreme courts. Trial reverses on appeal are usually due 
to the newness of the issue, the vagueness of this entire 
field of the law, and not because of a deliberate disregard 
55 
of the rights of either aide, corruption or prejudice. 
It still remains true, however, that labor regards 
the usual equity procedure unfair when followed in labor 
cases, and the most important aspect of the reaction of 
labor injunctions upon the courts is their weakened 
prestige. Workingmen consider the interference of courts 
in labor disputes as an act of partisanship, that labor 
is being singled out as is no other group or class, that 
injunctions deny workers their constitutional rights, that 
the courts favor the rich and powerful, and that the 
injunction is for the express purpose of destroying their 
labor unions to the end that their demands for better 
working conditions may be defeated. Edwin Emil .Witte says 
that although, of all branches of government, the courts 
55 Ibid, pp. 129-130. 
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have the strongest popular support, there is abundant 
evidence that the issuance of injunctions in labor 
disputes has done more to destroy the confidence of 
workingmen in the reputation of our judiciary for 
impartiality than any other development of recent 
56 
decades. 
Employers• associations charge that dissatisfaction 
with the courts among the rank and file has been created 
artificially by labor leaders. Mr. Witte comments that 
this may seem an adequate explanation to some, but does 
not make the distrust of the courts any less serious. 
Whether labor leaders have just grievances against labor 
injunctions, as our authority believes, or whether they 
are merely raising a smoke screen to hide their own 
misdeeds is not nearly so significant as the fact that 
their views are shared by the great mass of the organized 
workingmen, and to a very considerable extent also by the 
unorganized. Distrust of the courts by workingmen is a 
57 
fact. Thus, injunctions in labor disputes have been an 
important fact·or from the beginning of our nation's 
history in keeping alive and stimulating this feeling, 
and in fostering labor union agitation for ameliorating 
legislation. 
56 ~~ p. 131. 
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Labor parties. We have seen~ therefore, that the 
workers early used their labor union movement for polit-
ical action. Forty years before England saw the rise of 
political groups interested solely in labor representation, 
the Philadelphia Workingmen's Party was born in May~ 1828. 
The first labor party in the modern world~ in the fall 
election of that year it gained the balance of power in 
58 
the city council. In 1829 was established the New York 
City Labor Party. The first objective of the Philadelphia 
and New York labor parties was to sponsor the reversal of 
the conspiracy doctrine under which the courts had held 
unions to be unlawful organizations. Both the Philadelphia 
and New York City parties also sponsored the abolition of 
chartered monopolies, particularly in the field of banking; 
the establishment of free public education for all, passage 
of a mechanics' lien law to secure the payment of workers' 
wages; abolition of compulsory militia service, which the 
rich could avoid by paying a fine but which the poor were 
forced to perform; abolition of imprisonment for debt; 
equal taxation; a less expensive law system; all public 
officials to be elected by the people, and reduction of 
high bonds for public officials so that more workingmen 
59 
could seek office. 
58 Harry A. Millis and Royal E. Montgomery, The 
Economics of Labor, vol. III, Organized Labor, pp 29-30. 
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The Philadelphia example is best known, but in 61 
other cities workers organized independent political 
action during 1828-1834 and published about 50 weekly 
labor papers in that period, indicating considerable 
propagandist activity. New York, Albany, and Boston were 
outstanding examples. In a couple of years the unions 
had organized functioning parties in 15 states. Their 
candidates asked for the 10-hour day, free public educa-
60 
tion, restrictions on child labor and similar reforms. 
Although for a time the various labor parties were fairly 
important political forces, their immediate strength was 
soon dissipated. The labor parties were led by inexper-
ienced men whose idealism exceeded their ability as 
practical politicians. Sensing the popular appeal of 
many of the labor reforms, the older parties adopted into 
their own platforms and espoused as their own the labor 
party proposals, such as mechanics' lien laws, that 
appealed most to the wage earners. By 1831 the Philadel-
phia party had become virtually moribund, and shortly 
thereafter in New York and elsewhere the political labor 
61 
forces passed into history. 
Years of confusion. The trade unions, even though 
supporting with varying degrees of enthusiasm the independ-
60 Loe.cit. 
61 Harry A. Millis and Royal E. Montgomery, ~· 
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ent party movement, now centered their demands on labor 
gains through economic methods. But relegation of active 
politics to the background did not repudiate legislative 
lobbying, such as the campaign for suppression of the 
competition from prison-made goods. Between 1837 and 1852 
labor's attention was occupied by a utopian search for a 
better economic order, of humanitarian aspirations for 
"equality'tt and ncitizenship" arising out of depression and 
personal hardships. w. H. Sylvia strongly urged that 
workers sponsor an independent party, but George H. Evans, 
whose agitation for free land led to the Homestead Act of 
62 
1862, advocated a non-partisan policy. 
From 1852 through 1860, the workers abandoned their 
quest for the correct "ism" and concentrated on the 
economic front. The Civil War, and following, saw a 
re-emergence of political panaceas. Also arising out of 
this period were both the reform-minded Knights of Labor 
and the strict trade unions, forerunners of the craft-
conscious American Federation of Labor. Certainly 
indecision as to the political strategy for organized 
labor was the order of the day. But by 1890, the argument 
was settled, ·"after seventy-five years of oscillation 
between ••• job control and uplift of the masses,n the 
workers had chosen, not to deny a common labor cause, but 
62 Ibid, PP• 29-75. 
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to assert that the best instrument to promote labor 
63 
interests was the craft union. 
"Non-Partisan" Politics 
Gompers' policy. When Samuel Gompers came to the 
fore and successfully built up the American Federation of 
Labor in the 1880's, he told union members to stay clear 
of partisanship, but to 11reward your friends and punish 
your enemies. tt While trying to avoid party politics, the 
A.F.L. found it necessary to protect the interests of the 
workers in state and federal legislation. In 1895 the 
A.F.L. had a oommittee stationed in Washington during the 
session of Congress, in 1900 futilely sought legislation 
against the labor dispute injunction, and the convention 
of 1902 instructed the Legislative Committee to prepare 
labor bills, especially on oriental immigration, government 
by injunction, the eight-hour work day, and child labor. 
The bills were to be submitted to the state federations, 
which were to support only those candidates endorsing these 
labor bills. But the influence of the National Association 
of Manufacturers was strong enough to nullify labor's 
efforts, and in 1904 the N.A.M. contributed to the defeat 
64 
of pro-labor legislators. 
63 Loc.cit. 
64 John R. Commons and Associates, History of Labor 
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Labor 1 s Bill of Grievances. On March 24, 1906, 
the A.F.L. Executive Council and representatives of 118 
international unions met in Washington and drew up a 
statement of legislative demands styled "Labor's Bill of 
Grievances., which called for an adequate eight-hour law, 
elimination of the competition of convict labor and from 
the increasing stream of immigration, Chinese exclusion, 
a law forbidding the towing of more than one undermanned 
and unequipped vessel, exemption from the application of 
the provisions of the anti-trust laws and from injunctions, 
the appointment of members to the House Committee on Labor 
who are sympathetic to labor, and restoration to govern-
65 
ment employees of the right of petition. This petition 
was laid before President Theodore Roosevelt and both 
66 
branches of Congress with the statement that 
Labor brings these--its grievances--to 
your attention because you are the represent-
atives responsible for legislation and for 
failure of legislation ••• Labor now appeals 
to you, and we trust it may not be in vain. 
But if perchance you may not heed us, we 
shall appeal to the conscience and the 
support of our fellow-citizens. 
Campaign o:f 1906. Congress ignored "Labor's Bill 
o:f Grievances" and, therefore, fulfilling its threat, the 
A.F.L. Executive Council decided to enter the congress-
ional campaign of 1906, and of later years, to help bring 
65 Ibid, pp. 152-153. 
66 Howard R. Penniman, Sait 1 s American Parties ~ 
Elections, p. 139. 
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about the defeat of its enemies. Although it was the 
policy of the A.F.L. to support friends and punish 
enemies, this was seldom done effectively without 
co-ordinated activity. The elections of 1906 therefore 
marked a real change in that the Executive Council now 
urged central bodies and local unions to elect delegates 
to conferences or conventions to formulate plans to 
nstand by our friends and administer a stinging rebuke 
to men or parties who are either indifferent, negligent 
or hostileu to labor's demands. More important was the 
instruction that wherever both parties ignored labor, to 
nsecure the election of intelligent, honest, earnest 
trade unionists, with unblemished, paid.up union cards 
67 
in their possession" as straight labor candidates. 
A Labor Representation Committee made up of Samuel 
Gompers, Frank Morrison, and James O'Connell, was elected 
to direct the campaign, and an appeal was made for funds 
to elect legislators favorable to labor regardless of 
party. The committee was to scrutinize the attitude of 
all candidates for nomination on all issues that affect 
labor and instruct local campaign committees to have 
trade unionists take part in the primaries of both parties 
and in the general election. The task of the local 
committee is to inform the public on the labor issues in 
67 Ibid, p • . 139; John R. Commons and Associates, 
op.cit., p:-153. 
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the campaign, to obtain the support of farmers and other 
groups for the A.F.L.-~pproved candidates, and to collect 
funds. During the campaign statements are issued and 
speeches made from time to time in behalf of or in 
68 
opposition to one or another candidate. 
Labor put its first efforts into Maine to defeat 
Congressman Littlefield who was on the payroll of the 
National Association of Manufacturers. Although the 
Republicans spent money lavishly on behalf of Littlefield 
and rushed half a dozen of their leading spellbinders to 
salvage his election1 Gompers and a large number of other 
union speakers had enough effect to cut Littlefield's 
margin from 5449 to 1362. Labor carried on its political 
activities in other districts and reduced the pluralities 
of its chief opponents. Spending $8225.94 during the 
campaign1 the A.F.L. elected six trade unionists to 
69 
Congress. 
Campaign of 1908. Having once become involved in 
politics 1 the A.F.L. found it impossible to keep clear of 
partisanship. In 1908 A.F.L. President Gompers submitted 
the demands of labor to the national conventions of the 
major parties. Being rejected by the Republicans and 
accepted by the Democrats 1 Gompers asked labor support 
68 John R. Commons and Associates, ~; Penniman, 
op.cit. 1 pp. 139-140. 
69 John R. Commons and Associates 1 op.cit. 1 pp. 
153-154. 
- 42 -
for the better party platform as a matter not of political 
partisanship but of principle. A test of strength between 
the A.F.L. and the National Association of Manufacturers 
occurred in Wisconsin in 1908. Congressman John J. 
Jenkins, as chairman of the Judiciary Committee to which 
all bills pertaining to injunctions were referred, had 
been very helpful to the N.A.M. The victory went to labor 
and to its ally Senator Robert M. LaFollette Sr. Also in 
1908, ten trade union members were elected to the House, 
and the A.F.L. also helped to reduce the Republican 
70 
majority in Congress. 
Campaign ££ 1910. Following the 1908 election, the 
A.F.L. sought the enactment of an anti-injunction bill. 
This failing, the A.F.L. Executive Council led by Gompers 
appeared before both the Democratic and Republican Reso-
lution Committees to request their endorsement of the 
following planks for the party platforms: recognition of 
the right of labor to organize; prohibition by law of the 
issuance of injunctions in labor disputes, when such 
injunction would not apply if no labor dispute existed, 
and in cases where there already existed a remedy through 
the ordinary processes of law; trial by jury in contempt 
cases when not COnlli1itted in the presence of the court; a 
pledge to extend the eight-hour day to all public work, 
70 Penniman, op.cit., pp. 139-140; John R. 
Commons and Associates, op.cit., pp. 156-158. 
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whether the laborers were employed directly or by 
contractors; an employers• liability law; an amendment 
to the United States Constitution granting woman suffrage; 
and the creation of a department of labor, and a bureau 
71 
of mines. 
As in 1908, the Republicans rejected all of the 
demands of organized labor Whereas the Democratic Party 
incorporated all of these demands in their platform. 
In the campaign of 1910, the A.F.L. succeeded in electing 
fifteen members of trade unions to Congress, including 
eleven Democrats, three Republicans, and one Socialist. 
William B. Wilson, for.mer secretary-treasurer of the 
United Mine Workers, was appointed chairman of the House 
Labor Committee. At the approach of the 1912 election, 
the A.F.L. again submitted its proposals to the leading 
political parties. Again, the Republicans rebuffed the 
A.F.L. and again the Democrats accepted labor's program. 
72 
Campaign 2£ 1912. The campaign of 1912, resulting 
in the election of President Woodrow Wilson and a Demo-
cratic Congress, was hailed as a great victory for labor. 
The National Association of Manufacturers had lost most 
of its influence on Congress and immediately labor's views 
found acceptance in the successful opposition to the 
71 John R. Commons and Associates, op.cit., p. 157. 
72 ~. pp. 158-159. 
- 44 -
so-called "scientific managementu methods for government 
arsenals. Labor•s opposition to these methods was based 
on pride in craftsmanship, the principle of seniority and 
group relationships rather than only on personal efficiency 
and individualism, the fear of speed-ups and unemployment. 
In 1912 a Special House Committee to investigate these 
methods reported favorably to the union•s stand. Labor's 
influence was also evident in the authorization by 
Congress of the United States Commission on Industrial 
Relations to investigate labor unrest which reported that 
trade unionism should be fostered as the paramount 
73 
remedy for the industrial ills of the country. 
Anti-Trust revisions. Although a number of its 
affiliated organizations from time to time have sponsored 
political parties and occasionally have gone so far as to 
advocate a separate labor party, it should be remembered 
that the A.F.L.'s general policy of rewarding friends and 
punishing enemies did not as a rule extend to a formal 
endorsement of presidential candidates. But there have 
been a few occasions when the A.F.L. has broken this 
policy. As has been mentioned, Samuel Gompers himself 
actively participated in the Democratic Party campaign in 
1908 after he was repulsed by the Republicans in his 
efforts to obtain relief from the courts' use of injunctions 
73 Ibid, pp. 158-159, 164. 
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in labor disputes under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. This 
Act, passed in 1890, was applied to labor organizations 
and some of the most important cases in this country under 
the federal anti-trust laws have been prosecutions against 
unions for being combinations in restraint of interstate 
74 
commerce. 
Probably the decision of the United States Supreme 
Court in the case of Loewe v. Lawler, 208 u.s. 274, 28 
s.ct. 301 {1908), is the most celebrated example giving 
75 
rise to the great union alarm over damage suits. The 
union was sued by a Danbury hat manufacturer on alleged 
conspiracy to prevent the manufacturer from selling his 
products in interstate commerce. The hatters union had 
instituted a nation-wide boycott against this manufacturer's 
hats in support of the strike at Danbury. Inasmuch as 
there was no interference with the transportation of the 
hats, the union felt it had not violated the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act. But in 1908 the union was found guilty, in 1912 
a jury awarded a verdict of ~250 1 000, and in 1915 the 
76 
Supreme Court sustained the award of damages. The 
consternation that these cases caused in labor circles led 
to a campaign by organized labor to obtain relief from the 
74 Lester, op.cit., p. 301. 
75 For other decisions in this case, see 148 Fed. 924 
(1907); 187 Fed. 552 (1911); 223 u.s. 721 (1912); 209 Fed. 
72 (1913); 235 u.s. 522, 35 s.ct. 170 (1915). 
76 Loewe v. Lawler, 235 U.S. 522, 35 S.Ct. 170 (1915). 
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Sherman Act. 
The Clayton Act of 1914 and nine state laws pattern-
ed after it were designed to remedy abuses in the issuance 
77 
of injunctions in labor cases. The Clayton Act, declaring 
that the labor of a human being is not a commodity or 
article of commerce, specified that labor organizations 
were not to be construed as illegal combinations or 
conspiracies in restraint of trade under federal anti-trust 
laws. It also limited the effectiveness of injunctions in 
labor disputes by prohibiting certain activities from being 
enjoinable. But, although these laws were thought to have 
excluded unions from the anti-trust laws, in three cases in 
the 20's the United States Supreme Court upheld continued 
application of the federal anti-trust laws to labor 
disputes. The Supreme Court construed the Clayton Act 
narrowly, restricting ita benefits to those immediately 
involved in the diaput·e. Thus, in Duplex Printing Press 
Company v. Deering, 254 u.s. 443 (1921), secondary boycotts 
were forbidden. 
The Loewe v. Lawler case has often been regarded as 
a parallel to the English decision of Taff Vale Ry v. 
78 
Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, (1901) A.D. 426, 
in which it was ruled that a labor union could be sued for 
77 John R. Commons and Associates, op.cit., pp. 164-165. 
78 Witte, op.cit., p. 134. 
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damages caused by its officers and agents. This decision 
was overruled by the British Trades' Disputes Act in 1906. 
In the Danbury case the union was sued through its indiv-
idual members and not against the union as an entity. But 
in United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 u.s. 344, 
42 S.Ct. 570 (1922), the Supreme Court held that a labor 
union could be sued as an entity, and in United Mine 
Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 268 U.S. 295, 45 s.ct. 551 
(1925), later upheld an appeal that facts warranted a 
finding of guilt. Thus, subsequent court interpretation 
of these acts, which had been thought to relieve labor of 
injunction abuses, robbed them of any real effectiveness. 
Farmer-labor parties. Plagued by court injunctions 
in labor disputes which cost the unions hundreds of 
thousands of dollars in damages and sent union leaders to 
jail, the A.F.L. felt compelled to maintain an increased 
level of political activity in seeking to reverse these 
79 
decisions. In the states, labor enjoyed some success 
through outstanding co-operation with farmers in the 
Nonpartisan League. This political organization was 
founded in 1915 in North nakota by a group of socialists, 
political independents, farmers, the Agricultural Workers' 
Union of the Industrial Workers of the World (I.w. w.), and 
the United Mine Workers of America. In Minnesota the 
79 John R. Commons and Associates, op.cit., pp. 
154-156. 
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Nonpartisan League was endorsed by the Minnesota State 
Federation of Labor in 1917, and nominated many pro-labor 
candidates in the 1918 Republican primary. A farmer-
labor-independent ticket in Minnesota became the second 
party, polling almost half the votes for governor, 
electing fifteen members of the state senate and thirty-
80 
six lower house representatives. 
As a result, on the advice of their president, the 
delegates to the convention of the Minnesota State Federa-
tion of Labor met on July 19, 1919, as a political confer-
ence and organized the Working People's Nonpartisan polit-
ical League. Its revenue was to come from a per capita 
tax of twenty-five cents a year from each supporting union, 
and the members of the governing committee were forbidden 
to belong to any other political party. This eagerness 
of the Minnesota State Federation of Labor to set up a 
political mechanism was a manifestation of a widespread 
tendency in the latter part of 1918. The Chicago Federa-
tion of Labor organized the Labor Party of Cook County on 
January 4, 1919, which was endorsed by the Illinois State 
Federation of Labor. Later in the year at a conference 
of delegates of local unions was launched the Labor Party 
81 
of Illinois. 
80 Ibid, PP• 525-526. 
81 Ibid, p. 527. 
- 49 -
Following an overwhelming vote of the state locals 
on the question of a labor party, 400 delegates of the 
Indiana State Federation of Labor organized the Indiana 
Labor Party. State labor parties were also organized in 
Michigan, New York, Utah, and Pennsylvania. In August, 
1919, the Chicago and Illinois State Federations of Labor 
and the two labor parties of their creation, inviting 
fraternal delegates from the Nonpartisan League and the 
Committee of 48, a group of middle class liberals, convoked 
a conference to start a national labor party. .Diatrict 12 
of the United Mine Workers in Illinois also endorsed 
independent political action, and a national conference of 
over 1000 in Chicago on November 22, 1919, produced the 
82 
American Labor Party. 
'rhe national nominating convention of the American 
Labor Party met in Chicago on July 11, 1920. Of the 500 
labor delegates, two-thirds were from Illinois and Indiana. 
Of the three principal leaders, one was an old trade union 
socialist, and one was the president of the Illinois 
Federation of Labor. Although there were hardly any 
representatives of farmer organizations present, the party 
was renamed the Farmer-Labor Party to gain farmer votes. 
A national campaign was made and the ticket polled about 
300,000 votes, running considerably ahead of the Democrats 
82 Ibid, pp. 527-528. 
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but second to the Republicans in Washington and South 
Dakota. After the 1920 election, the trend towards 
independent political action continued strong in the 
labor movement, especially in the city centrals and state 
federations. The 1921 convention of the United Mine 
83 
Workers endorsed the idea of a national Farmer-Labor Party. 
In 1922 the Nonpartisan League of Minnesota decided 
to unite the strength which the farmer-labor political 
movement had in two separate parties by launching a third 
party, and the 1922 election was the first major victory 
of a straight third party ticket since the days of Populism. 
The Farmer-Labor Party elected a United States Senator, a 
governor, secured control of the state senate, greatly 
increased its representation in the lower house, and elected 
a second United States Senator in 1923. The Farmer-Labor 
Party held a convention in 1922 which instructed its officers 
to take steps toward a national Farmer-Labor Party. Accord-
ingly, invitations went out to labor, farm, and progressive 
organizations to hold a joint political conference in 
Chicago. However, the communists set out to "capturett the 
new party by packing the convention with delegates from 
every conceivable communist-controlled group. Finding 
themselves outvoted, the genuine Farmer-Labor Party delegates 
84 
withdrew, leaving the communists with an empty victory. 
83 1£!£, pp. ~28-529. 
84 Ibid, pp. 529-530. 
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Campaign of 1924. The united front in the Middle 
West between labor and the farmers which resulted in 
victories for the Populist, Farmer-Labor, and Progressive 
parties had not been joined by the international unions, 
although, as we have seen, a number of A.F.L. state federa-
tiona had identified themselves with the Farmer-Labor Party 
successes in a number of state and local elections. Other 
unions had made contributions to the Socialist Party. But 
in February of 1922 delegates from fifty of the more 
politically conscious of the international unions formed 
the Conference for Progressive Political Action. The 
railway unions were in the forefront joined by the garment 
and other unions. Also included were representatives from 
the Socialist Party, the Church League for Industrial Demo-
cracy, the National Catholic Welfare Council, the Methodist 
Federation of Social Service, the Farmers' Union, the 
Nonpartisan League, the Single Taxers, farm and labor 
organizations, co-operative societies, liberal political 
organizations, and other sympathetic groups and assorted 
85 
progressives. 
The Conference for Progressive Political Action 
chose a representative national committee of fifteen to 
co-ordinate activities. Leaders of the railroad brother-
hoods, United Mine Workers, Socialist Party, National 
85 Ibid, PP• 531-532. 
- 52 -
Far.mers• Council, the People's Legislative Service, and 
others on this national committee were to secure support 
for progressive major party candidates and where there 
was no real choice, to support Socialist or Farmer-Labor 
candidates Who had a chance to win. Any final decision 
on a third party was to be postponed until the major 
86 
parties had held their nominating conventions. 
The Conference drew up a legislative program which 
included repeal of the Each-Cummins law, direct election 
of the President and Vice-President, endorsement of the 
Norris-Sinclair producers• financing bill designed to 
increase the value of farm products, increased taxation 
of large incomes and inheritances, the payment of a 
soldiers' bonus by an excess profits tax, women's protective 
labor legislation, federal regulation of child labor, 
amnesty for political prisoners, safeguarding of civil 
liberties, government regulation of the coal industry, 
denunciation of the labor injunction, opposition to 
financial imperialism, and a declaration that the power 
of the courts to hold laws unconstitutional was a usurpation. 
Because of Democratic pledges against the labor 
injunction, long-time A.F.L. president Samuel Gompers had 
supported the Democratic Party, although less actively, in 
86 Ibid, pp. 532-533. 
87 Loc.cit. 
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the 1912, 1916, and 1920 presidential elections, and the 
A.F.L. seemed to be drifting to the Democratic Party. 
But in 1924, with the nomination of Calvin Coolidge by the 
Republicans a foregone conclusion, and with the adoption 
of both a conservative platform and a conservative 
candidate, John W. Davis, by the Democrats, A.F.L. support 
of an independent third ticket, even if only as a protest, 
became inevitable. The candidate was Wisconsin's famous 
United States Senator Robert M. LaFollette Sr., labor's 
best friend in Congress. Repudiating the communists who 
offered him the doubtful gift of their endorsement, 
88 
LaFollette invited progressives to follow his leadership. 
On July 4, 1924, the Progressive convention met at 
Cleveland, nominated LaFollette for President, accepted 
LaFollette's platform, and selected LaFollette's choice 
for Vice-President, United States Senator Burton K. Wheeler, 
Democrat of Montana. LaFollette's independent candidacy 
was endorsed by the convention of the Socialist Party. 
Largely influenced by the court rulings adverse to labor 
in regard to the Clayton Act, the A.F.L. Executive Council 
and Samuel Gompers personally endorsed LaFollette on the 
Progressive Party and Socialist Party tickets, but without 
committing the A.F.L. to either a third party as a permanent 
policy or with the views of the Socialists. LaFollette 
88 John R. Commons and Associates, op.cit., pp. 
532-534; Penniman, op.cit., p. 140. 
- 54 -
also received the official and unqualified support of the 
Railroad Brotherhoods, the Seamen's Union, and a number of 
others, many of whom contributed to the National Progressive 
Committee. On the whole, the unions supported the new 
89 
party. 
On no other occasion had labor support been pledged 
so definitely as to LaFollette in 1924. Although the 
number of congressmen elected with A.F.L. endorsement in 
1924 was 170, leaders of the railway unions and the A.F.L., 
measuring the outcome from the standpoint of its immediate 
accomplishment regarding employment conditions and the 
labor injunction, were disappointed. Compared with the 
almost 16,000,600 votes for Coolidge and the more than 
8,000,000 cast for Davis, LaFollette received slightly 
less than 5,000,000 votes, largely in the cities, and 
carried Cleveland, Ohio. Only in his own state, which he 
carried, and in North Dakota, did he draw heavily from the 
farmers. Gompers found solace in the thought that the 
votes cast for the independent ticket would teach the old 
90 
parties a salutary lesson. As a matter of fact, on the 
percentage of votes cast, compared with 1948, on the same 
ratio LaFollette would have received 10,000,000 votes. I 
89 John R. Commons and Associates, oy.cit., pp. 
534-536; Louise Overacker, Labor's Politica Contributions, 
54 Political Science Quarterly 56-68; Penniman, Ibid. 
90 John R. Commons and Associates, op.cit., p. ·537; 
Penniman, op.cit., pp. 139-140. 
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make this comparison because if the Progressive candidacy 
of Henry A. Wallace in 1948, which was maligned as much 
as LaFollette's in 1924, had received anywhere near 
10,000,000 it would have been regarded as a tremendous 
achievement. 
At its meeting of February, 1925, the Conference 
for Progressive Political Action decided to liquidate the 
movement. The unions, including the railroad brotherhoods, 
were opposed to a third party, and the only third party 
survivors after 1924 were the LaFollette Progressive Party 
adherents in Wisconsin, and the Minnesota Farmer-Labor 
Party which was successfully maintained on its reliable 
rural support, the skill of the labor politicians, and 
the virtual disappearance of the state's Democratic Party. 
It elected Floyd Olson as governor in 1930 and in 1932. 
Although the outcome of the 1924 election brought the 
A.F.L. back to its earlier policies, insofar as financial 
political backing was concerned it had never departed much 
from Gompers' advice. From 1906-1925 the A.F.L. had raised 
and expended for political purposes only a little over 
$95,000 from general treasury funds, made no contributions 
to candidates or parties whatsoever, and the A.F.L. Execu-
tive Council resisted strong pressure for the endorsement 
91 
of Alfred E. Smith, 1928 Democratic presidential nominee. 
91 John R. Commons and Associates, Ibid; Penniman, 
op.cit., p. 140; Louise Overacker, Labor•s-pQlitical 
Contributions, 54. Political Science Quarterly 56-68. 
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Legislation. The conservative nnon-political" 
philosophy of Samuel Gompers, and his distrust of state 
intervention which still endures among the older A.F.L. 
unions and their leaders even though Gompers died in 
1924, was due largely to the feeling that the A.F.L. had 
all it could do to build the union against business and 
political opposition without trying to build a political 
party at the same time. The specific exclusion of party 
politics from A.F.L. conventions in Article III, Section 
92 
9 1 of the A.F.L. Constitution was an attempt to prevent 
the internal contention which helped destroy the Knights 
of Labor. After all, the attitude of "hands offn to the 
government was in the American tradition. However, even 
in the early days, neither the A.F.L. nor Gompers person-
ally were permitted by circumstances to be completely 
consistent with their non-partisan policy of "rewarding 
your friends and punishing your enemies. u From the first 
to the most recent A.F.L. convention political demands, 
requests for government action, and the misdeeds and 
virtues of individual politicians have been prominent on 
92 This is in contrast to the Congress of Indust-
rial Organizations. Article 2 of the C.I.O. Constitution 
outlines the objects of the national organization, includ-
ing "To secure legislation safeguarding the economic 
security and social welfare of the workers of America, to 
protect and extend our democratic institutions and civil 
rights and liberties, and thus to perpetuate the cherished 
traditions of our democracy." Leo Huberman, The Truth 
About Unions, pp. 35-36. ---
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the agenda. That also applies to the activities of state 
93 
federations and city central labor unions. 
In the 23 years between 1909 and 1931, the A.F.L. 
defeated 115 proposed laws that were unfavorable to labor, 
and by 1931 state legislatures had passed 489 laws 
94 
proposed by labor. Although states had begun in the 
1840's to enact child-labor laws and legislation limiting 
the hours of work for women, much of that early legisla-
tion was limited in applicability or failed to provide 
for effective enforcement. Likewise, many of the measures 
favorable to labor between 1909 and 1931 were not too 
important or effective or both. Gradually, however, 
loopholes were closed and enforcement made effective. 
Big advances in protective labor legislation were made in 
1907 to 1917 when most states enacted their first 
hours-of-work laws for women, and state minimum-wage 
legislation for women was enacted by twelve states during 
the years 1912 to 1917. Congress enacted "workmen's 
compensation" laws in 1908 providing for compensation for 
accidents sustained while on the job in federal employment 
95 
and from 1910 to 1915, 30 states had also so provided. 
Major political advances for labor came with the 
93 Florence Peterson, Survey of Labor Economics, 
pp. 495-497; Starr, op.cit., pp. 9-li; l4. 
94 Starr, op.cit., p. 19. 
95 Lester, op.cit., p. 305. 
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1912 Lloyd-LaFollette Act granting public employees the 
right of lobbying and affiliating with labor organizations, 
the creation of the United States Department of Labor in 
1913, the prohibition in government arsenals and naval 
establishments of the so-called "~~scientific management'' 
systems, the government report of 1914 favoring unionism 
and collective bargaining for improved industrial relations, 
the LaFollette Seamen's Act of 1915, the passage by 
Congress in 1916 of the Adamson Act to avert a threatened 
railroad strike by providing for an 8-hour day for train 
operatives, and the Norris-LaGuardia anti-yellow dog 
96 
contract and anti-injunction law of 1932. 
The LaFollette Seamen's Act of 1915 for improving 
the working conditions of marine transportation employees 
was a revolutionary change in the legal status of seamen. 
Evidence of the very strong permeation of Congress by 
labor's influence, the reform abolished imprisonment for 
desertion in a safe harbor, granted seamen the right to 
demand half of the wages earned and unpaid in ports of 
loading and unloading cargo, raised the standard of living 
and food allowance, decreed the nine-hour day while in 
port, protected seamen's wages from allotment to original 
creditors, and made the owner as well as the master liable 
for failure of officers to appear for trial when charged 
96 Loc.cit.; Starr, Ibid.; John R. Commons And 
Associates, op.cit., p. 160:---
- 59 -
with inflicting corporal punishment on the crew members. 
In cases of foreign vessels no deserting seaman could be 
arrested and returned to his job. The legislation also 
included regulations that were at the same time safety 
measures, job protection for skilled seamen, and devices 
to minimize oriental competition. Further, the Act pro-
97 
vided for greater passenger safety in ease of shipwreck. 
Prior to the 1932 Norris-LaGuardia Act, between 1870 
and 1925, at least twenty state legislatures adopted laws 
restricting union activities, including boycotts and peace-
ful picketing. But in the same period thirty-three states 
limited the issuance of injunctions in labor disputes, 
exempted unions from state anti-trust laws, legalized 
picketing, outlawed yellow-dog contracts (or made them 
unenforceable in state courts), and forbade employer black-
listing of workers. Unfortunately, these early state laws 
favorable to labor were largely ineffective because of 
either being declared unconstitutional or made innocuous by 
court interpretation. .Except for the Wilson World War I 
period, prior to 1933 executive intervention in labor 
disputes by the use of the injunction, as in the great 
railroad strikes of 1877 and 1894, generally operated to 
the benefit of management. It has been observed that 
the factors influencing the development of labor legislation 
97 John R. Commons And Associates; op.cit., pp. 
160-163. 
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in this country have been the attitude of the courts, 
the philosophy of organized labor, executive leadership 
98 
in government, economic conditions, and public opinion. 
The New Deal Era 
~ legislation. The depression following 1929 
gave a new impetus to labor legislation, ana seven states 
enacted new minimum wage laws in 1933, ana following a 
1936 Supreme Court decision validating a State of Washing-
ton minimum wage law, a new wave of such legislation 
99 
occurred. The 1932 Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction 
Act, which also outlawed the yellow-dog contract, severely 
limited the granting of labor injunctions by the federal 
courts and in the 1930's some 16 states also enacted anti-
injunction laws of the Norris-LaGuardia type, curbing the 
power of state courts to issue injunctions in labor dis-
100 
putes, or to hamper lawful union activities. In the 
1940's the Supreme Court reversed its earlier decisions 
under the Sherman and Clayton Acta ana granted labor unions 
wide immunity from the anti-trust laws by reasoning that 
the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts taken together showed 
101 
a Congressional intent to legalize labor union conduct. 
98 Lester, op.cit., pp. 300-305. 
99 Loc.cit. 
100 Loc.cit. 
101 Loc.cit. 
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National Industrial Recovery Act. During the 
first two administrations of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 
organized labor expanded greatly in numerical strength 
and political influence. Public opinion supported 
government intervention to improve economic conditions, 
and labor seized the opportunity to obtain favored 
legislation. In 1933 the National Industrial Recovery 
Act's famous Section 7(a) declared that it was desirable 
for workers to have 11the right to organize and bargain 
collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing," "free from the interference, restraint or 
coercion of employers of labor or their agents, 11 and that 
no worker nshall be required as a condition of employment 
102 
to join any company union or to refrain from joining, 
organizing, or assisting a labor organization of his own 
103 
choosing." 
National Labor Relations Act. When the N.I.R.A. 
was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, 
Section 7(a) was incorporated into the National Labor 
Relations Act of 1935, popularly known as the Wagner Act. 
Hostile toward much New Deal legislation prior to F.D.R.'s 
102 This provision was in opposition to the strong 
employer company union movement known as the "American 
Plan.u A company union is a union which is under the 
control, domination, or influence of the employer so that 
the union leadership is not wholly free to act independ-
ently for the exclusive benefit of the union membership. 
103 Lester, op.cit., p. 306; Starr, op.cit., pp. 
32-33. 
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court reorganization proposal in 19361 thereafter the 
Supreme Court became more liberal in ita interpretation 
of the Constitution, as we have already seen in the case 
of minimum wage laws and the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Thus, 
although employers generally had refused to comply with 
the Wagner Act, relying on legal opinion that it was 
unconstitutional, in April of 1937 the Supreme Court upheld 
the new labor legislation. The federal law was followed 
and complemented for intrastate commerce by a number of 
state ulittle Wagner Actsu modeled more or less after the 
Wagner Act. These states included New York, Massachusetts, 
Pennsylvania, Utah, Wisconsin, Rhode Island, and Connecticut. 
Under the Wagner Act, the rise in business activity, 
and the psychology of hope created by the New Deal, the 
unions more than quadrupled their strength. In addition to 
explicitly outlawing company unions and guaranteeing to 
workers the right to organization and collective bargaining, 
the Wagner Act established a number of employer "uni'air 
labor practices" which prevented employers from discriminat-
ing against a union member in hiring, firing, or promotions. 
No longer could employers use their economic power and 
104 This proposal was that for every Supreme Court 
Justice who did not retire upon reaching the age of 70 1 the 
President could appoint an additional Justice, but in no 
event could the Supreme Court exceed 15 Justices. This 
so-called 11 court-packingu plan did not pass Congress, but 
apparently -did have some effect upon the Court. 
105 Lester, op.cit., pp. 306-307, 309; Starr, Ibid. 
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influence to interfere with the workers' right to organize 
and operate unions. Any union concerned had the right to 
call in the National Labor Relations Board to hold an 
official election to decide which, if any, union the 
employees desired to represent them and which the employer 
must recognize and bargain with in good faith. This legal 
status which the New Deal gave to collective bargaining 
was instrmnental in union membership soaring to unprece-
dented heights. 
It was also the New Deal which used the power of 
the federal government in bold constructive ways. It was 
the federal government which set up relief agencies and 
created jobs when the large corporations closed their doors, 
and private enterprise failed to overcome the depression. 
These changing economic and political circumstances altered 
the traditional A.F.L. attitude toward government interven-
tion in industrial relations. Notably since 1933 the A.F.L. 
has gotten away from the imprint of Samuel Gompers and is 
coming to take a different view of government as an agency 
for social betterment. Consequently the A.F.L. has been in 
the process of changing its mind in favor of greatly 
increased participation of unions in political activity, 
both to protect their own legal status and to obtain 
improvements for the workers such as higher minimum wages 
and social security at state and federal levels. 
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CamEaign 2£ ~· But this has been a very slow 
process indeed. Thus, in spite of the heartening political 
development in Great Britain of the youthful Labor Party, 
the spontaneous movements in various parts of the country 
by organized labor for its own party, Which seemed to 
indicate that the time was ripe for action on a national 
scale, and the insistent urging of the formation of a labor 
party, more than at any convention in the past, the 1935 
A.F.L. Convention refused to even instruct the A.F.L. 
Executive Committee to "study the subject of independent 
political action." Even in 1936, when Roosevelt was 
favored by an overwhelming sentiment among organized 
workers, the policy of nonpartisanship was not abandoned 
106 
formally. The attitude of the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations, which arose out of the A.F.L. as the 
Committee for Industrial Organization, has been more alert 
and positive toward political action than that of the A.F.L. 
because it was the favorable climate of the New Deal which 
made possible its own birth and rapid growth. 
Convinced that vigorous political activity is 
necessary if labor is to retain and increase its economic 
gains, in 1936 various C.I.O. unions led by John L. Lewis 
and joined by several A.F.L. unions founded Labor's Non-
Partisan League with the specific purpose of campaigning 
106 Penniman, OE.cit., pp. 140-141. 
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for the re-election of the New Deal administration. 
Individual labor unions contributed $7701 218 1 all of which 
went to the Democrats and affiliated parties such as the 
New York American Labor Party. Founded in 1936 by active 
unions supporting President Roosevelt, and patterned after 
the British Labor Party, the A.L.P.'s strength was largely 
confined to the City of New York. Himself previously a 
prominent Republican, John L. Lewis gave Labor's Non-
Partisan League $500,000 from the treasury of the United 
Mine Workers and retained it largely under his control. 
108 
The clothing workers unions contributed $1501 000. 
Rise and fall of the A.L.P. In 19371 the American 
Labor Party elected five members to the New York City 
Council, five New York State Assemblymen, and a number of 
public officials have been elected as Democrats or 
Republicans with the endorsement of the A.L.P. which 
contributed 35% of the total vote which elected Mayor 
LaGuardia. In 1937 it gave Mayor LaGuardia 4821 790 votes 
and 434,297 votes in 1941. Its statewide vote in 1944 
109 
constituted about 8% of the total. Vito Marcantonio in 
1946, and Leo Isaacson in a 1948 by-election, were elected 
as A.L.P. Congressmen from Harlem and the Bronx in New York 
107 Penniman, op.cit., p. 141; Peterson, op.cit., 
pp. 495-497. 
108 Penniman, Ibid; Starr, op.cit., p. 16; Louise 
Overacker, Labor's Political Contributions, 54 Political 
.Science Quarterly 56-68. 
109 Penniman, Ibid. 
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City, and one A.L.P. Assemblyman was elected to the New 
York legislature. The national elections of 1948 saw 
the A.L.P. 1 s high point, with over 500,000 votes for the 
Progressive Party presidential candidacy of Henry A. 
110 
Wallace. In 1944, the president of the International 
Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, David Dubinsky, had 
established the Liberal Party in protest to alleged 
Communist infiltration into the A.L.P. The Liberals 
polled 329,325 votes in 1944 compared with 496,405 for the 
111 
A.L.P. In 1948 there were 222,562 Liberal Party ballots. 
So far, the Liberal Party has elected some members 
of the New York City Council, made possible the victory 
of a number of major party candidates, and jointly endorsed 
with the Democrats several Congressmen from New York, 
including Democratic-Liberal United States Senator Herbert 
H. Lehman. In the 1949 New York City mayoralty fight, 
373,287 voted for the Liberal Party, and Vito Marcantonio 
received 356,626 A.L.P. endorsements. Votes cast for the 
110 Henry A. Wallace was chosen by President Roosevelt 
to serve variously from 1933 as Secretary of Agriculture, 
Vice President, and Secretary of Commerce. Upon Roosevelt's 
death in 1945 and the succession of Harry S. Truman to the 
Presidency, United States relationships with the Soviet Union 
began rapidly to deteriorate. Wallace protested that this 
mutual hostility was due largely to Truman's "get toughu 
policies. Wallace resigned from the Cabinet and the 1948 
Progressive Party was founded with the slogan "Wallace or War." 
Later, American involvement in the Korean conflict was cited 
as evidence that the Progressive slogan was not too extreme. 
111 World Almanac for 1953, pp. 69-70, 209. 
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A.L.P. in 1950 were 147,578 and for the Liberals 223,993. 
The 1952 Liberal Party vote was 357.535, whereas the 
112 
A.L.P. dropped to 63,136. The Liberal candidate for 
Mayor of New York City in 1953, Council President 
Rudolph Halley, received 400,000 ballots, and in 1954 
by the narrowest of margins Averell Harriman was elected 
Democratic-Liberal Governor of New York. The A.L.P. had 
declined to such an extent in the 1954 election as to 
receive insufficient votes to be entitled to automatic 
status as a regular political party, and must now secure 
signatures to appear on the ballot in future elections. 
Trend to Democrats. In 1938, the growing breach 
between the A.F.L. and the C.I.O. led A.F.L. President 
William Green to denounce John L. Lewis' Labor's Non-
Partisan League as 11 a ventriloquist's dummy for C.I. o. 
leaderstt and urged all A.F.L. affiliates to sever 
113 
relations with it. This did not prevent the unions 
114 
from contributing large sums in the 1940 election. 
The percentage contributed by labor, however, was still 
fairly small. Organized labor contributed only 5.1% of 
the funds of the .Democratic National Committee in 1936, 
112 Loc.cit. 
113 Penniman, op.cit., p. 142. 
114 Reynolds, op.cit., p. 122; Louise Overacker, 
Presidential Campaign Funds, pp. 16-18. 
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and 6.2% in 1940. But it should be understood that 
merely considering labor's "contributions8 as above is 
misleading. Labor's uexpenditures" cannot be computed 
as easily as labor's "contributionsu because political 
expenditures are often intangible and are inextricably 
interwoven with other non-political expenditures. Labor's 
political activity takes on new meaning when we consider 
that the Democratic Party, which has lost much of the nbig 
business 11 support (except for liquor manufacturers) which 
it had in 1928 and as late as 1932, has been the chief 
116 
recipient of labor's support. A split in the economic 
interests which had previously contributed to both parties 
leads to speculation that labor's welcome aid may cause 
117 
the Democrats to become more and more a "labor party." 
The tide begins to turn. It is clear from British 
experience that one result of labor union participation 
in the financing of political campaigns is likely to be 
agitation for the legal prohibition or regulation of such 
contributions, expenditures, and activities. In its 
report of the financing of the 1936 campaign, a Senate 
115 Section 304, Taft-Hartley Act: Validity of 
Restrictions 2£ Union Political Activity, 57 Yale Law 
Journal 806-827. 
116 Louise Overacker, Labor's Political Contribu-
tions, 54 Political Science Quarterly 56-68; Louise 
Overacker, Presidential Campaign Funds, pp. 16-18. 
117 Loc.cit. 
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committee stressed labor's role and recommended that the 
existing prohibition upon contributions from banks and 
corporations be extended to include labor union contribu-
tiona. The proposal was not pushed at that time, but 
the handwriting was on the wall: sooner or later the use 
of labor union funds for political purposes would be 
challenged. A bill to prohibit unions from contributing 
politically was unsuccessfully introduced into the New 
118 
York legislature in 1938. The impetus for direct 
political action on a national scale was strengthened 
during 1943 when widespread expressions in the daily 
press, state legislatures, and Congress aroused fears 
that the New Deal labor gains were in jeopardy. In 40 
state legislatures bills were introduced to restrict 
various practices and activities of labor unions, 
although only eleven of these bills actually became law 
119 
during the year. 
Strikes in 1943 brought about an adverse public 
opinion toward the unions. A Gallup Poll showed the 
extent of this anti-labor reaction, reporting that when 
the Smith-Connally bill to curb unions was before 
Congress, 67% of the nation was for it, only 24% against 
118 Louise Overacker, Labor's Political Contribu-
tions, 54 Political Science Quarterly 56-68, p. 63. 
119 Loc.cit. 
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it, and 9% undecided. Again, a Fortune poll covering 
tests of the Whole population gave the following results: 
7% believed that labor unions have done an excellent job 
and should be given more power; 28% believed that labor 
unions have made mistakes but they have done more good 
than harm and should be supported; 49% believed that labor 
unions have done some good in the past, but they have gone 
too far and should be curbed by law; 7% believed that 
labor unions should be abolished; and 9% expressed no 
121 
opinion. The year 1943 saw six southern and north-
western states adopt laws regulating unions, and in 
Congress bills were introduced to apply the existing 
prohibition on corporate political contributions to labor 
122 
unions. 
Smith-Connally ~· Stoppages of work by the 
United Mine Workers in 1943 helped to bring about the 
enactment, over President Roosevelt's veto, of the Smith-
Connally War Labor Disputes Act in June of that year. It 
has been observed that its passage marked the end of a 
123 
decade of federal legislation favorable to labor. 
120 Stuart Chase, Democracy Under Pressure: Special 
Interests vs The Public Welfare, p. 73. Chase comments 
this was soeven though it was 11 a thoroughly stupid act" 
121 Ibid, p. 72, Chase observes "This is a public 
reaction to throw the fear of God into any leader of labor." 
122 Lester, op.cit., p. 311. 
123 Loc.cit. 
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Among its other provisions, the Smith-Connally Act 
prevented direct contributions by labor unions to the 
campaign funds of candidates or political parties on the 
same basis as a federal law of 1907 prohibiting such 
contributions from business corporations. But these 
provisions applied to national elections only, and not 
to national primaries. Also, the law had no application 
to primary or election campaigns on a state or local 
level. Further, the Smith-Connally Act prohibition on 
national election contributions did not make illegal 
labor union political expenditures through independent 
124 
committees. 
Political Action Committee. Therefore, to 
circumvent the Smith-Connally Act ban by carrying on 
election activities directly and to assure the continua-
tion of the New Deal program, both national and 
international, the C.I.O. established a Political Action 
Committee on July 7, 1943, under the direction of the late 
president of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, Sidney 
125 
Hillman Others on the Committee were R.J. Thomas of 
the United Automobile Workers, Albert J. Fitzgerald of 
the United Electrical Workers, John Green of the 
Shipbuilders, David J. McDonald of the Steelworkers, and 
124 89 Cong.Rec. 5328 House 1943 78th Contress lst 
Session. 
125 Peterson, op.cit., pp. 495-497; Huberman, 
op.cit., p. 81. 
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126 
Vice President Van A. Bittner of the C.I.O. Hillman 
maintained that the c.r.o. was losing the gains it had 
made since the depression. There had been no construct-
ive social legislation since 1936. Labor had suffered 
setbacks in the 1942 congressional election. There 
seemed to be an effort to destroy organized labor and 
opposition to Franklin D. Roosevelt was bitter. The 
Wagner Act was under attack. 
The P.A.C. was intended to perform the same functions 
as those originally proposed for Labor's Non-Partisan League, 
but to organize within wards and precincts just like a major 
127 
party. P.A.C. Chairman Hillman said the main task was 
to re-elect F.D.R. and to elect congressmen who were favor-
able to F.D.R. The 1943 c.r.o. Convention approved the 
action of the c.r.o. Executive Board in establishing the 
128 
P.A.C. and resolved that: 
p. 82. 
Our primary task in the political field 
today is to weld the unity of all workers, 
farmers and other progressives behind candid-
ates, regardless of party affiliation, who 
are committed to our policy of total victory 
and who fully support the measures necessary 
to achieve it and to lay the basis for a 
secure, peaceful, decent and abundant postwar 
world. 
126 Labor Research Association, Labor Fact Book 
--
127 Penniman, Ibid. 
128 Labor Research Association, o:;e.cit., p. 61. 
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7, 
This meant that the Political Action Committee backed 
only those senators and representatives from both parties 
who stood not only for a C.I.O.-sponsored labor program, 
but also for an acceptable foreign policy. Thus, it 
opposed uisolationistsu even if their voting records 
129 
were pro-labor. 
Campaign of 1944. The aim of the C.I.O. was to 
awaken the people to political issues and never before 
had America seen so vigorous a political campaign by 
130 
labor. The P.A.C. produced a number of able pamphlets 
which instructed C.I.O. members in the art of politics, 
how to organize local areas, get radio time, make speeches, 
etc. In greater New York the C.I.O. checked registration 
lists and set up an elaborate system to insure the registra-
tion of all eligible members of the c.r.o. A high pressure 
propaganda campaign for Roosevelt was carried on during 
131 
the summer and fall of 1944. The P.A.c. organized 
itself throughout the country and distributed, or at least 
printed, 85 1 000,000 copies of campaign literature which 
included 2,000,000 pamphlets, 57,000,000 leaflets, and 
132 
over 400 1 000 posters. 
129 Penniman, Ibid. 
130 D.M. Young, Restrictions On Political Contribu-
tions, July, 1950, 1 Labor Law Journai 77o-774. 
131 Penniman, ~· 
132 Young, Ibid. 
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The National Citizens Political Action Committee 
was organized in July, 1944, to supplement the C.I.O.-
P.A.C. Signey Hillman was also Chairman of the N.C.P.A.C. 
which showed total receipts from voluntary contributions 
of $380,306.45 ana total expenditures of $378,424.78. 
The C.I.O.-P.A.C. spent nearly $500 1 000 of union funds 
for an unprecedented educational program ana pre-campaign 
publicity ana collected another $500 1 000 for the campaign 
itself. c.r.o. unions contributed $647,903.26 to the 
P.A.C. Four c.r.o. unions haa contributed $100,000 each. 
Total contributions to .the C.I.O.-P.A.G. by unions ana 
individuals ana to the N.C.P.A.C. were $1,405,120.48 ana 
133 
total expenditures were $1,327,775.92. 
The Executive Council of the American Federation of 
Labor remained "neutral" in the 1944 campaign, although 
two of its fifteen members came out for Republican candidate 
Thomas E. Dewey, ana nine for President Roosevelt. The 
October issue of the Feaerationist, official A.F'.L. organ, 
impartially printed F.D.R. 1 s speech to the Teamsters ana 
133 Section 3041 Taft-Hartley Act: Validity of 
Restrictions on Union Political Activity, Comment in 
1948, 57 Yale Law Journal 806, pp. 822-823; Vol. 1 
Senate Miscellaneous Reports, Report No. 101, 79th 
Congress, 1st Session, pp. 21, 23; Regulation of Labor's 
Political Contributions ana E~enaitures, Comment in 
Winter 1952, 19 University of hicago Law Review 371, 
p. 374, estimates labor spent ~~1,570 1 000 in the 1944 
campaign, more than in any previous election. 
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Dewey's Seattle address on opposite pages. However, 
officials of certain international unions supported 
F.D.R. openly. The October 28, 1944, Trade Union Record 
of New York City, reported the names of a dozen important 
national unions and twenty-one state federations which 
had endorsed the President, along with the city central 
bodies of most of the big cities. In addition, many 
state and district organizations of national unions, 
especially among the machinists, teamsters, food, 
building, and needle trades workers went on record for 
the fourth term. Also helping the Democratic campaign 
134 
were many popular figures in the theatrical trades. 
The railway unions, and especially President A.F. 
Whitney of the Railroad Trainmen were active in supporting 
F.D.R., but Labor, organ of fifteen of the railroad unions, 
declined to endorse any presidential candidate. Although 
John L. Lewis supported the Dewey-Bricker ticket, the 
rank and file of the United Mine Workers in Pennsylvania, 
West Virginia, and Illinois gave Roosevelt substantial 
enough majorities in leading coal mine counties to hold 
these states for the President. On September 27, 1944, 
a 31-state pre-election poll of 60 A.F.L., 58 C.I.o., and 
21 joint or independent papers, with a combined circulation 
of over six million, revealed only one Dewey supporter 
134 Labor Research Association, op.cit., pp. 80-81. 
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among the labor editors, an independent in Salina, 
Kansas, and only 11 A.F.L. papers took a non-partisan 
135 
or neutral position. 
Percentages of political support within the unions 
in the 1944 campaign show the Democrats with their greatest 
strength in the C.I.O. 78 per cent of C.I.a. members and 
69 per cent of A.F.L. members voted Democratic, compared 
with 56 per cent of workers not members of labor unions. 
In a group of some four hundred top union officials, 51 per 
cent of the A.F.L. leaders reported themselves as Democrats, 
19 per cent as Republicans, and 30 per cent either as minor 
party endorsers or supporters of candidates favorable to 
labor regardless of party. Among C.I.a. leaders, 65 per 
cent were Democrats, 7 per cent Republicans, and 28 per 
cent either favorable to minor parties or supporters of 
136 
pro-labor candidates irrespective of party affiliation. 
Although the A.F.L • . Executive Council, as noted, 
took a "neutraln position in the 1944 election, there was 
much co-operation between the C.I.O.-P.A.c. and A.F.L. 
leaders. In many industrial centers the A.F.L., the 
Railroad Brotherhoods, and the C.I.a. united in what were 
called nABC" connnittees for political and legislative 
action. A survey in March, 1944, revealed these committees 
135 Loc.cit. 
136 Reynolds, op.cit., p. 127. 
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functioning in 15 states, and before the election the 
137 
number had increased. Even though the political 
expenditures by labor were but a fraction of the 
estimated $21,000,000 spent in the 1944 campaign, the 
C.I.O.-P.A.C. was believed to have had a major influence 
on the outcome of the elections. It spotlighted the 
record of every candidate. Its campaign for getting out 
the vote was a dramatic and startling success. Especially 
in the last weeks of the campaign, the P.A.C. was the 
subject of continuous attack by its enemies who, said 
Hillman, attempted to smear him personally and the 
138 
G.I.O.-P.A.C. with: 
••• lies on top of lies, lies in newspaper 
chains the editors of which I am sure are 
now ashamed to read their own editorials 
••• No slander was too base, no appeal to 
prejudice too bigoted, no tactic too un-
principled for them to employ. 
The vitriolic attacks on the P.A.C. were a 
tribute to ita effectiveness, for it was credited with 
having played the decisive role in the defeat of several 
prominent congressmen. Not only was President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt re-elected with 3,600,000 more votes than his 
opponent, but the Democrats increased their seats in 
Congress. In some cases the P.A.G. had supported 
137 Labor Research Association, op.cit., p. 84. 
138 Ibid, p. 83. 
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progressive Republicans like Senator Wayne L. Morse of 
Oregon, Senator George Aiken of Vermont, and Representa-
tive R. J. Welch of California. In the final count, 
P.A.C. claimed partial responsibility for carrying several 
states for F.D.R., for the election of seventeen Senators 
and 120 Representatives to the Congress, as well as at 
139 
least six governors. 
Following the 1944 election, both the House and 
Senate investigated charges that the C.I.O.-P.A.C. had 
violated the Smith-Connally Act, but found no violation 
of the law because the ban was on "contributions" and not 
140 
on "expenditures." A majority of the Senate Committee 
recommended publicity as to labor's political expenditures, 
while the minority believed that such union activities 
141 
should be prohibited. Having been vindicated in their 
right under the Smith-Connally Act to engage in political 
affairs, the c.r.o. subsequently continued to be a very 
active force in primary and election campaigns. The 
seventh annual c.r.o. convention, held at Chicago in 
November, 1944, voted to continue the P.A.C. and expand 
its organization under the chairmanship of Sidney Hillman 
who was instructed to intensify the P.A.C. 1 s program of 
139 ~' pp. 85-86; Penniman, Ibid. 
140 Vol. 1 Senate Miscellaneous Reports, Report No. 
101, 79th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 20-22. 
141 Ibid, pp. 83-84. 
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political education and to prepare the ground work for 
extensive participation in the local, state, and congress-
142 
ional elections of 1946. 
Strikes. Between 1944 and 1946 five non-industrial 
143 
states banned the closed shop. "The reaction against 
144 
unions was growing." This u.ni'avorable public reaction 
was due largely because of wartime stoppages chiefly in 
the coal industry, by jurisdictional strikes, and by 
exceptional strikes in public services. By these wartime 
strikes organized labor had antagonized public opinion, 
which viewed the unions as unpatriotic. The strikes 
following World War II were the natural consequence of 
pent-up grievances of all kinds which had been accumulating. 
The no-strike pledge for the duration of the war had been 
honored by most of the labor movement, and now was the 
opportunity to catch up and keep up with the rising cost 
of living. Thus, 1946 was the biggest strike year in 
145 
American history to that time. These large-scale strikes 
following the war were regarded as inflationary and created 
an atmosphere of anti-labor sentiment which formed the basis 
142 ~, p. 22. 
143 Lester, op.cit., p. 311. 
144 Loc.eit. 
145 A review of these post-war strikes may be found 
in ~ The Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley by Harry A. Millis 
and Emily Clark Brown, pp. 311-314. 
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of the Republican campaign of 1946 and set the stage for 
146 
a flood of union-restricting laws. 
Campaign of~· Exploiting labor's neglect of 
public relations, the National Association of Manufacturers, 
the United States Chamber of Commerce, and other anti-labor 
groups, launched a systematic and lavishly financed attack 
on the New Deal with the Wagner Act as the focal point of 
147 
the onslaught. As an immediate result, legislation 
restricting unions was passed by at least 30 states in 
early 1947, including the industrial states of New York, 
148 
Pennsylvania, and Michigan. Nationally, the father of 
the New Deal, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, was no 
longer alive to provide the Democratic Party with his 
inspiring leadership. Organized labor did not provide the 
effort needed to ward off the Republican challenge. The 
A.F.L. and c.r.o. were divided, expending their energies 
146 On February 7, 1946, after a week of bitter 
debate and involved parliamentary tangles, the House of 
Representatives passed the so-called Case bill which was 
severely restrictive on labor unions. An amendment to 
prohibit labor organizations from political expenditures 
was ruled out of order as not germane at the request of 
the bill's author, Francis Case. President Truman's veto 
of the bill was sustained. Congr~ssional Quarterly, Vol. 
11, No. 1, pp. 84-92. 
147 The 1946-1947 prop~ganda campaign of the N.A. M. 
and the u.s. Chamber of Commerce through the use of news-
paper advertisements, etc., is described by Harry A. Millis 
and Emily Clark Brown, From The Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley, 
pp. 287-291. 
148 Lester, op.cit., p. 312. 
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on £ighting each other rather than their common foe. 
Enemies of labor claimed~ "During the New Deal, labor 
unions were coddled, nursed, and pampered ••• Labor has 
149 
been permitted to grow into a monster supergovernment." 
Even persons who were considered friendly to labor's 
objectives were persuaded that in the bigness of the 
unions was a potential danger of abuse in the powerful 
150 
hands of arrogant or unscrupulous labor leaders. 
As a consequence, the 1946 campaign was a defeat 
for the P.A.C. In the 34 states outside the South only 
73 of the 318 congressional candidates with P.A.C. backing 
151 
were elected and only 5 of the 26 senatorial candidates. 
Republican spokesmen had made much of the 11left wing11 
leanings of some of the P.A.c. leaders and the Republican 
congressional victory was attributed at least in part to 
the public reaction against unionism. In control of both 
houses of Congress for the first time in 20 years, the 
Republicans felt they had a 11mandate" to repeal the Wagner 
152 
Act and replace it with drastic anti-labor legislation. 
Organized labor asked for a non-partisan commission to 
149 Fred A. Hartley Jr., Foreword by Robert A. Taft, 
Our New National Labor Policy--The Taft-Hartlez Act And The 
Rext~eps, pp. 4, 47. ~ ---
150 Elias Lieberman, Unions Before the ~~ p. 309. 
151 .Penniman, Ibid. 
152 Harry A. Millis and Emily Clark Brow.n, From The 
--Wagner !£1 to Taft-Hartley, p. 363. 
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examine the operation of the Wagner Act. But a grimly 
determined Republican-controlled Congress, backed by the 
editorial pages of much of the nation's press and spurred 
on by John L. Lewis' coal miners strike of 1946, wanted 
153 
immediate adverse action. 
Taft-Hartley ~· Restrictive measures were 
adopted in the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 
commonly known as the Taft-Hartley Act. The moving spirit 
behind this legislation can be judged from the attitude 
of Congressman Fred A. Hartley Jr. who, in making his 
report to the House on the necessity for this legislation, 
154 
said: 
For the last 14 years as a result of 
labor laws ill-conceived and disastzrously ~ 
executed, the American workingman has been 
••• cajoled, coerced, intimidated, and on 
many occasions beaten up, in the name of 
the splendid aims set forth in Section 1 
of the National Labor Relations Act ••• His 
whole economic life has been subject to 
the complete domination and control of . 
unregulated monopolists ••• His mind, his 
soul, and his very life have been subject 
to a tyranny more despotic than one would 
think possible in a free country. 
The employer's plight has likewise 
not been happy ••• He has had to stand mute 
while irresponsible detractors slandered, 
abused, and vilified him. 
153 Lieberman, op.cit., p. 312. 
154 Loc.cit. A member of the New York Bar, Elias 
Lieberman maintains, pp. 323, 325, ''There are various bits 
of evidence indicating that many provisions of the act were 
dictated by political expediency." He believes that the 
Taft-Hartley Act "was drafted with malice toward labor." 
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General provisions. Not only did the Taft-Hartley 
Act, which replaced the Wagner Act in many important part-
iculars, revive the government-initiated injunction and 
make unions liable in damage suits £or violation o£ agree-
menta, but it made unions subject to twice as many un£air 
labor practices as employers and made unions, but not 
employers, liable to damage suits for un£air labor 
155 
practices. The law requires the workers to vote on the 
employer's last offer before going out on strike. Techni-
cally, this may be interpreted to permit employers to make 
••1ast 11 offers even up to the point of balloting, necessi-
tating further delay of the strike until the new nlast 
offer" could be considered. I£ so, this has the interest-
ing possibilities of going on indefinitely if the employer 
156 
is resourceful enough in thinking up last offers. 
Union boycotts against the employer are outlawed, 
but no restrictions are placed upon the common action by 
157 
employers to break a strike. Thus, an employer might 
be allowed to subcontract work to another firm in the 
same locality employing members of the same union, and 
155 Labor Management Relations ~~ 1947, Act o£ 
June 23, 1947, c. 120, P.L. lOl, 80th Cong.;-6! Stat. 136; 
Title II, 29 U.S.C. ss. 171-182; Title III, 29 U.S.C. ss. 
185-189; Title IV, 29 U.s.c. ss. 191-197; Title V, 29 
u.s.c. ss. 142-144; 29 u.s.c. A. 151 et seq. 
156 Lester, op.cit., pp. 322, 328. 
157 Labor Management Relations !£!, 1947, ~· 
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under the law these employees could not strike. Therefore, 
the union would be forced to work against itself. The 
Taft-Hartley Act favors craft unions as opposed to indust-
rial unions by specifically exempting professional employ-
ees, if they so desire, from the same unit of representation 
158 
as other employees. Supervisors, foremen, and plant 
guards are entirely excluded from union representation, and 
.federal employees are prohibited from striking, whether 
they are employed in the government itself or in federally 
159 
owned corporations. 
The Taft-Hartley Act gave an employer the right of 
".free speech11 to talk against the union and to warn workers 
against organizing, although he was not supposed to have 
the power to promise benefits to his workers if they stayed 
out of unions or to threaten them with dismissal if they 
160 
joined. Instead of the union having the right to decide 
the date of elections, the employer could postpone an 
election to decide representation merely by making allega-
161 
tiona of unfair labor practices by the union. The 
active union member was therefore subject to dismissal if 
the employer could discover some alleged cause. Further-
more, the employer is given the right to call for a decerti-
158 Loc.cit. 
159 Loc.cit. 
160 Loc.cit. 
161 Loc.cit. 
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162 
fication election. As the Taft-Hartley Act bars 
economic strikers from voting, whereas the ·"scabs" may 
vote, combined with '"free s peech11 the decertification 
163 
procedure could be used to wreck the union movement. 
The closed shop, prior membership in the union 
164 
before hiring by the employer, was eutlawed. In the 
construction, entertainment, and shipping industries, 
the union had acted as an employment agency, with mutual 
benefit to the employer and employee, so that this 
provision against the closed shop was not enforced in 
162 Loc.cit. 
163 Loc.cit. The following comments from 
a speaker's book of facts published in August, 1952, by 
the C.I.O. Political Action Committee, page 245, indicate 
the seriousness of this situation in the opinion of 
national labor leaders: 
nThe most lethal direct blow struck at unions by 
Taft-Hartley is the spelled-out right of employers to 
fire any workers who strike for higher wages or better 
conditions and to replace them with scabs. 
11So-calle d 'economic 1 strikers could be fired, of 
eourse, _even under .the Wagner Act ••• But the Wagner act 
gave one element of security ••• if another NLRB election 
was held ••• both the original employees--the strikers--and 
the scab were allowed to vote. 
t'Taft-Hartley canceled out the voting right of 
strikers ••• With Taft-Hartley, only the scabs can vote. 
A strike can be provoked, scabs brought in, a quick 
election held, and the union is denied the right even to 
ask for an election for a year. Then the scabs can be 
moved on and there's nothing the union can do." 
164 Labor Management Relations ~~ ~~ Ibid. 
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165 
these industries. The union shop, membership in the 
union after hiring by the employer, was acceptable only 
if a majority of all workers in the shop voted for it in 
166 
a special election. If this requirement of a majority 
of those eligible to vote rather than a majority of those 
actually voting were to be applied to our national 
elections the American people would be deprived of a 
government. 
Trade union discipline was grossly interfered with 
by the Taft-Hartley Act because no worker could be expelled 
165 At pages 436-438 in From The Wagner Act to 
Taft-Hartley, Harry A. Millis ~ily Clark Brown--
explain the situation: 
urn building and related construction work, where 
the closed shop has been prevalent, the contractors, 
assembling and using crews of craftsmen for a limited 
period of time, have generally appreciated a definite 
source of labor upon which to draw and are usually glad 
to turn to the business agent of the union for needed 
help. They likewise appreciate the partial guaranty of 
efficient help found in the apprentice system and its 
requirements, which have increasingly brought under joint 
control. And they appreciate a relatively stabilized 
crew, teamwork and understanding among the employees, 
and a degree of protection of labor costs during the life 
of the contract. Adapting Taft-Hartley to the building 
trades would be an exceedingly difficult, if not impossible 
task ••• 11 
"In ocean shipping, with the rapid changes in crews, 
and employees usually sailing with a different carrier at 
the completion of a voyage for which they had signed, the 
shippers prefer to have a closed-shop contract ••• 11 
There are also sound reasons for the closed shop 
"In newspaper publication and in large segments of commer-
cial printing ••• " and also "In the manufacture of ladies• 
and men's garments ••• " 
166 Labor Management Relations ~~ ~~ ~· 
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167 
from the union except for non-payment of dues. This 
meant that an infringement of union rules, spying for 
the employer, or even "scabbing," could not be made a 
cause for expulsion. The check-off of union dues was 
permitted only if the individual made a signed declaration 
168 
to have such a deduction made. Vague clauses made the 
union liable to prosecution if its officers threatened or 
169 
coerced any worker to join the union. There was also 
a prohibition against excessive or discriminatory initia-
tion fees, without any definition of what would be so 
170 171 
considered. Welfare funds were also interfered with. 
One clause in the Taft-Hartley Act, aimed at 
ttfeatherbedding" (E.G. payment of musicians when not 
172 
utilized, as in a radio show or stage performance), 
made it uncertain Whether union requests for greater 
"'safety" measures, workers employed on union business, or 
guarantees of a half-day's pay by union contract if a 
worker is called in to work, could be penalized under 
173 
such power. Jurisdictional strikes were made illegal, 
167 Loc.cit. 
168 Loc.cit. 
169 Loc.cit. 
170 Loc.cit. 
171 Loc.cit. 
172 Loc.cit. 
173 Loc.cit. 
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one of the few good provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act. 
This prevented strikes over which union was to do certain 
work. The law forbade workers from refusing to work on 
non-union material or to strike in sympathy with any 
group or workers, even if they were in a neighboring Shop 
174 
or in the same industry. Unions were compelled to file 
detailed financial reports, and their officers to sign an 
affidavit that they were not members of the Communist 
175 
Party. Employers needed to make no such declaration. 
Section ~· Finally the authors of the Taft-
Hartley Act attempted to close the federal primaries and 
the "contributionstt loopholes of the Smith-Connally Act. 
176 
The Taft-Hartley Act, under Section 304, amended 
Section 313 of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 
by prohibiting unions from making both contributions or 
expenditures in connection with federal primary or election 
campaigns, although, as we shall see, this section is 
either ineffectual or unconstitutional. The rise of 
177 
unionism had not only increased the economic strength 
174 Loc.cit. 
175 Loc.cit. 
176 Loc.cit. 
177 "During the fifteen years from the depth of 
the depression, organized labor had grown greatly in 
membership and power. It had added some twelve million 
members to its rolls ••• " Harry A. Millis and Emily 
Clark Brown, From ~ Wagner Act !£ Taft-Hartlez, p. 271. 
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of employees, which the Taft-Hartley Act was designed to 
curb, but also increased labor's political power. There-
fore, Section 304 was included in the Taft-Hartley Act. 
President Harry s. Truman had criticized the proposed 
legislation as a menace to successful democratic society 
which raised serious issues of public policy transcending 
178 
labor-management difficulties. But his veto was over-
ridden and the Taft-Hartley Act became law on June 23, 
179 
1947. 
Campaign £f ~· The sponsors of the Taft-Hartley 
Act, Who had taken the opportunity of the Republican 
majority in Congress secured in 1946, had intended to use 
this law to suppress labor•s· political activities, but 
instead labor was brought even more into politics. Many 
of the provisions of the new legislation had not been 
applied or defined by the courts before the 1948 election, 
but its very existence provoked a campaign for its repeal. 
Thus, the Taft-Hartley Act proved to be a boomerang politi-
cally. As did the 1927 Trade Disputes and Trade Unions 
Act in Great Britain, the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act prodded 
the unions to increased political activity. In the past, 
178 H.R. Doc. No. 334, Message from the President 
of the United States returning Without His Approval the 
Bill (H.R. 3020) Entitled the "Labor-Management Relations 
Act, 1947," Vol. 2, 80th Gong., 1st Seas., pp. 9-10. 
179 Labor Management Relations !£i, 1947, ~· 
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labor's participation in politics has been sporadic with 
the exception of the c.r.o.-P.A.c. But the passage of 
the Taft-Hartley Act also catapulted the American Federa-
tion of Labor into political action. 
By 1947 the A.F.L. had so modified its traditional 
non-political activity policy as to create in 1947 
Labor's League for Political Education (L.L.P.E.}, 
similar to the c.r.o.-P.A.C. to combat the congressional 
supporters of the Taft-Hartley Act and as a permanent 
180 
agency of the A.F.L. Appointed Director of the L.L.P.E. 
was the Secretary of the Chicago Federation of Labor, 
Joseph D. Keenan, who established four L.L.P.E. depart-
menta: 1) Finance--to plan and carry out appeals for 
contributions, and audit accounts (union funds were separ-
ate from L.L.P.E.); 2) Public Relations--to enlighten 
members and the public regarding the objectives of the 
League, political and economic policies of the 80th 
Congress and individual voting records of each congressman; 
3) Organization--to organize and coordinate state and 
local leagues and cooperate with sympathetic groups; and 
4) Political Direction--to prepare and keep records of 
181 
public office holders and candidates. The A.F.L. has 
now accepted the fact of continuing political action. 
180 Comment in 1948• 57 Yale Law Journal 806, 
op.cit., pp. 822-823; Lester, op.cit., p. 315. 
181 Young, Ibid. 
- 91 -
The Taft-Hartley Act has become one or the signifi-
cant issues of contemporary American politics. Thoughtful 
commentators have deplored the fact that the Republican 
leadership did not rise to the great opportunity to lay a 
lasting legal foundation for labor-management relations 
in an industrial economy. 1'Instead of contributing to a 
solution, the law generated acrimonious debate and ill-will, 
and turned the problem into a political football to be 
182 
kicked around at each election." In the presidential 
campaigns of 1948 and 1952, the Democratic platform called . 
for repeal while the Republican platform praised the law. 
Democratic orators have appealed for labor support on the 
ground that the Taft-Hartley Act was sponsored by the 
Republican Party and is alleged to be a clear manifestation 
of the control over the Republican Party by anti-labor 
industrialists and businessmen hostile to the working 
class. In the 1948 campaign, President Truman correctly 
expected labor support because he had vetoed the Taft-
Hartley Act, although some of the labor union leaders 
and others stressed the fact that he did not exercise 
183 
enough control over his party to make his veto stick. 
182 Lieberman, op.cit., p. 329. 
183 Some of the nlert-wingn unions, such as the 
United Electrical Workers (U.E.), endorsed the candidacy 
of the 100% pro-labor Progressive Party ticket of former 
Vice President Henry A. Wallace and Idaho Senator Glen 
Taylor. They did so on the ground that even though the 
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Repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act was both pledged by 
President Truman and included in the Democratic platform 
of 1948, however, and opposition to the Taft-Hartley Act 
was made the Chief focal point of the unions' attention. 
The P.A.c. spent $238,498. The A.F.L. League spent 
$112,202 and hired a public relations firm for $500,000 
to ward off further attacks and to represent the unions 
in a more favorable light before the community. Both 
the A.F.L. and c.r.o. support went almost exclusively to 
Democratic candidates. The labor vote proved decisive. 
President Truman was elected, receiving a two million 
popular vote plurality. Both the House and Senate were 
transferred from Republican control. The Democratic 
Party secured the Senate 54 to 42, while victorious 
Republican Party was primarily responsible for the Taft-
Hartley Act, the picture was far from being black-and-white. 
Partisan but factual, the best summary and the most complete 
evaluation of the record on this point, and the political 
realities behind the Truman veto, has been compiled by the 
National Wallace for President Committee, Facts to Fight 
With, pp. 11-13; and The Progressive Party, More~acts to 
Fight ~' pp. 12-13. Also see Harry A. Millis and Emily 
Clark Brown, From The Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley, pp. 391-
392; and Fred-x:-Har£ley Jr.,-roreword by Robert A. Taft, 
Our New National Labor Policy And The Next Steps, p. 102. 
It would appear that President Truman ~not make any 
serious effort to have his veto upheld, and that had he 
so desired sufficient support could have been secured from 
enough Senators to have sustained the veto. Despite this 
strong suspicion of bad faith on the part of the Democratic 
leadership in not maintaining even an appearance of party 
discipline, the more ttpractical" labor leaders regarded 
the Wallace candidacy both as politically hopeless and 
inspired by the Communists. 
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Democrats led the Republicans in the House by 263 to 171. 
In 29 states there were Democratic governors as against 
19 with Republican governors. Representative Fred A. 
Hartley Jr. in New Jersey, co-author of the Taft-Hartley 
Act, prudently decided not to run and his previous 
constituency elected a Democrat. After these labor 
successes in the 1948 elections, the A.F.L. announced 
184 
plans to raise and spend larger funds in future campaigns. 
Campaigns of 1950 ~ ~· In the congressional 
elections of 1950 1 granting the normal off-year fall-off 
in the strength of the incumbent party, the Democrats kept 
control of Congress with the active support of both the 
C.T.O.-P.A.C. and the A.F.L.'s L.L.P.E. However, attempts 
following the 1948 and 1950 campaigns to repeal or amend 
the Taft-Hartley Act in labor's favor had been blocked by 
a coalition of Republicans and southern Democrats. The 
labor forces had hoped to repeal Taft-Hartley by securing 
a large enough Democratic majority in the 1952 presidential 
election to permit the liberal element in the Democratic 
Party to dominate over both the Republicans and reactionary 
southern Democrats. Thus, in 1952 the A.F.L. and C.I.o. 
both officially endorsed Illinois Governor Adlai Stevenson. 
184 Reynolds, op.cit., p. 122; Starr, op.cit., pp. 
34, 36; Comment in Winter l952 1 19 University of Chicago 
Law Review 371, op.cit., at page 3781 estimates expendi-
tures by labor in 1948 were $1,280,000. 
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However, the personal popularity of General Dwight D. 
Eisenhower was overwhelming and for the first time since 1932 
a Republican occupied the \Vhite House. The congressional 
results, however, were much closer. In the Senate there was 
one Independent with an even division of Democrats and Repub-
licans, Vice-President Nixon, President of the Senate, having 
the deciding vote. Oregon's progressive Senator Wayne Morse, 
elected as a Republican in 1950, had decided that he prefer-
red being an Independent. Although during the campaign Eisen-
hower had promised to seek amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act 
which would eliminate from that law the most objectionable 
features such as that which permits strike-breakers to vote 
on union representation but prohibits the economic strikers 
from balloting, 1954 saw Senators Morse and North Dakota's 
William L~ger, a Republican in name only, joining with the 
Democrats to defeat Eisenhower-sponsored Taft-Hartley changes 
which, from labor's viewpoint, would have made the law even 
worse. 
Campai&?: 2.f. ~· Complicated by a Republican "smear 
campaign·" that the Democrats were "the party of treason, 11 the 
1954 congressional campaign was bitterly contested. The most 
controversial Republican Senator, Joseph R. McCarthy of Wis-
consin, repeatedly charged that the past Democratic administra-
tions had been infiltrated by subversives and the Communist 
issue was made one of the features of the campaign. However, 
- 95 -
with the Republicans favoring the encroachment of private 
interests upon the public lands and off-shore oil reserves, 
policies against public power and social reform, friendly 
attitudes toward big business, revision of tax laws to 
benefit "coupon clippers 1' who derive their income from 
corporate dividends, the Dixon-Yates contract proposal taking 
preference over the T.V.A., and the failure to act against 
rising unemployment, all tended to create a public opinion 
reacting to the advantage of the Democrats. 
Further, although Taft-Hartley as such was not an 
issue in the campaign, the unions worked quietly but effect-
185 
ively for pro-labor Democrats. Also, a blundering refer-
ence by a Cabinet member, Defense Secretary Charles E. Wilson, 
likening demands for relief by workers out of jobs as akin to 
the barking of "kennel-fed dogs 1' was sei~ed upon by C.I.o. 
President Walter Reuther and Democratic candidates generally 
to condemn the Republicans. A last-minute appeal by Presi-
dent Eisenhower for a G.O.P. majority went unheeded. The 
people gave the Democratic Party control of both the House 
and Senate. Senator Morse had campaigned against his fellow 
Senator Guy Cordon and Oregon elected its first Democratic 
185 For an analysis that the political activities of 
labor unions were an important factor in electing many local, 
state, and national Democrats, see Peter Edson, "Election 
Results Indicate Labor vote Is Influential," Washington, p. 
4, The News-Tribune, January 26 1 1955. Edson reports that 
the A.F.L.-L.L.P.E. and the C.I.O.-P.A.c. each raised more 
than $1 1 000 1 000 1 and that this $2,000,000 campaign fund was 
equally divided between local and national expenditures. 
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Senator since 1912 when the ·"Bull Moose" Roosevelt campaign 
had split the Republican vote. The Democrats also added 
eight governorships to their credit, including Maine (1), 
Pennsylvania, and New York. 
Practices and Programs 
Support of candidates. The political activities labor 
unions engage in are of three main kinds: support of candidates 
for public office, promotion of legislation, and participation 
in the administration of existing legislation. To discuss 
them in order, union electoral activities and support for a 
candidate may involve his being called to a conference for 
questioning as to his record and viewpoints on labor problems. 
The union may prepare and disseminate information on the issues 
involved in the campaign, and on the relative merits of the 
candidates. In an area where the union endorsement may arouse 
antagonism, the union might concentrate on opposing the incum-
bent rather than endorsing his opponent. This would take the 
for.m of publicizing the incumbent's poor record, and working 
for his defeat. 
Where the union decides to support a candidate, union 
members are told they should get together politically to make 
their vote count just as they have joined together in their 
union for economic strength. The candidate will be given a 
letter of endorsement which is usually reprinted in the local 
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press, ana/or distributed to union members. At the polls, 
the union may hand out this letter, or other circulars or 
cards. Sometimes the union will advertise in the newspaper, 
or go on the radio or television, either endorsing or con-
demning a candidate. The unions try to ensure that all 
members eligible to vote are properly registered and work at 
"getting out the vote" on election day. Workers may be at 
the polls to pass out campaign literature. In this way the 
C.I.O.-P.A.G. ana the A.F.L.-L.L.P.E. perform many of the 
functions of a political machine. 
An example of the extent to which labor unions feel 
it desirable to go today to engage in effective political 
action is found in the 1948 U.E. Guide to Political Action 
which explains what political action is, why it is necessary, 
and how to start organizing; conduct registration drives; 
research candidate's records; select candidates; set up and 
operate a campaign headquarters; run a campaign; write news-
paper publicity ana advertising copy; use radio time, mailings, 
leaflets, posters; conduct meetings and rallies, work with 
small businessmen, farmers, professional people, women, youth, 
nationality ana religious groups, etc.; deal with opposition 
tactics; keep within the law; operate a voting machine; work 
at the polls on election day; meet legislators; ana also 
explains how bills become law. The C.I.O.-P.A.C. has a Manual 
of Practical Political Action of which any political party 
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would be envious. Measuring nine by twelve inches and weigh-
ing one pound and eleven ounces net, it is an index-tabbed 
loose-leaf binder which adds to political s.cience the most 
up-to-date super-salesmanship. Graphs, charts, forms, 
cartoons, picture stories, dramatic presentations and cumula-
tive features make its contents dynamically modern. 
Promotion of legislation. In addition to the 
political activity mentioned, labor unions promote 
legislation. At the federal level this work is carried 
on by legislative representatives of the A.F.L., c.r.o., 
and individual national unions. At the state and local 
levels, it is carried on primarily by the state and city 
federations of labor. Legislative work includes drafting 
bills, persuading friendly legislators to introduce 
certain bills, appearing before committees to present 
testimony for or against pending legislation, soliciting 
the support of individual legislators for particular 
measures, urging union members to write or wire their 
congressman, and so on. These tactics are similar to 
those used by other economic-interest groups. Specific 
legislative proposals by the unions will be taken up 
under the discussion of labor's political objectives. 
Participation in administration. An increasingly 
important function of union officials is participation in 
public administration. Labor is ~epresented equally with 
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industry, for example, on the committees set up to 
recommend minimum wages under the Fair Labor Standards 
Act and under state minimum wage laws. Labor is usually 
represented on state unemployment compensation commis-
sions, state workmen's compensation boards, and similar 
bodies. The tripartite board, consisting of an equal 
number of labor and industry representatives under a 
public chairman, has become a well-established device for 
administering labor legislation. Many union leaders have 
also become full-time public officials, at levels ranging 
186 
from routine local positions up to Secretary of Labor. 
President Eisenhower gave this Cabinet post to Martin P. 
Durkin, an A.F.L. official, who later resigned on grounds 
that Eisenhower did not intend to keep campaign promises 
pledging pro-labor revisions of the Taft-Hartley Act. 
In addition to direct participation in public 
administration, unions have an important indirect influence 
on the enforcement of legislation affecting labor. They 
spend much time in educating union members in their rights 
under existing legislation, and in representing them before 
administrative bodies. A worker who feels that he has been 
unfairly treated in a claim for unemployment compensation 
or old age pensions, etc., can present. the problem to a 
union official, who will see that an appeal is taken through 
186 Reynolds, op.cit., pp. 123-124. 
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the proper channels. If workers suspect that their employ-
er is violating a wage-hour law, the union can present the 
matter to the appropriate agency and secure an investiga-
tion. The enforcement of labor legislation would be much 
less effective than it is if unions were not available to 
187 
serve as an auxilliary police force. 
Increased Eolitical action. The effect of labor's 
political action--support of candidates, promotion of 
legislation, and participation in administration--is diffi-
cult to appraise, but is probably very considerable. In 
the 1948 campaign, for example, both the A.F.L. and C.I.O. 
support went almost exclusively to Democratic candidates. 
188 
The great political upset of the Truman victory and the 
capture of Congress by the Democrats, open up possibilities 
about Which no dogmatic assertions can be made. It would 
187 Ibid, pp. 124-125. 
188 The 1948 campaign saw the extreme left and right 
wings of the Democratic Party break away to form their own 
separate groups. On the left, with a radical domestic 
platform and a pacifistic foreign policy, the Progressive 
Party was founded with former Vice President Henry A. Wallace 
and United States Senator Glen Taylor the standard-bearers. 
On the right, opposing any federal civil rights program, 
the States' Rights Democrats (Dixiecrats) chose South 
Carolina Governor J. Strom Thurmond as their presidential 
nominee with Mississippi Governor Fielding Wright for vice 
president. It was felt by almost all political observers, 
commentators, and pollsters, that this division in Democratic 
ranks spelled out Truman's defeat. But although the two 
split-off factions received well over 1,000,000 votes each, 
and the Dixiecrats carried four states, Truman campaigned 
vigorously and amazed everyone but himself by being elected, 
together with a Democratic House and Senate. 
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seem inevitable, however, that organized labor continue in 
politics. Many leaders in both the A.F.L. and c.r.o. are 
now convinced that the time has come for increased political 
action. On December 6, 1954, the C.I.O.-P.A.c. submitted 
its Report to the 16th Constitutional Convention of the 
c.r.o., and concluded "that year-round political activity 
is a necessary and indispensable part of trade union 
activity ••• " In Our Job For 1952, the then Secretary-
-----
Treasurer of the A.F.L., Mr. George Meany, who is now the 
President of the A.F.L., wrote that the Taft-Hartley Act 
is a "threat to the future of American trade unionism" 
which "must be met by political action. 11 
In this leaflet, Mr. Meany said that organized labor 
has an interest in, and made a contribution to the welfare 
of, this country, "greater, perhaps, than any other segment 
of the population." Labor must use its "fighting spirit" 
not only to organize economically for good conditions of 
work, but 
If this movement is going to maintain the 
achievements of the past, if it is going to 
progress further, we must be politically active. 
We can't afford to take the position that 
we have no . interest in politics ••• We must, as 
trade union officials, and as an integral part 
of our trade union activities, go into the field 
of politics. 
Keep this in mind. When they counted the 
votes to enact the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, we 
got a fair count. When they overruled President 
Truman 1 s veto of that law we got a fair count. 
Big business, as represented by the National 
Association of Manufacturers, and as represented 
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by their lackeys like Taft and Hartley in 
Congress--big business had the votes. We 
didn't have them. So, if we are going to 
correct that situation, there is only one way 
I know of and that is by getting the votes. 
We are never going to repeal the Taft-
Hartley Act until we put into Congress men 
and women friendly to the ideals and 
principles of this great labor movement. · 
Objectives££ labor. Taking Mr. Meany's words, what 
are the "ideals and principlesn of organized labor? What 
is labor's economic program? What objectives does it hope 
to accomplish through political action? What kind of legis-
lation does it favor and oppose? On what basis does labor 
decide that a public official or a candidate for office is 
ttfriendly to the ideals and principles of this great labor 
movement."? How does labor determine whether a legislator's 
record is Hgood 11 or 11badtt? Will the unions remain increas-
ingly active in politics? Does organized labor have plans 
for a new political party to represent labor? If so, what 
are the possibilities of success? Bei'ore proceeding to the 
next chapter, I shall attempt to touch upon these questions. 
There are three broad categories of labor union object-
ive. First, there are objectives which are of interest in a 
particular industry and which, therefore, are pursued by the 
national unions operating in that industry. For example, the 
United Mine Workers has been largely responsible for mine 
safety legislation. Second, there are objectives which most 
workers have in common, such as wage, hour, and child labor 
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laws, improved working conditions and benefits. Third, 
there are objectives which, while they are in the interest 
of the working class, are also in the interest of some or 
all of the other groups in the economy. Thus, the 1948 
A.F.L. Convention supported the Marshall Plan, the United 
Nations, reduction of taxes on consumption, increases in 
gift and estate taxes, improvements in the old-age 
pension and unemployment compensation systems, health 
insurance, increase in the level of minimum wages, 
public subsidies to housing construction in order to 
provide low rentals for low-income families, and repeal 
of the Taft-Hartley Act, together with defeat for all 
189 
members of Congress who voted for it. 
The c.r.o. program contained most of these items 
and many others, including restoration of price controls 
and rationing of scarce comnodities in order to prevent 
continued increases in the cost of living; a "realistic" 
attack upon monopoly in basic industries; legislation to 
prevent discrimination in employment on racial, religious, 
or other grounds; a federal anti-lynching bill and other 
measures to protect the civil rights of Negroes; a more 
comprehensive full-employment program; reduction of 
income tax rates on the lowest taxable incomes and 
abolition of all forms of sales tax; reimposition of the 
189 Reynolds, op.cit., pp. 130-131. 
- 104 -
war-time excess profits tax on corporations; liberaliza-
tion of veterans' benefits; increase of the minimum wage 
under the Fair Labor Standards Act from 40 to 75 cents 
per hour; federal aid to education; and establishment of 
organizations similar to the Tennessee Valley Authority 
in the Missouri Valley and certain other areas. The 
c.r.o. came closer than the A.F.L. to presenting a compre-
hensive program on the leading issues of national economic 
policy. Its program was also further to the political 
190 
left than that of the A.F.L. 
These general objectives of organized labor have 
been toward reducing economic, political, and social 
inequality. The unions have demanded for workers the 
rights of political participation, greater educational 
and vocational opportunities, sufficient leisure, an 
adequate and rising level of consumption, and protection 
against the important types of economic insecurity. 
This program has led labor unions in recent decades to 
demand increasing government participation in the 
management of the economy. The c.r.o. has gone further 
in this direction than the A.F.L., but even the A.F.L. 
has moved very far from the laissez faire position which 
it took as recently as 1930. 
Organized labor's advocacy of increased government 
190 Loc.cit. 
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intervention is a pragmatic policy based on a belief that 
the American industrial system should be operated primar-
ily to serve human needs, and that the right to a decent 
and secure livelihood should be placed ahead of property 
rights. Most American labor unions are not uclass 
consciousn in a revolutionary sense. On the contrary, 
they are conservative institutions in that they tend, by 
gradual but steady improvement in the workers' lot, to 
reduce the tensions which might otherwise incline him 
toward violent change. In addition to being beneficial 
to workers, some of labor's objectives are beneficial 
also to other groups in the economy. Included in this 
category would be such things as comprehensive social 
insurance systems, vigorous measures to combat depression, 
the conservation and development of natural resources, 
increased expenditures for education, health, public 
housing, and other welfare purposes. 
Political potentials. The possibilities of labor's 
potential political power may be judged from the fact that 
there are more than 17,000,000 union members in the United 
States today, including an estimated 8,600,000 in the 
A.F.L., 5,500,000 in the C.I.O., and several million more 
191 
in non-affiliated unions. Among the independent unions, 
the most important are the Railroad Brotherhoods, the 
191 1955 Information Please Almanac, pp. 774-775. 
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United Mine Workers, the United Electrical, Radio and 
Machine Workers (U.E.), and the International Union of 
192 
Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers. These workers in 
organized labor have families, relatives, and friends. 
Much could be made to happen politically if all these 
union members became active. For many years the Inter-
national Ladies' Garment Workers Union has asked the 
A.F.L. to initiate a political party representing labor. 
Several other unions have also supported the idea of an 
American Labor Party patterned after the British Labor 
Party, with policies adjusted to American conditions. 
As an example of this viewpoint, the United 
Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America in its 
U.E. Guide to Political Action published in 1948, states: 
Many times in history, the American people 
have become dissatisfied with the existing pol-
itical parties and have established new parties 
pledged to act on certain urgent issues. Usually 
new political parties have been born of necessity. 
Establishing a new political party is no 
easy job. The network of ward and precinct 
organizations, the clubs and local leaders, the 
system of patronage and loyalties built up through 
the years, favor a political party that has been 
in existence for a long period of time. 
However, history shows that when an issue 
before the people is sufficiently urgent--and no 
existing mass political party moves to act as 
the people believe necessary--political parties 
are formed and succeed. An example of this was 
the . birth of the Republican Party in 1854. 
192 Loc.cit. 
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At the present time labor is dedicated to 
the cause of independent political action by 
working people and their allies. Wherever major 
parties fail to bring forth people's candidates, 
labor favors supporting independent progressive 
candidates. 
By this means labor will build its independ-
ent strength with a view to the ultimate creation 
of a new people's political party supported by 
people in the factories, shops, offices, farms. 
(Page 31) 
To continue at page 93, the U.E. favors "the 
building of an independent political force by the working 
people and their allies u and npledges its full support 
and resources to the National C.I.O.-P.A.C. in the drive 
to build this political a trength. 11 Continuing, the U .E. 
said J'Above all, we call for the creation of an independ-
ent political force answerable to no boas or machine, and 
responsive only to the will of the rank and file ••• 
Wherever the major parties fail candidates who will act 
and fight on behalf of the people, we shall use the inde-
pendent political force we are building to support inde-
pendent pPogressive candidates. We shall build this inde-
pendent strength with a view to the ultimate creation of 
a new People's Political Party representative of the work-
ing people in the factories, shops, and farms, and their 
allies. It is probable, the U.E. believes, that a genuine 
Farmer-Labor Party would not for long be a third party, 
that the reactionary elements of the older parties would 
unite into one against it. 
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In addition to the financial resources which are 
necessary, organized labor must do a better job in educating 
its own union members. It must also improve its public 
relations. A political labor movement must have ideas, 
enthusiasm, and organization. Such an organization, of 
course, cannot be built from the top. It must be rooted 
in the active support of its individual members. This 
fact was pointed out in 1946 by Walter Reuther, now 
193 
national president of the C.I.o., who spoke as follows: 
A party serving the true interests of the 
common people cannot be declared into existence; 
it must grow. The time must be ready. Labor's 
political responsibility is neither to close 
its eyes to the necessity of new alignments nor 
to surrender to doctrinaire moves to launch a 
new party prematurely on a too-narrow base. It 
is rather to recognize the transitional stop-gap 
nature of its present political activity and to 
reach out into the community for natural 
alliances with farm and progressive middle class 
groups, and to lay the organizational and 
programmatic groundwork for a people's party. 
If the United States is to see a Labor Party, the 
forces which initiate and work for this new political 
alignment will have the important job of building up a 
new philosophy which will permanently unite the liberal 
and labor traditions of the urban centers with the farm 
proposals of the radical agrarians. Labor's long-run 
success in achieving its political objectives will depend 
a gpod deal on the extent to Which it can convince 
193 Starr, op.cit., p. 49. 
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farmers, white-collar workers, professional people, and 
194 
others of the validity of those objectives. That 
labor already has had some success in convincing these 
groups is demonstrated in the Populist, Farmer-Labor, 
and Progressive victories in the West in which, for a 
time, there was a united front between labor, the farmers, 
and various liberals. Also, we have seen the American 
Labor and Liberal parties of New York. It should be 
remembered that Franklin D. Roosevelt's policy of political 
improvision, which helped the United States to meet crises 
also called into being, particularly in the 1936 election, 
a farmer, labor, liberal alliance for the Democratic Party. 
194 Labor, of course, believes that because the 
majority of the people are workers, in promoting the wel-
fare of the workers unions are promoting the general wel-
fare--what is good for labor, most of the people, must be 
in the interest of the community. Leo Huberman, in his 
The Truth About Unions, pp. 81-82, maintains that: 
-
11The tie-up is plain. Labor is fighting for a 
program of full-employment, high real wages, guaranteed 
annual wages, revised tax laws putting the burden on those 
best able to pay, adequate social insurance, the establish-
ment of a permanent Fair Employment Practice Committee to 
fight the cancer of race prejudice. 
"If this program is achieved it will mean for workers 
and their families more and better food, clothing, homes, 
medical care, education, leisure, security. 
11This, in turn, would mean for the nation a major 
step on the road to economic progress--the redistribution of 
income and increased consumption by the masses of the people. 
11It would mean the end of misery and the b.eginning of 
prosperity as millions of workers who need goods and want 
goods become customers with money enough to buy goods. 
"It would mean good citizens free from fear. 
11The coupling of labor's political and economic 
strength to achieve this program is in the interest of the 
workers, it is in the interest of the nation." 
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Nevertheless, many feel that something more funda-
mental is necessary, that political parties will be forced 
to develop long-range plans based on specific principles 
to meet future social changes. It must be remembered that 
while the New Deal lessened the effects of the great 
crisis of 1929, it was only the Second World War which 
expanded production. The postwar aid to ravaged countries, 
the European Recovery Plan, rearmament, the military 
programs, the Korean War, and so forth, all created full 
employment in recent years. Yet the atomic age is now 
upon us. We are even now speculating about factories run 
by push-button control rooms operated by a handful of 
humans, with the work being done by automatons, robots. 
The serious question arises whether the economic f "laws and 
difficulties of modern production and distribution in the 
United States will create ~nother 1929 crisis. Can we 
eliminate the causes of depression? If the economic 
situation worsens, the unions may be spurred to political 
activity on a much wider scale than before. 
In this connection, it must be remembered that the 
possibility of an American. Labor Party would be faced with 
the many difficulties it would encounter in this country 
which are not applicable to the Labor Party in Great 
Britain. Although many of the early immigrants had brought 
with them political experience from the older trade union 
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movements, labor in the United States has never felt the 
need for political action as strongly as in the British 
homeland of the Industrial Revolution. The rapacity of 
the American ttrobber barons," while resulting in bitter, 
tragic, or even violent episodes, did not duplicate the 
ruthlessness and exploitation of the class struggle in 
195 
Europe. Thus, there is no American Fabian Society 
educating the population into a more radical philosophy, 
although some of these functions are carried on by the 
League for Industrial Democracy. 
It needs to be recognized that for many years a 
new party would be required to depend upon the ideals of 
its supporters alon~. A new party could not reward its 
supporters with patronage, until after it had built itself 
into a major party. The adherents of the new party would 
have to be enthusiastic in order to give it the 11blood, 
sweat, and tears" which always go into the early pioneering 
days of any organization. But where in Great Britain Kier 
Hardie, despite occasional friction, stayed with the unions 
and helped them to create the British Labor Party, in the 
United States Eugene Debs, who also preached the solidarity 
of labor and the ethical ideal of Socialism, broke irrevoc-
ably with the railroad unions which he had once led and 
became the brilliant orator, presidential candidate, and 
195 Starr, op.cit., pp. 9-10. 
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political martyr of the Socialist Party. It was in this 
way that the rebel spirits in the A.F.L. either exhausted 
themselves in temporary crusades, or gave up the fight, 
and the A.F.L. became more conservative as the new blood 
was thus siphoned away. 
The biggest contrast between the politics of the 
United States and Great Britain is of course that a 
British Labor Government has held power and a British 
Labor Party commands so% of the vote, whereas in the 
United States there is not even the start of a Labor Party 
on a nationwide scale. There is no crusading Kier Hardie, 
no Fabian Society, and no Independent Labor Party preparing 
the way. There are no well-known union leaders in Congress 
nor any trade union group recognized as such. There is 
only a beginning of labor representation on local and state 
levels. This means that labor lacks the leadership and 
trained workers who have had experience in political 
administration. It also indicates that American labor has 
not yet won the battle for public opinion and is not taken 
for granted in such a way as it is in the smaller country. 
The Americans for Democratic Action (A.D.A.), which 
has collaborated closely with the A.F.L. and C.I.a., is the 
only nation-wide group most closely akin in viewpoint to 
the British Labor Party, though it does not run its own 
candidates as such nor does it support candidates exclusively 
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of one party. A.D.A. leadership includes prominent 
liberals and labor leaders, and in its ranks are many 
New Deal ex-administrators. Like the British Labor Party, 
A.D.A. refuses Communist membership, support, or 
co-operation. Originally, it was organized to combat 
isolationist tendencies and hoped to formulate post-war 
plans, perhaps playing the role of the Fabian Society in 
the larger and more complicated American scene. However, 
those prominent in A.D.A. leadership have become absorbed 
in immediate political campaigns and in permeating the 
Democratic Party, rather than in formulating long-term 
goals and a philosophy for the for.mation of a new political 
alignment. 
It seems, then, that independent political action 
by the unions themselves will not in the immediate future 
result in a new party. The labor unions, except for a 
few "left-wingu groups such as the U.E., rejected the 
Progressive Party formed in 1948 by former Vice President 
Henry A. Wallace, even though it advocated most of the 
programs sponsored by organized labor. Apparently, the 
struggle will be to turn the Democratic Party into a 
Social Democratic Party. This will be no easy task if 
one just considers the important conservative elements 
in the South, and even in areas of the North, Which have 
such great influence within the Democratic Party. 
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If the unions decided to strike out on their own 
with a Labor Party, or Whatever name it might be called, 
the many differences between the United States and Great 
Britain warn of serious difficulties for an American 
Labor Party. However, perhaps these obstacles could be 
overcome in such states as New York where both the 
American Labor and Liberal parties have enjoyed local 
popularity. From there, the movement might expand into 
agrarian states as a Far.mer-Labor Party. In states such 
as Wisconsin, with the LaFollette Progressive Party 
tradition, an independent political force might be met 
with acceptance. Certainly, even today we have Senators 
like Wayne Morse and William Langer who would be willing 
to join in such a movement. 
There remains to be commented upon the argument 
that a Labor Party assumes the possibility and validity 
of a consistent social philosophy, a long-range political 
policy and economic program. It is alleged that our 
present problems are not answerabl e by general principles 
but that we must proceed merely on a practical, pragmatic 
basis, undogmatically meeting each situation as such. It 
is this observation, plus the fact that we live today in 
a someWhat mixed economy which is neither capitalist nor 
socialist, Which leads many to believe that talk of a new 
party for labor does not make sense, is not realistic in 
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the United States. It is said that even the British Labor 
Party is no longer seeing the issue as "Capitalism versus 
Socialismn but as nWhat needs to be done and how best to 
do it?u 
In this context, these people claim that a Labor 
Party for this country is not needed, that labor can make 
itself felt and work within the existing parties. In 
Great Britain, at the time the Liberals had repealed the 
Osborne Judgment, this same reasoning was probably 
attempted in order to induce the labor unions to desist 
from continuing to build the Labor Party. In answer to 
the argument against a Labor Party, it could be asked: 
Are not the problems of today so complex and inter-related 
that one solution may affec-t many other sectors of the 
economy, and that a party with an over-all view may be 
necessary for the proper formulation, planning, and 
implementation of consistent policies and programs? It 
is fairly obvious that neither the Democratic nor the 
Republican parties of the present meet that description. 
It might be good judgment that labor can best 
achieve its objectives within the existing parties by 
the labor unions founding a Labor Party as a potential 
threat. Thus, whenever the major party programs do not 
meet with the approval of labor, then a Labor Party 
candidate could be put into the field. It could work with 
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farmers in agricultural areas, and with liberal groups in 
the towns and cities. The very possibility of such a step 
by the unions would put labor in a much stronger position 
especially When it is pointed out that When a pro-labor 
candidate is nominated by the Democrats, the Republicans, 
or whatever major party may exist, that a Labor Party 
candidate would not be placed in opposition. 
The Democrats, above all, cannot afford to have the 
labor vote it usually attracts, or even a good portion of 
it, lost to the Labor Party. Probably the result in many 
instances would be to split the progressive vote and to 
elect the Republicans, and perhaps labor would be willing 
to accept this risk, looking forward to the next and all 
future elections when the Democrats know that they must 
adopt pro-labor policies and candidates if they wish to 
be victorious. In this way, labor would raise itself 
above being confined to the status of only a powerful 
pressure group, but may exert its influence and work 
within the existing parties, and at the same time campaign 
independently if conditions warrant such political action. 
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II 
GENERAL LEGISLATION AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
CONTROLLING LABOR UNION POLITICAL ACTIVITIES 
Chapter Introduction 
In both Great Britain and the United States there 
is general legislation and judicial decisions controlling 
the electoral conduct of individual candidates, political 
parties, campaign committees, and those acting in their 
behalf as agents. It has become commonly recognized that 
such "corrupt practices" laws are desirable to prevent 
the abuse of political power, to guard against the evils 
of undue influence, to meet the dangers of unfair financial 
advantages, to promote honesty in government, and to protect 
the integrity of the democratic process. While not aimed 
specifically at the unions, the application of these laws 
to any group which accepts contributions or makes expendit-
ures for political purposes would include the electoral 
activities of organized labor. Thus, regulations as to 
political committees would apply to the C.I.O.-P.A.c. and 
the A.F.L.'s L.L.P.E. 
Under these general statutes we find publicity 
requirements and provisions for publicity pamphlets. 
Candidates, committees, and others may be obliged to file 
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statements as to contributions and expenditures. There 
are limitations as to the amounts and purposes of campaign 
expenditures. Certain prohibitions exist such as on 
corporate contributions. Individual limitations on 
contributions and various other restrictions have been 
made into law. In addition to these controls, there are 
also certain statutory provisions Which govern numerous 
'"corrupt practices. 11 For example, offers of money or of 
position for political support is outlawed, Civil Service 
employees are given protections, payment for newspaper 
editorial backing is made a crime, political material 
must be properly labeled, and there are penalties for the 
offenses of bribery, fraud, and other illegal practices. 
Publicity Requirements and Publicity Pamphlets 
Great Britain 
Expense accounts. The English Corrupt and Illegal 
Practices Act of 1883, 46-47 Victoria, ch. 51, requires 
the filing of expense accounts by candidates and their 
agents, publicity as to the sources and disbursements of 
the funds so employed. But under the law no accounts are 
required to be filed by party committees. However, even 
though not required to do so, the Labor Party makes a 
detailed accounting of its income and political expendit-
ures, including publication of the exact amounts in its 
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1 
various party funds. Most other parties do not publish 
accounts. The refusal of the Conservative Party to 
publish its accounts has been the subject of reproach 
against the Conservatives by the Labor Party. Conservative 
opposition to a public annual financial statement of its 
accounts has persisted in spite of the Maxwell Fyfe 
Committee on Party Organization recommendation that such 
an accounting is 11the only effective basis from which to 
explain to Conservative supporters the main facts about 
2 
party finance." 
Problem of inclusion. The Conservative leadership 
has regarded the publication of party accounts as undue 
intrusion into their affairs, arguing that "The idea of 
publishing the accounts of political parties is superficially 
attractive. It arises from the instinctive curiosity about 
3 
other peoples 1 affairs which we all share. 11 The Conserva-
tives also raise the problem, how can it be decided what 
legitimately is to be included under the heading of expend-
iture for party purposes? They assert that the accounts 
of the Labor Party represent only a small part of the total 
expenditure on behalf of the Labor Party. Thus, the head-
1 Ivor Bulmer-Thomas, The Party System in Great 
Britain, p. 175. 
2 Ibid, p. 176. 
3 Sydney D. Bailey, Political Parties and the 
Party System in Britain, p. 136. 
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quarters accounts of the national Labor Party do not 
include the financially autonomous constituency Labor 
Parties, and this would be a substantial amount of total 
4 
Labor organization expenditures. 
Further, the Conservatives claim that allowance 
also must be made for the propaganda expenditures and 
educational work of the trade unions, the co-operative 
movement, the retail societies, and the socialist organiza-
tions such as the Fabian Society. Though not incurred 
through the Labor Party itself, the Conservatives argue 
that these groups further the cause of the Labor Party by 
the propagation of socialist principles and that their 
funds are an auxiliary help to the Labor Party. Therefore, 
say the Conservatives, a comparison of campaign expendi t-
ures of the Conservative and Labor parties "would be 
completely misleadingu because the Labor Party is only a 
section of the whole Socialist movement. The Conservatives 
allege that, adding the "political expenditures" of the 
Trade Union Congress, the Co-operative Union, etc., with 
the national Labor Party funds, nthe Socialist Movement 
has at its disposal an income little less than il,OOO,OOO 
a year quite apart from what is raised and spent by the 
5 
Constituency Labour Parties." 
4 ~~ p. 134 
5 Ibid, pp. 136-137. 
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Labor report of 1950. Because the publication of 
party accounts would be liable to be "highly misleading," 
the Conservative Party opposed the Labor Party motion of 
December 15, 1949, "that in the opinion of this House, 
political parties and all other organizations having 
political action as one of their aims should publish 
6 
annually full and adequate statements of their accounts." 
In accordance with the intent of their party's resolution, 
the 1950 Report of the National Executive Committee to the 
Annual Conference of the Labor Party showed a credit 
balance at the end of 1949 of nearly l5oo,ooo. The princi-
pal sources of revenue for that year were the trade unions 
which provided l124,000 in affiliation fees, t27,000 
towards the party's Development Fund, and tl48,000 towards 
the General Election Fund. Constituency Labor Parties 
contributed tlB,OOO in affiliation fees, t7,500 to the 
By-Election Insurance Fund, and i7,000 to the pevelopment 
7 
Fund. 
Groups helping the Conservatives. In answer to the 
Conservative charge that the Labor Party has powerful allies 
whose support is not reflected in the party's budget, Labor 
spokesmen argue that "the nation should know what groups and 
organizations are especially anxious to have a Conservative 
6 Ibid, p. 137 
7 Loc.cit. 
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8 
Government." The Labor Party asserts that "big business 
9 
is actively helping the Tories ••• " It is true that 
organizations such as The Aims of Industry and the Economic 
League, which have the strong support of the powerful 
Federation of British Industries (equivalent to the N.A. M. 
in the United States), engage in anti-socialist propaganda 
and in behalf of the system of society which is advocated 
10 
by the Conservatives. The Aims of Industry is described 
by the Labor Party as "a propaganda body in the interests 
of big business" and in 1948 had, by its own admission, 
received over 78,000 column inches of newspaper space 
11 
"worth no less than i_780,ooo.n The Economic League has 
92 permanent speakers and during 1948 secured over 25,000 
inches of press publicity and distributed nine and one-half 
12 
million leaflets. 
Because the British law does not require publicity 
by political committees, and the fact that the Conservative 
Party does not publish an annual statement of its accounts, 
we shall not discover any official answers to the questions 
raised by the Labor Party concerning the financial backing 
8 Ibid, p. 138. 
9 Loc.cit. 
10 Ibid, PP• 134, 138. 
11 ~~ pp. 138-139. 
12 ~' p. 138. 
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of the Conservatives. Thus, in regard to Great Britain it 
has been observed that nThe subject of party finance awaits 
a full-scale study and anything short of it is bound to be 
13 
tantalizing and inconclusive.n The same source also 
observes, however, that there is no mystery about the 
14 
derivation of Conservative funds. In the past, the 
central work of the party was mainly supported by the 
subscriptions of firms and individuals, the Conservative 
cause securing sufficient financial backing from a 
15 
relatively small number of people. 
But in 1947 the Conservative Party made a public 
appeal for political funds. The Conservative Chairman 
Lord Woolton, admitting that it was a new thing to make 
such an open appeal, stated that in the past the party had 
collected its campaign expenditures 11from a few hundred 
16 
people." Also for the first time, the Conservative 
constituency parties were asked to accept some responsibil-
ity for contributing toward the central funds of the party 
and a large number of them have done so on a quota system 
based on the ratio of the Conservative vote to the runner-up 
in that district, the larger the Conservative margin the 
13 Ibid, p. l34 
14 Ibid, p. 177. 
15 Loc.cit. 
16 Ibid, p. 178. 
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17 
larger the contribution. Today, the Conservative Party 
income is derived from the subscriptions of members and 
18 
proceeds of social activities. 
Government aid for candidates. There is no 
provision in the British law for publicity pamphlets, 
which will be discussed later with reference to the United 
States. However, in England under 8 Geo. V, Ch. 64, Sec. 
33, any candidate for the House of Commons, the lower house 
of the national legislature, is allowed one free mailing 
to all of his constituents. Each candidate can send to 
each registered elector in his constituency one postal 
communication containing matter relating to the election 
only and not exceeding two ounces in weight, free of any 
charge for postage. The obvious aim of this provision is 
to put the wealthy and poor candidates on a more equal 
plane. This is also the purpose behind the granting of 
equal or fairly proportionate radio time, without cost, 
to all political parties. 
United States 
Federal publicity requirements: history. Prior to 
1890, no law had been passed in the United States regulat-
19 
ing the use of money in elections. Indeed, until the 
17 Loc.cit. 
19 James Kerr Pollock Jr., Party Campaign Funds, p. 7. 
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presidential election of 1904, the subject of campaign 
20 
funds had not received any serious public consideration. 
The 1904 Democratic candidate for the Presidency, Judge 
Alton B. Parker, had charged that corporations were 
supplying funds for the Republican campaign in order to 
21 
buy influence with the Administration. Although the 
charge was repeated during the closing days of the 
campaign, public sentiment was not sufficiently aroused 
22 
by it to affect the result of the election. But after 
the 1904 campaign, investigations into corporate political 
activities revealed that, among others, insurance companies 
had made substantial contributions and had concealed these 
23 
campaign donations by questionable bookkeeping methods. 
This scandalous conduct in the financing of political 
campaigns, details of which shall be taken up under restrict-
ions on contributions and expenditures, aroused the public 
24 
to demand legislative action. This stimulus against the 
power and influence of corporation funds being used to 
control the government led President Theodore Roosevelt to 
recommend publicity legislation in his messages to Congress 
20 Loc.cit. 
21 Sen.Doc. No. 495, 62nd Congress, Second Session, 
p. 17. 
22 Pollock Jr., op.cit., p. 9. 
23 Ibid, p. 11. 
24 Ibid, PP• 11-12. 
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25 
in 1904 and 1905. Although publication of the receipts 
and expenditures of political committees was advocated by 
many individuals and groups, including the national Public-
ity Law Association, billa framed by these organizations 
26 
failed to pass in 1906 and 1907. The following year, 
1908, saw both major parties making public their campaign 
27 
funds in a competition for the honor of uopen finances.u 
In his first message to Congress in December, 1909, 
only four years after the first publicity bill had been 
introduced in Congress, President William Howard Taft 
11urgently 11 recommended that a law be passed requiring that 
candidates for Congress and their campaign committees file 
with the government a statement of contributions received 
and expenditures incurred in the campaign for such federal 
28 
election. Encouraged by President Taft's support of 
publicity legis l ation, the National Publicity Law Associa-
tion renewed its efforts in the 6lst Congress and on June 
25, 1910, the first national publicity law was approved, 
providing for public information as to contributions and 
expenditures made for the purpose of influencing elections 
25 Louise Overacker, Presidential Campaign Funds, 
p. 21. 
26 Loc.cit.; Pollock Jr., op.cit., p. 13. 
27 Pollock Jr., op.cit., p. 14. 
28 Ibid, p. 15; see Messages and Papers of the 
Presidents, vol. 10, p. 7807. 
- 127 -
29 
at Which Representatives in Congress are elected. 
Federal publicity requirements: provisions. The 
1910 Act, containing ten sections, required publicity for 
election campaign receipts and expenditures. Political 
committees must make periodic reports, filing a sworn 
statement with the Clerk of the House of Representatives 
in Washington within 30 days after every federal election. 
This should be an itemized statement submitted by the 
treasurer of the political committee showing in detail the 
total of all receipts, the names and addresses of all 
persons contributing $100 or more, the aggregate of all 
contributions of less than $100, the total of all contribu-
tiona, the names and addresses of all persons to whom any 
sum of more than $10 has been paid, the purposes of all 
payments, the total of all disbursements, and a statement 
of outstanding obligations. In addition to political 
committees, the law also applied to 11 every person, firm, 
association, or committee except the political committees, 
that shall expend a sum amounting to $50 or more for the 
purpose of influencing in two or more states the result 
of an election at which Representatives to the Congress 
30 
of the United States are elected ••• fl 
Expenditures for traveling, stationery, postage, 
29 u.s. Statutes at Large, vol. 36, p. 822. 
30 Loc.cit. 
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telephone, and telegraph did not come within these provis-
ions, which penalized every person convicted of violating 
any section of the Act by a fine of not more than $1,000 
or imprisonment of not more than one year, or both. A very 
important compromise in the enactment of the 1910 law was 
the substitution of post-election publicity for the more 
effective pre-election publicity. The next year Congress 
amended the 1910 law. These changes, approved on August 
1911, extended the application of the 1910 Act, which had 
applied only to committees, to include candidates for 
31 
Congress. The 1911 amendments also achieved pre-election 
publicity. The treasurer of a political committee must 
keep a record of all receipts and expenditures and file a 
statement not only within thirty days after the election, 
but also not more than 15 days and not leas than 10 days 
before the election, and a supplementary statement on each 
sixth day thereafter until the election. Candidates for 
the House and Senate must file statements immediately 
32 
before and after the election. 
The 1911 law also applied to federal primaries as 
well as elections. Treasurers of political committees and 
candidates were required to file itemized statements ten 
to fifteen days after any primary or convention at which a 
31 u.s. Statutes at Large, vol. 37, p. 25. 
32 Loc.cit. 
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candidate for Congress was nominated or endorsed. These 
two laws of 1910 and 1911, together with a short amendment 
33 
passed in 1912 simplifying the filing of statements, and 
34 
another amendment in 1918, constitute the sum total of 
federal legislation bearing an campaign expenditures prior 
to 1925. In that year all this legislation with certain 
changes, most of them minor in character, was consolidated 
and became part of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 
35 
1925, which was Title III of the Postal Salaries Increase 
Act passed by Congress on February 28, 1925. The Federal 
Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 remained unchanged until the 
amendments, to be discussed elsewhere, of 1939, 1940, 1943, 
and 1947. There were only three important changes in the 
1925 law affecting national campaign fund publicity. 
First, the law applied only to general elections and 
not to primaries or conventions. This was the result of 
problems raised by court rulings which will be separately 
taken up under federal expenditure limitations in primaries. 
Second was the detailed reporting procedure outlined in 
Section 305 providing for continuous publicity, requiring 
national committees to file quarterly reports "between the 
first and tenth days of March, June, and September, in each 
33 u.s. Statutes at Large, vol. 37, p. 360. 
34 u.s. Statutes at Large, vol. 40, p. 1013. 
35 u.s. Statutes at Large, vol. 43, p. 1070 (68th 
Cong. 2d Sess. P.L. No. 506 Title III app. Feb. 28, 1925). 
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year, and also between the tenth and fifteenth days, and on 
the fifth day, next preceding the date on which a general 
election is to be held, at which candidates are to be elect-
ed in two or more states, and also on the first day of Janu-
ary, ·" together with an affidavit from the treasurer certify-
ing that the report covers all expenditures and contributions 
for the period in question. Statements filed the first of 
January are cumulative and cover the preceding calendar year. 
36 
These reports must be kept as public records for two years. 
The third change in the publicity law broadened the 
definition of political committee. A "political committee" 
is defined as any committee which accepts contributions or 
makes expenditures to influence the election of federal cand-
idates in two or more states, or in a single state if the 
committee is a 11branch or subsidiary" of a national organiza-
tion. A state organization should file first at the conclus-
ion of the primaries when the political committee starts to 
accept contributions and make expenditures for the purpose 
of the elections. No reports are required under the Act if 
campaign work is limited to primaries or the election of 
state or local officials. Nor will the political committee 
have to report if it is not associated with a national organ-
ization and does not engage in federal campaigns outside the 
37 
state. 
36 Loc.cit. 
37 Loc.cit. 
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Publicity requirements as to election campaign 
committees were supplemented by the Federal Regulation of 
Lobbying Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 839, 2 U.S.C.A. Sec. 261 
et seq. Not only was the public to be informed regarding 
the election expenditures of political committees, but 
now was to be enlightened concerning how much is spent to 
influence Congress. The law sets no limits on the amount 
of expenditures but requires that any person or organiza-
tion which receives or spends money for "the principal 
purpose of aiding or influencing legislation11 must file 
sworn quarterly reports of what they spend. But there is 
no specified form for these reports. Also, although the 
Act's constitutionality was upheld, the application of 
the law has been greatly diminished by the recent Supreme 
Court decision in United States v. Rumely, 345 u.s. 41, 
73 s.ct. 543, 97 L.Ed. (1953). 
Rumely, an officer in the Committee for Constitut-
ional Government, Inc., was found by the Supreme Court to 
be innocent of contempt of Congress for refusing to testify 
as to the amount and source of contributions. The Supreme 
Court held, inter alia, that the scope of the Lobbying Act 
did not make this information relevant to the inquiry. 
Further, said the Supreme Court, ''lobbying 11 was not defined 
in the Act and therefore the law should apply the usual 
meaning given to the word by the average citizen, the 
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common understanding should be used. According to the 
Supreme Court majority, the common meaning of "lobbying" 
is "direct communication with members of Congress." But 
Justices Robert Jackson, William Douglas, and Hugo Black 
dissented, protesting that this ruling in effect rewrote 
the Lobbying Act, creating a new and inferior law. 
Thus, under the present direct representations 
interpretation, the Lobbying Act has been construed as not 
covering the cost of printing and distributing "literature" 
designed to influence legislation, nor under this view does 
the Act include the cost of radio or television propaganda. 
Also, the percentage of time lobbyists actually spend with 
legislators is calculated, and only that percentage of their 
salary reported. Similarly, only a fraction of the expense 
of maintaining a Washington office need be reported. Unless 
and until the law is amended to include within the meaning 
of "lobbying" all such expenditures, the public cannot 
expect to know what is being spent by lobbyists to push or 
block legislation. 
Federal publicity requirements: problems. The 
publicity provisions of 1910 and 1911 were brought into use 
for the first time in 1912. In that year detailed financial 
statements filed in Washington gave official figures for 
public information of all money raised and expended by 
political committees for the election of national officers. 
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The presidential election of 1916 saw large sums expended 
by both parties, but it was all carefully accounted for 
in reports filed with the Clerk of the House of Representa-
38 39 
tives. On June 5, 1920, the Senate authorized the 
Committee on Privileges and Elections to conduct an investi-
gation into the receipts and disbursements of political 
committees in the campaign about to begin. Presided over 
by Senator Kenyon of Iowa, thi s Committee went into the 
question of party finance further than any previous invest-
igation and '~~ the value of its work cannot be over-estimated 
40 
by any serious student of the subject.n 
Thousands of pages of testimony were taken, and 
figures of party expenditures were secured which until then 
had been entirely unavailable. 11There is no doubt but that 
the committee aided materially in checking any undue 
expenditure of money, as also in providing unusual publicity 
41 
in the matter of campaign funds. 11 However, while there 
is general agreement that there has been compliance with 
the laws requiring publicity, the statements filed do not 
serve the purposes of publicity because hardly anyone 
42 
bothers to look at them and they are scarcely ever published. 
38 Pollock Jr., op.cit., pp. 17-18. 
39 Gong. Rec., vol. 59, pp. 8637-8643. 
40 Pollock Jr., op.cit., p. 19. 
41 Loc.cit. 
42 Ibid, pp. 185-188. 
- 134 -
This is so in spite of the fact that in actual practice 
the reports are kept indefinitely and afford the press~ 
the public, and the research worker a continuing and 
fascinating story of the financing of presidential elec-
43 
tiona. Furthermore~ to say that they give an absolutely 
accurate and complete story would be far from the truth. 
There is no requirement for a uniformity of reports 
or a regular system of accounting. No public officer is 
officially vested with the responsibility of examining the 
records and reporting violations to the Attorney General. 
It should not be surprising that researchers have found 
the statements filed diverse in their method of reporting 
receipts and expenditures, making it extremely difficult 
44 
to assemble comparable data. It has been observed that 
the Democratic accounts present a better appearance than 
the Republican accounts, and that the Democrats usually 
comply with the requirements of giving total figures, but 
45 
that the Republicans do not. Therefore~ in actuality 
43 Overacker, op.cit., p. 23. 
44 Loc.cit. 
45 Pollock Jr., op.cit., pp. 189-190. "In order to 
secure them, one must go through all the reports, put down 
the sums carried forward each time and add them all up. 
There is scarcely an account on file which would pass the 
scrutiny of an accountant hired by the government to deter-
mine whether the accounts were properly filed according to 
law. It can hardly be imagined that any business man would 
allow his books to be kept in a way that party treasurers 
keep the irs. 11 
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there is no pub~!city except for scholars. There is no 
requirement for effective publication of these reports. 
They are unsatisfactorily drawn, there is no checking upon 
them, and they are known if at all only after the election. 
State publicity requirements: history. The states 
were the first to secure legislation controlling the conduct 
of political campaigns. In 1890 New York passed the first 
46 
state corrupt practices law. This law did not regulate 
political committees but applied only to the expenditures of 
the candidates themselves. Limited in scope and otherwise 
defective, nevertheless it represented a beginning and gave 
an indication that public interest was being enlisted. In 
the following year Colorado and Michigan also enacted laws 
modeled after the New York statute, but improved upon the 
New York provisions by extend i ng to political committees the 
requirement of publicity in the matter of receipts and expend-
itures. In 1892 Michigan passed a more elaborate law which 
went further in the direction of the thorough-going English 
Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act of 1883 than any of the 
other statutes mentioned. Massachusetts followed in 1892 
with a law requiring almost complete campaign fund publicity, 
whereupon California, Missouri, and Kansas came forward in 
47 
quick succession with similar legislation. State after 
46 Sen. Doc. No. 89, 59th Cong., First Seas., p. 5. 
47 Loc.cit. 
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state enacted publicity laws until today the requirement o~ 
~iling a statement o~ receipts and expenditures is the most 
universal feature of corrupt practices laws. Only two 
states do not require these statements, Illinois and Rhode 
48 
Island. 
State publicity requirements: provisions. Ten 
states require the statement o~ candidates only, while 
thirty-six require such ~iling ~rom both candidates and 
parties. Usually the statement is to be filed with the 
secretary of state ~or state-wide offices and with county 
or city clerks or county probate judges in the case o~ 
county or city offices. Most states stipulate that these 
returns shall be open to the public and shall be kept for 
periods varying from six months to three years, or that 
they shall become part o~ the public records. Surprisingly, 
a few states make no provisions ~or preservation of these 
papers once they are filed. As to the time o~ ~iling, there 
is no uni~onnity. Most common are provisions for a double 
~iling, before and a~ter the general election, or a single 
filing after a general election. The time limit for ~iling 
be~ore or after elections varies from seven to thirty days. 
Because the interest in the election is still high, one o~ 
the most e~fective ways of publicizing the expenditures of 
49 
candidates is through the pre-election ~iling provisions. 
48 s. Signey Minault, Corrupt Practices Legislation 
in the 48 States, p. 4. 
49 Ibid, pp. 4-5. 
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Several state statutes require that the books kept 
by all treasurers be open to inspection by rival candidates 
at all reasonable times and these states empower the courts 
to enforce this provision by injunction. In fifteen states, 
the for.ms upon which the statements are made are provided 
by the state, While in four more the for.m is prescribed by 
law or by the secretary of state. A amall number of states 
further require an affidavit or oath by the candidate that 
all expenditures have been made for a legal purpose. A 
small number of states require that vouchers be submitted 
for all e.xpendi tures over a certain sum, usually ~p5 or $10. 
In addition to filing the statement with a state official, 
two states, Georgia and Maine, require that the statement 
be published in a newspaper. Of the 46 states requiring 
the filing of a statement of receipts and expenditures, 
all but four require the listing of unpaid debts in the 
statement. This is unfortunately a serious shortcoming 
which may give the unscrupulous candidate a means of 
avoiding the listing of illegal or embarrassing contribu-
50 
tions. 
It is a universal requirement that the statement 
contain the names of the persons to whom payment has been 
made or from whom contributions have been received, yet 
only Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina, and Ohio 
50 Ibid, p. 5. 
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(the latter in referenda campaigns only) stipulate that 
the address as well as the name of the contributor or 
payee be submitted. When the difficulty of checking the 
statements of candidates as to proper disbursements is 
considered, the importance of requiring the address of 
donors and receivers becomes apparent. Two states, 
Montana and Nevada, specify that a duplicate of the 
expense account be given the treasurer of the opposing 
51 
candidate. 
An interesting control is found in the New Jersey 
statute requiring all political funds to be deposited in 
a bank. Twenty days after an election, all deposit slips 
and all vouchers are to be filed in the same office as are 
required to be filed the petitions for nomination, that of 
secretary of state or county clerk. Furthermore, it is 
also stipulated that no candidate or any person, corpora-
tion, or association may withdraw funds from the bank 
except through a written order by the campaign manager 
authorizing the withdrawal and upon a form prescribed by 
52 
the state and detailing the purpose of the withdrawal. 
State publicity requirements: problems. Weaknesses 
in publicity laws include the post-election publication 
rather than the desirable pre-election publicity, whether 
51 Loc.cit. 
52 Ibid, pp. 5-6. 
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the returns made correspond to the actualities, failure in 
many states to require party filing as well as candidate 
filing, failure to require statements as to the borrowing 
of campaign funds, failure to stipulate that the address 
as well as the name of the donors and receivers be listed 
in the returns, and failure to provide for official inspect-
53 
ion of the statements filed. Undoubtedly the greatest 
weakness of the corrupt practices statutes of the various 
states lies in the difficulty of providing adequate enforce-
54 
ment. In many states provisions for such enforcement are 
entirely lacking, while in others adequate provisions may 
55 
be nullified by the action of the courts. 
According to the enforcement provisions of their 
statutes, states might be divided into two categories: 
those having nautomaticu enforcement of their corrupt 
practices laws, and those leaving such enforcement to 
private individuals. By 11automaticn enforcement is meant 
that the official with whom the statement is filed must 
report either the failure on the part of the candidate to 
53 Charles E. Merriam and Harold F. Gosnell, The 
American Party System, p. 405. 
54 Minault, op.cit., p. 6. 
55 For an excellent treatment of the still confused 
juridical and constitutional questions of corrupt practices 
legislation, consult Judicial .Decisions Affectin~ the 
Corrupt Practices Laws, Sen. Doc. No. 203, 76th ~ong., Third 
Seas., and Constitutionality of Corrupt Practices Acts, 
69 A.L.R. 377 • . 
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file the statement (seven states have this requirement only), 
or, after ex~1ination of the statement, the expenditure by 
the candidate or his treasurer of sums larger than allowed 
or of illegal expenditures (ten states have both these 
requirements) to the prosecuting officer. The latter must 
investigate and, should he find that the law has been violat-
ed, must begin criminal proceedings. In practice, however, 
it is found that very rarely does a prosecuting officer ever 
56 
bring charges, even when violations are known to him. 
That the nautomatic" method of enforcemant contains 
imperfections is also attested by the fact that some three 
states further stipulate that, should the prosecuting officer 
fa:il to bring charges against a delinquent candidate, the 
prosecuting officer shall himself be guilty of a corrupt 
practice punishable by severe penalties. The majority of the 
states still leave the initiative of the enforcement of their 
corrupt practice acts to private individuals, either to the 
defeated candidate or a number of qualified voters, usually 
five. Should the latter wish to contest the election they 
file a petition, together with sufficient sureties, with a 
designated court either for an audit of the expenditures or 
alleging any violation of the state statute. It is usually 
stated that the proceedings are to be given precedence, so 
far as is possible, over other matters before the court and 
56 Minault, op.cit., pp. 6-7; Louise Overacker, Money 
in Elections, p. 353. 
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the costs are assessed as in equity cases. Appeal is 
57 
usually allowed. 
The court certifies its findings to a prosecuting 
officer for appropriate action or, in the case of a success-
ful candidate, to the attorney general of the state for quo 
warranto proceedings to void the election and declare the 
office vacant. In the case of a state legislative office, 
the findings are certified to the presiding officer of the 
proper legislative body. Where a member of Congress is 
involved, the findings are certified to the governor of the 
state for transmission to the presiding officer of the approp-
riate chamber. Legislative houses, of course, are the sole 
judges of the qualifications of their members. Although fines. 
58 
and imprisonment, or both, are the most common penalties for 
violation of state corrupt practices statutes, such as failure 
to file or exceeding the expenditure limit, it is difficult to 
get convictions under these laws. A greater use of forfeiture 
of office and disqualification to hold office, as in Oklahoma 
which stipulates permanent disqualification, might have a 
59 
beneficial result. 
57 Minault, Ibid. 
58 In addition to state provisions, Maine's law requires 
municipal officials to file a campaign expense account with the 
local clerk within fifteen days after the election, subject to 
a fine of $25 a day for each day the report is delayed, and for-
feiture of salary until the official has con1plied with the law. 
59 Minault, op.cit., pp. 7-8 for a summary of the various 
state enforcement procedures; Merriam, op.cit., p. 412. 
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The provision withholding a certificate of election 
from a candidate who has not complied with all aspects of 
the law has given rise to a number of court proceedings. 
'livnere no willful intention of evading the law can be shown., 
the courts have generally interpreted these provisions 
60 
liberally. Thus it has been that although the corrupt 
practices acts contain general publicity requirements., of a 
statement filed for public record with details as to time 
61 
and manner of filing, they have not been particularly 
effective in publicizing the returns of candidates and 
committees, or even in securing the proper information in 
the first place. Just because most candidates and political 
committees are faithful in filing is no guarantee that these 
statements are accurate. One student of the subject believes 
that 11 there is a great deal of perjury, perhaps as high as 
62 
so%, in these sworn statements.u It should also be noted, 
however, that often failures to file are by candidates who 
are not acquainted with the law or who make very small or 
63 
even no expenditures. Irregularities of this type are an 
entirely different question from wilful violations. 
60 Judicial Decisions Affecting the Corrupt Practices 
Laws, Sen. Doc. No. 203, 76th Gong • ., Third Seas., pp. 33-41; 
Louise Overacker, Money in Elections., chapter XIII for an 
evaluation of states' corrupt practices acts provisions. 
61 Pollock Jr., op.cit., pp. 237-239. 
62 Ibid, pp. 240-241. 
63 Loc.cit. 
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As a result of very defective legal provisions, 
state regulations regarding publicity have been reduced 
61 
to a sheer farce. About half the disbursements are listed 
62 
simply as for 11 servicesn without any further explanation. 
The required returns list ridiculously small expenditures 
63 
and often there have been no returns at all. "As a rule, 
64 
the reports are worthless." The early legislation passed 
in the nineties died of neglect, the machinery for enforce-
ment being so ill-contrived and clumsy that no vigorous 
application of them was possible. Although after 1904 
public opinion was more awake to the possibilities of these 
measures and there was much closer attention given to the 
65 
practical application of the laws, defects still remain. 
Summarizing, what is presumed to be publicity is now 
required, but we have seen there is little real publicity. 
No candidate need hesitate to file an expense statement of 
almost any kind, because he knows that it will never be 
61 Merriam, op.cit., p. 412; Pollock Jr., op.cit., 
pp. 243-254 for a discussion of typical examples of how the 
publicity laws are often made a sham. 
62 Pollock Jr., op.cit., p. 242. 
63 Merriam, Ibid; but it has been pointed out that 
in Massachusetts where the 1922 primaries saw 1149 returns 
filed from candidates for nomination, there were 93 who 
failed to file, and the majority of these did so when 
requested by the Attorney General. Most of the failures 
to file were not wilful. Pollock Jr., op.cit., pp. 240-241. 
64 Pollock Jr., op.cit., p. 242. 
65 Merriam, Ibid. 
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brought to light. Many of the defects mentioned could be 
remedied if adequate publicity could be required. How can 
this be done? In addition to the statement being filed 
with a public officer, Georgia and New Hampshire require 
the candidate to publish the figures of his expenditures 
in two newspapers of general circulation in the state. It 
has been suggested that each secretary of state be required 
to release to the press the figures of individual and party 
66 
expenditures filed in his office. 
Publicity pamphlets. Although in the United States 
there is no federal provision for publicity pamphlets, 
several states have experimented with an official state 
bulletin or "publicity pamphlet. 11 These states include 
Montana (1913-1918), South Dakota (1916-1921), and Wyoming 
67 
(1911-1919}. In North Dakota a law was passed in 1911 
for official election pamphlets printed by the state in 
which each candidate was given an equal amount of space 
for propaganda purposes, the cost of which was shared 
equally by the candidates, but this interesting feature was 
changed in 1923 so that the publicity pamphlet is now issued 
only when constitutional amendments and other measures are 
submitted to the people. The pamphlet is distributed free 
68 
of charge to all registered voters. 
66 Pollock Jr., op.cit., pp. 246-247. 
67 Howard R. Penniman, Sait 1 s American Parties and 
Elections, p. 554. 
68 Loc.cit., Minault, op.cit., p. 2. 
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A Colorado law of 1913 never became effective, its 
validity requiring an amendment to the state constitution. 
A Florida law applying only to primaries, nomination in 
which is usually tantamount to election in that state, 
69 
was repealed in 1935. Through the office of secretary 
of state and with the approval of the attorney general, 
who is also authorized to simplify the wording of all 
referendum questions without changing the essential meaning 
of these questions, Massachusetts mails at public expense 
to each registered voter a copy of state referendum 
questions well in advance of the election, together with 
the complete text of the majority and minority reports of 
the legislative committees which considered the proposals. 
With reference to candidates, Oregon in 1908 was the 
first state to issue publicity pamphlets to every registered 
70 
voter. The Oregon law, as amended, is today the most 
71 
outstanding example of publicity pamphlet statutes and 
provides that the state executive committee of any political 
party "may file with the secretary of state protrait cuts 
of its candidates and typewritten statements and arguments 
for the success of its principles and the election of its 
candidates, and opposing or attacking the principles and 
69 Penniman, Ibid. 
70 Pollock Jr., op.cit., p. 104 
71 Oregon Election Laws, 1923, Sec. 4119. 
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72 
candidates of all other parties." Independent candid-
ates enjoy a like privilege. The material is printed in 
pamphlet for.m and mailed to the voters at least ten days 
73 
before the election. 
For each page in the publicity pamphlet there is 
a charge of fifty dollars for the cost of printing which 
is borne by the political parties, or the independent 
candidate, although the binding and distribution of the 
pamphlets is paid for by the state in an effort to provide 
reasonable means of publicity at public expense for 
parties and candidates as a means of aiding the electorate 
to make an intelligent choice. The maximum allowance of 
space is two pages for an independent candidate and twenty-
four pages for a political party. At fifty dollars per 
74 
page, each party can spend $1200.00 for this one item. 
Experience has shown that not all the allotted apace is 
taken and in a typical election only one-half of the space 
75 
is used and sometimes as little as one-third. 
The Democratic State Committee is more likely to 
buy space in this publication than the Republicans because 
the Democrats feel that it is an aid to their party, 11 the 
more information the voter has the more readily he votes 
72 Loc.cit. 
73 Loc.cit. 
74 Loc.cit. 
75 Penniman, ~; Pollock Jr., Ibid. 
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76 
our ticket." On the other hand, the Republicans take a 
dim view of the publicity pamphlet. They prefer to spend 
money in newspapers or print their own party literature 
because they claim that the voters don't pay much attention 
to the publicity pamphlet. However, the pamphlets have 
been continued by the state as a means of educating the 
77 
average voter. This type of state aid is considered by 
writers on this subject to be the most beneficial manner 
78 
of reducing corrupt practices at elections. 
As stated in the preamble, the purpose of the Oregon 
law is "as nearly as possible11 to prevent the use of any 
79 
means but arguments addressed to the voters• reason. The 
spending of large sums of money in the elections "tends to 
the choice of none but rich men or tools of wealthy corpora-
tions to important offices, and thus deprives the people's 
government of the services of its poorer citizens regardless 
80 
of their ability.n The law proceeds, therefore, to set 
a very severe limitation upon expenditures. Beyond his 
contribution toward the cost of the statement appearing in 
the publicity pamphlet, a candidate is restricted to a sum 
76 Pollock Jr., op.cit., p. 105. 
77 Loc.cit. 
78 Minault, Ibid. 
79 Oregon Election Laws, 1923, Sec. 4119. 
80 Loc.cit. 
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not exceeding ten per cent of one year's salary of the 
81 
office he is seeking. 
82 
governor is $750. 
Ten per cent of the salary of 
Obviously such slender resources will not permit a 
candidate to make himself known to almost 800,000 voters 
scattered over an area of more than 96,000 square miles. 
His portrait and a one or two page statement in the publici-
ty pamphlet is helpful but cannot substitute for a campaign 
83 
which involves a serious discussion of political issues. 
Not only does Oregon's drastic solution of the campaign 
fund problem over-emphasize the value of the publicity 
pamphlet, but if a real effort were to be made to guarantee 
both the information needed by the electorate and to prevent 
excessive campaign expenses, it would be necessary for the 
state to cover the entire cost of these pamphlets a~d, in 
addition, to appropriate the proper, reasonable, and legiti-
mate expenses of campaigning, or to provide such an amount 
to meet any deficit occasioned by stringent prohibitions on 
84 
contributions above a certain amount. 
81 Loc.cit. 
82 Penniman, Ibid. 
83 Ibid, p. 555. 
84 Loc.cit.; Pollock Jr., op.cit., pp. 106-110. 
Underwriting the cost of political campaigns was suggested by 
President Theodore Roosevelt to Congress in 1907, Messages and 
Papers of the Presidents, vol. 10, p. 7486. Under his proposal, 
private contributions would still be permitted; there would be 
no giving up the right of personal financial support. 
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Expenditure limitations 
Great Britain 
In addition to requiring publicity, a sworn statement 
as to the receipts, sources, and disbursements of campaign 
funds of individual candidates, the English Corrupt and 
Illegal Practices Act, 46-47 Victoria, ch. 51 (1883), strictly 
limits the amounts Which can be expended in furtherance of 
the election of a particular member of Parliament, restricting 
both the aggregate sums that may be spent and also the manner 
in Which such funds may be expended by forbidding expenditures 
for certain purposes and enumerating the objects upon which 
money may be lawfully spent. Great Britain per.mits a candid-
ate to spend for each registered voter ten cents in a borough 
constituency and twelve cents in a county constituency, 
together with small sums to cover personal expenses and the 
salary of an election agent. In addition to this, however, 
the Central Office may spend as much as it pleases in the 
general interests of the party as a whole, the law in Great 
Britain being concerned only with the outlay in behalf of 
87 
individual candidates. 
As borough and county constituencies are equal in 
number, the maximum expenditure for individual candidates 
88 
averages eleven cents for each registered voter. In the 
87 Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act, 46-47 Victoria, 
ch. 51 (1883). 
88 Penniman, op.cit., p. 539. 
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three elections of 1922, 1923, and 1924, according to the 
official figures including all permitted expenditures, the 
total average expenditure was twenty-two cents for each 
89 
registered voter. For purposes of comparison, if we 
assume that in the United States local committees spend no 
more than do state committees and if we base calculations on 
the whole number of adults, the two major parties spent for 
each adult some thirty-seven cents in 1936 and forty-five 
90 
cents in 1940. It should be noted that this figure for 
each adult is not a correct comparison with Great Britain 
because not all adults in the United States are registered 
voters, and that for each registered voter the amount would 
be much larger. 
United States 
Federal expenditure limitations: history. Campaigning 
in a constituency of well over 60,000,000 voters, as is the 
case in presidential elections, is necessarily expensive. 
uThe choice of the voter cannot, in the nature of things, be 
among men whom he knows, but must be among men whom he does 
not know. The making and selling of these pictures is the 
91 
costly part of campaigning for the presidency.n For example, 
89 Loc.cit. 
90 Loc.cit. 
91 Louise Overacker, Presidential Campaign Funds, p. 4. 
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in the 1944 campaign the national committees of the two 
92 
major parties spent for radio time alone over $1,500,000. 
Not only do the national committees of the political parties 
spend money, but we must remember that in a hotly contested 
election numerous non-party organizations also customarily 
enter the field. 
Thus, in the campaign of 1928 the Democratic presi-
dential candidate, New York Governor Alfred E. Smith, aroused 
strong emotions by his attitude on prohibition. National 
and state organizations of the Anti-Saloon League spent close 
to $1,500,000, and the Association Against the Prohibition 
Amendment spent nearly $500 1 000. A single individual contri-
93 
buted $172,800 to a variety of anti-Smith organizations. 
In this bitterly fought campaign, the Republican National 
Committee spent over $4,000,000 in behalf of Herbert Hoover 
and the Democratic National Committee spent over $3,000,000 
for Alfred E. Smith. If state committees and independent 
organizations are included, over $ 9,000,000 was spent to 
elect Hoover and over $7,000,000 in behalf of Smith. It is 
not known how much local committees spent, but the total for 
the campaign was probably well over $20,000,000. 11 Certainly 
94 
the total was larger than in any previous campaign." 
92 Ibid, P• 5. 
93 Ibid, pp. 6-7. 
94 Ibid, p. 12. 
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The 1932 campaign was fought mainly on the depression 
issue and the way out, including problems of unemployment, 
agricultural relief, and the extent of governmental expendi-
tures for welfare and refor.m. Also in dispute were the 
prohibition and tariff questions, and other but less import-
95 
ant election factors. As reflecting in the national 
committee reports required by law, the Republican Party 
was the choice of 11Wall Street" and spent more than the Demo-
96 
crats who drew more heavily upon very small contributors. 
The wider distribution of Democratic financial support to some 
extent foreshadowed the widely distributed popular vote of 
that party. Despite the larger campaign chest against them, 
the Democrats won. It was not the financial outlay of the 
parties but the economic condition of the country following 
the crisis of 1929 which was to be determinant of the outcome. 
Important as campaign resources are, in 1932 the 
people wanted a change. Their feelings of discontent were 
too deep-seated to be displaced by Republican arguments, and 
"the Democrats undoubtedly would have won regardless of how 
97 
much the Republicans might have spent." Although the radio 
had been used as early as 1924 in a presidential election, 
95 Roy v. Peel and Thomas c. Donnelly, The 1932 
Campaign An Analysis, pp. 123-142. 
96 See Louise Overacker's Money in Elections for a 
thorough consideration o~ campaign finances. 
97 Peel, op.cit., p. 122. 
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and was more extensively employed in the 1928 Smith-Hoover 
contest, in 1932 the radio industry put the conventions of 
the two parties on the air free of charge. But thereafter 
the parties had to pay for their radio time. All the 
addresses of the presidential candidates were carried over 
national hookups. The cost of an evening hour's broadcast 
over the combined networks of the Columbia and National 
98 
Broadcasting Companies in 1932 was $35,000 1 and the radio 
billa of the two parties constituted one of their largest 
99 
items of campaign expenditure. 
Where the radio had not materially influenced the 
1928 result, it did increase support for the Democrats in 
1932. The 1928 radio presentations of both Smith and Hoover 
were unpleasant, Hoover being dull and uninteresting, and 
Smith had offended many voters with his raucus speech. But 
in 1932 the sparkling radio personality of Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt, his apparent simplification and clarification in 
explaining the issues, gave him a decided advantage. The 
only chance President Herbert Hoover had to win the election 
for the Republicans against the challenge of New York's 
Governor Roosevelt was dependent upon the return of a measure 
of prosperity in the late summer or early fall months of 1932. 
But Republican hopes were in vain. Instead of improving, 
98 Peel, op.cit., p. 116. 
99 Ibid, p. 121. 
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100 
conditions got worse. 
In 1936 the ultra-conservative, if not reactionary, 
Liberty League spent over $500,000 in its futile attempt 
to .11 stop Roosevelt." In the same campaign, not to mention 
the labor union's substantial direct contributions to the 
Democratic Party, Labor's Non-Partisan League spent 
$170,000 to continue the New Deal by helping re-elect 
101 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The combined expendi-
t~res of the two national committees in 1936 exceeded 
$14,000,000, considerably above their 1928 expenditures. 
It is not known how much was spent by state and local 
political committees and therefore one cannot say with 
certainty whether the total expenditures in the 1936 
campaign were more or less than the previous high in 1928. 
It is known, however, that the defeated Republicans spent 
much more than the victorious Democrats who swept the 
country in the greatest presidential landslide in American 
102 
political history. 
The three presidential elections of 1928, 1932, and 
1936 went by without amendment to the 1925 Corrupt Practices 
Act. Up to 1940, with the exception of the 1907 enactment 
of the prohibition of contributions from national banks and 
100 Ibid, p. 122. 
101 Overacker, Presidential Campaign Funds, pp. 6-7. 
102 Ibid, p. 17. 
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corporations to be noted elsewhere, regulations affecting 
presidential, as distinct from congressional, elections 
consistently applied the principle of publicity rather than 
103 
prohibition. Although duly organized state or local 
committees of a political party were specifically placed 
outside the scope of the 1925 Act, we have seen that the 
treasurers of political committees coming within the scope 
of the Act, those attempting to influence the choice of 
presidential electors in two or more states or those acting 
as subsidiaries of a national organization, were required 
to file reports with the Clerk of the House. 
One careful observer believes that until 1940 we 
were moving slowly but steadily in the direction of effective 
publicity, and that the voters were becoming increasingly 
aware of the extent to which they did and did not pay their 
104 
own political bills. At the same time, the party 
national committees were assuming more responsibility for 
the collection and distribution of funds, a trend toward 
centralization which greatly facilitated the assembling of 
pertinent information. Our picture of the financing of 
presidential campaigns was still incomplete,- but it was 
becoming steadily more complete and clear cut. With more 
experience, patience and imagination, the gaps in the 1925 
103 Ibid, pp. 22-23. 
104 Ibid, p. 24. 
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legislation might have been filled in, and the defects 
105 
remedied. 
Federal expenditure limitations: provisions. In 
1940, however, Congress unfortunately abandoned the path 
of publicity. Rather than tightening the publicity 
requirements, prohibitions were to be attempted. The 1925 
Federal Corrupt Practices Act was amended by Hatch Act II 
enacted in 1940 to place a limitation upon the amount 
106 
expended by both candidates and committees. Individual 
expenditures for the election of United States Senators 
are restricted to $10,000 and of United States Representa-
tives to $2,500, or an amount equal to the amount obtained 
by multiplying three cents by the total number of votes 
cast at the last election for the office the candidate 
seeks but in no event exceeding $25,000 if a candidate for 
107 
the Senate or ~5,000 if a candidate for the House. 
Although backed by criminal sanctions, this prohibition 
108 
was passed w.ith little thought to enforcement provisions. 
105 Loc.cit. 
106 u.s. Statutes at Large, Vol. 54, p. 767, 76th 
Gong . 3rd Sess. Public Law No. 753, approved July 19, 1940. 
107 Loc.cit. 
108 The bill, s. 3046, was introduced January 8 7 1940. 
For Senate action, see Gong. Rec., vol. 86, pp. 2720-2723, 
2852-2866, 2969-2987, 9495-9497, 76th Gong. 3rd Seas., March 
12, 14, 18, and July 11, 1940. For House action, see pages 
7506, 9360-9380, 9426-9464, June 4, and July 9, 10, 1940. 
For newspaper comment see the New York Times, page one, 
March 15, 1940. The bill was signed into law July 19, 1940. 
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The most sweeping prohibition of the 1940 amendment, 
the $3,000,000 limitation upon the expenditures of national 
political committees, did not a ppear until the bill was 
109 
reported from the Judiciary Committee of the House. In 
the House there had been no debate on the $3 1 000,000 ceiling, 
but the House amendments to the original Senate bill were 
110 
accepted without change and without debate. Thus was 
this step taken without discussion of the important change 
in policy which it involved, with no explanation of the 
fairness of the standards set, and with no regard to the 
way these prohibitions would affect existing publicity 
111 
features. Dr. Louise Overacker comments, u ••• proceeding 
by the rule of 'by guess and by gosh,' we launched a totally 
new attack upon the problem of campaign funds, applying a 
totally different formula, with no consideration of its 
112 
merits or probable consequences." 
The 1940 limitation on the expenditures of any 
''political committee" (as defined in the 1925 Act) in any 
113 
calendar year to $3,000,000 was a most severe attempt 
to reduce the size of campaign funds considering the almost 
109 Loc.cit. 
110 Loc.cit. 
111 Overacker, Presidential Cam2aign Funds, p. 24. 
112 ~' p. 27 
113 Section 6 of U.S. Statutes at Large, vol. 54, 
p. 767, 76th Gong. 3rd Seas. P.L. No. 753, app. July 19, 1940. 
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$ 9,000 1 000 spent in 1936 by the Republican national organiza-
114 
tion and also considering that the legislation contained 
no flexibility for changes in the size of the electorate. 
Further, the law in regard to individual campaign expendit-
ures could be made even more restrictive by state action 
because the 1940 Act expressly added the provision that no 
candidate for the United States Senate or House of Represent-
atives could spend in the furtherance of his nomination and 
election more than the particular state made lawful. 
Of course, a public statement of receipts and expendi-
tures was still required of candidates and committees. How-
ever, not included as an expenditure would be any amount 
spent by the candidate for himself alone for his 11necessary 11 
travel and subsistence, stationery and postage, writing or 
printing other than in newspapers or on billboards, distribu-
ting letters, circulars, and posters, for telegraph, tele-
phone, and various other campaign services. These items 
need not be shown on the returns required to be filed, and 
in most cases the itemized statement of the candidate's 
expenditures includes only those items falling outside the 
excepted classes. Thus, the candidate may spend large sums 
for letters, circulars, and telegrams, and leave no hint of 
his total outlay in his report. His friends may spend huge 
sums for workers on election day, as long as they keep him 
114 Overacker. Presidential Campaign Funds, pp. 27-28. 
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115 
blissfully ignorant of What they are doing. 
Federal expenditure limitations: problems. It has 
been observed in regard to individual candidates that the 
whole outlay of an active campaign might be listed under 
the "personal" exemptions and that as a matter of fact the 
maximum allowance may be greatly exceeded without violation 
of the statute through the very large expenditures perrnitted 
116 
by these unlimited campaign exemptions. As with candid-
ates, the legislative language regarding political committees 
lacked precision. Did the $3,000,000 limitation apply 
collectively to all committees supporting the same candidates 
or, as has been interpreted by the committees themselves, 
separately to each? The limitations forced the parties, 
if they were to continue their same amount of spending, to 
discover other ways of financing their campaigns. 
This was done very easily by the Republicans by 
staggering their bookkeeping methods so as to include presi-
dential year expenditures under other years, the establish-
ment of a series of separate state finance committees, and 
the organization of national political agencies operating 
independently of the national committee. Although Senator 
Hatch, the author of the 1940 Act, disagreed, these Republican 
organizations insisted that the limitations permitted an 
115 Merriam, op.cit., p. !10. 
116 Penniman, op.cit., pp. 571-572. 
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expenditure of $3 ,000,000 by each political committee, and 
that it had not been the intention of Congress to limit to 
$3,000,000 the aggregate expenditure of all national organ-
117 
izations supporting the Republicans. Thus, enormous 
sums were spent in the 1940 campaign. The $3,000,000 
limitation did not achieve its purpose of reducing over-all 
118 
expenditures. 
It is interesting to study the effects of the 
ljji3,000,000 limitation upon the expenditures of the two 
national committees as contrasted with the total expendit-
ures of all political agencies in the 1940 campaign. As 
compared with 1936, when the combined major party expendit-
ure by the national committees was $14,087,713, the 1940 
national committee expenditure was $6,234,964. The Repub-
licans went $451,310 over the legal limit of $3,000,000 as 
119 
compared with 1936 expenditures of $8,892,972. The 
misleading nature of looking at the national committee 
expenditures can be easily understood when one knows that 
after the passage of the 1940 Act the Republicans raised 
over ~p6,600,000 through their newly organized series of 
state party finance committees to aid their presidential 
120 
candidate directly or indirectly. 
Furthermore, non-party agencies were so numerous that 
118 Penniman, Ibid. 
119 Overacker, Presidential Campaign Funds, pp. 27-28. 
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in no previous campaign in our history were they so import-
121 
ant, adding another $3,000,000 to the Republican campaign. 
The limitation, according to Senate Report No. 47, page 13, 
1941, "served to direct the flow of campaign funds in excess 
of that amount into channels other than those of the tradi-
tional party committees, i.e.--(a) independent political 
committees, each of which believed itself legally entitled 
to spend up to the $31 000,000 limitation; (b) state and local 
committees ostensibly supporting state candidates but actually 
working for the national ticket as well.~' The money spent 
on behalf of the Democrats totaled close to $6,000,000 whereas 
the expenditures aiding the Republicans reached the impressive 
122 
sum of $14,9411 000. 
The total spent by the two parties in 1940 was 
~20,787,000. "It is not without its touch of irony that in 
the first presidential campaign in which we attempted to 
place a ceiling upon expenditures, more money was spent than 
123 
in any previous election.n If the legal limit of i 3,000,000 
was to be an aggregate, the Democrats spent almost double the 
limit, and the Republicans spent close to five times that 
limit. SomeWhat embarrassed by their campaign expenditures, 
the Republicans claimed that the New Deal expenditures for 
121 Ibid, p. 33. 
122 Ibid, p. 34. 
123 Ibid, P• 35. 
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relief, W.P.A. projects and the like, should be added to 
124 
the Democratic campaign expenditures. The argument 
suggests some of the difficulties of trying to equalize 
the resources at the disposal of the candidates by 
limiting the funds Which may be spent in their behalf. 
These difficulties in determining the amount of 
campaign expenditures should not be dismissed lightly. 
If we attempt to eliminate or minimize differentials by 
placing a "ceilingn upon campaign funds, we must recognize 
the services of the party organization, of the party press, 
and of associations indirectly political but directly 
involved in a particular campaign. How can the expenditures 
of an individual candidate be ascertained when there are 
many candidates of the same party being publicized at the 
same time? What should, or can, be done concerning the 
relief funds about which the Republicans have complained, 
non-party but political organizations, or even the innuendos 
of radio commentators? The support given to a candidate or 
the help to a party by a favorable press certainly cannot 
be measured in terms of dollars and cents and appears upon 
125 
no account of campaign expenditures. 
The chief effect of the 1940 $3,000,000 ceiling was 
to decentralize the collection and distribution of funds. 
124 Ibid, pp. 18-19. 
125 Ibid, p. 19; Merriam, op.cit., p. 410. 
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Prior to Hatch Act II both parties discouraged independent 
money-raising committees and there was a conspicuous trend 
126 
toward centralization in the field of party finance. It 
was a trend which led to a concentration of responsibility 
within the parties, greatly facilitating full and prompt 
127 
publicity. Hatch Act II reversed that trend and has led 
to concealment and evasion. Now non-party organizations 
are condoned and sometimes even inspired by the party's 
official hierarchy. Because in 1940 several hundred non-
party political committees took over much of the campaigning, 
and publicity is needed for the protection of their members 
and the public, nThis decentralization of responsibility 
for the collection and distribution of money in presidential 
campaigns is one of the most unfortunate effects of the 
128 
Hatch Act.u 
Thus, expenditures by the numerous nindependent " 
committees made it possible for both parties to circumvent 
the prohibitions. Certainly if the purpose of Congress was 
to limit the aggregate expenditures of a party in a presi-
dential election, it failed. Because of the multiplicity 
of political groups which grew up, the campaigns of 1940 
and 1944 afford a convincing demonstration of the ineffect-
126 Overacker, Presidential C~~paign Funds, p. 44. 
127 Loc.cit. 
128 Ibid, PP• 40-42. 
- 164 -
iveness of the Hatch Act II ceiling~ to prevent excessive 
expenditures. In each campaign the expenditures in behalf 
of the Democratic Party were twice that amount and the 
Republicans spent four to five times as much. The limita-
tions may have had a certain nuisance value, perhaps they 
129 
represented an .act of conscience, but they did not limit. 
Regarding the Hatch Act II of 1940 and its operation, 
a special assistant to the United States Attorney General 
said in a Report dated February 26, 1941: 
We respectfully submit that in our opinion 
the present existing laws relative to contribu-
tions and expenditures of political parties are 
fatally defective in accomplishing the purposes 
intended by Congress, and are, in our opinion, 
unenforceable under the conditions which have 
been presented in this investigation. 
Unless we are willing to take the drastic step of making 
all political committees, including those on the state and 
local levels, subsidiaries of the national comraittee and 
subject to complete control from the national committee, 
130 
limitations cannot be effective. 
A Senate investigation of the financing of the 1944 
campaign recommended that existing ceilings be lifted and 
that the law be amended in the direction of effective 
131 
publicity. It was the hope of the Senate Special 
129 Ibid, pp. 43-44. 
130 Ibid, pp. 46-47. 
131 United States Congress, Senate, Special Committee 
to Investigate Presidential, Vice Presidential and Senatorial 
Campaign Expenditures in 1944, Senate Report No. 101, 79th 
Cong. 1st Sess., March 15, 1945, pursuant to Senate Resolution 
263, pp. 80-84. 
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Committee that Federal corrupt practices legislation should 
emphasize publicity rather than prohibition, arguing that 
with such publicity public opinion might regulate "where 
132 
prohibition without publicity has failed.n Surely, 
adequate publicity would be a greater deterrent to corruption 
than prohibitions which give citizens a sense of security 
but which are unenforceable. Among its more important 
specific recommendations for attaining the goal of publicity 
were a broader definition of ffpolitical committee., and the 
establishment of a central depository under a joint committee 
of Congress with authority to institute uniform reports and 
133 
publish summaries of them. 
But these recommendations, general or specific, were 
not acted upon, or even seriously considered by the first 
134 
session of the 79th Congress which ended in December, 1945. 
Yet the result of maintaining the prohibitions has been a 
futile legislative gesture which has not limited expenditures 
and which has lessened the effectiveness of publicity pro-
135 
visions. The use of prohibitions backed by criminal penal-
ties as a primary sanction presupposes a standard of limita-
tion carefully arrived at and generally accepted as fair. It 
132 Loc.cit. 
133 Loc.cit. 
134 Overacker, Presidential Campaign Funds, p. 47. 
135 Ibid, p. 23. 
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likewise presupposes a centralization of control over the 
raising and spending of campaign funds. It must be accomp-
anied by rigid enforcement provisions. In England where 
limitations have proven effective, all three of these condi-
tiona are present. All three of them are lacking in the 
136 
United States. 
Unless or until we effect that revolution in party 
organization which is an essential prerequisite, present 
limitations which were designed to put ceilings on expendi-
tures, will continue to defeat the very purpose they were 
designed to achieve. Even if it were held to be constitu-
tional, it seems most unlikely that legislation will be 
enacted requiring all political spending agencies, including 
local party committees and non-party political committees, 
to become officially affiliated branches of, and subject to 
complete financial control from, the national committees of 
137 
the parties. It appears more probable that the way the 
problem will be answered, if at all, is by securing effective 
publicity and to leave it to public opinion to decide what 
138 
is too much to expend for political campaigning. This 
had become so evident to the Senate Special Committee which 
investigated 1944 campaign expenditures that it concluded 
136 Ibid, p. 65. 
137 Loc.cit. 
138 Ibid, pp. 46-48. 
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that legislation directed to prohibitions and penalties 
should be abandoned, that publicity and public opinion 
based on established facts offer a better hope of 
139 
accomplishing the desired end. 
Federal expenditure limitations: primaries. The 
problem of federal regulation of expenditures in primary 
campaigns is deserving of separate consideration. As we 
have seen, the 1925 Federal Corrupt Practices Act applied 
only to general elections and not to primaries or conven-
tiona. Yet this was not always so. Among other improve-
menta, the Act of 1910 requiring publicity had been amended 
in 1911 to apply to federal primaries as well as elections. 
But when, with certain Changes, the legislation of 1910 and 
1911 was repealed and re-enacted into the 1925 Act, which 
was a consolidation of all previous legislation bearing on 
campaign expenditures, there was no reference to federal 
primaries. This failure was not an oversight. It was the 
outcome of two factors, legislative opposition and court 
rulings. It has been observed that even during its passage 
through Congress in 1911, no feature of the law had aroused 
more controversy than the regulation of expenditures in 
140 
primary campaigns. 
There had never been any doubt that Congress had the 
139 See footnote 131. 
140 Penniman, op.cit., p. 570. 
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right to regulate federal elections. Under the Constitution, 
Article I, Section 4, Congress has full power to regulate 
elections at which members of Congress are chosen. That 
power, exercised repeatedly by Congress, had been sustained 
by the Supreme Court in such cases as ~ parte Siebold, 100 
u.s. 371 (1880). The court even held in~ parte Yarbrough, 
110 u.s. 651 (1884), that Congress can regulate elections 
at which national officers are chosen quite independently 
of any express grant of power in the Constitution. It is 
clearly established law that Congress may regulate the 
funds of party national committees, and of party or non-
party committees active in behalf of presidential candidates 
141 
in two or more states. 
But is a primary an election within the meaning of 
the Constitution? In 1911, United States Senators and 
Representatives from the South, Where the Democratic 
primaries usually predetermine the results of _the election, 
141 The power of Congress to regulate contributions 
to presidential campaign funds was upheld in sweeping terms 
in Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934). Spec-
ifically upholding provisions of the 1925 Federal Corrupt 
Practices Act requiri.ng upoli tical commi ttees 11 to disclose 
facts concerning contributions, at page 545 the Court said: 
"The President is vested with the executive power of 
the nation. The importance of his election and the vital 
character of its relationship to, and effect upon, the welfare 
and safety of the whole people cannot be too strongly stated. 
To say that Congress is without power to pass appropriate 
legislation to safeguard such an election from the improper 
use of money to influence the result is to deny to the nation 
in a vital particular the power of self-preservation." See 
also United States v. Mosley, 238 u.s. 383 (1915). 
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denied the existence of any federal authority to regulate 
primaries. The constitutional question thus raised in 
Congress came before the Supreme Court in the famous case 
of Newberry v. United States, 256 u.s. 232 (1921). Elected 
United States Senator from Michigan in 1918, Truman H. 
Newberry was convicted of violating the corrupt practices 
law by expending ~195,000 in his primary campaign for the 
Republican nomination, although the law allowed less than 
one per cent of that amount. Upon appeal, however, the 
Supreme Court unanimously reversed the conviction. But the 
court was in disagreement as to the reasons. 
According to four of the Justices, Congress had and 
has no power to regulate primaries for United States Senator. 
One Justice believed that Congress had no such power before 
the Seventeenth Amendment which provided for the direct 
election of United States Senators, but possibly might have 
acquired it through the adoption of the amendment. Four 
said that Congress has and always had such power, but that 
the conviction should be set aside on the ground of prejudi-
cial error in the trial judge's charge to the jury. The 
decision left the scope of congressional authority uncertain, 
and it was felt that it struck a severe blow to the federal 
publicity law by holding invalid that part of the statute 
which related to primaries. If the law was to be cut in 
half, it was, of course, repealed for all practical 
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purposes in one-party states, or congressional districts 
overwhelmingly of one political viewpoint, Where the 
primary is all-important. 
A further blow to the law came in an opinion of the 
United States Attorney General at the Hearings of the 
Committee on the Election of the President, Vice-President, 
and Representatives in Congress, December 14, 1921, page 2, 
that since the method of selecting United States Senators 
had been changed from appointment by state legislatures to 
direct popular election, the portion of the law relating to 
142 
the election of United States Senators was no longer binding. 
But as sole judge of the qualifications of its own members, 
the Senate could apply its own standards and refuse to 
recognize a lawful election exclusively on the ground of 
lavish, though legal, expenditures in the primary. In November 
of 1922, Newberry resigned. The $195,000 spent on behalf of 
Newberry can hardly be compared with the colossal _primary 
expenditures on which the Senate refused to seat Smith of 
Illinois in 1928, and in 1929 refused to seat Vare of Pennsyl-
vania When an investigation revealed approximately $2,250,000 
143 
spent for the Republican nomination. 
For twenty years after the Newberry decision, it was 
at least doubtful Whether Congress had the power to regulate 
142 Pollock Jr., op.cit., pp. 19-20. 
143 Penniman, op.cit., pp. 570-571. 
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primaries at which candidates for federal office were nomina-
ted. This constitutional issue did not again come before 
the Supreme Court until the case of United States v. Classic, 
313 U.S. 299, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 85 L. Ed. 1368 (1941), involving 
fraudulent counting of primary ballots in violation of the 
United States Criminal Code, vindicated the power of Congress 
in a unanimous decision. In the words of Justice Stone, ttthe 
practical influence of the choice of candidates at the primary 
may be so great as to affect profoundly the choice at the 
general election •••• Unless the constitutional protection of 
the integrity of 'elections' extends to primary elections, 
Congress is left powerless to effect the constitutional 
purpose, and the popular choice is stripped of constitutional 
t t • II pro ec 1.on ••• A dissenting opinion by three of the seven 
Justices was based solely upon their interpretation of the 
Criminal Code. It fully endorsed the power of Congress to 
control primary elections. 
State expenditure limitations: history. The Corrupt 
and Illegal Practices Act, 46-47 Victoria, had become law 
in Great Britain in 1883, and its provisions were so thorough-
144 
going that they attracted wide attention. Even though the 
differences between the British and American electoral systems 
prevented a complete copying of the English law, doubtless 
it exerted considerable influence upon legislatures in the 
144 Pollock Jr., op.cit., pp. 7-8 • . 
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145 
United States. Starting in 1890, when the first state 
publicity law was passed, by the end of the decade no fewer 
than seventeen states had passed statutes regulating in 
146 
more or less complete fashion the use of money in elections. 
On January 1, 1925, all but four of the forty-eight states 
had some sort of legal provision for the regulation of party 
147 
electoral activities. Thus, in the period of thirty-four 
years after 1890, great progress was made toward the control 
of compaign funds. 
State expenditure limitations: provisions. Today, 
even though one of the most authoritative modern writers on 
corrupt practices believes that the limitation of campaign 
expenditures by legislation is ineffective in giving us fair 
148 
elections, in regard to state laws limiting expenditures 
these limitations seem securely entrenched in state statutes. 
All but nine states place a ceiling on expenditures by 
candidates. Of these states which have the expense ceiling, 
nineteen allow various exceptions some of which are so 
149 
liberal as to actually defeat the purpose of the limitation. 
In the main, the candidates for governor, senator, and repre-
145 Sen.Doc. No. 89, 59th Gong. First Seas., pp. 8-9. 
146 Sen.Doc. No. 337, 60th Gong. First Seas., p. 1; 
Pollock Jr., Ibid. 
147 Pollock Jr., op.cit., p. 21. 
148 Overacker, Money in Elections, p. 346. 
149 Minault, op.cit., p. 3. 
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sentative, the more lucrative positions, are the subjects 
of these limitations. Of course, many states extend them 
to all elective offices, including that of presidential 
150 
elector. 
There is no uniformity in the limitations of allowed 
expenditures. Eleven states place restrictions only upon 
the primary campaign, five states limit the amounts to be 
spent separately on both the primary and the general election, 
and the remaining twenty-five states allow total sums to be 
expended either for primary or for general elections, the 
allocation of the total permitted being left to the party 
151 
or candidate. The most common basis of limitations is 
upon a flat dollar scale. Some states specify a certain 
percentage of the yearly salary of the office sought, while 
a few others per.mit certain sums depending upon the number 
152 
of votes cast at the next preceding election. Only the 
five states of Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, Utah, and 
Wisconsin impose a limitation upon the party as well as upon 
the candidate. Here again the limitation is generally upon 
153 
a dollar basis, from $10,000 to $25,000. Utah, however, 
specifies that each state committee shall spend per year no 
150 Loc.cit. 
151 Loc.cit. 
152 Loc.cit. 
153 Loc.cit. 
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more than a sum at the rate of twelve and one-half cents 
for each vote cast by all parties for governor at the next 
154 
preceding election. 
Up to this point, we have been discussing state 
limitations as to the total amount of campaign expenditure. 
But another group of state expenditure provisions is direct-
ed at the character of the expenditures. These laws seek 
to limit or prohibit campaign expenditures on the basis of 
their purpose as distinguished from their amounts. Thus, 
of the nine states without any statutory limitation upon 
total expenditures, four enumerate the type of campaign 
155 
expenditure that may be made legally. Also, we have 
previously noted that all states but Illinois and Rhode 
Island require a filing of the statement of receipts and 
expenditures. Regarding limitations as to purposes, most 
states have long prohibited payment of money for the 
purchase of votes. Certain other expenditures are also 
unlawful, such as expenditures for meat, drink, and enter-
156 
tainment of voters as an incident of campaigning. 
In nearly two-thirds of the states expenditures are 
limited by the enumeration of what are legitimate expenses. 
All campaign expenditures are prohibited except those which 
154 Loc.cit. 
155 Loc.cit. 
156 Merriam, op.cit., p. 409. 
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157 
are allowed in the law. Where the law is so written 
that it enumerates permitted expenses, outlawing all others, 
the legislature should be alert to keep the law up to date 
or else the political use of new means of communication, 
such as television, would be illegal. Rather than statutes 
of this type, it would seem better to establish a specific 
f orbidden list. Among the long and varying series of items 
on the forbidden lists, differing materially in different 
states, are included payment of poll taxes, payment of 
naturalization fees, payment of campaign workers on election 
day, payments for transportation to and from the polls, and 
158 
many other examples of possible political outlay. 
In the state of Wisconsin, the abuse of excessive 
expenditures for political workers on election day has been 
practically eliminated by the prohibition of any payment 
159 
of any election day worker by any candidate or committee. 
There is no unifo~nity of laws as to the transportation of 
voters to the polls. Eleven states definitely forbid the 
practice, while eleven more permit the candidate or the 
party to expend money for the transportation of sick, aged, 
or infirm people. The two states of Nevada and Utah permit 
a joint arrangement between two or more parties for the 
157 Loc.cit. 
158 Loc.cit. 
159 Loc.cit. 
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conveying of sick, infirm, or aged voters to the polls. 
A few states expressly permit the expenditure of money for 
160 
such conveyance. Other provisions in state legislation 
relating to limitations on the purposes of expenditures, 
as prohibiting bribery, are taken up under the discussion 
of miscellaneous illegal practices. 
State expenditure limitations: problems. Although 
the principle of limitation of expenditures is quite widely 
accepted throughout the country, over three-fourths of the 
states having enacted laws placing limits either upon the 
161 
smn total to be spent in his behalf, too often there are 
nmnerous ways for practical politicians to evade these 
limitations with little danger to the candidate. Though 
it is by no means recent, corrupt practices legislation is 
as yet far from crystallized and court decisions in the 
162 
states are often at variance. Enacted without sufficient 
regard for the experience of other states with similar laws, 
provisions that have been held unconstitutional in a large 
number of states are still retained in the codes of many 
states with no attempt at remedying the weaknesses of the 
163 
statutes. Naturally, most of these statutes are frequent-
160 Minault, op.cit., p. 2; E.R. Sikes, State and 
Federal Corrupt Practices Legislation, Appendix. 
161 Merrima, op.cit., p. 411. 
162 Minault, op.cit., p. 8. 
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164 
ly and blatantly violated. 
Despite the fact that legislation in this field is 
growing progressively more stringent, it appears that the 
limitations upon expenditures are grossly ineffective and 
easily circumvented, especially in those states which allow 
exceptions to the limited disbursements. Too many states 
fail to make adequate provisions for enforcement of the law 
165 
and some lack both penalties and enforcement mechanisms. 
The amount which may be expended, as we have seen, may be 
a fixed sum or it may vary with the salary of the office or 
the size of the electorate. Vihere the sums are fixed, or 
where the sums depend upon the salary of the office sought, 
they are usually ridiculously low. It would be impossible 
in many states for any kind of campaign to be put on if the 
166 
limitations were strictly observed. But as a rule the 
more drastic limitations apply only to expenditures on the 
part of the candidate himself. 
A distinction must be made between limitations i mposed 
upon the candidate personally and the total amount available 
for the conduct of the campaign. This is a consideration not 
167 
infrequently overlooked and a common cause of confusion. 
164 Pollock Jr., op.cit•, p. 260. 
165 Minault, Ibid. 
166 Merriam, Ibid. 
167 Loc.cit. 
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Upon careful scrutiny, it appears that most of these laws 
are not designed to restrict the total amount expended in 
a campaign but, often a wholly different matter, merely 
168 
the amount given by the candidate. The 1940 Hatch Act 
II, which limited the expenditures of national committees 
in one year to $3,000,000, has aggravated this situation 
by increasing the activities of state, local, and so-called 
169 
"independent" committees. In Massachusetts an attempt 
bas been made to concentrate the responsibility for the 
raising and spending of money in campaigns in the candid-
ates, their agents, and political committees. While 
expenditures by individuals are prohibited by law, they 
have not been eliminated, and the law is not vigorously 
170 
enforced. 
Experience has shown that too many regulations have 
not been successful, that numerous requirements, especially 
unreasonable restrictions, are likely to lead to evasions, 
and that state expenditure limitations have not curbed the 
171 
evils at which they were aimed. These laws have accomp-
lished little except to decentralize campaign finance and 
168 Loc.cit. 
169 Minault, op.cit., p. 3. For an interesting treat-
ment of this question see Dr. Louise Ove.racker, "Campaign 
Finance in the Presidential Election of 1940, 11 American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 35, pp. 701-727, August, 1941. 
170 Merriam, Ibid. 
171 Ibid, p. 41Z; Pollock Jr., op.cit., p. 228. 
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to make effective publicity of campaign expenditures more 
172 
difficult. Publicity is not a sure remedy, nor is it 
the most thorough one, but on the basis of federal and 
state experience it seems to be the desirable solution 
because we have more reason to suppose that it will bring 
173 
about more improvements than an·y other method. Although 
publicity laws have been a restraining factor, at present 
they are defective and need to be remedied by more severe 
penalties, stricter enforcement, compulsory publication of 
the accounts in newspapers, and publicity regarding deficits 
174 
and money raised between campaigns. These provisions and 
similar requirements of complete publicity and adequate 
enforcement are essential to the purity of elections. 
Contribution Restrictions 
Great Britain 
We have seen that in Great Britain the Corrupt and 
Illegal Practices Act, 46-47 Victoria, ch. 51 (1883), out-
lawed certain enumerated and commonly condemned election 
abuses such as bribery. In regard to the control of 
campaign funds, it was directed primarily to the individual 
172 Merriam, op.cit., p. 411 
173 Pollock Jr., op.cit., pp. 228-229 
174 ~' pp. 229, 232-233. 
175 Ibid, pp. 232-233. 
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candidates and their agents, and not to other persons or 
groups. Thus, while the English legislation strictly limits 
the amounts which can be: expended by candidates, it does not 
restrict Central Office expenditures for the ganeral interest 
of all party candidates. Also, the law requires candidates 
to file statements of receipts, sources and disbursements, 
but does not require statements from the party or from 
political committees. Aside from limiting the amount a 
candidate may expend, there are no over-all limitations on 
campaign contributions. Labor union contributions, however, 
have been made the subject of special attention and will be 
taken up under the topic of specific legislation and judicial 
decisions controlling labor union activities. 
United States 
Federal contribution restrictions: history. The 
i~diate cause of public demand for prohibitions on campaign 
contributions by corporations in federal elections were the 
shocking disclosures of legislative inquiries which revealed 
very large contributions by banks, insurance companies, manu-
facturers, public utilities, and other corporations :for the 
176 
election of Republican candidates. Payments from the funds 
177 
of stockholder·s had been made to Republican Party campaigns. 
176 Comment, "Section 304, Taft-Hartley Act: validity 
or Restrictions on Union Political Activity," 1948, 57 Yale 
Law_ Journal 806-827, p. 807; Merriam, op.cit., p. 406 
177 Merriam, Ibid. 
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This was notably true in the campaign of 1896 when various 
insurance companies contributed large sums of money to the 
178 
Republicans. Other such contributions became known in 
the course of these inquiries. For example, in 1896 the 
179 
Standard Oil Company gave $250,000 to the G.O.P. In 1900 
the Republicans expected checks from all the corporate inter-
ests according to the ability of the corporation to contrib-
ute, and in the event that the corporation contributed less 
than the Republican leaders considered fair, the check might 
180 
be returned. This amounted to special taxation on behalf 
181 
of the Republican Party. 
In the campaign of 1900, as in 1896, the Standard Oil 
182 
Company again contributed $250,000. In fact, the Republi-
can campaign was so well financed by direct support from 
corporate funds that the G.O.P. returned to the Standard Oil 
Company $50,000 after the election as surplus from various 
183 
contributors. It is to be assumed that these corporations 
believed they were making a wise investment through their 
184 
donations to the Republican cause. National indignation 
178 Loc.cit. 
179 Penniman, op.cit., p. 544 
180 ~~ pp. 544-545 
181 Ibid, p. 545 
182 Loc.cit. 
183 Loc.cit. 
184 Loc.cit. 
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at these practices led to recommendations by President 
Theodore Roosevelt in 1904 ror a law against bribery and 
185 
corruption in rederal elections, and in messages to 
Congress in 1905 and 1906 ror a law forbidding corporations 
18o 
to make contributions for any political purpose. In 
1907 Congress passed legislation prohibiting political 
187 
contributions by banks or corporations in federal elections. 
But failure or control over corporate contributions 
in the 1907 legislation led to a shifting or attention to 
laws requiring publicizing of individual contributions in 
188 
1910, and in 1911 the first federal statute was passed 
ror pre-election public~ty, requiring reports of contribu-
tiona to and expenditures by political committees, with 
189 
limitations on expenditures by individual candidates. 
But little publicity resulted and the limitations proved 
190 
meaningless. 
191 
The Federal Corrupt Practices Act or 1925 
185 Ibid, P• 546 
186 58th Cong., Dec. 5, 1905, and Dec. 4, 1906, 
Cong. Rec., p. 22. 
187 Merriam, op.cit., p. 406; Penniman, op.cit., p. 546 
188 Comment, "Section 304, Taft-Hartley Act: validity 
of Restrictions on Union Political Activity," 1948, 57 Yale 
Law Journal 806-827, p. 808. 
189 u.s. Statutes at Large, vol. 36, p. 823 (1910); 
U.S. Statutes at Large, vol. 37, p. 25 (1911); see 2 u.s.c. 
sec. 244 ( 1940). 
190 Footnote 188, loc.cit. 
191 U.S. Statutes at Large, vol. 43, p. 1070 (1925); 
see u.~s.c. sec. 241-256 (1940). 
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192 
merely modified and eonsolodated previous legislation. 
This legislation remained unchanged until the passage of 
193 
Hatch Act II in 1940. The 1940 provisions, to be 
discussed, were brought about because the prohibitions on 
contributions from corporations had reduced but certainly 
194 
did not eliminate campaign funds from this source. It 
is an easy matter for individual corporation stockholders 
to make large contributions, or for the directors of a 
corporation to make personal contributions and to recover 
their payments in the form of bonuses from the corporation. 
For example, in the second Roosevelt campaign of 
195 
1936, "Big Business" came generously to the financial support 
of the Republican National Committee in a vain effort to 
196 
"stop" the New Deal. Over half of the Republican campaign 
197 
fund was contributed by those who gave $1000 or more. The 
198 
DuPonts and the Pews together gave $1,000,000. Not since 
1896 had bankers and manufacturers been so wholeheartedly 
199 
behind the Republican candidate--or against the Democratic. 
192 Overacker, Presidential CamEaiS!: Funds, p. 22. 
l«yil Loc.cit. 
194 Merriam, Ibid. 
-
195 Loc.cit. 
196 Overacker, Presidential CampaiS,!! Funds, p. 16. 
197 Loc.cit. 
198 Loc.eit. 
199 Loc.cit. 
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Contributions to the Republican National Committee totaled 
200 
$7,760,000. The Democratic National Committee received 
~ew very large contributions and its total collections o~ 
2.01 
$5,200,000 were $2,500,000 less than the Republicans. 
While the support o~ bankers dropped sharply, more than one-
third of all regular contributions came from donations o~ 
202 
less than $100. Indicative of pro.found changes in 
political alignments as well as in the pattern of financial 
support, however, was the fact that the largest contributors 
203 
to the Democratic campaign were the labor unions. 
Federal contribution restrictions: provisions. 
Approved January 26, 1907, the first o~ the federal laws 
204 
relating to campaign funds was enacted following a 
205 
favorable Senate report that "The evils of the use o~ 
money in connection with political elections are so generally 
recognized that the committee deemed it unnecessary to make 
any argument in ~avor of the general purpose o~ this measure. 
It is in the interest of good government and calculated to 
200 Ibid, p. 17. 
201 Loc.cit. 
202 Loc.cit. 
203 Loc.cit. 
204 Pollock Jr., op.eit., pp. 12, 181; see u.s. 
Compiled Statutes (1918), p. 1690. 
205 Sen. Rep. No. 3056, 59th Gong., First Sess. (1907), 
p. 2. 
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promote purity in the election of public officials." Deal-
ing directly with a manifest abuse in the collection of 
206 
campaign funds, the law of 1907, now Section 313 of the 
Federal Corrupt Practices Act, makes it unlawful for any 
national bank or any national corporation to contribute 
money in connection with any election, whether local, state, 
or national, and prohibits any corporation whatever to make 
a contribution for use in connection with the election of 
207 
any national officer. 
The validity of this ban was sustained in a success-
ful prosecution brought thereunder in United States v. Uhited 
States Brewers' Ass 1n., 239 F. 163 (W.D. Pa. 1916), and the 
federal district court decision was not appealed. A large 
number of brewing corporations of the state of Pennsylvania 
and the United States Brewers' Association, a corporation 
of the state of New York, were indicted for conspiracy to 
violate the prohibition on money contributions from certain 
corporations in connection with any federal election. Among 
other defenses, the corporations alleged that Congress had 
no power to enact the statute, that the statute was void for 
vagueness and uncertainty, and, finally, that the statute 
was an attempt to interfere with freedom of speech and press 
in the discussion of political candidates and electoral issues. 
206 Penniman, op.cit., pp. 569, 546. 
207 U.S. Statutes at Large, vol. 43, p. 1070 {1925), 
2 U.S.C. sec. 241-256 (1940). 
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The first objection rested on the ground that the 
regulations of the statute in connection with federal elec-
tions would be an unconstitutional interference with the 
conduct of state elections inasmuch as the states have sole 
jurisdiction over the qualifications of voters. But the 
court held that Congress has the power to regulate the con-
duct of state elections when this involves the election of 
federal officers. Although the electorate is qualified to 
vote only by state laws, the ri ght of the electorate to 
vote for members of Congress is derived fDom the United 
States Constitution. Therefore, corporations may be so 
regulated by Congress as to prevent undue influence on the 
election of federal officers. These limitations are for 
the purpose of preserving the freedom of the voter and the 
purity of the ballot. At page 168, the court noted that 
"By various acts Congress has undertaken to control the 
agencies by which political activities in campaigns may be 
carried on, the amount of money which a candidate may spend, 
the purposes for which it may be expended, and the manner 
of accounting for 3ll such expenditures." 
The se,tion in question "is in line with this wise 
and beneficial legislation by undertaking to place a prohi-
bition against political activities by those artificial 
beings who are merely the creatures of the law." The court 
went on, at page 169, to point out that the failure of the 
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statute to define "money contributions" did not make the 
words vague or uncertain, "but, on the contrary, their 
meaning is plain, and their purpose as used in the act 
unmistakable.n It is for a jury to determine in the light 
of the circumstances whether an expenditure is " a money 
coritribution in connection with any electionn within the 
spirit, intent, and meaning of the legislation. Further-
more, the statute does not prevent the freedom of speech or 
of the press, but only tends to guard against the conoerted 
use of money to corrupt elections. Congress may protect the 
electorate from such influences. Finally, the court asserted, 
at page 170, that it is not necessary for a conviction that 
the offense itself be committed, but it is enough that the 
corporations conspire to commit the offense. 
It is also illegal under the 1907 law for any candid-
ate, political committee, or other person to receive such a 
208 
contribution. The statute did not, however, prevent 
corporate political assistance in the form of advertising 
209 
expenditures. Also, the legislation did not apply to 
primaries. Violations of the law were made punishable by a 
fine of from $250 to $1,000 or to a term of imprisonment of 
210 
not more than one year, or both. But because the statute 
208 Loc.cit. 
209 Clark, "Federal Regulation of Election Campaign 
Activities," 6 Federal Bar Journal 5, p. 8 (1944). 
210 U.S. Statutes at Large, vol. 43, p. 1070 (1925), 
2 u.s.c. sec. 241-256 (1940). 
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did not prevent the officers of such corporations and those 
who held controlling corporate interests from making substan-
tial individual contributions which spoke for corporate poli-
cies, the doubtful efficacy of the law seemed to call for 
211 
further le gislative action. Demands for restrictions on 
campaign contributions were especially appealing to the Demo-
crats who were in control of Congress and who felt strongly 
that the Republicans had an unfair advantage in the size of 
212 
campaign contributions. 
In July, 1940, by amendments to Hatch Act I of the 
previous year, Congress instituted a new program of prohibi-
tion in Hatch Act II by seeking to reduc~ both the size of 
213 
campaign expenditures and of individual contributions. 
These amendments provide first, that during any calendar year 
no political committee, as defined by the Federal Corrupt 
Practices Act of 1925, shall receive contributions aggregating 
more than $3,000,000 or make expenditures above that amount, 
and secondly, that no individual, committee, or association 
shall contribute more than $5,000 per year to national committ-
214 
ees or candidates for a federal office. The statute also 
made it unlawful for persons or corporations to aid candidates 
211 Penniman, op.cit., p. 546 
212 Ibid, p. 552 
213 U.S. Statutes at Large, vol. 54, p. 767, 76th Cong., 
3rd Sass., P.L. No. 753, app. July 19, 1940, 18 u.s.c. sec 61 
(1940). 
214 Loc.cit. 
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for elective federal office by purchasing goods, commodi-
215 
ties, advertising, or articles of any kind. The law 
expressly stated, however, that such limitations did not 
216 
apply to contributions to state or local committees. 
As originally introduced by Senator Hatch on January 
8, 1940, Hatch Act II was Senate Bill 3046 for the purpose 
of extending the earlier law to state employees paid in 
217 
whole or in part from federal funds. The $3,000,000 
limitation on political committees was added to the bill in 
the House, and accepted by the Senate without change and 
218 
without debate. The $5,000 contribution limitation was 
sponsored by Senator Bankhead and accepted by a Senate vote 
of 40 to 38 without any discussion of the basis of the limita-
219 
tion, its fairness, or its probable effect. 
220 
there was no debate on the $5,000 limitation. 
In the House 
Thus, though 
the bill was debated in the Senate for ten days and in the 
House for two days as to its other provisions, at no time was 
215 U.S. Statutes at Large, vol. 54, p. 767, sec. 4 (13). 
216 Loc.cit. 
217 For Senate action see Gong. Rec., vol. 86, pp. 2720-
2723, 2852-2866, 2969-2987, 9495-9497, 76th Gong. 3rd Sess., 
March 12, lu, 18, and July 11, 1940. For House action see Gong. 
Rec., vol. 86, pp. 7506, 9360-9380, 9426-9464, 76th-.Gong. 3rd 
Sess., June 4, and July 9, 10, 1940. Bill signed July 19, 1940. 
218 Loc.cit. 
219 Loc.cit. 
220 Loc.cit. 
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221 
there the slightest discussion of these limitations. 
Senator Hatch himself voted against the Bankhead amendment 
as not pertinent to his measure, but supported both limita-
222 
tions on final passage. It is felt by one observer that 
apparently the $5,000 limitation was pushed by opponents 
of the original bill in an effort to kill it, but the ruse 
223 
f'ailed. 
Federal Contribution restrictions: problems. The 
direct consequence of Hatch Act IT was the creation of a 
number of non-party organizations and political groups, each 
of whose expenditures could total $3,000,000 and, of' course, 
224 
the expenditure limitations were thereby made ineffective. 
Moreover, each of these groups was theoretically empowered 
to receive as much as $5,000 from each contributor. Since 
only national committees came under the statute, individual 
contributions were easily channeled into state and local 
agencies. The $5,000 restriction was circumvented by giving 
that same amount to a variety of Republican committees, or 
having husband, wife, and other members of the family give 
225 
$5,000 each to one or more political agencies. For 
221 Loc.cit. 
222 Loc.cit. 
223 Overacker, Presidential CampaiBn Funds, p. 27. 
224 ~, pp. 44-45. 
225 Ibid, pp. 35-36. 
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example, a contribution by a husband and wife of $5,000 
each to the National Committee, and to every one of the 48 
State Committees, would total $490,000. This is not to 
mention county committees and all other political groups 
aiding in the campaign. 
Even national committees could be financed in part 
b y the aggregation of numerous $5,000 gifts from single 
families whose financial resources permitted substantial 
political contributions. Circumvention of the law .was also 
226 
resorted to by means of fake loans which were not repaid. 
As a result, although the combined expenditures of the two 
national committees was $4,211,000, the total amount spent 
in the 1940 election was $21,000,000, contrasted to the 
227 
previous high of $16,500,000 in 1928. Truly impressive 
is the family solidarity represented in some of the larger 
gifts to the Republicans. Among only the more conspicuous 
cases of family giving to various Republican committees are 
the $200,000 contributed by over sixty members of the DuPont 
family, the $164,500 donated by a dozen members of the Pew 
family, the more than $100,000 given by the Rockefellers, 
and over $55,000 from three Queenys, identified with the 
226 Loc.cit., Comment, "Se·ction 304, Taft·¥tHartley Act: 
Validity of Restrictions on Union Political Activity," 1948, 
Yale Law Journal, vel. 57, p. 808. 
227 Loc.cit. 
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228 
Monsanto Chemical Company. 
These facts demonstrate that a restriction upon the 
size of individual contributions which does not cover gifts 
to state and local committees is farcial. The distribution 
of Lammot DuPont's gifts is illuminating. His contribution 
of ~9, 000 was divided among three national Republican 
finance committees and state committees as widely scattered 
as New Jersey, Tennessee, West Virginia, Maryland, Wyoming, 
229 
South Dakota, Missouri, and Indiana. Only $4,000 of this 
money passed through the books of the Republican National 
230 
Committee. Edgar Monsanto Queeny, a resident of Missouri, 
contributed to Republican committees in Connecticut, New 
231 
York, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming. It does not appear upon 
the record whether these contributions were routed where they 
were needed, but this is more likely than to imagine that 
they were guided to these particular states by mere happen-
232 
stance. 
All this information as to family contributions has 
been given to us by congressional investigations, notably the 
special committee of the Senate appointed in 1940 following 
228 Overacker, Presidential Campaign Funds, p. 36. 
229 Ibid, p. 37. 
230 Loc.cit. 
231 Loc.cit. 
232 Loc.cit. 
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233 
a practice adhered to consistently since 1912. Under 
the chairmanship of Democratic Senator Guy M. Gillette, 
the committee was aided by an unusually able corps of 
234 
assistants. This committee found that the law was being 
avoided by uarious members of the same family contributing 
235 
the legal maximum to many state and local committees. 
The money which the DuPonts and the Pews invested in the 
Republican campaign would not have been brought to light if 
the reports of the national committees had not been supple-
236 
mented by the Gillette investigations. A staff member 
with a keen, almost morbid, interest in "America's Sixty 
Families," pieced together contributions from many scattered 
237 
reports before the full story was available. 
The same study showed that the Democratic National 
Committee received no contributions in excess of $10,000 
238 
from any one family. The Democrats raised over $750,000 
from Jackson Day dinners at $100 a plate for a dinner worth 
233 United States Congress, Special Committee to 
Investigate Presidential, Vice Presidential, and Senatorial 
Expenditures in 1940, Senate Report No. 47, 77th Cong. 1st 
Sess., 1941, p. 13; Overacker, Presidential Campaign Funds, 
pp. 29' 37. 
234 Loe.cit. 
235 Loc.cit. 
236 Loc.eit. 
237 Loc.eit. 
238 Loc.cit. 
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239 
ten dollars. Cash contributions received by the Democra-
tic National Committee in 1940 came largely from labor unions, 240 
ofrice holders, and small donations generally. Contribu-
tions or less than $100 made up a larger proportion of the 241 
whole, whereas gifts of more than $1,000 dropped sharply. 
The Republican financing followed a more traditional pattern 
and, while it is true that Hatch Act IT caused contributions 
over $5,000 to vanish, it did not cause a loss in total 
receipts. The diminished size of contributions was balanced 
by an unusually large proportion of donations or $1,000 or 
242 . 
more, including many $4,000 gifts, Bafikers and manufactu-
rers, who had given one-fourth of the contributions of $1,000 
or more in 1936, were even more generous than usual. In 1940 
243 
their share rose to more than one-third. 
Thus, in the 1940 campaign, the loss of $5,000 contri-
butions to the Democratic Party was offset by many small gifts, 
but Republican support merely dropped into the $1,000 to $4,000 244 
bracket. It must not be supposed, however, that these 
extremely interesting contrasts in the financing of the two 
239 Overacker, Presidential Campaign Funds, p. 38. 
240 ~, p. 39· 
241 Loc.cit. 
242 Loc.cit. 
243 Loc.cit. 
244 Loc.cit. 
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major parties reflects only differences arising out of the 
operation of Hatch Act II. While illustrating the failure 
of statutary expenditure limitations and contribution 
restrictions, it must be remembered that these are funda-
mental differences beginning with the 1936 campaign, ante-
dating and neither caused nor affected by any legislation. 
~5 
Rather, this important trend reflects a realignment of 
political support on economic lines which led Mr. James 
Farley, then national Democratic chairman, to assert in 1936 
that many of the usual Democratic sources of supply had been 
246 
dried up by the New Deal. In the financing of the 1940 
campaign, an increasingly clear-cut economic cleavage is 
even more apparent. 
As in the election of 1940, again in the 1944 campaign 
Hatch Act II was avo+ded by diverting campaign contributions 
to non-party groups, local and state committees. Thus, the 
total national committee expenditure for the two major parties 
247 
in 1944 was $4,997,729, but the total amount spent was 
248 $20,500,000. In addition to these direct money contribu-
245 Loc.cit. It is Dr. Overacker's opinion that the 
really fundamental differences in financial support began in 
1936. However, one could point to the two parties in the era 
of Bryan versus McKinley, or to the forces aligned against 
Wilson, for an argument that these differences arose earlier. 
246 Overacker, Presidential Campaign Funds, p. 39. 
247 Ibid, p. 32. 
~8 Comment, "Section 304, Taft-Hartley Act: Validity 
of Restrictions on Union Political Activity," 1948, Yale Law 
Journal, vol. 57, p. 808. 
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tions, other influences are at work, including the services 
of the party oz•ganization, which escape monetary ascertain-
ment. For example, what about the contributions of a .favor-
able press? The public opinion which is at least in part 
shaped by the press certainly has an effect upon the voting 
behavior of the1 electorate, and is of aid to the candidates 
whose views coincide with that press-influenced public opin-
ion. Yet the help given to a candidate or party by a favor-
able press cannot be established as campaign contributions. 
Of course, one should be careful not to over-estimate the 
power of the pr•ess to form public opinion~ The Democrats 
have been elected against almost unanimous press opposition. 
Is the problem of campaign finance primarily one of 
size, of where the money comes from, or of keeping the voter 
informed about who pays the polj_tical bills? Also, how far 
may the problems be met by legislation? Failure to properly 
answer these questions has led to muddled thinking and to 
249 
futile legislative gestures. One scholar of the subject 
maintains that the size of the funds is relatively unimport-
ant, that a mof'·e significant factor is the sources from which 
250 
they come. A sound program of legislative control should 
251 
be firmly grounded upon the principle of publicity. There-
249 Overacker, Presidential Campaign Funds, pp. 10-11 
·-· 250 Ibid, p. 13 
251 ~.' pp. 10-11 
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fore, the shif t in emphasis from publicity to prohibition 
252 
has been most unfortunate. Unless and until we estab-
lish a generally accepted fair standard of limitation, 
centraliza tion of control over campaign fund raising and 
spending , and rigid enforcement provisions, restrictions 
are bound to dE~fea t their own purpose by breaking down 
publicity, driving organizations underground, and facili-
253 
tating evasions. 
State contribution restrictions: history. American 
interest in thE~ legislative control of campaign funds was 
stimulated by the enactment in 1883 of the Corrupt and 
Illegal Practiees Act, 46-47 Victoria, ch. 51, in Great 
254 
Britain. Starting in 1890, the states began to regulate 
the use of money in elections, and in 1897 three states 
passed laws prohibiting corporations from contributing in 
. 255 
any way to political campaigns. Although these three 
states did not accompany their legislation with a general 
corrupt practices statute of any kind, by the end of the 
decade seventee·n states bad enacted laws regulating in more 
or less complete fashion the use of money in elections, and 
before the presidential campaign of 1904, two other states 
252 Loc.cit. 
253 Ib:J.d., p. 65. 
254 Pollock Jr., op~ cit., pp. 7-8. 
255 Loc.cit. 
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256 
had passed sim~liar legislation. Proir to 1904, when 
for the first time there was important agitation for a 
national law, such statutes had related only to state 
25.7 
conditions. Now the movement went forward with greater 
rapidity. The year 1905 produced two new state laws and 
258 
two more states were added to the list in 1907. 
State contribution restrictions: provisions. Today, 
prohibition of contributions by corporations is a common 
259 
feature of state corrupt practices legislation. With 
varying degree~! of penalties, thirty-six states outlaw the 
receipt of corporate contributions. For violation of this 
prohibition, me>st of these states impose a heavy fine upon 
the corporation, and for repeated offenses a few states 
stipulate cancetllation of the corporation charter, forfeit-
260 
ure of business in the state. This penalty has been 
attacked upon the grounds that it is an unconstitutional 
denial of the freedom of speech and a violation of the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but these 
261 
contentions hav·e found no favor in the courts. Although 
256 United States Congress, Sen. Doc. No. 337, 60th 
Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 1, 4, 6, 16. 
257 Pollock Jr., op.cit., p. 9· 
258 United States Congress, Sen. Doc. No. 337, 60th 
Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1. 
259 Minault, oE.cit., p. 4-
260 Ibid,, pp. 4, 8. 
261 I'bid,, p. 8. 
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there are various exceptions, in all but nine states these 
laws restrict contributions by and to candidates as indivi-
duals through the limitation on the amount these candidates 
262 
may spend personally. 
However, candidates for the more important elective 
offices nearly always avoid these restrictions by establish-
ing one or mo,re political committees which may receive 
contributions. Therefore, most states have enacted certain 
controls in regard to political committees. Generally, 
candidates must appoint a political committee with a respon-
sible treasurer who alone may receive and disburse funds, 
263 
except personal expenditures of the candidate. Some 
264 
states permit the candidate to be his own treasurer. Two 
states, Indiana and Maryland, specify that a treasurer must 
post bond and submit in writing his acceptance of authority 
265 
to expend funds. Unfortunately, the purpose of the 
restriction is often defeated in a few states which permit 
266 
the candidate to disclaim expenditures made by his treasurer. 
In order that no excuse for late filing shall be valid, a 
number of states stipulate that all claims for political 
services against a committee or a candidate must be presented 
262 Ibid, P• 3. 
263 Ibid, p. 4• 
264 Loc.cit. 
265 Loc.cit. 
266 Loc.cit. 
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267 
within a short time, usually ten days, after the election. 
Possibly because of the difficulty of enforcement, the 
restriction of contributions to political committees has been 
adopted by only two states, Massachusetts and Nebraska, which 
268 
place a $1,000 Ceiling upon individual contributions. This 
restriction is easily sidestepped by having various members 
. 269 
of a family each contribute the maximum amount. Eighteen 
s t ates require statements from all persons other than candid-
ates or committee treasurers who receive or disburse sums for 
political purposes in excess of a certain amount, usually 
270 
from five to ten dollars. Believing that it is both wiser 
and easier of enforcement to legislate against the wrong use 
of money rather than against the amount of contributions and 
expenditures, thirty-two states have either enumerated the 
purposes for which money can be expended and prohibit expend-
itures for any other purpose, or specifically outlaw the 
271 
objectionable practices and permit all other expenditures. 
Because it needs less revision to keep up with modern means 
of political campaigni ng, such as by television , this latter 
method seems to be more practical, and to be preferred. 
267 Loc.cit. 
268 Loc.cit. 
269 Loc.cit. 
270 Loc.cit. 
271 Ibid, p. 3; Pollock Jr., op.cit., p. 250. 
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In some states anonymous gifts are not allowed and 
272 
if made must be turned over to the state. New York and 
Oregon stipulate that all contributions must be in the name 
273 
of the actual donors. In Oregon no contribution may be 
received from a manufacturer of or a dealer in intoxicating 
274 
beverages. Florida prohibits one candidate from contri-
275 
buting .to the campaign fund of another candidate. Nearly 
all violations of the corrupt practices statutes are punish-
able by fines and a few states specify the use to which 
these fines shall be put. In Utah these receipts are to be 
placed in the road and bridges fund, while in Wisconsin, 
276 
Missouri, and Nebraska, they go to the common school fund. 
More severe penalties include imprisonment, forefeiture of 
office, and either ·temporary or permanent disqualification 
277 
to hold an elective position. Violating corporations may 
. 278 
forfeit their privilege of doing business in the state. 
On the whole, however, enforcement provisions are not 
279 
adequate. 
272 Minault, Ibid. 
273 Loc.cit. 
274 Loc.cit. 
275 Loc.cit. 
276 Ibid, p. 8. 
277 ~· pp. 7-8 
278 Ibid, pp. 4, 8. 
279 Ibid, P• 9· 
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State contribution restrictions: problems. We have 
already seen that the political result _of the 1940 Hatch 
Act II limitations on the yearly e.x.pendi tures by national 
committees was an increase in the nu,mlJ,er or:,_ and in the 
amounts donated to, local and state committees. Also 
involved in ~ state contribution restrictions are other 
problems of the same nature as those arising out of state 
and federal expenditure limitations and need not be reviewed 
again. As in the case of federal contributions, it is even 
more difficult to enforce legal restrictions on the size of 
280 
contributions. Inasmuch as candidates have much more to 
fear from an enlightened electorate than from statutes which, 
too often, contain many loopholes, undoubtedly one of the 
best remedies for this situation is to be found in carefully 
281 
worded legislation providing the widest possible publicity. 
Such a law must be strictly and efficiently applied by the 
offices of the Secretary of State and of the Attorney General. 
To be effective, compulsory newspaper publication of the 
political contributions received by, and the campaign expenses 
of, candidates and commitftees·_, ~_h_~).lld be required while public 
282 
interest is still high, befo-re.~- the election. 
One of the reasons for limiting political expenditures 
280 Pollock Jr., op.cit., p. 249. 
281 Minault, Ibid. 
282 Loc.cit. 
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and restricting campaign contributions is to place the 
poorer candidates upon a more equitable basis with wealthy 
283 
opponents. To the present, this purpose has not been 
accomplished. Perhaps a partial solution combined with 
publicity could be increased governmental assumption of 
the financial burdens of campaigning. This would indicate 
a trend toward a greater individual sense of responsibility 
for the functioning of democracy through the broadening of 
284 
campaign financing. Often advocated is state aid to the 
candidates in the form of dfficial election publicity 
pamphlets, the state providing the printing at cost, as is 
285 
done now in three states, or even free of charge. Massa-
chusetts now furnishes free printed information mailed at 
state expense to every registered voter on all state refer-
enduro questions. Why couldn't this service be extended to 
include the candidates? 
It has also been proposed that candidates for the 
more important public offices be furnished with meeting-
places and that the franking privilege, the free use of the 
286 
mails as in England and France, be granted to all candidates. 
Another suggestion concerns the distribution of radio time. 
283 Ibid, p. 1. 
284 Merriam, op.cit., p. 414. 
285 Minault, op.cit., P• 9· 
286 Loc.cit.; Merriam, QP.Cit., p. 415. 
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Where there are government-owned radio stations, as in the 
state of Wisconsin~ it is possible for all parties to be 
given an opportunity to present their views over the air to 
287 
the electorate. In fact, inasmuch as the operation of a 
radio or television station is not a matter of right but a 
privilege to be regulated "in the public interest, conven-
ience, or nsdessity" within the reasonable discretion of 
288 
the licensing authorities, I can see no valid legal 
objection to requiring as a condition of the privilege that 
all candidates must be allowed a certain period of time to 
present their qualifications and viewpoints. 
Finally, states having inadequate corrupt practices 
statutes might well remodel these to conform to the various 
provisions of the best existing laws in many states, such 
289 
as those of Indiana, Massachusetts, and New Jersey. The 
chief value of these laws has been the education that has 
accompanied the general discussion of the sources and the 
290 
applications of campaign funds. A generation ago the 
291 
question of "Who is paying the bills?" was not even raised. 
287 Merriam, Ibid. 
288 National Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. United States, 
319 u.s. 190, 63 s.ct. 997, 87 L.Ea. 1~ (1943). 
289 Minault, Ibid. 
290 Merriam, op.cit., p. 414. 
291 Loc. cit. 
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The common raising of this question today has affected the 
political morale of the community more deeply than the 
292 
actual enforcement of the laws. In this, they have 
served the useful purpose of focusing public interest on 
the large political contributions by private interests, 
thus calling attention to the direct or indirect obligations 
incident to meeting the campaign requirements of the party 
293 
budget incurred by the candidates. 
Miscellaneous Provisions 
Great Britain 
Enacted August 25, 1883 the British statute entitled 
"An Act for the better prevention of Corrupt and Illegal 
Practices at Parliamentary Elections," 46-47 Victoria, ch. 
51 (1883), was a summarization of the previous laws known 
as the Corrupt Practices Prevention Acts passed on a temporavy 
basis in 1854, 1863, 1868, 1872, and 1879, and enacted as 
294 
permanent legislation in 1867, 1868, and 1881. Already 
referred to in connedtion with publicity requirements, 
expenditure limitations, and contribution restrictions, the 
1883 statute strictly regulates the amounts which can be 
spent by or on behalf of an individual candidate during the 
292 Lo~.cit. 
293 Ibid, pp. 414-415 
294 See also Representation of the People (Equal 
Franchise) Act of 1928, 18-19 Geo. V, ch. 12, sec. 5 (1928). 
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relatively short formal election period, and requires reports 
of these contributions and expenditures. But, so long as a 
particular candidate is not mentioned by name, the legislation 
places no limitations on contributions to, no restrictions on 
the amounts which can be spent by, and requires no reports 
from, political committees or pressure groups. Here is a 
legal distinction with a real practical difference. 
Therefore, while the English law regulates the personal 
campaign funds of individual candidates, it is not at all in 
the same legislative category as the general prohibitory laws 
in the United States. Where American statutes have failed to 
accomplish their purposes in this regard, the British haven't 
even attempted to pass such legislation. Rather than over-
all prohibitions as in the United States, the English have 
largely confined themselves to enacting penal statutes prevent-
ing only those election practices which were commonly deemed 
contrary to public policy, morals, and decency. Coercion, 
threats of force, intimidation, undue influence, bribery, 
treating, the payment of persons for transporting voters to 
the polls, expenditures for certain purposes, illegal registra-
tion, fraudulent voting, repeat voting, and other unsavory and 
improper election practices are forbidden. Most of these 
illegal items are also included within the purview of American 
laws, but in the United States are looked upon only as a 
necessary supplement to the corrupt practices statutes. 
- 207 -
United States 
Federal employee protections. Abuse of power by 
the party in control often led to the assessment of office 
holders and civil servants for money and services in behalf 
295 
of the campaign fund. Thus, this was one of the first 
abuses of party financing which Congress attempted to 
296 
regulate. In 1867, legislation was passed designed to 
protect navy yard employees from political assessments and 
in 1883 the Civil Service Reform Act, popularly known as 
297 
the Pendleton Act, went much further. Under this law, 
the solicitation of campaign funds from any officer or 
employee of the United States by a fellow employee is 
forbidden, a federal employee cannot pay to another such 
employee any political contribution, no one may solicit or 
receive political contributions in federal buildings or on 
federal premises, and federal employees are protected from 
298 
discharge for refusing to make political contributions. 
This legislation was reasonably successful in reducing 
the pressure upon federal civil service employees, but many 
federal political appointees were still expected to make 
408. 
295 Penniman, op.cit., p. 540; Merriam, op.cit., p. 
296 Loc.cit. 
297 U.S. Statutes at Large, vol. 22, pp. 406-407 
(1883). 
29 8 Lo e • ci t • 
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299 
"voluntary" contributions. Therefore, in the second 
session of the Sixtieth Congress in 1909 a revision of 
the Criminal Code, by amendments to and re-enactment of 
the 1883 Pendleton Act, resulted in a penal law prohibiting 
any United States Senator or Representative, or any public 
officer, employee, or clerk, from soliciting or receiving 
any assessment, subscription, or contribution for any 
political purpose from any officer, clerk, or employee of 
the United States or from any person receiving a salary 
300 
from the United States Treasury. This problem did not 
arise again in public attention until the New Deal was 
accused of manipulating relief programs for political 
301 
advantage. 
Obviously, there can be no doubt that the expendi-
tures of Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration served the 
302 
political interests of the Democratic Party very well. 
According to the Institute of Public Opinion, although in 
1936 F.D.R. was supported by 57% of the voters who had 
received no money aid from the government, voter support 
for F.D.R. rose to 68% in the case of subsidized farmers, 
73% in the case of subsidized owners of land or homes, and 
299 Merriam, Ibid. 
300 Pollock Jr., op.cit., pp. 15, 181; see u.s. 
Compiled Statutes (1918), pp. 169~-1695. 
301 Penniman, op.cit., p. 542. 
302 Ibid, p. 541. 
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303 
80 % in the case of relief recipients. Gratitude for 
help when help was needed is certainly worth a great deal 
more than mere propaganda expenditures, and when government 
assumes the responsibility of providing for the general 
welfare, why should it not be expected that as a natural 
consequence the electorate will vote accordingly? Surely 
one of the aims of democratic electoral procedures is to 
make government more responsive to the needs of the people. 
Vfuere is the sinister plot in such legislation? 
However, to guard against possible abuses in govern-
ment spending, and to meet widespread disapproval of what 
was believed by critics to be improper purposes in these 
policies, in August of 1939 Congress passed Hatch Act I to 
make it unlawful to deprive or threaten to deprive anyone 
of federal work or compensation for relief on account of 
race, creed, political activity, or support of, or opposi-
tion to, any candidate or party, or to solicit~r receive 
from a person on federal relief an assessment for any 
political purpose whatever, or to furnish or receive, for 
political purposes, any list of persons receiving federal 
3~ 
relief. The penalty for violation is a fine, imprison-
305 
ment, or both. Aside from these immediate objects, the 
statute was designed to prevent certain additional "perni-
303 ~, p. 542. 
304 u.s. Statutes at Large, vol. 53, p. 1147 (1939). 
305 Loc.cit. 
- 210 -
cious political activities" on the part of all federal 
306 
administrative officers and employees. 
Employees of the federal government in non-policy 
determining positions were forbidden to take any active 
part in political management or in political campaigns, 
and such employees shall not use their official authority 
or influence for the purpose of affecting in any way the 
result of a nomination or election of any candidate for a 
307 
federal office. Federal employees classified under 
Civil Service may express their political opinions privately 
308 
only. The penalty for violation is stoppage of pay and 
309 
removal from office, However, non-classified civil 
servants may be solicited for political contributions and 
may publicly voice their opinions on candidates, issues, 
310 
and parties, but not as part of any organized campaign. 
Further, the statute applied only to federal personnel and 
did not include employees of state and local governments. 
311 
Legislative and judicial employees are also excluded. 
Hatch Act II of 1940, notable for its drastic 
306 Loc.cit. 
307 Loc.cit. 
308 Loc.cit. 
309 Loc.cit. 
310 Loc.cit. 
311 Loc.cit. 
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chaages concerning the collection or campaign funds, amended 
Hatch Act I of the previous year to extend its coverage to 
all state and local government employees whose salaries are 
paid in whole or in part from federal funds, and forbade 
such employees from active political participation in federal 
campaigns, or from using their official position to interfere 
with or influence the outcome of federal primaries or elec-
tions. 312 Taken together, these two statutes constitute the 
principal provisions regulating the political conduct of 
federal employees. Excluding officials in policy-determining 
pos~tions, employees of the federal government are severely 
restricted in their political activities. What was originally 
a protection has so narrowed their rights that these employees 
have become, in effect, second-class citizens. 
Also, the problem of defining "political activity" has 
-
led to hair-line decisions. For example, federal employees 
may display campaign stickers on personal automobiles and, 
when not on the job, may also wear political badges, even 
though they may not pass out these stickers or badges. Such 
employees may not serve on or for any political committee or 
party, or as an officer of any political club or organization, 
or as a member or any of its committees. However, the Hatch 
Acts do not prevent activity in "good government" or civic 
welfare organizations, as long as these organizations are 
312 u. S. Statutes at Large, vol. 54, P• 767 (1940). 
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non-partisan in nature and do not hold political meeting2. 
Therefore , federal employees may not solicit or work for a 
political party, candidate, or faction, distribute campaign 
literature, ask for or handle political contributions, cir-
culate nominating petitions, act as a watcher or checker at 
the polls, help get out voters on registration or election 
days, help organize political meetings, or take any active 
part in such meetings, or march in a political parade. 
On the other hand, these restrictions in no way impair 
a federal employees right to register and vote, or to express 
private opinions on political subjects or candidates as long 
as such expression does not constitute taking part in a pol-
itical campaign. Employees of the federal government may 
also contribute on a personal basis to political organizations 
313 
or c ampaign funds. Federal employees may attend political 
meetings as an observer, sign nominating or other political 
petitions, and may petition Congress e xpressing support of or 
opposition to pending legislation. However, these employees 
cannot initiate or circulate such petitions, and may not have 
an editorial or managerial connection with any politically 
partisan publication. Further, a federal employee may not 
write for publication any letter, signed or unsigned, in favor 
of or against any political party or candidate. But the Hatch 
313 Merriam, op.cit., p. 408, reports that in 1940, of 
contr~b~tions $1,000 or over received by the Democratic Party, 
·nearly one-fift\lr· came from of:fi ceholders. 
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Acts do not prohibit federal employees from informing 
others of registration and voting laws on a non-partisan 
basis, or from urging people to vote as a matter of good 
citizenship. 
State employee protections. Where state employees 
are paid wholly or in part with federal funds, Hatch Act II 
prevents their being legally solicited for political contri-
314 
butions. In addition to this protection through the 
operation of federal laws, many states make it a corrupt 
315 
practice to intimidate relief clients, and statutes 
similiar to the Hatch Acts prohibiting the solicitation of 
funds for political purposes from various classes of public 
employees, usually those in non-elective offices, have been 
316 
enacted in twenty-one states. About one-third of the 
317 
states prohibit the assessment of officeholders. This 
leaves a large proportion of state and local employees 
without any protection against this form of tribute, and 
even where legislative protections are theoretically in 
effect enormous sums for campaign funds are still collected 
from sta t e and municipal officeholders in the form of 
"voluntary" political contributions, varying from the usual 
314 u.s. Statutes at Large, vol. 54, p. 767 (1940). 
315 Minault, op.cit., p. 2. 
316 Tbid, p. 3. 
317 Merriam, Ibid. 
- 214 -
318 
2% to 10%, which it would be unsafe to withhold. 
It should be noted, however, that the employment of 
public school teachers usually offers much greater employee 
protections than ordinarily prevail in the case of other 
319 
public employees. Control over school personnel is 
customarily vested within the e~clusive jurisdiction of a 
Board of Education or School Committee which, though elected 
locally, is subject to state laws and usually has an inde-
pendent authority over educational matters. Within the 
scope of power conferred upon it, the Board of Education or 
School Committee is a quasi-judicial and policy-making 
administrative body which selects the superintendent of 
schools, appoints school personnel, passes upon the curricu-
lum, purchases textbooks, establishes and operates under its 
OlArn budget, and cannot be interferred with by other locally 
elected officers. This separation of education from all 
mther local governmental functions is an American tradition 
resulting from a ~esire to "keep politics out of the schools." 
318 Loc.cit.; Penniman, op.cit., p. 541. 
319 In Massachusetts, for example, Chapter 71 of the 
General Laws stipulates that no ~eacher applicant can be 
questioned regarding religion or politics. Causes for dis-
missal are enumerated in the statute. Further, a teacher in 
the employ of a school system for three years or more thereby 
acquires "tenure" rights which entitle such teacher to notice 
of specific charges in writing, a public hearing with benefit 
of legal counsel before the School Committee, and then a two-
thirds affirmative vote of the entire School Committee is 
required before such a teacher may be dismissed. 
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Other corrupt p~actices provisions: federal. In the 
United States the popular connotation of the term ncorrupt 
practices" is usually confined nowadays to legislation 
dealing with the limitation of expenditures, restrictions 
on contributions, and the filing of statements accounting 
320 
for campaign funds. Yet it should be remembered that 
publicity requirements, prohibitions on political donations 
by corporations, and the like, are not at all necessarily 
pa:;t of even a very comprehensive statute such as exists in 
321 
England where . party campaign funds are undisturbed. 
American laws, then, mention the standard corrupt practices 
items in a secondary position, and include them under 
general aspects of election administration legislation 
322 
mainly for the sake of completeness. 
With one exception--the prohibition on the solicita-
tion of political contributions by United States Senators 
and Representatives--the penal statutes relating to corrupt 
practices, with certain amendments and additions, were 
323 
consolodated into the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, 
320 Minault, op.cit. p. 1. 
321 Pollock Jr., op.cit., p. 180. 
322 Minault, Ibid. 
323 U.S. Statutes at Large, vol. 43, p. 1070, 68th 
Cong., Second Session, P.L. No. 506, Title III,approved 
February 28, 1925. 
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324 
and added in 1939 and 1940 were the Hatch Acts. More 
s pecifically, the law penalizes such off enses in federal 
primaries and election s as coercion, threats to persuade 
or compel a per s on to vote or refrain from voting in a 
particular way, undue influence, the purchase of votes, 
illegal voting either by impersonation or repeating, 
325 
tamperi ng with the ballots, and falsifying the returns. 
Bribery and intimidation are each punishable by a fine of 
not more than $1~000 or imprisonment of not more than one 
32b 
year, or both. 
No candidate is legally permitted to promise any 
office or make any pledge relative to the appointment or 
recommendation for appointment of any person to any 
position of employment in order to secure that person's 
s upport, and the sworn itemized statement of contributions 
and expenditures required of every candidate for Congress 
must include every such promise or pledge made by him or 
by any person with h i s consent for the purpose of procur i ng 
that person's support. Knowingly falsifying this statement 
makes the candidate liable to a fine of not more than $1,000 
327· 
or imprisonment of not more than one year, or both. One 
324 u.s. Statutes at Large, Vol. 53, p. 1147 {1939); 
U. S . Statutes at Large, vol. 54, p. 767 (1940). 
325 See Footnote 323. 
326 Loc.cit. 
327 t oc.cit. 
- 217 -
observer believes that these federal provisions, enacted 
separately and at different times, can scarcely be said 
to constitute comprehensive corrupt practices legislation, 
that in most of the states corrupt practices laws save the 
328 
situation and prevent the worst of election abuses. 
Other corrupt practices provisions: state. Although 
the federal laws have had some limited influence, they have 
not attempted to cover as broad a field as corrupt practices 
legislation in the states, political conditions today would 
be much worse than they are if it were necessary to depend 
upon federal laws alone for protecting the purity of elec-
329 
tions. State corrupt practices statutes have been in 
force since 1890 and, despite their defects, limitations, 
and diversities, these state regulations are largely res-
ponsible for whatever progress has been made in improving 
such political conditions as prevailed in this country in 
the 'eighties and have succeeded in preventing at least the 
330 
worst forms of political corruption. The fact that all 
the states have some corrupt practices statu.te, and that a 
glance at successive state enactments on the subject reveals 
a progressive stringency of such laws, is evidence of the 
need for state corrupt practices legislation for the purpose 
328 Pollock Jr., op.cit., pp. 184, 234. 
329 Ibid, p. 234. 
330 Loc.cit. 
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of preventing abuses on the part of candidates in their 
331 
attempt to secure votes. 
These state laws are extremely diverse, but there 
are certain fairly uniform requirements running through 
most of them. All states have made it unlawful to give a 
bribe in connection with elections, while all :.but seven 
332 
forbid the receiving of a bribe. Most states make it 
illegal for any corporation doi n g business in the state, 
directly or indirectly, to make any contribution or 
expenditure for any political purpose whatsoever, and make 
it a crime for any person to solicit or knowingly receive 
333 
any such contribution or expenditure. Although only 
twenty states mak e treating of voters an offense, twenty-
four states forbid candidates to promise appointments to 
secure votes or to give official patronage i n return for 
334 
polit i cal support. However, candidates are legally 
protected i n twe n ty-three states from pressure to make 
contributions to any organization, but this does not prevent 
the candidate from contributing to org a n izations which he 
335 
has r egularly sypported in the past. Of these states, 
331 Minault, op. cit,. p. 1. 
332 Loc.cit. 
333 Penniman, op.cit., PP• 556-557. 
334 Minault, Ibid; Penniman, Ibid. 
335 Minault, o:e. cit., p. 2. 
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six specifically exempt political org anizations from the 
336 
law, and others permit "voluntary contributions. 11 
Of course, the most common requirements of state 
corrupt practices statutes are penalties against threats 
. . 
or coercion , undue infl uence, i l legal expenditures, ~oting 
by impersonation, repeat voting, tampering with ballots, 
337 
and fraudulent reporting of election returns. Twenty-
six states forbid distinguishing marks to be made on the 
338 
ballots. Most states outlaw the i ntimidation of e mploy-
ees by employers in voting matters, and many make it a 
339 
corrupt practice to intimidate relief clients. Among 
the states imposing a poll tax, several prevent the payment 
of such tax by others 
340 
except close relatives or members of 
the household. Anonymous contributions are often prohi-
342 341 
bited. Many states forbid election betting. A few 
s t ates outlaw the wearing of political buttons around t h e 
343 
polls on election day. In other ways these valuable 
336 Loc.cit. 
r 
337 Penniman, opcit., p. 556; Sikes, State and 
Federal Corrupt Practices Le gislation, Appendix. 
53~ Minault, OD • cit. 1 p. 1. 
339 Ibid, P• 2. 
340 Loc.cit. 
341 Pollock Jr., opci t., p. 255. 
242 Loc.cit. 
243 Loc.cit. 
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provisions of state corrupt practices statutes indicate 
that their purposes are the same, differing only in the 
344 
ways in which they carry out those purposes. 
Control over newspaper support and advertising is 
widespread. Seventeen states prohibit the purchase of 
34.5 
editorial or newspaper support. Over half the states 
require proper labeling of political advertisements, 
. 346 
es:pecially in newspapers. In Massachusetts, this means 
that all political material must be. plainly marked as such 
and bear the name and address of the person or persons 
responsible. The circulation of statements reflecting upon 
the character of a candidate is unlawful in eight states, 
while others stipulate that such statements in a newspaper 
entitle the victim to the same amount of space in rebuttal. 
Texas requires that no newspaper advertisement be paid in 
excess of regular rates, and in Kansas a candidate owning a 
newspaper must charge himself for all ; pereonal references 
in his ne wspaper at the standard rate, and report these 
348 
charges in his campaign expense account. In Minnesota, 
every candidate having a financial interest in a newspaper 
p. 25.5. 
344 Ibid, p. 23.5 
34.5 Minault, op.cit. p. 2; Pollock Jr., op.cit., 
346 Minault, Ibid. 
34 7 Lo c • cit. 
348 Loc.cit. 
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347 
349 
must file with the county auditor a statement of that fact. 
· Although only a few states have attempted to control the use 
of the radio, Mississippi stipulates that radio time be given 
in accordance with the provisions of federal statutes and at 
350 
the regular rates. 
Many of the provisions of state corrupt practices 
statutes, therefore, are sometimes quite elaborate and 
penalties for violations of these laws include fines, 
imprisonment, withholding of names from the ballot, dis-
qualification to hold office, forfeiture of office, and 
351 
disenfranchisement. Even so, in too many states the 
problem of abuses at elections has not been solved because 
these enactments are merely a stop-gap, often so ill-
constructed as to open them to the suspicion that they are 
352 
meant solely as a sop to a touchy but ignorant electorate. 
Fortunately, the efficient working of carefully worded 
statutes shows that such legislation can effectively curb 
353 
election abuses. As an example of a comprehensive state 
law, the provisions of the Wisconsin corrupt practices 
349 L0 c.cit. 
350 Loc.cit. 
351 Ibid, p. 1; Pollock Jr., op.cit., p. 254. 
352 Minault, Ibid; Overacker, Money in Elections, 
chapter XIII. 
353 Minault, Ibid. 
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354 
statute are outlined as follows: 
(1) Publicity is required. This consists of a sworn 
itemized statement of receipts, and disbursements in detail, 
includi ng express or implied obligations. 
(2) A limitation is imposed upon the amount that may 
be spent by or in behalf of any candidate for nomination or 
election. 
(3) The purposes are defjned for which lawful expendi-
tures may be made by candidates and committees, such as main-
tenance of headquarters and rental of halls; stationery, 
postage, · clerical assistance at headquarters; printing and 
distribution of campaign literature; political advertising; 
salaries and expenses of speakers, traveling expenses of 
committee members, and so rorth. 
C4) No payment of any kind shall be made for services 
to be performed on the day of the primary or election, even 
for the expense of transporting of any voter to or from the 
polls. 
(.:5.) Campaign literature must bear the name and 
address of its author and the candidate. 
(6) Newspaper, periodical, or other printed paid 
political matter shall be labeled as a paid political 
advertisement, stating the charge made for it and the name 
of the candidate on whose behalf it has been inserted. 
354 Penniman, op.cit., pp. 557-556. 
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(7) No newspaper or periodical or anyone connected 
therewith shall solicit or receive any compensation in 
return for political influence and no person shall offer 
compensation therefor. 
(8) No candidate shall directly or indirectly pro-
mote his interests by the offer of appointment to public 
or private.office. 
(9) Corporations doing business in the state are 
forbidden to contribute directly or indirectly, or to offer 
or agree to contribute any money, property, free service, 
or thing of value, for any political purpose whatsoever. 
(10) The giving or receiving of a bribe is unlawful, 
as is any form of i n timidation in connection with an 
election. Such behavior as election betting, fraudulent 
voting, improper marking of ballots, and certain other 
familiar corrupt practices, are similarly illegal. 
Chapter Conclusions 
On the whole, by neglect, evasion, and nonenforcement, 
the federal laws regulating party finance have been left 
innocuous and of little value, without much basic effect 
355 
upon the actual conduct of the electoral process. The 
amended and consolodated Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 
1925 omits essential features of a good regulatory statute, 
355 Pollock ~r., op ~ cit., p. 260; Merriam, op.cit., 
p. 415. 
- 224 -
~aving important fields of control to the various states. 356 
Although the ;925 law is primarily for publicity of campaign 
receipts and disbursements, it achieves little or no practical 
publicity insofar as making this information part of the 
357 public's common knowledge. Other features of the feder.al 
statutes, such as the limitations upon the amount of expendi-
tures and the restrictions upon the size of contributions 
in the Hatch Acts, have been more honored in the breach than 
in the observance.35B Of ~ourse, the senatorial investigatw 
ing c·ommi ttees have made up for many of the deficiencies in 
the publicity law.359 
In fact, these investigations have made use of the 
publicity requirements to examine the general operation of 
the federal corrupt practices statutes. For example, in 
1940 a study was m~de of the reports of contributions, 
expenditures, and activities of national, state, and inde-
pendent political committees. 360 This investigation 
concluded, in the light of the provisions of the Hatch Acts, 
356 Pollock, Jr., Ibid. 
357 Loe. cit. 
358 Merriam, Ibid. 
359 Loc. cit. 
360 Report of the Special Committee to Investigat e 
Presidential, Vice Presidential, and Senatorial Campaign 
Expenditubes, 1940, Pursuant to Senate Resolutions Nos.212, 
291, and 336. Senate Report No. 47, 77th Cong., First Seas. 
February 15, 1941, pp. 5-13, 79-80. . 
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that these provisions were ineffective in preventing the 
expenditure of enormous sums of money in the 1940 national 
361 
election campaign. The $3,000,000 limitation served to 
direct the flow of campaign funds in excess of that amount 
i nto other channels than the traditional party committees, 
such as state or local committees, and the newly-established 
independent political committees, all actually working for 
the national party ticker, and each legally entitled to 
362 
spend up to the $3,000,000. Further, the $5,000 contri-
bution restriction was avoided by the simple procedure of 
donating that amount to each of these committees, meaning 
that almost any sum could be put into the campaign and 
363 
spent without restriction. 
Necessary statutory changes in the public interest 
became a pparent as the result of the thorough investigation 
of the 1940 campaign, and the Senate Special Committee 
recommended exploration and study of the advisability, 
possibility, and validity of remedial 1$gislation designed 
364 
to accomplish the following objectives: 
(1) To remove ambiguities and uncertainties as to 
statutory limitations on campaign contributions and expendi-
tures. 
361 Loc.cit. 
362 Loc.cit. 
363 Loc.cit. 
364 Loc.cit. 
- 226 -
(2) To place an all-inclusive limitation on the 
total amount of money that may be collected or expended 
during any calendar year by political committees and other 
organizations and groups of persons on begalf of candidates 
for nomination and election for the offices of President 
and Vice President of the United States. 
(3) To place an all-inclusive limitation on the 
total amount of money that may be contributed during any 
calendar year by any one individual to be expended directly 
or indirectly on behalf of the nomination or election of a 
candidate for federal office. 
(4) To provide protection for candidates for nomina-
tion or election to any federal office against false, 
libellous and scurrilous campaign material. One remedy 
suggested by the committee is to require that all campaign 
literature bear upon its face the name of its sponsor and 
its printer or publisher. 
(5) To make unlawful any pernicious political 
activities by county, township1 committeemen, or agricultural 
conservation associations. 
(6) To prohibit coercion, either actual or construct-
ive, of their employees, by private companies or corporations 
or their officials to interfere with the free exercise of 
their voting franchise in the nomination or election of 
federal officials. 
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(7} To prohibit contributions, directly or indirectly, 
by any public utility or other corporation regulated in whole 
or in part by the federal government by officers or directors 
of such corporations to campaign funds to be used in connec-
tion with the nomination or election of any candidate for 
federal office. 
(8} To make effective the provisions of the Federal 
Corrupt Practices Act prohibiting contributions to campaign 
funds by natiohal banks, directly or indirectly. 
(9) To prevent abuses of the congressional franking 
privileges during political campaigns. 
(10} To prohibit distribution of surplus commodities 
or other necessities of life, cash, or other benefits by 
any federal relief or local administrative agency for th~ 
purpose of influencing the nomination or election of any 
federal official. 
~ese recommendations are in themselves a commentary 
on the failure of existing federal corrupt practices statutes. 
But it does not necessarily follow that the final answer is 
to merely list more prohibitions. It should be kept in mind 
that present-day political campaigsn cannot be frugal affairs.365 
Fanciful regulations, and attempts to write provisions govern-
ing every line of political activity, may be devised by theo-
retical students, but they will be disregarded and prove quite 
365 Pollock, Jr., op. cit., p. 261 
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fruitless when it comes to a close and hard-fought election.366 
Consequently, perhaps it would be much more reasonable to 
concentrate on being careful about the sources of the campaign 
fund and about the manner in which it is expanded than with 
the size of the fund. 367 Because an informed electorate 
will be the judge, beneficial results will follow more auto-
matically from an adequate publicity law effectively enforced 
than from additional penal legislation, and therefore the 
best means to control excessive campaign expenditures is 
effective publicity.368 
Additionally, improved national legislation must be 
complemented and supplemented by improved laws in the states.369 
This is true because of the nature of our constitutional 
system, the fact that the federal government cannot legally 
interfere in purely state matters. Although the worst forms 
of political corruption have been eliminated by the vast 
amount of corrupt practices legislation in the states, what-
ever good results which have occurred being largely attribu-
table to these laws, effective control over campaign funds 
has not been brought about and there is still a great need 
for improvement.370 Thus, in many cases they contain pro-
366 ~, p. 229. 
367 ~~ p. 261 
368 Ibid, pp. 256-259, 263 
369 Ibid, p. 263 
370 Ibid,pp. 260, 263 
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visions which encourage perjury and are worse than dead 
371 
letters because of frequent blatant violations. Many 
state statutes have been conceived in partisanship, brought 
forth in the spirit of persecution, enacted without suffic-
372 
ient consideration, and are therefore objectionable. 
Instead of endeavoring to reach the really important points 
in the regulation of campaign funds, legislatures have too 
often sought to multiply regulations which are bothersome 
373 
and in many cases virtually impossible of enforcement. 
On the other hand, aside from the standard corrupt 
practices provisions outlawing bribery and the like, the 
publicity sections of the state statutes should be the most 
helpful in suppressing electoral corruption, but, as has 
been shown, these statutes have too often omitted many 
features indispensable for a thorough knowledge of the real 
374 
contributions to, and the expenditures of, the campaign. 
Compulsory pre-election newspaper publication of these 
statements would be especailly valuable. Because they can 
be effective only through complete and absolute publicity 
of party finance, the better statutes require careful enforce-
ment through an inspection of the statement of accounts and 
371 Ibid, p. 260. 
372 Loc.cit. 
373 Ibid, pp. 260-261. 
374 Ibid, p. 263; Merriam, o;e. cit., p. 415. 
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expenses by a state officer, such as the secretary of 
state, who shall notify the person filing the statement 
of any deficiency and report subsequent failure to file 
properly to, for example, the district attorney or attorney 
general, for enforcement and other appropriate proceedings. 
375 
Obviously, the penalties for violation of the publicity laws 
should be sufficient to constitute an adequate deterrent. 
Finally, good state corrupt practices statutes define 
what is meant by a political committee and both the rights 
376 
and obligations of such committees. These laws reach 
those political committees of a subsidiary nature existing 
side by side with party committees, and the legal provisions 
applying to the parties are just as applicable to the non-
party political committees which, experience has shown, often 
377 
expend sums of money rivaling those of _~the party committees. 
Effective publicity will contribute most toward raising the 
level of political practices and it is in this area of polit-
378 
ical committee publicity that new laws must be directed. 
With effective publicity could be combined the broadening of 
campaign financing through government aid in the form of 
furnishing major state and federal candidates with free 
375 Pollock Jr., op.cit., pp. 252-253, 262-263. 
376 Ibid, p. 251. 
377 Loc.cit. 
378 Ibid, p. 263. 
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meeting places, use of the mails without cost, free radio 
and television time, and official election publicity 
pamphlets, printed and mailed at public expense to every 
registered voter. While this would create certal.n problems, 
as in determining the amount of aid to be given minor parties, 
it would be a tremendous forward step in securing both an 
informed electorate and greater equality of opportunity for 
candidates. 
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III 
SPECIFIC LEGISLATION AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
CONTROLLING LABOR UNION POLITTCAL ACTIVITIES 
Chapter Introduction 
As desirable background inrormation to adequately 
understand the discussion of general and specific controls 
over the political activities of organized labor in Great 
Britain and the United States, the first chapter reviewed 
the history and significance of British and American labor 
union political activities, the important differences 
between the two countries, and the electoral practices, 
programs, and potentialities of organized labor in the 
United States. The second chapter dealt with the history, 
provisions, and problems of general legislation and judicial 
decisions in Great Britain and in the United States controll-
ing or affecting all political activities. These included 
publicity requirements and publicity pamphlets, expenditure : 
limitations as to amounts and purposes, the restrictions on 
CQntributions, protections for public employees, various 
illegal practices, and other miscellaneous provisions govern-
ing elections, particularly relating to the conduct of candi-
dates, parties, committees, and their agents. While not aimed 
specirically at organized labor, these laws, or course, 
- 233 -
equally apply to the political activities of the unions and 
their members. 
In this third chapter, greater attention is given to 
detailing the specific legislation and judicial decisions 
controlling the political activities of organized labor in 
Great Britain and the United States, the development of 
these controls, their history and provisions, and the practi~ 
cal effects, the political results of these attempts to limit 
or prohibit labor union political activities. Of interest 
for the legislative intention are the parliamentary and 
congressional debates, and found in the Appendix is a trans-
cr~pt : of the United States Senate's consideration of Section 
304 of the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act. The scope of this chapter, 
therefore, includes British and American, federal and state, 
limitations on labor · union political contributions, prohibi-
tions on organized labor's electoral expenditures, particular-
ly Section 304, and related legislation and judicial - decis-
ions concerning labor's political activities. As in the case 
of many of the general controls dealt with in the second 
chapter, however, these specific controls have also largely 
failed and again will be shown some of the pertinent reasons 
why these attempts have not been as effective as originally 
conceived by their authors. 
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Limitations on Contributions 
"contracting-Out~and "Contracting-In" 
History. Although American common law was derived 
from England, the British law of today differs - in many 
1 fundamental respects from that of the United States. 
Mainly statutory and much more definite, the English law 
has discarded the abstract legal theories upon Which 
2 American labor law is largely premised. Under the present 
law in Great Britain, both si.des are accorded full freedom 
of combination and while there are certain specific restrie-
tions of long standing designed to eliminate intimidation 
and more recent limitations prohibiting specified kinds of 
strikes, all other strikes as well as boycotts and blacklists 
are lawful, labor injunctions are practically unknown, there 
is no anti-trust statute applied to labor organizations, and 
neither unions nor employers' associations are held legally 
responsible for unlawful acts commi tted,-i.ln their behalf. 3 
Labor unions are completely free to support political parties 
and candidates of their choice. They may assess their member-
ship for such purpose with the exception that any union member 
who objects to contributing may sign a statement so indicating 
1 Edwin Emil Witte, The Government in Labor Disputes, 
p. 313. 
2 Loc. cit. 
3 Loc. Cit. 
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and he will not be assessed for the political fund. q. With 
this wider freedom goes strict law enforcement.5 
However, the political rights of labor unions were 
not always so clear, and back of this present status is an 
interesting history which begins wi.th a diametrically 
opposite policy from that now pursued. Until the middle of 
the nineteenth century, the very existence of labor unions 
6 
was without the law. In the eighteenth century, the 
English common law doctrines of criminal conspiracy, as 
well as statutes, had declared all organized associations 
of workingmen to be unlawful combinations in restraint of 
7 
trade. This policy was materially reduced by the Combina-
tion Actg of 1824 and 1825 which repealed the prior anti-
combination laws and expressly declared it to be legal for 
workingmen to combine to fix their wages and hours of work. 
But these statutes penalized intimidation and molestation, 
by no means conferring complete freedom of combination. 
On the contrary, in the next decades numerous union 
leaders were convicted on charges of criminal conspiracy 
for ordinary union activities and some of them peported to 
4 Louise Overacker, "Labor's Political Contributions," 
1939, 54 Political Science Quart~ly 56-68. Also, Louise 
Overacker, Presidential Campaign Funds, p. 52 
5 Witte, Ibid. 
6 Ibid, p. 31U. 
7 See footnote 4. 
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8 
the penal colony in Australia. Strikes to procure the 
discharge of non-union workers, and even peaceful picketing, 
were held criminal offenses. The labor unions themselves 
were regarded as extra-legal organizations and denied all 
right to sue in the courts, even for the protection of their 
9 
funds. Parliament then enacted various laws to give the 
10 
unions a better status, culminating in legislation which 
not only legalized the unions but gave them all of the 
advantages of incorporation without any of the disadvantages. 
By merely registering, they were given the right to sue in 
their common name but for thirty years thereafter were 
11 
believed not to be subject to suit. 
The Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act of 1875, 
38-39 Victoria, ch. 86,. was intended to sweep away the common 
law doctrine of conspiracy in its application to labor dis-
putes. For this doctrine it substituted specific prohibitions 
against certain offensive conduct such as violence, intimida-
tion, persistent following of a person from place to place, 
and picketing which was not peaceful or not for the purpose 
of information. It also declared criminal the breach of 
8 Witte, op.cit., p. 314. 
9 Loc.cit. 
10 Trade Union Act of 1871, 34-35 Victoria, ch. 31; 
conspiracy . and Protection of P~operty Act of 1875, 38-39 
Victoria, ch. 86; Trade Union Act of 1876, 39-40 Victoria, 
ch. 22. 
11 Witte, Ibid. 
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employment contracts with knowledge that such brea ch will 
endanger human life, expose valuable property to destruction, 
or deprive a municipality of gas or water. It also provided 
that strikers would still be liable to prosecution, if guilty 
of these offenses, for rioting, unlawful assembly, breach of 
12 
the peace, and sedition. 
Once having achieved legal status, however, the major 
activity of the unions, collective bargaining, was early 
supplemented by political action. In fact, at least since 
the 1860's labor unions had used their funds for political 
.. 13 
purposes. Ever since Disraeli had extended the franchise 
in 1867 union funds were used to aid the election campaigns 
of friendly candidates, the unions had put up candidates for 
Parliament, and two labor union candidates elected in 1874, 
for over thirty years members of the House of Commons, had 
14 
always had their election expenses paid by unions. From 
1874 onward the unions paid salaries to their members in 
Parliament. This was felt necessary because Members of 
Parliament friendly to labor were usually poor, and the law 
15 
at that time did not provide salaries for the M.P.'s. 
12 Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act of 1875, 
38-39 Victoria, eh. 86. 
13 V. Henry Rothschild 2nd, "Government Regulation of 
Trade Unions in Great Britain: II," 38 Columbia Law Review 
1335, December 1938, p. 1356. 
14 Loc. cit. 
15 See footnote 4· 
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As early as 1873 a labor union had a Parliamentary 
Candidates Fund and in 1894 the Royal Commission on Labor 
had noted that one of the nine purposes on which labor 
unions expended their funds was parliamentary representa-
16 
tion. Political contributions by labor unions had long 
been recognized as valid by the acceptance for registration 
of labor union rules providing that the making of political 
contributions was to be a labor union object. The Registrar 
had decided that although the making of such contributions 
might not properly be considered a labor union objec~, 
nevertheless it was a proper means to accomplish labor union 
17 
objects and could be registered upon this ground. Thus, 
it was apparently legal for labor unions to give financial 
support to a political party. 
The first important attempt at a party representing 
labor as such was made in 1893 when Kier Hardie founded the 
Independent Labor Party. Lacking union support, this party 
18 
was unsuccessful. In 1900, however, the Trades Union 
Congress joined with Kier Hardie's organization and other 
societies to form the Labor Representation Committee. In 
several decisions of trial and intermediate courts in the 
next decades following the Conspiracy and Protection of 
16 Rothschild 2nd, ~· 
17 Ibid, pp. 1356-1357 
18 Ibid, p. 1357 
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Property Act of 1875, the law was narrowly construed, but 
not until 1901 did the unions deem it necessary to ask for 
any new legislation. Two decisions rendered by the House 
of Lords in this year created consternation in the union 
19 
ranks. Quinn v. Leathem, 1901 A.C. 495, held that 
workingmen acting in combination with intent to injure 
another were civilly liable despite the 1875 Conspiracy 
and Protection or Property Act, and Tarf Vale Ry v. 
Amalgamated Society or Railway Servants, 1901 A.C. 426, 
held that labor unions might be sued and their runds taken 
ror damages caused by their members' unlawrul acts. 
Alarmed, the unions demanded remedial legis l ation 
20 
and thi s became an important issue in the 1905 election. 
The Liber al Party which came into power brought in a bill 
which went only halfway on the most important issue in 
21 
question, that of the liability of the unions ror damages. 
So many of ita supporters, however, had plectged their votes 
to the complete exemption or unions from all actions in 
tort that the government withdrew its rirst bill and rollow-
ing the 1906 elections presented and secured passage of the 
British Trade Disputes Act, 6 Edw. VII, ch, 47. The indigna-
tion aroused by the Taff Vale case had given the needed impe-
19 Witte, op.cit., p. 315 
20 Loc.cit. 
21 Loc.cit. 
tus to labor union political action and in 1906 the Labor 
Representation Committee had been renamed the Labor Party. 
Its rapid growth with over a million adherents, its success 
in the 1906 elections, and its triumph in obtaining the 1906 
22 
statute, established the Labor Party as a political power. 
The 1906 statute is still in effect and, although it 
has been supplemented by other legislation, remains the 
23 
principal law governing labor disputes in England. It 
provides that no act done by a combination of either employ-
era or workingmen in contemplation or furtherance of a labor 
dispute shall give rise to either civil or criminal liability 
unless the act would be actionable if done by only one person. 
It expressly legalizes peaceful picketing and peaceful per-
suasion, retaining, however, the enumeration of specific 
unlawful actions in labor disputes included in the 1875 law. 
Further, it provides that no action shall be maintained in a 
labor dispute for persuasion to break contracts, outlawing 
the yellow-dog contract as a basis for prohibiting efforts 
at unionization. Finally, it declares that no labor union, 
employers' association, nor agents or members of either may 
be sued in tort for unlawful acts alleged to have been 
24 
committed in behalf of the union or association. While 
22 Rothschild 2nd, Ibid. 
23 Witte, op.cit., p. 316. 
24 Trade Disputes Act of 1906, 6 Edw. VII, ch. 47. 
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this statute has been less liberally interpreted that the 
unions desired, no decision has destroyed its essential 
25 
provisions. 
Following 1906, labor's growing political strength 
soon became a source of much concern. Its M.P.'s were no 
longer Liberals or Conservatives but were now pledged to an 
independent platform. Although not speaking for the Labor 
Party viewpoint at that time, Kier Hardie said that 11Labour 
representation means more than sending a Member to the House 
of Commons. It is a means to an end and that end is not 
26 
trades unionism but Socialism. 11 This statement was seized 
upon by the Conservatives in an attempt to undermine the 
Labor Party's influence and, financed by the Conservatives, 
the secretary of a local branch of the Amalgamated Society 
of Railway Servants brought an action against the union to 
27 
enjoin payment of union funds for political purposes. 
This action was upheld by the House of Lords in the Osborne 
28 judgment. So long as this decision remained law, unions 
were absolutely prohibited, legally, from all political 
activity, and labor immediately began a vigorous campaign 
25 Witte, Ibid. 
26 Rothschild 2nd, Ibid. 
27 Loc.cit. 
28 Osborne v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, 
1 Law Re.Ch.Div. 163, 1 British Ruling Cases 56 (1909), art. 
A.C. 87 (1910). Full discussion in later section. 
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for ita repeal by supporting the Liberals in 1910 1 and by 
29 
electing 42 Labor Party M.P.'s that year. 
"Contracting-Out·n The Parliamentary effort to secure 
repeal of the Osborne judgment was launched on April 13, 
19101 but nothing was done at that time, and the debate 
30 
resumed seven months later on November 181 1910. A Mr. 
Barnes explained that it was only through collective action 
that working class representation was possible, that, 
individually, workmen do not have the means, the money, to 
enable them to ca~mpaign or to serve in Parliament. This 
ngolden key" was taken away by the Osborne decision, closing 
the door to labor of the nopportunity of taking their own 
distinctive part in the Councils of the nation.rr The Trade 
Union Congress, representing two million workmen, held 
special conferences and numerous meetings all over the 
country, demanding the reversal of the Osborne judgment 
which "deprives working people of that right which they 
have exercised for two generations of organizing themselves 
in Trade Unions not only in the industrial field but also 
in the political field, with a view of working out their 
31 
own social and industrial emancipation ••• " 
29 Paul Blanchard, An Outline of the British Labor 
Movement, p. 22. -- -- ---
30 Parliamentary Debates, Commons, Official Report, 
Fifth Series. 1910, vol. 16 1 pp. 1321-1324, 1327-1328, 1330, 
1333-1336, 1339, 1348; vol. 20, pp. 118-119, 1643-1644. 
31 Ibid, pp. 118-119. 
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Speaking in favor of maintaining the Osborne decision, 
Mr. F. E. Smith thought "it would be a great misfortune and 
a gross act of tyranny" if it should be reversed or modified. 
He claimed he came from a city where the labor unionists as 
a whole supported the Conservative Party. It would be an 
injustice if these constituents 11were compelled against 
their wishes to subscribe to the expenses of Labour candid-
ates.« He condemned the Liberal Government's proposal which 
would restore the right of political activity to the unions, 
but Which would make it necessary for any union member who 
wished to be relieved of the political subscription to 
indicate his dissent from the general policy of the union. 
Mr. Smith complained that under this provision 11the onus is 
thrown, not upon those who want to pay, but upon those who 
do not want to pay." This, too, is utyranny,-u because "No 
one can have followed the recent history of the political 
activity of trade unions without being aware of the degree 
of pressure upon persons who do not wish to subscribe to the 
political expenses which the men 1 s leaders desire which is 
brought to bear upon individuals upon whom the duty is thrown 
of signifying their dissent.« Mr. Smith expressed his concern 
32 
lest any union member be subjected to "intimidation." 
There was practical unanimity that labor unions could 
not legitimately be denied the right to a pply their funds in 
32 Ibid, pp. 1643-1644. 
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political activity. Even Conservatives recognized the 
indispensability of labor representation in the House of 
Comraons, agreeing that labor was affected by almost all 
important legislation and that, consequently, labor should 
be rep~esented by those with a special knowledge of its 
problems. The leader of the Conservative opposition in 
the House of Lords, the Marquess of Landsowne, conceded 
that it would be "absolutely impossible to maintain" a 
position denying the labor unions the right to contribute 
33 
funds for political purposes. But, while not arguing 
against the principle of labor union political action, the 
Conservatives sought instead to greatly narrow this right, 
baaing their contentions on the alleged injustice of assess-
ing a political contribution from a labor union member pro-
34 
fessing different political convictions from the majority. 
Thus, the Conservatives proposed the requirement that 
the approval of each individual member be obtained even 
though the majority should vote in favor of political contri-
butions. On the other hand, the Labor Party asked for major-
ity rule to govern in this as in other issues of internal 
union administration, that there was no valid reason to dis-
tinguish political from other types of expenditures. ~hy not 
33 Parliamentary Debates, Lords, Official Reports, 
Fifth Series. 1913, vo1. 13, p. 854. 
34 Parliamentary Debates, Commons, Official Reports, 
Fifth Series. 1910, vo1. 20, pp. 118-119. 
- 245 -
apply the same majority rule which prevails in Parliament 
and in other democratic bodies? If a minority disagree 
with this type of union expenditure, it may attempt to gain 
sufficient support within the union to defeat rules or by-
laws authorizing political contributions. The Labor Party 
argued that since its members worked in the interest of all 
union members and all union members obtained the benefit of 
35 
its work, why should not all union members contribute? 
Labor did not succeed until 1913 in obtaining the legisla-
tion it sought when, even though the statute fell short of 
expectations, Parliament finally enacted the Trade Union 
Act of 1913, 2-3 Geo. V, ch. 30. 
This measure represented a compromise between the 
Conservatives and the Labor Party. Unions could create a 
political fund through rules or by-laws satisfactory to the 
Registrar, engage in political activity, make political 
contributions, spend money for any political purpose for 
which a majority of the members voted by secret ballot at 
a meeting called for the purpose, and all members auto-
matically contributed, except that any union member who 
objected to contributing to the political fund was allowed 
to individually sign an exemption form 11contracting-outn 
of payment of the political contribution, and the statute 
stated that such union member was to be free from any penalty 
35 Ibid, vol. 16, pp. 1327-1328, 1334-1336. 
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36 
for choosing to be exempt. Under this law, political 
contributions could be levied directly, or indirectly as 
part of the regular dues with exempt members being entitled 
to a ratable reduction, but in either event the political 
fund was to be kept separate from the general funds of the 
union and payments for political purposes were to be made 
37 
only out of the political fund. 
The net effect of these provisions was to place the 
burden upon the dissenting union member to attend the meet-
ing at which the making of political contributions was to 
be considered and, if a majority should vote in favor of 
political contributions and he should still prefer to avoid 
contributing, to require him to indicate a dissent intended 
to be in the nature of a conscientious objection. The bill 
had first read "'is unwilling" to contribute, but was amended 
to read 11 objects 11 to contributing in order that there should 
be more than just a desire to avoid a payment out of lesser 
motives than moral convictions opposing the purpose of the 
38 
pa:yment. The political expenditures to which the statute 
applies consist in substance of contributions to the campaign 
of any candidate for public office, payment of the mainten-
36 G.D.H. Cole, A History of the Labour Party From 
1914, p. 2; Florence Peterson, Survey of Labor Economics, p. 
647. 
37 Trade Union Act of 1913, 2-3 Geo. V, ch. 30. 
38 Rothschild 2nd, op.cit., p. 1363. 
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ance or expenses of any public office holder, and payments 
in connection with political meetings or for political 
literature. 
However, the ~rade Union Act of 1913 would not apply 
if the main purpose of these payments is the furtherance of 
ustatutory" labor union objectives, and upon these expendi-
tures for meetings or literature, which may have an incident-
al political purpose, such as the passage of legislation for 
an eight-hour day, there would be no limitation either in 
39 
the statute or elsewhere. Further, the statute was not 
intended to apply to labor union political newspapers, and 
in no way prohibits political activity by labor unions not 
involving expenditure of union funds. Thus, the Liberals in 
power combined with the Labor Party to override the Conserva-
tive objections, although the final result did not completely 
meet the original labor demands for a full repeal of the 
Osborne judgment. While many unionists criticized the 1913 
law, they conformed to its provisions in good spirit. Some 
unions voted against political levies, and within those in 
which they were authorized a small fraction of the members 
chose to exercise their right to "contract-out." Most union-
ists, however, supported the political levy and the Labor 
40 
Party drew most of its financial support from this source. 
39 Ibid, p. 1364. 
40 Louise Overacker, Presidential Campaign Funds, p. 
53. 
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11Contracting-Inn Although it has been observed that 
the Trade Union Act of 1913 worked reasonably well, almost 
from the date of ita passage, disturbed by the rapid growth 
of the Labor Party, the Conservative Party engaged in an 
active campaign to amend the 1913 statute to curtail even 
41 
more the right of unions to make political contributions. 
This anti-labor opportunity arose in 1926 when the unions 
of Britain united in a general strike. On May 31, 1926, 
Conservative Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin told the House 
of Commons that in calling a general strike the labor 
42 
leaders were 
threatening the basis of ordered government, 
and going nearer to proclaiming civil war than 
we have been for centuries past ••• thia is the 
moment which has been chosen to challenge the 
existing Constitution of the country and to 
substitute the reign of force for that which 
now exists ••• The only people who are happy in 
this situation are those who envy us or who 
hate us, because they see the home of democra-
tic freedom entering on a course which, if 
successful on the part of those who enter on 
it, can only substitute tyranny. 
The Conservative Government charged that as a 
result of the Trade Union Act of 1913 passed by a Liberal 
Government 11the trade union of today is a vast political 
body spending money to the end that the capitalist state 
may be overthrown. 11 Replying, Labor Party spokesmen 
41 Rothschild 2nd, op.cit., p. 1366. 
42 Parliamentary Debates, Commons, Official Report, 
Fifth Series. 1926, vol. 195, p. 71. 
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observed that events threw unions into political activities 
43 
"relectantly" but necessarily because 
It was found that scarcely ever could a trade 
union ever get the meanest advance for its 
members without resorting to the arbitrament 
of a strike, and we thought by sending repre-
sentatives to this House, and using constitu-
tionally and peacefully the power that polit-
ical action might give, the standard of the 
workers' life and wage might be raised. 
Not only is labor entitled to take part in the political 
activities of the country, but any attempt to prevent 
worlonen from taking political action would be to .,drive 
them back upon the weapon of revolution. It is the 
development of trade union i nfluence which has strengthened 
44 
the bulwark against revolutionary aims a.l'ld tendencies. 11 
In February of 1927, the debate resumed on the 
Conservative Government's proposals to, inter alia, severely 
limit the political activities of labor unions. Arguing 
against these proposals, it was pointed out that under the 
existing law a member of a union who desires to 11 contract 
outu of the political contribution, because he may be a 
Liberal or a Conservative or for any reason of political 
conscience, only has to send in a written statement that he 
objects to contributing to the political fund of the union. 
45 
But the Conservative Government was proposing 
43 Ibid, pp. 335-336. 
44 Loc.cit. 
45 Ibid, 1927, vol. 202, pp. 226-227. 
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not to contract out as they do now, but to 
contract in--an entirely new principle of 
legislation. What happens in that event? 
First of all the uni ~<m will have to take .a 
ballot as to whether or not it will engage 
in political action, whether it will form a 
political fund, a n d whether it will ask its 
members to contribute for political purposes. 
A ballot will be taken. Let us assume that 
the ballot results in a large majority being 
in favour of political action and political 
contributions. The members, by a majority, 
will have decided that political action from 
their point of view is desirable. If the 
Government intend to introduce the principle 
of contracting-in, it means that the officials 
or the executive of the union cannot operate 
a decision already reached in conformity with 
the rules and secured by ballot by an affirma-
tive vote given in favour of political action. 
Of what use is it taking a ballot and confirm-
ing a principle or a course of action if, 
immediately after, we are to be restricted by 
an Act of Parliament Which prevents us from 
putting that vote into operation? Having 
decided that the union shall take political 
action we shall have to vote again, if there 
is to be contracting-in. We shall again have 
to make application to the union executive for 
the purpose of securing the right of paying 
towards the political fund. 
That is an entire reversal of the legislative 
principle. It puts the onus upon members of 
trade unions of saying 11Yes, " twice to one 
question. First of all, they have to vote by 
majority in favour of a proposal to engage in 
political work and to pay to the political 
fund, and having done that they have to express 
in writing--in all probability it may be enact-
ed that way--their desire, over and above the 
vote already given, to engage as individual 
members in the political work of the union. 
If that is to be the kind of legislation propos-
ed, it will be unfair to a movement which ••• has 
shown itself to be a solid, well-managed move-
ment, designed for ••• the betterment of the 
conditions of the working people of this country 
••• men and women combined for the purpose of 
improving their position. 
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In answering the Labor Party oratory, Conservative 
leaders argued that although the Labor Party might have 
been justified in the early days when the party was being 
built, now that it was the second party of the nation it 
should no longer take union money. It was asserted that 
the Laborites 1'ought to be ashamed that money is being 
taken out of the wages of poor Unionists and poor Conserva-
ti ves 1• against their wishes. Labor Members ought not to 
46 
coerce the minority of the union. It was brought out 
that even though the number of exemptions claimed as of 
December 31, 1925, was only 104,797, the ballots against 
the political levy had been almost 560,000 to about 1,065,000 
for the political levy. Only one-third of the union members 
47 
had voted. Of course, it could be said that those who do 
not ballot are thereby consenting to abide by the will of 
those who do ballot. · Also, many of those Who balloted 
against the political levy may have then decided to accept 
the will of the majority rather than claiming their right 
to 11contract-out. u 
One of the points against the proposed 11 contracting-
in11 law was that it required the money to be sent to the 
head office or some branch office of the union. This was 
contrary to the usual method of paying union assessments 
•I•; 
46 ~~ p. 658. 
47 Ibid, 1927, vol. 203, p. 367. 
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which was to pay the assessment to a union agent or 
collector, and therefore this new method would be just 
another difficulty to be deliberately imposed upon the 
48 
unions. Another argument compared the union's political 
49 
levy to a tax: 
There are a good many people in the suburbs 
who object to the roads being made up; some 
object to the Army and Navy and others have 
objected to the excursion of the Duke of 
York to Australia. Is the Government going 
to give them an exemption for.m Which they 
can send to the Surveyor of Taxes in order 
to secure exemption? 
The bitterness of the debate is illustrated by the following 
50 
verbatim exchange: 
Mr. JEPHCOTT: Members of the other side, 
said that many of us were supported out of a 
party fund that was gathered together by 
shameful methods. If that is true, I ought 
to be ashamed of myself, because I have been 
supported entirely out of party funds in my 
effort to get into this House. The difference 
lies in this however, that what money I have 
had I have had out of the rich, and what money 
some .of my friends on the other side have had 
they have had out of the poor. 
Mr. J. JONES: And proud of it, tool 
Mr. JEPHCOTT: So may I pe permitted to put 
this point? 
Mr. JONES: We cannot be bought. 
Mr. JEPHCOTT: I want no insults. 
48 Ibid, 1927, vol. 206, pp. 2050-2053. 
49 Ibid, p. 2059. 
50 ~~ pp. 2122-2125. 
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Mr. JONES: You will get them. 
The DEPUTY-CHAIRMAN: The hon. Member for 
Silvertown (Mr. Jones) cannot be allowed to 
make these remarks. 
Mr. JONES: On a point of Order. The hon. 
Member insinuates that we are robbing the 
poor. That is a mis-statement of fact. He 
has been kept by the rich to rob the poor. 
The DEPUTY-CHAIRMAN: That is not a point 
of Order. 
Mr. JEPHCOTT: The hon. Member can be 
assured from me that I never shall take 
notice of What he says. The only point that 
I tried to make, and hon. Members opposite 
can see the humour of it, is that it is far 
better to get money out of the rich than out 
of the poor. I do not want to have to remind 
some hon. Members how they have lived out of 
the poor, unless they challenge me. 
Mr. RHYS DAVIES: I am sure the Committee 
will agree with me when I say that the hon. 
Member who has just sat down possesses at 
least one splendid quality, and that is 
honesty; because he has just made the most 
remarkable confession I have ever heard from 
a workman. He has told us frankly that he 
gets his money out of the rich; and I presume 
that he never inquires from where the rich 
get their money. 
Economically, the general strike of 1926 was a fail-
ure. Politically, it made possible the anti-labor Trade 
Disputes and Trade Unions Act of 1927, 17-18 Geo. V, ch. 22, 
much of which had long been urged in one form or another by 
the Association of British Chambers of Commerce, the National 
Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations, and other 
such organizations eager to restrict union activity, and also 
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51 
had been the subject of various press campaigns. Without 
the mandate of a national election~ as in the case of all 
important labor union legislation in the past~ without any 
preliminary inquiry or investigation~ relying upon its 
tremendous parliamentary majority secured in 19241 the 
Conservative Government gave legislative effect to the 
antagonism of various opponents of unionism at a moment 
52 
when middle-class feeling ran high against labor. The 
general strike supplied the occasion for the enactment of 
extensive amendments to the 1913 law~ which went far beyond 
any necessities indicated in the course of the strike, 
including some which could not possibly be related to the 
strike, and to secure its passage the Conservatives were 
required to invoke the 11 cloture1' or ngag rule~ 11 a procedure 
53 
unprecedented in labor union legislation. 
Passed over the determined opposition of the unions, 
the result was a statute which labor believed to be founded 
upon resentment, which labor promised to ignore, and which 
54 
developed fresh bitterness and strife. Although the 
'"contracting out" provisions of the 1913 law which author-
ized political contributions by labor unions were strongly 
51 Rothschild 2nd, op.cit.~ pp. 1366-1372. 
52 Loc.cit. 
53 Ibid~ pp. 1372-1373. 
54 Ibid, p. 1373. 
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objected to by the Labor Party, in Whose behalf all polit-
ical expenditures of British labor unions are made, as put-
ting too great a burden on the unions, the 1927 provisions 
made labor's political situation even worse. In amending 
the Trade Union Act of 1913 which had been enacted to over-
rule the Osborne judgment, the Trade Disputes and Trade 
Unions Act of 1927 drastically restricted the political 
activities of the unions, and thereby labor's electoral 
rights, by reversing the 1913 ucontracting-out" procedures 
so that the union's political funds could be raised only 
from members who positively "contracted-in. 11 Regardless of 
whether a majority of union members may have voted in favor 
of political contributions and irrespective of any exemption 
opportunities, the 1927 statute specified that each member 
must individually authorize the union to use his contribution 
for political purposes by signing a form expressing his 
desire to pay. 
The purpose of this written consent provision was of 
course to have carelessness, lukewarmness, faint-heartedness, 
indecision, and inertia act to reduce the political funds 
available to the Labor Party from the unions and thus to 
check the political development of the British labor move-
55 
ment. Moreover, the 1927 statute required a separate levy 
for political contributions instead of permitting, as before, 
55 Peterson, op.cit., p. 647; Cole, op.cit., pp. 190, 
193, 195. 
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a general levy with an appropriate reduction for those union 
members exercising their right of claiming exemption. Pay-
menta for political purposes could be made only from the 
political fund, and no assets were to be transferred to the 
fund which had not been separately raised. Unregistered as 
well as registered unions were now required to file annual 
financial statements with respect to their political funds. 
These provisions effected more than a mere change of machin-
ery from allowing members to 11contract out" to requiring 
them to ttcontract in," for labor unions were deprived of the 
advantages of group decisions and were given nothing more 
than "the right which any group of individuals enjoy volun-
56 
tarily to subscribe to a common fund." 
Labor M.P.'s declared the effect would be to take 
from unions the "benefit of inertia of people of no strong 
5? 
opinions" and to throw the burden of inertia against the 
party which has come to a decision. It has been noted that 
these political provisions "cannot conceivably be related 
58 
to the national strike of 1926." In support of the 1927 
measure the Conservatives argued that under the 1913 statute 
intimidation was practiced to coerce labor union members 
from exercising their right to exemption, quoting figures 
56 Parliamentary Debates, Commons, Official Report, 
Fifth Series. 1927, vol. 205, p. 1644. 
57 Loc.cit. 
58 Rothschild 2nd, op.cit., p. 1380. 
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to show that fewer numbers of union members claimed exemp-
tion than had voted against political contributions. Accord-
ing to figures cited by the Attorney General in the 1927 
Parliamentary debates, about 185 labor unions had political 
rules. In these unions 270,000 union members had voted 
against political rules but only 100,000 had claimed e.xemp-
59 
tion from contributions. That the unions practiced 
intimidation was vigorously denied by the Labor Party, which 
emphasized the relatively few complaints to the Registrar. 
Up to December 31, 1927, 111 complaints had been made, of 
60 
which only 62 were held to be well-founded. 
Moreover, assuming there was intimidation, it was 
argued that it could be practiced just as easily to coerce 
union members to ncontract in" as to coerce them not to 
61 , 
"contract out. 11 Nevertheless, the clause was adopted 
and was bitterly resented by both the labor unions and the 
Labor Party as an unprecedented attack by a party in power 
62 
against the resources of the party in opposition. It is 
interesting to note the similarity in their origins, pro-
visions, and consequences between the British Trade Disputes 
59 Parliamentary Debates, Commons, Official Report, 
Fifth Series. 1927, vol. 205, pp. 1325, 1495-1496. 
60 Rothschild 2nd, op.cit., p. 1365. 
61 Parliamentary Debates, Commons, Official Report, 
Fifth Series. 1927, vol. 205, pp. 1362-1363. 
62 Rothschild 2nd, op.eit., p. 1380. 
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and Trade Unions Act of 1927, and, 20 years later, the Labor-
Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act in the United States, 
which will be discussed later. That the two laws may be 
compared, suffice it to mention here that the 1927 statute, 
besides changing the 1913 law which had permitted unions to 
levy for political purposes upon those of their members who 
did not formally protest, to a new requirement that the 
political levy could be made only upon such union members 
as individually authorized it, also imposed economic 
63 
restrictions upon the unions. 
Certain strikes were declared to be illegal and 
punishable, by fine or imprisonment, including strikes 
against the public interest, strikes to coerce the govern-
ment, strikes other than or in addition to the furtherance 
of a labor dispute, general strikes, and sympathetic strikes. 
Also outlawed was such ttintimidation" as mass picketing, 
picketing an individual at his place of residence, and any 
picketing which causes a reasonable apprehension of injury 
64 
to one's person or property. This last was a sharp change 
in the definition of "intimidation" which had previously 
been confined to an actual or implied threat of personal 
violence. In addition, the 1927 legislation prohibited the 
closed shop, weakened union discipline over their members, 
63 Witte, op.cit., p. 317. 
64 Loc.cit. 
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and forbade public employees from belonging or affiliating 
with unions which have any members outside the civil service. 
Now governmental employees were to have only independent 
unions, could not be members of the Trades Union Congress, 
65 
and could have no connection whatsoever with the Labor Party. 
Consequences. Although the entire legislation of 1927 
66 
was very objectionable to the unions, experience found the 
economic restrictions more of an insult than an injury, the 
most important provisions in the 1927 statute proving to be 
the clauses prohibiting civil service employees from associa-
tion with other unions and those relating to labor's politic-
67 
al contributions. Under the new ucontracting-in 11 procedures, 
the Labor Party 1 s affiliated memberShip fell from 3,3881 000 
in 1926 to 2,077,000 in 1928 1 the year the new law became 
68 
applicable. Actually, while not affecting the finances of 
the Labor Party as disastrously as supporters of that party 
had feared, the annual income of the Labor Party was reduced 
by about ll51 000 a year. Between 1927 and 1929, the unions 
had to restrict their financing of candidates, the Labor 
Party lost over a quarter of its total income from affilia-
tion fees, and the local Labor parties also suffered heavy 
65 Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act of 1927, 17-18 
Geo. V 1 ch. 22. 
66 Witte, Ibid. 
67 Rothschild 2nd, op.cit., p. 1385. 
68 Cole, op.cit., p. 195. 
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69 
losses. 
As there is no available record of the number of 
members of unregistered labor unions who contributed to 
the pol i tical fund prior to 1928, the year in which the 
1927 statute went into effect, and since union members may 
affiliate locally with the Labor Party as individuals and 
pay dues directly to it, no exact statistical comparison 
70 
is possible. However, in the case of the registered 
labor unions with political rules, contributions were 
received from 2,224,000 members in 1927 1 whereas in 1928 
71 
only 1,634,000 union members contributed. Only 58% of 
the members of labor unions with political rules contributed 
in 1928 as compared with 76% in 1927, and contributions 
72 
decreased from il37,000 to iloo,ooo. Only 1,780,000 union 
73 
members, or 54%, contributed at the end of 1936. According 
to statistics, the operation of the "contracting in" pro-
vision depended upon the type of the union. Thus, in the 
case of unions with a far-flung membership with relatively 
infrequent opportunity to communicate with their members, 
69 Ibid; Overacker, Presidential Campaign Funds, pp. 
53-54. 
70 Edwin Emil Witte, 11British Trade Union Law Since 
The Trade Disputes And Trade -Unions Act of 1927," 1932, 26 
American Political Science Review 345,p. 348. 
71 Loc.cit. 
72 Loc.ci t. 
73 Loc.cit. 
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as in the case of the engineers and seamen, there was a 
74 
considerable falling off in contributions. 
For example, in the Amalgamated Engineering Union, 
only 9,800 members were exempt in 1927 whereas 145,000 
failed to contribute in 1930, and in the National Amalgam-
ated Union of Shop Assistants, Warehousemen and Clerks, 
with a membership of 35,000 scattered in 600 branches, 97% 
of the membership contributed in 1926, but only 17% eontri-
75 
buted in 1929. On the other hand, in some unions with a 
more closely-knit membership the number making political 
contributions since the 1927 statute actually increased. 
Only 36% of the closely-knit membership of the National 
Society of Pottery Workers had contributed to their polit-
76 
ical fund in 1926 compared to 60% in 1929. In fact, as 
against the difficulties imposed by "contracting-in,n and 
within the limits set upon labor union political action, 
labor's resentment against the 1927 law tended to increase 
77 
union support for the Labor Party. The considerable 
decrease in the total number of union members contributing 
to the Labor Party resulting from the 1927 statute caused 
74 Loc.cit. 
75 Loc.cit. 
76 Loc.cit. 
77 Loc.cit.; Rothschild 2nd, Ibid; Cole, Ibid. 
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an increase in the pro rata payment of those who still contri-
78 79 
buted. In 1931 the affiliation fee was increased 25%. 
Thus, the Conservatives in effect over-reached them-
selves. Instead of smashing the Labor Party, they compelled 
it to strengthen itself by building up its individual member-
SO 
ship. Even so, the Labor Party was working under very 
serious financial handicaps deliberately imposed upon it by 
its political enemies, and felt that irrespective of any 
case for legislating against general strikes, it was unjust-
ifiable political sharp practice to use the occasion for a 
manoeuvre designed to put the Labor Party in a financial 
81 
quandary. In 1929 and 1930 the Labor Party brought in a 
Trades Disputes Bill which declared sympathetic strikes to 
be lawful, repealed the non-affiliation provisions against 
government work ers, stipulated that a threat to strike was 
not intimidation, and that there should be no legal restric-
tiona upon the use of union funds for political purposes 
82 
when a majority of the members have authorized such use. 
The bill met with strenuous opposition, largely over the 
proposed repeal of all restriction s upon the use of union 
78 Loc.cit.; Overacker, Presidential Campaign Funds, 
Ibid. 
79 Loc.cit. 
80 Loc.cit. 
81 Overacker, Presidential Campaign Funds, p. 53. 
82 Witte, Ibid. 
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83 
funds. 
But the Conservatives were joined by the Liberal 
allies of the coalition Labor Government and the bill was 
so amended in committee as to be no longer acceptable to 
84 
the unions, whereupon the Labor Party withdrew the measure. 
The unions, however, did not retreat from their consistent 
position for repeal held ever since passage of the 1927 
85 
legislation. Although suffering setbacks, the Labor Party 
continued its political efforts and following the 1940-1945 
wartime coalition, Labor won 399 seats, the Conservatives 
86 
202, the Liberals 25, with 14 elected from other parties. 
Less than 20 years after the passage of the Trade Disputes 
and Trade Unions Act of 1927, designed to halt labor union 
political activity, the Labor Party gained control of the 
87 
government. One of the first acts of the Labor Govern-
ment was to repeal the hated 1927 legislation and replace 
it with the •rrade Disputes and Trade Unions Act of 1946, 
9-10 Geo. VI, ch. 52. This 1946 statute re-instated the 
1913 ttcontracting-outu provisions. The Labor Party has 
83 Loc.cit. 
84 Ibid, p. 318. 
85 ~' p. 317. 
86 Frederick Austin Ogg, European Governments And 
Politics, p. 281; Cole, op.cit., pp. 1§5, 262, 310-3lr;-
424-425, 428. 
87 Loc.cit. 
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been greatly helped by the substitution of "contracting out 11 
88 
for "contracting in. 11 
The political funds of the unions felt the benefit 
89 
of the new law at once. The practical results of this 
90 
return to the 1913 law have been described as follows: 
Contributions to the Labour party in 1948 from 
the political funds of the unions were more 
than double those of 1944~ both non-election 
years. The fi gures for 1948 are higher than 
for the election year of 1945 ••• Although many 
unmeasurable factors influenced labor's 
political contributions, the drop immediately 
following the 1927 Act and the increase immed-
iately after 1946 indicate a causal connection 
between the changes in system and the size of 
labor's expenditures and contributions. 
The percentage of members of all labor unions having polit-
ical funds who were liable to contribute to those funds rose 
91 
from 45% at the end of 1945 to 91% at the end of 1947. 
The total affiliation fees paid to the Labor Party by unions 
rose in the same period from i51,261 to i91,930, and by 1950 
92 
the figure had risen to il24~297. Although Parliamentary 
elections held in 1951 returned 321 Conservatives, 294 Labor 
88 Ivor -- Bulmer-'l'homas~ The Part;r System In Great 
Britain, p. 175. 
89 Loc.cit. 
90 "Regulation of Labor's Political Contributions 
and Expenditures: The British and American Experience~" 
19 University of Chicago Law Review 371~ p. 384. 
91 Bulmer-Thomas~ Ibid. 
92 Loc.cit. 
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M.P.'s, 6 Liberals, and 3 others, no attempt was made by 
the Conservatives to go back to the old "contracting-in" 
93 
statute. 
Even with the various socialistic measures adopted 
during the five years of Labor Government, British labor 
policy today is essentially one of full freedom of combina-
tion for both employers and employees. Neither the fact of 
combination nor the motives of those combining have any 
weight in determining the legality of conduct or the rights 
of the contending parties in labor disputes and the restric-
tions applicable to the~ are all prescribed q~ite definitely 
in statutes. Compared with the United States, there are few 
restrictions on strikes. Peaceful picketing is lawful. The 
English law differs from the American law most radically in 
that legal actions are relatively rare and no action is 
allowed to be brought against unions from wrongful acts 
committed in their behalf. The individuals who commit these 
acts are held responsible, but not the union nor members 
unconcerned with such conduct. As a matter of fact, there 
is little violence in British labor disputes. Wide freedom 
for both employers and employees is accompanied by strict 
93 1953 Information Please Almanac, p. 470. The seats 
won were not proportional to the popular vote of 13,948 1 985 
for Labor, 12,660,071 for the Conservatives, 1,830,551 for 
Liberals of all kinds, and 198,969 for all others. This dis-
parity was the result of overwhelming Labor support in indus-
trial areas ~th the Conservatives winning other districts by 
smaller margins. 
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law enforcement and those guilty of acts of violence are 
94 
usually apprehended and convicted. 
The Smith-Connally Act 
Historx. As was detailed in the first chapter, in 
carrying out Samuel Gompers• advice to ttreward your friends 
and punish your enemies," the A.F.L. raised about $95,000 
between 1906 and 1925, the largest collections being made 
in 1920 and 1925 through what was called the National Non-
95 
Partisan Political Campaign Committee. This money was 
contributed by affiliated unions specifically for political 
purposes and was spent on postage, leaflets, and speakers• 
96 
expenses. But although some member unions used their money 
in this way, in no instances were general funds of the A.F.L. 
97 
itself so used or contributed to the major political parties. 
Labor union funds have occasionally gone to the Socialist Party, 
the Farmer Labor Party in 1920, and in 1924 the Railroad Brother-
hoods, the Seamen's Union and some others gave substantial sup-
98 
port to LaFollette's campaign fund. Since 1928, under Daniel 
J. Tobin's leadership, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters 
94 Witte, op.cit., p. 318. 
95 Overacker, Presidential Campaign Funds, pp. 49-50. 
96 Ibid, p. 50. 
97 Loc.cit. 
98 Loc.cit. 
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has consistently contributed to the Democratic National 
99 
Committee. It is clear, however, that before 1936 labor 
was not interested in paying its political bills and union 
political contributions were small, sporadic, and of little 
100 
political importance. 
But by 1936, the New Deal's support of labor in legisla-
tion and administration had won the active confidence of the 
unions, and to secure the re-election of President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt organized labor planned to raise more than a million 
101 
dollars for the 1936 campaign. Although the A.F.L. clung 
to its traditional 11non-partisan" policy, other labor groups 
102 
invested a total of $770,324 in behalf of the Democrats. 
All affiliates of the c.r.o. wh ich had been organized late in 
1935 under the aggressive leadership of John L. Lewis, the 
most generous contributions were the $469 1 870 donated and the 
$50,000 lent to the Democratic National Committee by the United 
Mine Workers, which gave more than half of all that labor con-
tributed to F.D.R. 1 a re-election, the $81,000 from the Amalga-
mated Clothing Workers, and the $60,000 given by the Interna-
99 Loc.cit. 
100 Loc. cit.; 11Regulation of labor 1 a poll tical contri-
butions and expenditures: British and American experience," 
Winter 1952, 19 University of Chicago Law Review 371. 
101 Loc.cit.; Howard R. Penniman, Salt's American 
Parties And Elections, P• 543. 
102 Loc.cit.; Overacker, Presidential Campaign Funds, 
Ibid. 
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103 
tional Ladies• Garment Workers. Union support for Presi-
dent Roosevelt was divided among the Democratic National 
Connnittee, Labor's Non-Partisan League, and the American 
104 
Labor Party. These contributions were made from general 
funds and all of the larger appropriations were authorized 
by convention vote, and the vote of the Amalgamated Clothing 
Workers limiting its support to Labor's Non-Partisan League 
105 
was strictly adhered to by the executive committee. 
Labor's role in the financing of the 1936 Roosevelt 
campaign was widely publicized and discussed both before the 
106 ' 
election and afterward. The American voters were fully 
aware that the unions were supporting Roosevelt, and this 
was a factor which many considered before casting their 
ballots, helping them to decide whether they did or did not 
107 
wish to go along with the unions. Whether labor's endorse-
ment endeared some to F.D.R. or antagonized others, at least 
the public knew that the unions were now beginning to pick up 
the Democratic political bill, each citizen could ask why, 
108 
weigh the consequences, and act accordingly. Yet in its 
103 Loc.cit. 
104 Overacker, Presidential Campaign Funds, Ibid. 
105~, P• 51. 
106 Ibid, p. 54. 
107 Ibid, pp. 54-55. 
108 Ibid, P• 54. 
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report on the financing of the 1936 campaign, Senator 
Lonergan's committee specifically recommended that the 
existing prohibition upon contributions from banks and 
corporations be extended to contributions from labor 
109 
unions. The proposal was not pushed at that time, but 
110 
plainly the handwriti ng was on the wall. After 1936 
it should have been evident to labor's friends as well as 
its enemies that sooner or later the use of union funds 
111 
for political purposes would be challenged. 
Reflection upon British experience should have 
suggested that the American labor unions were likely to be 
more active politically in the future than in the past, that 
such a course inevitably involves the use of union funds for 
political purposes, and that this in turn would just as 
112 
surely lead to demands for legal regulation or prohibition. 
Emergence of labor as a political force in the 1930's produced 
several legislative proposals aimed at restricting union 
113 
political activity. Although none of these proposals 
109 United States Congress, House, Special Comrnittee 
to Investigate Campaign Expenditures of Presidential, Vice-
Presidential, and Senatorial Candidates in 1936, Report No. 
151, 75th Gong., 1st Sess., March 4, 1937, p. 135. 
110 Overacker, Presidential Campaign Funds, p. 54. 
111 Ibid, p. 55. 
112 Ibid, p. 54. 
113 "Regulation of labor's political contributions 
and expenditures: British and American experience," Winter 
1952, 19 University of Chicago Law Review 371. 
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114 
resulted in federal legislation before 1943, of course 
labor was subject to general election laws. For example, 
the Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 providing for publicity 
of the source and amount of campaign contributions and 
expenditures received and spent by political committees, as 
amended, defines a political cor~1ittee as any group in two 
or more states which accepts contributions and makes expendi-
tures for the purpose of influencing the election of candid-
ates for president and vice president, including any branch 
or subsidiary of a national organization even though such 
115 
branch or subsidiary may be confined to only one state. 
In the second chapter we saw how Congress has, with 
116 
minimal success, attempted to exercise some control over 
corporate and individual political contributions, and over 
campaign expenditures by national committees and candidates. 
In order to free party policy from corporate influence and 
to protect the electorate, legislation was enacted prohibit-
ing corporations from making money contributions in connection 
114 Loc.cit.; For a review of the various proposals in 
Congress prior to 1943 to limit labor's political action, see 
Joseph E. Kallenbach, uThe Taft-Hartley Act and Union Politi-
cal Contributions And Expenditures," December, 1948, 33 Minne-
sota Law Review, pp. l-4. 
115 United States Statutes at Large, vol. 43, p. 1070 
(1925), 2 u.s.c. ss. 241-256 (1940). 
116 "Section 304, Taft-Hartley Act: Validity of 
Restrictions on Union Political Activity,u comment, 1948, 
57 Yale Law Journal 806, p. 807. 
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117 
with federal elections. Not until 1943 was Congressional 
action directed toward the regulation of labor union politi-
cal activity. Debate on the British experience would not 
only have helped to clarify basic issues but it would also 
have brought out that American legislation already included 
the important corrective of campaign fund publicity lacking 
in Britain when that country adopted its restrictions. 
Although labor's contributions to the 1936 campaign were 
widely commented upon, little discussion of fundamental 
problems followed the Lonergan Committee recommendation to 
118 
prohibit contributions from this source. Again in 1940, 
despite the Hatch Acts of 1939 and 1940, the unions took a 
very active part in re-electing pro-labor Democrats. 
Smith-Connallz Act. In the hope that the issues and 
problems arising out of union political activities would be 
overlooked by others, labor chose to ignore the Lonergan 
recommendation and the criticism of its enemies who, however, 
were biding their time until the situation was favorable to 
119 
drastic action. This propitious opportunity cmae in the 
summer of 1943 when a wave of anti-union feeling resulting 
from war-time strikes by the United Mine Workers carried the 
117 United States Statutes at Large, vol. 34 1 p. 864 (1907), vol. 35, p. 1103 (1909). 
118 Overacker, Presidential C~paign Funds, Ibid. 
119 Loc.cit. 
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120 
Smith-Connally War Labor Disputes Act of 1943 through 
Congress over the President's veto. Although, on its face 
at least, purportedly an emergency anti-strike measure for 
the possible duration of the war, expiring by ita terms on 
June 30, 1947, the statute contained the first federal 
legislative provisions in the United States specifically 
limiting labor union political activities by barring labor 
organizations from making political contributions in connec-
121 
tion with any federal election. It has been noted that 
the circumstances under which the prohibition was included 
in the Smith-Connally Act were discouragingly reminiscent of 
122 
the inclusion of campaign fund ceilings in the 1940 Hatch Act. 
As with the 1940 Hatch Act, again the political contri-
butions restriction was not ger.mane to the main purpose of the 
bill, again the provision was inserted with very little dis-
cussion of the underlying issues of public policy, and again 
123 
the principle of prohibition was applied without exception. 
However, considering the complexity of the problems involved 
and the confused emotional atmosphere attending the passage 
of the Smith-Connally Act, it is not surprising that this 
120 u.s. Statutes at Large, vol. 57, p. 163, 78th Cong., 
lst Sess., Public Law 89, approved June 25, 1943. 
121 Loc.cit.; 50 U.s.a. App. ss. 1501-1511 (supp. 1944). 
122 Overacker, Presidential Campaign Funds, p. 55. 
123 Ibid, pp. 55-56. 
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particular section of the law should not have been singled 
124 
out for special consideration. When the Senate bill as 
introduced by Senator Connally of Texas was being considered 
by the House, during these deliberations Indiana Representa-
tive Harness moved an amendment which was in effect a substi-
125 
tute bill. The provision dealing with labor union politi-
cal contributions was included therein in the form of a pro-
posal to add "labor organizations" to the prohibition on 
corporation political contributions of the Federal Corrupt 
126 
Practices Act of 1925. Lost in a bewildering array of 
amendments to the amendment, some of which passed and others 
of which were defeated, few members of the House had a very 
clear idea of just exactly what was or was not in the bill 
127 
when it came to a vote. 
Thus, after weaving its confusing and circuitous way 
through the legislative process, the political prohibition 
124 Ibid, P• 56. 
125 Loc.cit.; u.s. Congress, Gong. Rec., vol. 89, p. 
5328, 78th Gong., lst Sess., June 3, 1943. The bill was s. 
796. For the more important steps in its passage see u.s. 
Congress, Gong. Rec., vol. 89, pp. 5341, 5382, 5391, 5401, 
5727, 5734 1 5773, 78th Gong., 1st Sess., June 3, 4, 11 and 
12, 1943. Also, u.s. Congress, Gong. Rec., vol. 89, pp. 
5328, 5390, 5721, 5754 ff, 6488. For the Conference Report 
see u.s. Congress, Gong. Rec., vol. 89, pp. 5726-5729. The 
bill was enacted into law as u.s. Statutes at Large, vol. 
57, p. 163, 78th Gong., lst Sess., P.L. 89, app. June 25, 1943. 
126 Loc.cit. 
127 Loc.cit. 
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affecting labor was accepted by the House and also by the 
joint House-Senate Conference Committee to which the bill 
was then referred, and which included the provision in its 
128 
Report without supporting argument or explanation. In 
the Senate, this particular section of the Smith-Connally 
Bill as submitted by the Conference Committee Report was 
sharply assailed as being irrelevant to the bill's major 
purpose and discriminatory in that it proposed to restrain 
labor groups but not business or management interest groups, 
but the Senate accepted the prohibition apparently in order 
129 
to expedite passage of the entire bill. President Roose-
velt's veto message objected to the political feature, stating 
that if there was any merit in such a prohibition it should be 
enacted as permanent peacetime legislation and "careful consid-
eration should be given to the appropriateness of extending the 
130 
prohibition to other non-profit organizations.u 
Although the veto was overridden by Congress, in the 
same session Senator Hatch of New Mexico subsequently intro-
duced a bill designed to answer the charges of discrLmination 
by further amending the F'ederal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 
to place a ban on the political contributions of "management 
organizations," defined as "any business league, chamber of 
128 Loc.cit. 
129 Loc.cit. 
130 u.s. Congress, Gong. Rec., vol. 89, pp. 6487-6488, 
78th Gong., lst Seas., June 25, 1943. 
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commerce, board of trade, employers' organization, trade 
association, manufacturer's association, or any other 
conm1ittee, association, organization or group representing 
or designed to further the interests of any group of persons 
••• engaged in the operation or management of one or more 
131 
types of business enterprise." This broadening of the 
prohibition to include employer groups was reported favorably 
132 
and passed without debate in the Senate on February 15, 1944, 
but the House failed to act upon it. As enacted by Congress, 
then, the Smith-Connally Act prevented direct political 
133 
contributions by labor unions: 
Sec. 6. Section 313 of the Federal Corrupt 
Practices Act, 1925 (u.s.c., 1940 edition, 
title 2, sec. 251), is amended to read as 
follows: 
Sec. 313. It is unlawful for ••• any labor 
organization to make a contribution in connec-
tion with any election at which Presidential 
electors or a Senator or Representative in, or 
a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, Cong-
ress are to be voted for, or for any candidate, 
political committee, or other person to accept 
or receive any contribution prohibited by this 
section. Every ••• labor organization which 
makes any contribution in violation of this 
section shall be fined not more than $5000; 
131 Loc.cit.; u.s. Congress, Gong. Rec., vol. 89, 
pp. 5721, 5754 ff, 6503 (1943). 
132 u.s. Congress, Senate Report No. 412, 78th Gong., 
1st Seas. (1943); Gong. Rec., vol. 90, p. 1643 (1944). 
133 u.s. Statutes at Large, vol. 57, p. 163, 78th 
Gong., 1st Seas., Public Law 89, approved June 25, 1943. 
Note that only those portions of the law concerning labor 
union political contributions have been cited, omitting the 
previously enacted prohibitions and penalties for violation 
on national banks and corporations. 
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and every ••• officer of any labor organization, 
who consents to any contribution by the ••• 
labor organization ••• in violation of this 
section shall be fined not more than $1000 or 
imprisoned for not more than 1 year, or both. 
Consequences. It should not be supposed, however, 
that the Smith-Connally Act political provision was at all 
a complete prohibition on the use of labor union funds in 
elections. Far from it, there were a number of important 
exceptions to any blanket ban. Terminating on June 30, 1947, 
the statute was temporary. It applied only to general 
elections, not to primaries or nominating conventions. It 
did not cover purely state or local elections. Most signifi-
cant, even where it did apply, to federal elections, the 
prohibition was confined to political contributions. There 
was no prohibition on political expenditures. Further, as 
interpreted by the United States Attorney General, such 
groups as the C.I.O.-P.A.C. were construed not to be "labor 
134 
organizations." Thus, it should be obvious why the law 
135 
had little practical effect on the 1944 campaign. In 
spite of the seemingly sweeping prohibition of the Smith-
Connally Act, organized labor spent more money in 1944 than 
134 Letter from the Attorney General of the United 
States to Senator Moore dated September 23, 1944, Department 
of Justice Press Release, September 25, 1944. 
135 "Section 304, Taft-Hartley Act: Validity of 
Restrictions on Union Political Activity," comment, 1948, 
57 Yale Law Journal 806, p. 807. 
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136 
in any previous election in our history. 
The clumsily-drawn political provision which origin-
ally had been tacked on as a rider to the 1943 anti-strike 
legislation, even when added to the limitations of the 1940 
Hatch Act, presented no barrier to labor unions determined 
upon throwing their full political weight into the scales 
on the side of their chosen candidates, and with very little 
ingenuity the money-raising and campaign expenditures of the 
137 
C.I.O. were brought within the limits of these statutes. 
In a publicity campaign which many political professionals 
viewed with envy and alarm, P.A.C. organizations under C.I.O. 
leadership spent $1,327,776 in an election which may well go 
138 
down in history as a victory for the P.A.C. as well as F.D.R. 
The Smith-Connally Act did not apply to nomination campaigns 
and the C.I.O. spent $478,499 from its treasury before the 
July 23, 1944 Democratic National Convention on a general 
139 
educational program in regard to labor's outlook on issues. 
While not strictly politically partisan, this helped create 
140 
public attitudes favorable to certain candidates. After 
the nominations, the unions began the second phase of their 
136 Overacker, Presidential Campaign Funds, p. 57. 
137 Loc.cit. 
138 Ibid, pp. 57, 59. 
139 ~~ p. 58. 
140 Loc.cit. 
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campaigning. 
In compliance with a literal interpretation of the 
Smith-Connally Act as prohibiting political ucontributions" 
but not political 11 e.x:penditures,n labor reorganized its 
method of political financing to provide for direct political 
action rather than union contributions to candidates and 
141 
parties. Under this arrangement, the union funds which 
had been spent in nomination campaigns were frozen immediate-
ly following the nominations, and thereafter labor spent 
voluntary contributions amounting to $478 1 499 through the 
142 
O.I.O.-P.A.C. which endorsed the Roosevelt-Truman ticket. 
A campaign fund was raised through "A Buck for Roosevelt" 
appeals to the s,ooo,ooo c.I.o. members for individual 
contributions to finance the national and regional activities 
143 
of the P.A.C. Organized in August, 1944, the National 
Citizens P.A.C. solicited contributions from persons outside 
the labor unions. The two P.A.C. organizations expended all 
but $77,344 of the total receipts of $1,405,120, considerably 
more than the $770 1 000 spent by labor in 1936 before the 
144 
enactment of the Hatch and Smith-Connally Acts. 
The political activities of the two P.A.C. 1 s included 
141 Ibid, pp. 58-59. 
142 Loc.cit. 
143 Ibid, p. 59. 
144 Loc.cit. 
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inducing people to register as voters, endorsement of presi-
dential, congressional, and local candidates, the distribu-
tion of literature bearing on the issues of the campaign and 
on the voting records of candidates, radio programs, meetings, 
145 
and speakers. Money was also paid out for rent, furniture, 
running expenses, salaries, travel, publications, and publici-
146 
ty. These activities were designed to promote the political 
program of the C.I.O. without violating the Federal Corrupt 
Practices Act and after the nominations the C.I.O-P.A.C. 
refrained from making direct contributions to candidates or 
political committees, although the N.C.-P.A.C., operating on 
funds derived from individual contributions not confined to 
labor circles, not only carried on its own political activities 
147 
but also made direct money contributions to candidates. 
The 1944 election, while not the beginning of the story, opened 
an important chapter in labor's participation in the financing 
of political campaigns and the c.r.o. emerged as a political 
148 
force to be reckoned with. 
Although the methods used to finance the C.I.O.-P.A.C. 
were criticized during the 1944 campaign, the c.r.o. defended 
its expenditures as legal because the union funds spent before 
145 Charles E. Merriam, The American Party System, p. 
408 
146 Ibid, P• 407. 
147 Ibid, pp. 407-408. 
148 Overacker, Presidential Campaign Funds, p. 49. 
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149 
the nominations were not in connection with any election. 
Thus, there was no legal violation in the $700,000 pledged 
150 
to the P.A.C. from union treasuries. Also, after the 
nominations the unions relied upon individual contributions 
and spent money directly. Technically, these expenditures 
were not "contributions,u and the C.I.O.-P.A.C. was not a 
"labor organizationu within the meaning of the Smith-Connally 
151 
Act. Further, it was not a "political committee11 during 
the pre-convention period. But once nominations were made 
and it had endorsed President Roosevelt, the P.A.C. clearly 
became a "political committee" subject to the Hatch Act II 
limitations. It could not spend more than $3,000,000 in any 
calendar year, or receive a contribution of more than $5000. 
In 1944 these limitations occasioned no embarrassment for the 
reason that the combined expenditures of all C.I.O. funds 
were less than half $3,000,000 and the persons who could 
afford $5000 contributions were not interested in donating 
152 
in behalf of labor. 
It should be noted, however, that it would have been 
149 Ibid, p. 60. 
150 Merriam, op.cit., p. 407. The Amalgamated Clothing 
Workers, the United Automobile Workers, the United Electrical 
Workers, and the United Steelworkers, the fou~ largest C.I.O. 
unions, contributed @100,000 each. 
151 Overacker, Presidential Campaign Funds, pp. 60-61. 
152 Ibid, p. 62. 
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possible under existing legislation for the C.I.O.-P .A.C. 
and the N.C.-P.A.C. each to spend $3,000,000 and simply by 
mult iplying committees organized labor could spend as much, 
or more, if they could get it, than the expenditures of the 
153 
various Republican agencies. It would be possible, also, 
for a labor union supporter to contribute $5,000, if he had 
it, to an unlimited number of independent political commit-
tees. The Smith-Connally Act forced organized labor to make 
only one important change in their political financing. 
After the conventions they could no longer receive contribu-
tiona from labor union treasuries but were dependent upon 
the individual gifts of union members and friends of labor. 
It is, of course, more difficult to raise $1,000,000 in one 
dollar donations from 1,000,000 C.I.O. members than to raise 
the same amount in $5,000 pledges from the union treasuries. 
But it is not i mpossible. Once organized labor has decided 
that it must play the political game they will find ways and 
means to collect the funds to play it vigorously and effect-
154 
ively. 
The 1943 provision, clumsily drawn with scant attention 
to existing legislation and with no debate on the underlying 
public policy issues, was no barrier. If the framers of this 
prohibition hoped to uhamstring '' labor union political acti vi-
153 Loc.cit. 
154 Ibid, P• 63. 
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ties, they failed in their goal. They did, however, add a 
provision which may make it more difficult to determine the 
155 
role of labor in political campaigns. Under existing pub-
licity laws, the names and addresses of those who contribute 
$100 or more to a political committee must be filed with the 
Clerk of the House of Representatives in Washington. There-
fore, the $5,000 contributions from labor organizations would 
be itemized while the small contributions from individuals 
would not. Hence, it would be possible for individual union 
members to personally contribute unrevealed amounts to a 
number of political committees without violating the law and 
with no public knowledge of those gifts. Of course, even 
without this hypothetical situation, experience has shown 
that the part-time P.A.C. services of persons who are both 
union and P.A.C. officers cannot readily be segregated, and 
in California, for example, it was especially difficult to 
156 
separate the state P.A.c. from the state c.r.o. council. 
Even so, assuming the circumstances described in the 
preceding paragraph, under the operation of the statute we 
might know less about labor's stake in the campaign than 
about the contributions of those who are identified with 
corporations. For while the large political contributions 
of the Pews and the DuPonts stand out most conspicuously 
155 Ibid, p. 64. 
156 Merriam, Ibid. 
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upon the record, the dollar gifts from labor union members 
are not recorded as such, but are lumped together under a 
general heading of other contributions less than ~100. 
That we have a reasonably complete over-all picture of 
labor's contributions in the 1944 election must be credited 
to the investigating committees of the House and Senate, 
which put together the various pieces of the political 
fund jig-saw puzzle. The work of these committees served 
the dual purpose of giving the voters valuable information 
about labor's role in the campaign and of clearing labor 
unions of false charges which were levelled at them by 
157 
their enemies. 
Congress investigates. A heated controversy arose 
as to whether the C.I.O.-P.A.C. had violated the Smith-
Connally Act. In April, 1944, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation completely investigated the books of the 
P.A.C. and found nothing wrong. Despite the failure of 
these ''fishing expeditions, 11 Senator E. H. Moorse of Oklahoma 
accused the P.A.C. of corrupt practices. Once again the 
F.B.I., after careful investigation, found nothing irregular, 
158 
illegal, or subversive in the organization. However, 
following widespread comment in the press, debate in Congress, 
and charges that the C.I.O.-P.A.C. had spent ~5,000,000 to 
p. 83. 
157 Overacker, Presidential Campaign Funds, Ibid. 
158 Labor Research Association, Labor Fact~ 7, 
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purge legislators generally regarded as unfriendly to labor, 
159 
both the House and Senate authorized an extensive inquiry. 
Sidney Hillman, Amalgamated Clothing Workers President and 
P.A.C. Chairman, told the House Committee investigating 
campaign contributions and expenditures that labor unions 
contributed before the conventions but froze these accounts 
afterwards except for contributions to or on behalf of 
candidates in primaries or state elections or for such other 
purposes as were unquestionably permitted under the terms 
of the law, and all other expenditures were made from the 
160 
individual contributions account. 
The Chairman of the House Committee, Clinton P. 
Anderson, said he had listened to Mr. Hillman and his assoc-
iates in hearings, had brought the House Committee to New 
York to complete the congressional investigation at the 
C.I.O.-P.A.C. offices, and stated that the P.A.C. operates 
in a fish bowl, "where almost anyone who wishes to see every 
161 
move it makes can see it without any concealment." On 
June 13, 1944, a Special Senate Committee to Investigate 
Presidential, Vice Presidential and Senatorial Campaign 
Expenditures was convened for the purpose of hearing testimony 
by Signey Hillman. ~~. Hillman explained the organizational 
159 u.s. Congress, Senate Miscellaneous Reports, Vol. 
1, Report No. 101, 79th Gong., 1st Seas., p. 20 (1944). 
160 Merriam, Ibid. 
161 Labor Research Association, op.cit., pp. 83-84. 
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structure of the P.A.C. and submitted a detailed financial 
statement showing total receipts and disbursements. vVhen 
questioned as to the validity of the P.A.C.'s activities 
under the Smith-Connally Act, Mr. Hillman said that he had 
relied upon the advice of legal counsel that the ban on 
union "contributions" in connection with a federal election 
- 162 
did not apply to union nexpenditures.n 
In support of his assertion, he presented copies of 
a letter which had been sent to all regional directors of 
the C.I.O.-P.A.C. under date of December 9, 1943, which 
called attention to 11the necessity of scrutinizing all of 
the expenditures of your office to make certain that they 
are in strict confor.mity with all of the provisions of law 
and particularly with the requirements of the Smith-Connally 
163 
Act. 11 The letter dealt in some detail with the legal 
aspects of P.A.C. activities and read in part as follows: 
Counsel has advised the committee that the 
Smith-Connally Act is applicable only to 
elections for Presidential and Vice Presi-
dential electors or a Senator or congress-
ional Representative. The act has no appli-
cation to primary elections, elections of 
delegates to political conventions, or 
elections of State or local officials. In 
the case of those elections to which the law 
does apply, the Amith-Connally Act prohibits 
contributions of money or any other thing of 
164 
162 u.s. Congress, Senate Miscellaneous Reports, vol. 
l, Report No. 101, 79th Gong., lst Seas., pp. 20-21 (1944). 
163 Loc.cit. 
164 Ibid, pp. 21-22. 
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value by a labor organization with respect 
to the specific offices covered by the law. 
Counsel further advises us that the law does 
not prohibit a labor organization, or the 
Congress of Industrial Organizations Politi-
cal Action Committee as an instrumentality 
of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, 
from spending moneys in connection with its 
own activities, undertaken for the purpose 
of advancing the cause of one or more candi-
dates for Federal office, provided that this 
money is spent directly by the labor organi-
zation and not pursuant to an agreement or 
prearrangement with these candidates, their 
political parties or committees. Thus the 
Congress of Industrial Organizations Politi-
cal Action Committee is prohibited from mak-
ing any contribution to a candidate for a 
Federal office or to his political party or 
po l itical committee, to be used to forward 
his candidacy. The committee may, however, 
continue to engage in its general political 
and educational activity and, through the 
distribution of leaflets, the holding of 
meetings of members of organized labor and 
the general public, the use of radio time, 
etc., forward the candidacy of such persons 
as it may endorse for Federal office. These 
activities on the part of the committee are 
merely the exercise of its constitutional 
right of free speech, press and assembly. 
They are not and cannot be prohibited by law. 
Having concluded his testimony, Mr. Hillman introduced 
the legal counsel for the P.A.C., Attorney John J. Abt, who 
testified that the Federal Corrupt Practices Act made a "very 
clear distinction between contributions and expenditures. 11 
He pointed out that if the expenditure of money for the pro-
duction of a poster, or a pamphlet, or an editorial urging 
the election of a candidate, were a contribution within the 
meaning of the Corrupt Practices Act, it followed that every 
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newspaper wnich published an editorial urging the election 
of a political candidate for federal office would likewise 
be violating the law. It was further contended by Attorney 
Abt that the issuance of a pamphlet, circular, or leaflet by 
a labor union or corporation under its own name and financed 
out of its own funds, which literature openly expressed 
support of a candidate for federal office, was an 11 expendituren 
which Congress did not intend to prohibit by passage of the 
Smith-Connally .amendment to the Corrupt Practices Act. 1Nhat 
Congress intended to outlaw, Abt asserted, was the transfer 
of corporate or labor union funds to a political candidate 
165 
or political committee. 
The Special Senate Committee, in its 11 Conclusions,n 
found no violation of the Smith-Connally Act by the c.r.o.-
P.A.C. because the ban was on ncontributions" and not on 
"expenditures." The Senate investigators had accepted the 
C.I.O.'a view of the law as it stood at present, but split 
on its ;'Recommendations." O:f the five members, two, Republican 
Senators Ball and Ferguson, advocated that expenditures 
by a labor organization in connection with any federal elec-
tion be prohibited as well as contributions. The majority, 
Democratic Senators Green, Stewart, and Tunnell, opposed the 
minority recommendation as a limitation on the rights o:f 
freedom of speech, press, and assembly as guaranteed by the 
165 Ibid, p. 22. 
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Federal Constitution. This was indicated by the fact that 
the Attorney General had declined to institute a test case 
against the C.I.O.-P.A.C. :ttFree discussion of political 
questions should be encouraged, not prohibited." Labor 
unions should not be under the same political limitations 
as corporations because a labor union "is not a legal person 
like a corporation, but an aggregation of individuals like a 
church, or a fraternal organization, or a social group." 
The answer of the majority was not to prohibit, but rather 
166 
to publicize, political expenditures. 
Summary. Democratic social and labor legislation to 
meet the problems of the 1929 crisis and the economic depres-
sion of the 1930's won the confidence of organized labor which 
enthusiastically entered into increased political activities 
to ensure the continuance of F.D.R.'a New Deal programs. 
Criticism of this union support of pro-labor candidates led 
to inclusion in the war-time Smith-Connally anti-strike law 
of ill-considered provisions against labor union political 
contributions. Added to the previous regulations, the effect 
of the Smith-Connally Act, including certain conclusions and 
167 
recommendations, have been summarized as follows: 
1. Labor unions could make contributions or spend union 
funds directly to influence primary nominations and could make 
166 Ibid, pp. 83-84. 
167 Overacker, Presidential Campaign Funds, pp. 61-65. 
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expenditures from union treasuries to create a climate of 
political opinion favorable to pro-labor presidential or 
vice-presidential aspirants in the pre-convention period. 
2. Once nominations were made, labor organi~ations as 
such could not contribute directly to political funds, but 
committees operating under labor union influence could raise 
funds on a voluntary basis from union members and spend this 
money for political purposes. 
3. Such committees were defined "political committees11 
within the meaning of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act and 
subject to the $5,000 individual contribution restriction and 
the , 3,000,000 expenditure limitation of the 1940 Hatch Act. 
4. In 1944 labor's financial plans were too modest to 
be affected by these ceilings, but a more ambitious money-
raising campaign could have been kept within the limits of 
existing legislation by the device of creating a number of 
independent agencies. 
5. Experience conclusively demonstrated that so far 
as labor union contributions are concerned, the prohibitions 
of the Smith-Connally Act had essentially the same effect as 
the Hatch Act II limitations, failure to accomplish the 
desired ends. 
6. On the contrary, the very limitations designed to 
restrict expenditures tended to decentralize the collection 
and distribution of campaign funds, breaking down and . making 
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practically impossible any really effective legal control. 
7. Rather than directing legislation and penalties 
to prohibitions which do not prohibit and limitations which 
do not limit, adequate publicity should be the guiding 
principle of any regulatory program. 
State Legislation and Decisions 
As we have seen, the Federal Corrupt Practices Act 
regulates the conduct of political committees concerning 
publicity provisions requiring the reporting of receipts 
and expenditures, and also prohibits corporations and labor 
organizations from making contributions ~or political pur-
168 
poses in connection with any federal election. It is to 
be noted that the statute mentions only federal elections 
and there is no legislative restriction on corporate and 
labor union political contributions toward any primary 
169 
campaign or state and local elections. But additional 
limitations aimed at and applying to the source of campaign 
fund revenue in state and local elections may be imposed by 
state law. Nearly three-quarters of the states now prohibit 
170 
contributions by corporations. Also, while governed by 
provisions relating in general to the activities of political 
168 u.s. Statutes at Large, vol. 43, p. 1070 (1925); 
vol. 54, p. 767 (1940); vol. 57, p. 163 (1943). 
169 Loc.cit. 
170 Merriam, op.cit., p. 406. 
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committees, labor unions have been made the specific objects 
of regulation by several states which have attempted, in 
171 
most cases unsuccessfully, to limit or prohibit organized 
172 
labor's political contributions and/or expenditures. 
These efforts to limit the use of union funds in 
elections, of course, were the result of the growth and 
success of union electoral activities. At first, such 
efforts were on the state level as in Hatcher v. Petry, 261 
Ky. 52, 86 S.W.2d 1043 (1935), where a local union of the 
United Mine Workers voted a campaign contribution of $50 to 
be expended in behalf of Petry, who was president of the 
local. The court held that a campaign contribution was not 
covered by a law forbidding anyone from accepting money or 
anything of value to influence him "in his official capacity." 
Further, the prohibition on corporations does not apply to 
labor unions When the labor union is not incorporated. Since 
1943, Alabama, Texas, Colorado, Pennsylvania, and Delaware 
have passed laws patterned on the political provisions of the 
171 "Section 304, Taft-Hartley Act: Validity of 
Restrictions on Union Political Activity, 11 comment, 1948, 
57 Yale Law Journal 806, p. 807. 
172 See Ala. Code, Title 26, sec. 392 (Supp. 1943), 
forbidding political contributions by unions; Colo. Stat. 
Ann., Ch. 97, sec. 94-(20) (Cum. Supp. 1946), forbidding 
political expenditures by labor unions; Ore. Comp. Laws 
Ann. sections 102-909 (1940) prohibiting the creation of na 
fund in excess of the legitimate requirements of the unionn; 
Pa. Stat. Ann., Title 25, sec. 3225 (Purdon, 1941), forbid-
ding contributions by unincorporated associations; Tex. Civ. 
Stat. Ann., Title 83, art. 5154a, sec. 49 (Vernon, 1947), 
forbidding contributions to candidates or political parties. 
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173 
Smith-Connally Act. The Pennsylvania law bars political 
contributions by both corporations and unincorporated asso-
ciations, except those for.med primarily for political action. 
Both the Alabama and Colorado statutes were invalidated on 
technical grounds. The Alabama statute was the most compre-
hensive, Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdorx, Ala-
bama Supreme Court, 18 So.2d 810 (1944), prohibiting both 
174 
contributions and expenditures. 
The Texas case. The Texas legislation permitted union 
political expenditures, confining the prohibit i ons to finan-
175 
cial contributions to any party or candidate. American 
Federation of Labor v. ~~ 98th District Court of Travis 
County (1944), Texas Court of Civil Appeals, 3rd Supreme 
Judicial District, No. 9446 (1945) L.R. R., XVI (1945) 307, 
188 S.W.2d 276, 286 (1945), held that the state has the right 
to reasonably regulate labor unions in the public interest: 
Few subjects have been deemed more essential 
to the preservation, protection and operation 
of our democratic form of government than the 
free and untrammeled selection by the people 
of their public off icials . This is on the 
principle that such officials represent all of 
the people , and not merely the interests of any 
particular party, group or class. To that end 
laws are designed to prevent their becoming 
173 Loc.cit.; Joseph E. Kallenbach, ttThe Taft-Hartley 
Act and Union Political Contributions and ~xpenditures," 
December, 1948, 33 Minnesota Law Review 1, p . 6; Charles c. 
Killingsworth, State Labor Relations Acts, p. 289. 
174 Loc.cit. 
175 Loc.cit. 
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a~duly amendable to, or subject to undue con-
trol or influence by, any particular group 
when the interests of such group affect the 
public interest. Such campaign contributions 
by corporations have long been forbidden ••• 
And in 1943 the Federal Corrupt Practices Act 
••• was amended to expressly include 11labor 
organizationst' within such prohibited class 
of c~1paign contributions. Obviously the 
same power to so regulate, need for such regu-
lation, and reasons therefore would apply to 
the State as in the case of Federal regulation. 
Prohibitions on Expenditures 
The Osborne Judgment 
In our consideration of the English history, law and 
legislation, in regard to labor's political activities, pp. 
235-267, it was observed that even before the formation of 
the Labor Party, British labor unions financed political 
campaigns and since the beginning of labor's independent 
political movement the unions have supplied almost all the 
campaign funds of the Labor Party, and are today that party's 
176 
main source of financial support. Until the 1910 Osborne 
decision, soon to be discussed, there were no legal fetters 
177 
on this political activity. Unions contributed directly 
to both the necessary election and living expenses of Labor 
176 11Regulation of labor's political contributions 
and expenditures: British and American experience,'' Winter 
1952, 19 University of Chicago Law Review 371, p. 381. 
177 Of course, inter alia, labor was subject to the 
general provisions of The Corrupt and Illegal Practices 
Prevention Act of 1883, 46-47 Victoria, ch. 51, Part III· 
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M.P.'s and neither practice was seriously questioned until, 
supported by union funds, the Labor Party began to challenge 
178 
the supremacy of the traditional parties. As one might 
expect, there were also certain minority union members who 
strongly ob j ected to being assessed to support political 
candidates, either because they personally did not favor the 
candidate endorsed by the union or because they objected in 
principle to the union engaging in political action. Financed 
by opponents of the Laeor Party, some of these minority union 
members went so far as to initiate legal action against the 
union. 
Judicial rulings. The first ease to reach the courts 
and to be appealed was Steele v. South Wales Miners Federation, 
1 K.B. 361 (1907). The defendant federation was a union 
179 
registered under the Trade Union Act of 1876. This Act 
required that all labor unions be registered. Section 16-1 
of the Act defined a labor union as "any combination, whether 
temporary or permanent, for regulating the rela tiona between 
workmen and masters, or between workmen and workmen, or between 
masters and masters, or for imposing restrictive conditions 
on the conduct of any trade or business, whether such combina-
tion would or would not, if the principal Act had not been 
178 Overacker, "Labor's Political Contributions," 1939, 
54 Political Science Quarterly 56-68; Overacker, Presidential 
Campaign Funds, p. 52. 
179 Trade Union Act of 1876, 39-40 Victoria, ch. 22. 
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passed, have been an unlawful combination by reason of some 
180 
one or more of its purposes being in restraint of trade." 
One of the objects of the South Wales Miners Federation was 
to elect and provide funds to pay the expenses of labor mem-
bers in Parliament. A meeting was held at which a ballot was 
taken of all the members on the question of an annual contri-
bution from each member for the union's parliamentary repre-
sentation fund. This was carried by a large majority, with 
the plaintiff voting in opposition. 
The plaintiff paid the assessments and brought an 
action to recover these payments and to restrain the union 
from levying any money from the plaintiff or other members 
for such purpose. The plaintiff maintained that the Trade 
181 
Union Act of 1876 defined "trade union" narrowly and that 
parliamentary representation could not be included, and hence 
was an illegal use of union funds. The Court, however, held 
that the definition was not intended to be exhaustive, or to 
prevent an association from lawfully doing other acts beyond 
those mentioned. Thus the Trade Union Act could not be inter-
preted to bar the collection and administration of benefit 
funds for union members. So, also, mere silence would not 
bar the union from political action. Indeed, none of the 
ways of regulating the relations between workmen and masters, 
180 Loc.cit. 
181 Loc.cit. 
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or workmen and workmen~ or masters and masters~ is to get 
laws passed by Parliament for their regulation~ and that 
one of the first steps toward getting those laws passed 
would be to send a representative to Parliament to promote 
a Bill for that purpose.n 
A similar situation arose in Osborne v. Amalgamated 
Society of Railway Servants~ 1 Law Re.Ch.Div. 163~ 1 British 
Ruling Cases 56 (1909}, affirmed A.C. 87 (1910) which over-
ruled the Miners Federation case. A railway porter foreman 
and branch Secretary to the Amalgamated Society of Railway 
182 
Servants~ Osborne objected to a compulsory subscription 
to pay election expenses and salaries of Labor Party M. P . r s, 
and was expelled for his non-payment. He then backed up his 
objection by bringing an action, financed by the Conservative 
Party, against the Society and its Trustees maintaining that 
such an objective was not within Section 16-1 of the 1876 
Trade Union Act and asking for an injunction to restrain the 
union. The union replied that the purpose of the expenditure 
was a proper union objective under the Act, and that the 
annual general meeting had endorsed such expenditures by large 
majorities. The trial judge, following the Miners Federation 
decision, dismissed the action. On appeal, it was held that 
the definition of the 1876 Trade Union Act was based on the 
objectives of labor unions at that time, which did not include 
182 William Glenvil Hall, The Labour Party, pp. 29-30. 
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parliamentary representation. 
Thus, the definition was limiting and restrictive. 
It was against public policy for members of Parliament to 
receive their salaries from the union, as this would amount 
to bribery. If the union could subsidize members of Parlia-
ment, so could employers or an individual millionaire and 
the result would be 11 scandalous. 11 The Court also objected 
to the union, which has widespread membership, maintaining a 
representative from one district because under such circum-
stances he would not represent his district but the union 
membership. The following excerpts indicate the feeling of 
the Court: 
Trade unions comprise members of every shade 
of political opinion and I cannot think it 
was the intention of the Legislature that it 
should be competent to a majority of the mem-
bers to compel a minority to support ••• by 
their subscriptions, political opinions which 
they may abhor, under penalty not only of 
being expelled from the union, and thus los-
ing all chance of benefit, but also the ••• 
very serious risk, of not being able to find 
employment in their trade in consequence of 
the refusal of the trade union members to 
work with the non-union members. 
Freedom of choice is the very corner stone of 
representative government, the withdrawal of 
which would destroy the whole fabric. It is 
the justification by Which legislative inter-
ference with the individual freedom of free 
men in a free country is reconciled with such 
freedom, namely, that the interference is 
their own act, because the Act is passed by 
the representatives of the whole body of free 
and independent electors freely chosen. Any 
compulsion, Whether physical, spiritual, or 
temporal which makes a man subscribe to and 
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support a representative against his will and 
judgment is as inconsistent with those prin-
ciples as is similar compulsion to vote, 
and, indeed, may in these days, when voters 
are so numerous, be of even more pernicious 
effect because more far-reaching. It is not 
enough to say that a man's vote has not been 
influenced. It is also necessary for his 
freedom that he shall not have been coerced 
into supporting by money or otherwise the 
candidate whom he wishes to oppose. It is 
really ludicrous to suggest that his choice 
is confined to voting on the day of the poll. 
A man who throughout desires the return of A, 
and yet wittingly and willingly assists to 
return B, by subscription or otherwise, 
stultifies himself and ranks in point of 
intelligence with the man who votes at the 
poll for both of the opposing candidates. To 
contain a man to such imbecility is to both 
injure and to insult him, and is, besides, an 
injury to the community in preventing freedom 
of election. Unless freedom of choice is to 
be reduced to an absurdity it must extend to 
the whole conduct of the elector towards the 
candidate from beginning to end. 
Parliamentary debates. Except for Conservatives and 
other anti-labor elements, the Osborne judgment was widely 
criticized as poor law and poor policy. The ruling of the 
Law Lords that a labor union was acting illegally in placing 
a compulsory levy on its members for political purposes made 
it almost impossible for the unions to promote candidates 
and as a result of this crippling effect upon the political 
funds of the unions the number of Labor Party candidates in 
the December, 1910 election were only 56, a decrease of 22 
183 
candidates from the previous January. The Labor Party 
183 Loc.cit. In fact, the payment of salaries intro-
duced in 1911 saved many Labor M.P.'s from withdrawing. 
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elected 42 of its members and had supported the Liberals in 
184 
order to secure repeal of the Osborne judgment. The 
effort to secure repeal was launched on April 13, 1910, when 
185 
Mr. John W. Taylor moved, 
That, in the opinion of this House, the right 
to send representatives to Parlia~ment and to 
municipal administrative bodies, and to make 
financial provision for their election and 
maintenance, enjoyed by Trades Unions for 
over forty years, and taken away from them by 
the decision in the case of Osborne v. Amal-
gamated Society of Railway Servants, should 
be restored. 
Mr. Taylor argued that the Osborne decision was looked 
upon by almost all the labor unions of the country as 11 just 
another incident, that proves distinctly the disabilities of 
being poor. n It is both wise and just, he said, that work-
ingmen should have their fair representation in Parliament, 
but the opportunity to serve in such a capacity is not avail-
able to a workingman unless he has the support of the unions. 
Mr. Taylor pointed out that the ''railway companies, shipping 
companies, mining interests, and other industries» are repre-
sented in Parliament, and that labor upossesses equal rights, 
and its needs are greater perhaps than those of the other 
186 
interests. 11 Mr. Taylor felt that the fact that some union 
184 Paul Blanchard, An Outline of the British Labor 
Movement, p. 22. 
185 Parliamentary Debates, Commons, Official Report, 
Fifth Series. 1910, vol. 16, p. 1321. 
186 Ibid, pp. 1322-1324. 
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members were compelled to contribute against their will was 
only part of the basic democratic principle of majority rule. 
Many unions required a two-thirds vote. To ask unanimous 
agreement would be to place the majority "absolutely at the 
mercy of the minority. There can be no doubt about that, 
because if an association decides by a majority of seven-
eighths of its members, the one-eighth, or even less than one-
eighth, can object to the exercise of their rights by that 
large majority. We say that is a condition of things that 
187 
we can scarcely be expected to tolerate.n 
Mr. William Harvey, seconding Mr. Taylor's motion, 
answered the objection to compelling the minority to contri-
bute to the political fund by an analogy that union-won bene-
fits go to all and not merely to the majority. If the union 
secures a 10% advance in wages, and there is a 90% membership 
in the union, the Whole 100% get the advantage and not only 
the 90%. "It is not in harmony with modern times that a man 
shall receive without paying. There have been plenty of 
people in this country, and I am afraid there are a few now, 
who reap where they have never sown." He summed up with the 
plea that labor asks no favors, but only fair treatment, the 
right to use union money in harmony with the will of the maj-
ority of the people Who are in the unions. "We are suffering 
today under a decision which is unbearable, and we ask the 
187 Ibid, p. 1324. 
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Government at the earliest possible moment to relieve us 
188 
from a position of' that kind. 11 
Speakers againat the motion asserted that they had 
no objection to working class representation, but rather to 
the principle of' majority rule ·being used to t'interi'ere with 
freedom of thought." Compulsion should not be sanctioned to 
require contributions towards the expenses and maintenance 
of M.P. 1 s. Instead of repealing the Osborne judgment, it 
would be better to provide for government payment of Members 
of the House so that a poor man could serve. It was stated 
that a pparently the Labor Party leaders lack sufficient 
faith in the enthusiasm of members of the unions for parlia-
mentary representation nto allow the matter to be left to 
the free will of the members of these bodies; otherwise 
there would be no need for an amendment of the law at the 
189 
present moment." In response to these assertions, Mr. 
Daniel Boyle rose to express his sympathy with the Taylor 
190 
motion, and answered the previous contention: 
I do not see any hardship in asking members 
of a union to subscribe, quite irrespective 
of what their political views may be, to the 
advancement of the class to which they belong. 
I have never known one of them to refuse any 
of the advantages Which are won ••• Who will 
say that the legislation of recent years, 
since Labour representation has assumed the 
dimensions it has, has not been toned and 
188 Ibid, pp. 1327-1328. 
189 Ibid, pp. 1330, 1333. 
190 Ibid, pp. 1334-1336. 
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influenced by the presence here of the con-
tingent directly representing Labour? I 
think he would be a bold man on either side 
of the House who would declare that the Mem-
bers of the Labour party had abused their 
position, that they had fought only for 
their peculiar sectional interests, and 
that they were unmindful of the general 
interests of the community. 
I join, therefore, with my Labour Friends 
on the opposite side in hoping that an 
Amendment of the law may take place by 
which every man who is advantaged--and 
every working man will be advantaged--by 
what Labour does in this House and outside 
it, to improve the condition of working men, 
and every man who joins his union will be 
asked to subscribe his modest little 'for 
the maintenance of those who speak and act 
for him, who defend him, and who advance 
his interests, and without whose defense 
and representation both here and outside, 
they would be looked upon as small and very 
worthless factors indeed. 
Representing those who opposed the motion, a Mr. 
Vivian decried the fact that the Labor Party was socialist 
and that none of the money to be spent would ever go to the 
Conservatives. Less selfishly, he argued that the power to 
expel a man from the union for refusal to pay the political 
subscription would result in a loss of freedom because the 
man would be unemployed, and face starvation, unless he 
complied with a political contribution which is against his 
191 192 
conscience. Mr. Vivian then went into this analogy: 
191 Note that this is the same argument used by Cecil 
B. Dei.Ulle in his suit against the American Federation of 
Radio Artists, to be discussed in a later section. 
192 Parliamentary Debates, Commons, Official Report, 
Fifth Series. 1910, vol. 16, p. 1339. 
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Do I understand that if a majority of the 
Miners' Union wer e to determine that a sub-
stantial sum of money should be handed over 
to the Pope of Rome for the propagation of 
Roman Catholicism, or to the Archbishop of 
Canterbury for the propagation of the Church 
of England tenets, or to the Rev. R. J. 
Campbell for t h e propagation of the new 
theology, that that would be a justifiable 
transaction? ••• The members of those unions 
belong to every political party and pPofess 
practically every creed. No condition is to 
be found in the rules of these organizations 
which makes the adhesion of a member to a 
particul ar party a condition of joining, nor 
is there an indication that the members of 
the uni on will be expected to subscribe 
money towards the support of a particular 
political creed~ 
Agreeing with Mr. Vivian, a Mr. Sherwell maintained 
that a man may be a convinced unionist, being both in his 
precept and practice absolutely loyal to unionism, but could 
be compelled to forfeit the benefits of all the payments to 
sick funds and other funds to which he has been contributing 
for many years "because he declines to subscribe to the 
expenses and maintenance of a Parliamentary representative, 
with whose views he finds himself altogether out of harmony 
and accord ••• That is to say, under the arrangements proposed 
in this Resolution the rewards of a man's thrift and self-
sacrifice over a number of years are to be destroyed at a 
blow simply on account of that man's political dissent. Is 
that fair or at all consonant with common justice and common 
193 
equity? u 
193 Ibid, p. 1348 
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Consequences. Following the Parliamentary debates 
and after considering various alternatives to the prohibi-
tion of the Osborne judgment, in 1913 legislation finally 
194 
provided for "contracting-out." Vlihile not completely 
meeting the original union demands for full repeal, this 
statute did not enable the Labor Party to conduct greatly 
increased political activities and until 1927 it was the 
usual practice for labor unions to collect the political 
assessment along with the customary union dues unless the 
member "contracted-outu by signing a paper objecting to, 
195 
and declining to pay, the political levy. This situa-
tion was moat unsatisfactory to the anti-labor elements 
who seized upon the opportunity of the 1926 general strike 
to enact the 1927 provisions substituting a much more cum-
196 
bersome procedure for "contracting-out.u Henceforth, 
under n contracting-in, 11 the political levy could be collect-
ed only from those who signed a declaration that they wished 
197 
to pay the assessment. Because of the inertia in human 
nature, the political funds of labor unions dropped markedly 
and the Labor Party suffered severe declines in both financ-
194 'I'rade Union Act of 1913, 2-3 Geo V, ch. 30. 
195 Ivor Bulmer- '.i:homas, The Party System In Great 
Britain, p. 175. 
196 Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act of 1927, 
17-18 Geo. V, ch. 22. 
197 Loc.cit. 
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198 
es and membership. 
But labor unionists and Labor Party supporters renew-
ed their political efforts, strengthened their electoral 
activities, and in 1945 the Labor Party won control of the 
government, repealing the 1927 statute and re-establishing 
199 
the 1913 "contracting-out" law. Thus, today the Labor 
Party is financed by the labor unions with the right of 
each individual union member to object to this contribution 
and thereby to be personally excused from such political 
200 
levy. The Labor Party's income is mainly provided from 
the affiliation fees of labor unions, from Which additional 
201 
special contributions are voted for general elections. 
The Labor Party also accepts individual donations and 
derives income from affiliation fees of the constituency 
Labor parties for every member on their books, from each 
central ~abor party, from each federation according to the 
number of constituency parties, from socialist societies, 
202 
and from co-operative associations. 
Affiliated with the Labor Party, and the political 
198 Bulmer-Thomas, Ibid. For statistics, see this 
thesis pp. 260-263. 
199 Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act of 1946, 
9-10 Geo. VI, ch. 52. I 
200 Loc.eit. 
201 Bulmer-Thomas, op.cit., p. 174. 
202 Loc.cit. 
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branch of an association of trading societies known as the 
Go-operative Union, the Co-operative Party is financed 
through contributions from affiliated retail societies, 
wholesale societies, productive societies, and other special 
203 
societies. It also receives contributions from the 
central board of the Co-operative Union and special donations 
204 
and subscriptions from individuals and organizations. 
The Labor Party and its affiliated Co-operative Party differ 
from the other British parties in being part of more compre-
hensive movements. Thus, the "labor movement 11 is made up of 
the Trades Union Congress, the Co-operative Union, and the 
205 
Labor Party. The Labor Party is controlled by the members 
voting in the unions, local Labor parties, and Trades Councils. 
Each local Labor party is supposed to have affiliated to it 
the local branches of the national unions and socialist 
206 
societies Which belong to the national Labor Party. 
There are no direct primaries in Great Britain, so 
the Labor Party candidates are chosen by local conferences. 
Wnen a seat becomes vacant and the local members of the Labor 
Party believe that it is worthwhile to fight for the election 
of a Labor Party member, some union or local Labor Party 
203 Ibid, p. 181. 
204 Loc.cit. 
205 Loc. cit. 
206 Paul Blanchard, An Outline of the British Labor 
Movement, pp. 24-25. 
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comes forward with a candidate and offers to pay the expen-
ses of his campaign if the national Labor Party will accept 
him as a nominee. The candidate may be a member of the union 
which nominates him or he may be some well-known national or 
local leader who is not a member of any union. The union or 
society which nominates him is not obliged to pay his elec-
tion expenses, but the unions which nominate their own mem-
bers quite frequently finance their campaign for election. 
Perhaps several candidates will be nominated by several 
207 
different unions. The officers of the local Labor Party 
see that the names of all candidates are sent to all the 
unions and societies which compose the local Labor Party so 
that the members have a chance to consider tbe candidates 
208 
before making a choice. 
Then a local Labor Party Conference is called at 
which delegates from all the local bodies choose the candid-
ate by majority vote. The candidate becomes official when 
he has been approved by the National Executive Committee of 
the Labor Party. Under British law, a candidate need not 
be a resident of the district in which he seeks election. 
Also, another difference from the American system is that 
the local Labor parties do not always choose their candidates 
immediately before elections. Often a constituency has a 
207 Loc.cit. 
208 ~, pp. 25-27. 
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11prospective 11 candidate who may be chosen s h ortly after an 
election and approved by the national Labor Party. Such a 
candidate acts as a leader of the opposition in his consti-
209 
tuency until the next election. Some of the most dis-
tinguished citizens and professional people, including 
writers, economists, attorneys, doctors, and educators, 
represent the Labor Party in the House of Commons, together 
with full-time labor union officials and manual workers 
210 
directly from industry. Not only did the attempts to 
prohibit labor's political activities result in eventual 
failure, but as a consequence the unions were spurred on by 
these attacks until today the Labor Party is supported by a 
211 
plurality of the electorate. 
Section 304 of the Taft-Hartley Act 
DeMille testifies. Strikes following World War II 
antagonized public opinion and in 1946, the biggest strike 
209 Loc.cit. 
210 Loc.cit~ 
211 Overacker, Presidential Campaign Funds, pp. 53-
54; Witte, op.cit., p. _348; Cole, op.cit., p. 195; Rothschild 
2nd, op.cit., p. 1385. In the last general election in Great 
Britain in 1952, the popular vote was 13,948,985 for Labor to 
12,660,071 for the Conservatives, with 2,029,520 for others: 
1953 Information Please Almanac, p. 470. However, because of 
a disparity in the concentration of political strength in 
different sections of the country, the Conservatives won 321 
seats as compared to 294 for Labor and 9 for other parties. 
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212 
year in American history to that time, the Republicans 
regarded their congressional victory as a ttmandate" to 
213 
enact drastic anti-labor legislation. This took form 
214 
in the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act. Prior to its enactment, 
Cecil B. DeMille, whose legal problems shall be discussed 
later in this chapter, testified on February 14, 1947, at 
the hearings before the Committee on Labor• and Public Wel-
215 
fare. He stated that he was a member of the Screen 
Directors Guild of Hollywood, California, and that he had 
been a member of the American Federation of Radio Artists, 
known as AFRA. He said that in 1944 his AFRA local levied 
upon all its members an assessment of $1 to finance a 
campaign against a proposition appearing on the California 
ballot at the general election of that year. This was a 
referendum to outlaw both the closed shop and the union 
shop. He used his personal experience as an example of the 
216 
need for limitations: 
212 Harry A. Millis and Emily Clark Brown, From The 
Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley, pp. 311-314. ---- ---
213 Ibid, p. 363. Details of the pre-election 
campaign were discussed earlier in the first chapter of 
this thesis. 
214 Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, u.s. 
Statutes at Large, vol. 61, p. 159. See the first chapter 
of this thesis for the economic provisions of the statute. 
215 u.s. Congress, Senate, 80th Gong., 1st Sess. 
Labor Relations Program, Part 2, pp. 796-797. 
216 Loc.cit. 
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I personally favored this proposition. I 
refused to pay a dollar to oppose my own 
convictions as a citizen. For this adher-
ence to my political rights I was suspended 
by AFRA, and under the provisions of the 
union shop, I was prevented from appearing 
on the radio pro gram which I had produced 
for more than 8 years. Because I refused 
to pay a political assessment, I was 
deprived of the right to work. 
Mr. DeMille said that he had taken his individual 
case to the district court, and to the district appellate 
court, both of which had sustained the union on the ground 
that the union was fighting for its existence, that it had 
approved the assessment by majority vote, and that the 
union's constitution provides for the assessment. He told 
the Senators that he was taking the issue to the Supreme 
217 
Court of California. Senator Ball asked: 
The case has not been finished, but so far 
as you have gone, the courts in your opinion 
at least, have permitted the closed-shop 
union to depri ve you of your freedom of 
suffrage? 
Mr. DeMille replied: 
Yes, sir; that is my whole contention here 
and that is why new legislation is needed. 
It is vitally important. 
Section 304. Attempting to close both the federal 
primaries and the ucontributions n versus "expenditures" 
loopholes of the Smith-Connally Act, Section 304 of the 
Taft-Hartley Act amen ded Section 313 of the Federal Corrupt 
217 Loc.cit. 
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218 
Practices Act of 1925, as follows~ 
It is unlawful for ••• any labor organization 
to make a contribution or expenditure in 
connection with any election at which Presi-
dential and Vice Presidential electorsor a 
Senator or Representative in, or a Delegate 
or Resident Commissioner to Congress are to 
be voted for, or in connection with any pri-
mary election or political convention or 
caucus held to select candidates for any of 
the foregoing offices, or for any candidate, 
political committee, or other person to 
accept or receive any contribution prohibit-
ed by this section. Every ••• labor organiza-
tion which makes any contribution or expendi-
ture in violation of this section shall be 
fined not more than $5000; and every officer 
••• of any labor organization who consents to 
any contribution or expenditure by the ••• 
labor organization ••• in violation of this 
section shall be fined not more than $1000 
or imprisoned for not more than one year, or 
both. 
In view of the severity of the law upon labor's eco-
nomic activities, it was strongly suspected that the inclu-
sion of Section 304 in the Taft-Hartley Act was bad faith 
219 
on the part of the authors. , The A.F.L. offered the opin-
218 u.s. Statutes at Large, vol. 61, p. 159, 2 u.s. 
c.A. App., sec. 251 (Supp. 1947), 18 u.s.c.A., sec. 610 
(1948 Rev.), amending u.s. Statutes at Large, vol 43, p. 
1070 (1925), 2 u.s.c., sec. 251 (1940). Only pertinent 
provisions quoted. 
219 Elias Lieberman, Unions Before The Bar, p. 325, 
observes "That politics was very much on the minds of the 
sponsors of the act is evident from the very fact that they 
deemed it necessary to prohibit unions from making political 
'contributions or expenditures' in connection with primaries, 
political conventions, or campaigns for the election of presi-
dent, senator, or congressman. What place has unions' politi-
cal activity in an act which is supposed to deal only .with 
labor-management relations?" See also Harry A. Millis and 
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ion that uThe framers of the Taft-Hartley Act, not content 
with reversing the philosophy underlying the Wagner Act, 
have attempted to perpetuate their new order by making it 
difficult, if not impossible, for organized labor to seek 
to defeat them at the polls and to install in their places 
legislators equipped with better understanding of the nat-
ure of our economy and the functions of trade unionism in 
220 
that economy." It has been pointed out that "Underlying 
this regulation, apparently, is an intention to restrict 
221 
union activity largely to collective bargaining." The 
Emily Clark Brown, op.cit., where they state at page 598 
that Section 304 has no place in the Taft-Hartley Act or in 
any other statute "unless the provision is simply an indica-
tion of an effort to weaken unions and their influence in 
public life ••• " 
220 J. Albert Woll and Herbert s. Thatcher, 11Taft-
Hartley Law Exposed," pp. 9-10. 
221 George W. Taylor, Government Regulation of 
Industrial Relations, p. 268. In noting the economic pro-
visions of the legislation, Taylor comments at page 269 
concerning the logical consistency of this intended restric-
tion upon union activities: ttRestrictions were placed upon 
labor's political activities by the very Act than transfer-
red important industrial-relations issues from the economic 
to the political arena. Only through political activity--as 
distinct from economic pressure--can organized labor secure 
changed treatment of these issues. Yet any labor organiza-
tion 1 which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of 
dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, 
wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of 
work' is legally restrained from making any contribution or 
expenditure in connection with major political elections. 
Some observers have concluded, and not in any cynical sense, 
that the ban on political activity was intended to give 
finality to the determinations made in the Act and to avoid 
11retaliation11 by the Wlions against those who supported the 
legislation." See also the remarks of Congressman Fogarty 
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spokesman for the Council for Social Action of the Congre-
gational Christian Churches has written that "There is 
little doubt that this provision of the bill was intended 
to muzzle any effective political retaliation by labor 
222 
unions against the sponsors of the Act." In this, we 
may compare the motives of the sponsors of the 1926 Act in 
Great Britain. 
It should be noted here that the original Taft bill 
in the Senate did not contain Section 304. This had been 
included in the Hartley bill in the House, with the explana-
tion that it was meant to make permanent the Smith-Connally 
War Labor Disputes Act political restriction upon unions, 
with the adde~ limitation upon political expenditures of 
both unions and corporations. It was justified as a pro-
tection of the rights of the individual union member to 
support any candidate he chooses, and "'to decide for himself 
in the House of Representatives on April 16~ 1947~ Cong.Rec., 
vol. 93, p. 3536: 11This is not legislation for the common 
good--this is punishment because labor unions have grown so 
powerful. American workers now have a voice in the function-
ing of our industrial machinery and some industrialists resent 
this. They are determined that, at whatever the cost, these 
men and women must be returned to the position of humble and 
suppliant employees, glad to work for whatever pittance is 
awarded them." 
222 Gerhard P. Van Arkel, t'The Taft-Hartley Act," pp. 
13-14. Mr. Van Arkel is a member of the Massachusetts Bar~ 
was formerly General Counsel of the National Labor Relations 
Board, and is the author of !!!, Analysis of The Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, 1947 published by the Practicing Law 
Institute, 57 Williams Street, New York, in co-operation 
with the American Bar Association. 
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whether or not his money will be spent for political pur-
223 
poses." The only other discussion in the House was a 
careful and detailed statement by Congressman Miller of 
California, which was never answered. The Hartley bill 
had passed the House and the Taft bill passed the Senate 
on May 13, 1947, by a vote of 68-24. Voting in favor were 
47 Republicans and 21 Democrats. Voting against were 21 
224 
Democrats and Republican Senators Langer, Malone, and Morse. 
Truman 1 s veto. The •raft bill and the Hartley bill 
went to the Conference Committee which accepted the House 
223 In addition to the congressional debate, also 
see Our New National Labor Policy--The Taft-Hartley Act And 
The Next-steps by Fred A. Hartley Jr., Foreword by Robert A. 
Taft, p. 166: 
"These funds are gathered by the union leaders for 
necessary and proper expenditures in connection with the 
administration of the union. Dissemination of information 
of interest to the membership is a necessary and proper 
function. So too are expenditures in connection with 
collective bargaining negotiations, organizational campaigns, 
and other activities pertaining to the contract terms and 
condi tiona. 
nPolitical activities ~ not proper union activities, 
any more than they are proper activities for business 
corporations. 
"This is in no sense a deprivation of rights of 
citizenship. Union members are perfectly free as individual 
citizens to take part in politics through any of the many 
organizations formed for that purpose. 
11 0n the other hand, it is not proper that an organiza-
tion created under government sponsorship should exercise the 
influence obtained by reason of such sponsorship to engage in 
political activity designed and employed to create political 
pressures to force desired results." (Underscoring added) 
224 The Legislative process in the House and in the 
Senate is taken from Harry A. Millis and Emily Clark Brown, 
op.cit., pp. 380, 387, 594 • . 
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clause. The conference bill was reported to the Senate on 
June 5. Senator Taft explained that Section 304 was a con-
tinuation of the Smith-Connally Act's prohibition on contri-
butions and that the word uexpenditure" had been added to 
''plug a loophole, 1' since it had been thought that "contribu-
tion11 was not broad enough. · The following day the Taft-
Hartley bill passed the Senate by a vote of 54-17. Favoring 
the bill were 37 Republicans and 17 Democrats. Against it 
were 15 Democrats and two Republicans, Morse and Langer. 
Of the absentees whose views were announced, 15 would have 
been in the affirmative and 7 would have been opposed. Here 
as in the House more than the two-thirds necessary to over-
ride a veto had been obtained. On June 20, 1947, President 
Harry S. Truman sent a veto message to the Congress, in 
225 
which he analyzed Section 304 as follows: 
In undertaking to restrict political con-
tributions and expenditures, the bill would 
prohibit many legitimate activities on the 
part of unions and corporations. This provi-
sion would prevent the ordinary union news-
paper from commenting favorably or unfavor-
ably upon candidates or issues in national 
elections. I regard this as a dangerous 
intrusion on free speech, unwarranted by any 
demonstration of need, and quite foreign to 
the stated purposes of this bill. (226) 
225 u.s. Congress, H.R.Doc.No.334, Message from the 
President of the United States returning Without His Appro-
val the Bill (H.R. 3020) Entitled the nLabor-Management 
Relations Act, 1947," vol. 2, 80th Gong., lst Seas., pp. 9-10. 
226 Our New National Labor Policy--The Taft-Hartley Act 
And The Next Steps published in 1948 by Fred A. Hartley Jr., 
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Furthermore, this provision can be inter-
preted as going far beyond its apparent ob-
jectives, and as interfering with necessary 
business activities. It provides no exemp-
tion for corporations whose business is the 
publication of newspapers or the operation 
of radio stations. It makes no distinction 
between expenditures made by such corpora-
tions for the purpose of influencing the 
results of an election, and other expendit-
ures made by them in the normal course of 
their business uin connection with" an 
election. Thus it would raise a host of 
troublesome questions concerning the legal-
ity of many practices ordinarily engaged in 
by newspapers and radio stations • 
••• The most fundamental test which I have 
applied to this bill is whether it would 
strengthen or weaken American democracy in 
the present critical hour. This bill is 
perhaps the most serious economic and social 
legislation of the past decade. Its effects 
--for good or ill--would be felt for decades 
to come. 
I have concluded that the bill is a clear 
threat to the successful working of our 
democratic society. 
One of the major lessons of recent world 
history is that free and vital trade unions 
are a strong bulwark against the growth of 
totalitarian movements. We must, therefore, 
be everlastingly alert that ••• we do not 
destroy the contribution which unions make 
to our democratic strength. 
Foreword by Robert A. Taft, comments at pages 85-86, 164, 
166, that although the Section 304 provision "restricting 
the political activities of union organizations ••• has re-
ceived a great deal of criticism" on the ground that it 
violates freedom of the press, the authors "do not agree 
with such an interpretation.tt The law does not prohibit 
the "legitimate" function of _the labor press. It does not 
prevent any labor leader, as a private citizen, from endors-
ing a candidate for public office. .uP.ersons in the labor 
movement still have the same rights as every other citizen 
to engage in political activity and to raise campaign funds 
on a voluntary basis. 11 The law was designed to prevent 
political activity by workers through their union organiza-
tion, but not individually. 
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This bill would go far toward weakening 
our trade union movement. And it would go 
far toward destroying our national unity. By 
raising barriers between labor and management 
and by injecting political considerations in-
to normal economic decisions, it would invite 
them to gain their ends through direct politi-
cal action. I think it would be exceedingly 
dangerous to our country to develop a class 
basis for political action. 
The House received the veto message at 12:05 P.M. 
One minute later the clerk began reading; without a word of 
debate or discussion the roll call was started just three 
minutes after the clerk had finished reading the President's 
227 
message. ~he vote was 331 (including 57% of the Demo-
227 This refusal to give even the most casual consi-
deration to the veto message is explained as follows in Our 
New National Labor Policy--The Taft-Hartle~ Act And The Next 
steps by Fred A. Hartley Jr:;-Foreword by obert-x7 Taft, at 
pages 90-91: "Since 1933, Congress has been increasingly sus-
picious of the New Deal use of the veto power, and has become 
less inclined to study veto messages with a view to correct-
ing the legislation concerned ••• The Truman veto of the Taft-
Hartley Act was of this character ••• a political veto ••• the 
President attempted to set aside the well-founded judgment of 
almost three-quarters of the nation's elected representatives 
••• The House acted immediately, voting to ignore the wishes 
of the President by 331 to 83 ••• The vote of 331 is the larg-
est vote ever recorded in the House of Representatives to 
override a veto of the President.u At another point, page 
102, Hartley admitted that not much consideration was given 
to the Taft-Hartley Act by Congress even during the course of 
the entire legislative process, and that this "railroading" 
attitude was not confined merely to President Truman's veto 
message: 11As I witnessed the Senate vote, I could not help 
but ponder one question: how many of the members of the House 
and Senate had voted for the new labor law out of a full 
knowledge of its contents, or how many because of their con-
fidence in the men who wrote the legislation and presented it 
to their respective bodies." Also see Harry A. Millis and 
Emily Clark Brown, op.cit., . page 374: 11We are forced to con-
clude that the House proceedings did not do credit to that 
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crats voting) to 83 for overriding the veto. This was 55 
more votes than the two-thirds needed to override the veto. 
More House Democrats had voted to override the veto than 
voted for the original bill. In the Senate, the opposition 
succeeded in delaying the vote. However, three days later 
when the Senate vote was finally taken, President Truman's 
veto was overridden by a vote of 68 to 25, and the Taft-
Hartley Act became law on June 23, 1947. The Democratic 
Party had delivered only 37% of its strength in the House 
227 
to sustain the veto, and only 50% in the Senate. The 
first chapter of this thesis discusses the events leading 
up to final congressional action on the veto in greater 
detail and provides sources for additional information. 
Analysis of Congressional debate. Although any 
analysis of a statute must proceed from the clear meaning 
of the statute itself, its wording being construed according 
to its natural import and common usage as the main source 
for the ascertainment of the legislative purpose, the imper-
fections of language to express intent often render necessary 
further inquiry into the intention of its authors as indicated 
by the legislative record, and the policy background to its 
body in terms of adequate and relevant analysis of the import-
ant issues presented. Vfuether because of the shortness of 
time, the lack of information on the part of many members, or 
the sense of defeat harbored by the opposition, relatively few 
persons participated, and their contributions were on the 
whole neither brilliant nor penetrating." 
227 Lieberman, op.cit., p. 331. 
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enactment. The congressional history of Section 304, of 
course, really begins with the Smith-Connally War Labor 
Disputes Act of 1943 and in discussing the ban on political 
contributions in Section 304, it must be assumed that the 
word 11 contributionu is carried over from the Smith-Connally 
Act and conveys the same meaning. It has a fairly clear 
factual content. If a corporation or a labor union gives a 
candidate for some federal office a certain amount of cash 
for campaign purposes, it has obviously made a ucontribution 11 
228 
and committed a crime. Moreover, the candidate has 
committed a crime by accepting the money. If a corporation 
or a labor union pays for a candidate's political advertis-
menta in newspapers of general circulation or on the radio, 
229 
it has made a ncontribution" and has violated the law. 
228 See extension of remarks of Senator Robert A. Taft, 
Cong. Rec., vol. 93, p. A3369, legislative day, July 7, 1947: 
"If a union used funds collected as dues for political contri-
butions or expenditures, it would violate an amendment which 
the law has made in the Federal Corrupt Practices Act and the 
officers responsible for the diversion of such funds would be 
committing a crime.u 
229 The statement of the conference report, signed by 
Fred A. Hartley Jr., Cong. Rec., vol. 93, p. 6380 (June 4, 1947) 
supports this contention: "Section 304 of the House bill con-
tained a provision placing .on a permanent basis the provisions 
which were contained in the War Labor Disputes Act whereby 
labor organizations were prohibited from making political con-
tributions to the same extent as corporations. In addition, 
this section extended the prohibition, both in the case of 
corporations and labor organizations, to include expenditures 
as well as contributions. Moreover, expenditures and contribu-
tions in connection with primary elections and political conven-
tions were made unlawful to the same extent as those made in 
connection with the elections themselves. There was no compar-
able provision in the Senate amendment. The conference agree-
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The meaning o:f the word 11expenditure" is not, however, 
quite so clear. Its ambiguity was discussed in the Senate 
debate o:f June 5, 1947, between Senators Ta:ft, Ball, Pepper, 
Barkley, and Magnuson, with a :few comments by Senators Taylor 
and Morse. (See Appendix) The inquiring legislators pointed 
out to Ta:t:t that most newspapers are run by corporations, 
that a newspaper which makes an editorial comment in :favor 
o:t: one candidate or against his opponent has made an "expendi-
ture in connection with" his election, and that this kind o:f 
expression o:f opinion--generally thought to be an exercise 
o:t: the :freedom o:f the press--is quite possibly a crime under 
230 
the statute. Senator Taft insisted in his reply that the 
ment adopts the provisions of the House bill, with one change. 
Under the con:ference agreement expenditures and contributions 
in connection with primary elections, political conventions, 
and caucuses are made unlawful to the same extent as those 
made in connection with the elections themselves." See also 
Donald H. Wollett, Labor Relations And Federal Law, p. 141. 
230 The analysis of this point by Paul H. Douglas o:f 
the University of Chicago, now United States Senator, was in-
serted in the Gong. Rec., vol. 93, pp. A3510-A3511, by Hon. 
Melvin Price, Tuesday, July 15, 1947: 11The act forbids unions 
from making not only any ''contributions 1 in connection with 
national primary or general elections, but also any 'expendi-
tures• (sec. 304). Outright contributions by unions for such 
purposes are doubtless subject to abuse although they can be 
de:fended on the ground that they permit the many in the low-
income groups to pool their individually small contributions 
to o:ffset the bulked contributions of the wealthy. But this 
act goes ~ :further. It would pretVent unions :frompubTISh-
ing literature to acquaint their members with ~ voting rec-
ords of Members o:f Congress £,£ the public attitudes of candid-
ates ••• While an apparent attempt is made to make this prohibi-
tion mutual by a loosely worded clause which would similarly 
prevent 'any corporation' from making similar expenditures 
or contribution (and which might stop newspapers from taking 
polls, etc.), this restraint is not applied to unincorporated 
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primary objective of the provision is to atop unions from 
using their members dues for political purposes. Thus, 
according to Taft, although it is a crime for any corpora-
tion or labor organization publishing a newspaper which is 
financed from the funds contributed by its members as dues 
and fees to print the voting record of a candidate to 
recommend his defeat or election, it is not a crime for a 
corporation or a labor union publishing a newspaper for 
profit, or financing it by advertising and subscriptions, 
to do precisely the same thing. (See Appendix) 
In answer to questions from Senators Pepper and 
Barkley, Senator Taft declared that, although under the law 
it would be legal for an organization such as the c.r.o.-
P.A.C. (not a labor organization as defined in the statute) 
or an association of manufacturers (not a corporation) to 
use funds for political activity where such funds were not 
contributed by a labor organization or a corporation but were 
contributed directly by individual union members or stock-
holders who know that the money will be spent for political 
purposes, the publication of political news and political 
editorials is ligitimate under Section 304 only if the news-
paper is 11 sold to aubscribera 11 and "supported by aubacrip-
employer's associations and hence in all probability would 
not serve to restrain them. This somewhat one-sided and 
certainly injudicious prohibition strikes at the fundamental 
rights of citizens in a democracy." (Underscoring added) 
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231 
tions. 11 In other words, if the newspaper is in business 
for a profit it does not come under the ban of Section 304. 
but if it is a corporate or union publication paid for from 
corporate or union funds, then such publication is subject 
to the prohibitions of Section 304. 
Since daily newspapers are usually published for a 
profit or financed by advertising and subscriptions, while 
union newspapers frequently are not, the Taft interpretation 
of Section 304 would prevent any expression of political 
232 
opinion by union leaders or union members in the labor press. 
Official union journals and labor publications would be 
under a political prohibition which did not apply to the 
daily press. Presumably, Senator Taft would require unions 
to avoid or circumvent the law by buying daily newspapers in 
order to carry forward the political policies of the union 
through editorials and general comment. This has been the 
Labor Party practice in Great Britain. But, as we shall 
231 Confirming the Senate debate is the comment in 
Our New National Labor Policy--The Taft-Hartley Act And The 
Next-steps by Fred A. Hartley Jr:; Foreword by Rober~. 
Taft, p. 165, that Section 304 was not meant to restrict 
"the publication of a bone fide newspaper by either a labor 
union or by a business-cO:rporation formed for the purpose of 
publishing a newspaper ••• " 
232 See extension of remarks of Hon. Homer D. Angell, 
House of Representatives, Gong. Rec., vol. 93, p. A2918, Mon-
day, June 16, 1947: nsome 95 percent of union papers are paid 
for out of union funds rather than from subscriptions paid 
directly and specifically for the paper by the member. Under 
the provision, these union papers could not make any politi-
cal expression during an election campaign." 
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soon discuss, the Supreme Court in 1948 and appeal court 
decisions in subsequent cases have rejected Senator 'l'ai't r s 
interpretation of his own law, that the law does not meru~ 
what Senator 'l'aft thought it meant. 
As has already been indicated, Senator Taft's view 
was founded on a policy justification that minority union 
members needed protection from the union majority, that 
labor's influence in elections and upon legislation was dis-
proportionate, and that this prohibition placed labor unions 
on the sruae footing as corporations. These reasons for Sec-
tion 304 have been disputed. For example, concerning minor-
ity protection, it has been suggested that the British exper-
233 
ience may be of value to American policy makers. Thus, 
rather than total prohibitions, the solution could be "con-
tracting-out." In regard to undue influence in elections, 
organized labor contributed but 4% to 7fb of all campaign 
234 
funds in recent elections. This is not evidence that 
organized labor, representing 17,000,000 union workers, and 
presumably their families, exercises a disproportionate 
influence on the electoral process. On the contrary, there 
is considerable evidence that other groups enjoy a peculiarly 
233 "Regulation of Labor's Political Contributions and 
Exp enditures: 'rhe British and American Experience," comment, 
19 University of Chicago Law Review 371, pp. 384-385. 
234 "Section 304, Taft-Hartley Act: Validity of Restric-
tions on Union Political Activity," 57 Yale~ Journal 806, 
pp. 824-827. 
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advantageous monopoly in that the press, radio, motion 
picture, and other "opinion industries 11 represent and 
articulate the point of view of their owners, managers, and 
235 
advertisers--against labor. 
As for labor's influence upon legislation, in passing 
the Taft-Hartley Act over President Truman's veto with votes 
to spare, Congress provided the strongest possible evidence 
that labor unions, in 1947 at least, did not possess any 
dictatorial power. While conceding that n ••• the AF of L, 
the CIO and the railway brotherhoods are in pressure group 
politics up to their neckau Stuart Chase also observes that 
"As compared with any particular business lobby, the labor 
lobby serves more people, and people who often need that 
service very bitterly ••• Big Union has caught up with Big 
236 
Business, and in that there is a kind of rough justice." 
Furthermore, it is pointed out that .nLabor accounts for 
about only one tenth of all funds spent on lobbying at the 
237 
national level." Again, as in the case of elections, 
this is not evidence that organized labor exercises a dis-
proportionate influence on legislation. 
Turning now to the contention that the Taft-Hartley 
Act is even-handed in ita effect on employers and workers, 
235 Loc.cit. 
236 Stuart Chase, Democracy Under Pressure: Special 
Interests ~ The Public Welfare, pp. 74-75. 
237 Richard A. Lester, Labor And Industrial Relations, 
p. 315. 
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that it puts labor unions and business corporations on an 
equal footing because it applies the same prohibitions to 
both, the answer to this is that Section 304 »is likely to 
weigh more heavily on unions, since corporation officers 
and owner groups are usually able to finance personal con-
tributions out of their own incomes more easily than union 
238 
officers and members." It is impossible to say that 
unions and corporations are on an equal footing 11because of 
differences in structure, wealth, membership, and control 
239 
of the media of mass communication. 11 It is one thing to 
prohibit a corporation from making a political expenditure, 
and another to deny such privilege to laboe organizations 
238 Extension of remarks of Hon. Homer D. Angell, 
House of Representatives, Gong. Rec., vol. 93 1 p. A2918 1 
Monday, June 16 1 1947. See also the observation by J. Albert 
Woll and Herbert s. Thatcher, "Taft-Hartley Law Exposed," 
pp. 9-10: nwhile individuals are permitted to make political 
expenditures under the act, it is obvious that employers are 
able to utilize this privilege much more effectively than 
individual workers whose income is greatly more limited than 
the income of corporate officers. It is only through small 
joint contributions of many individual employees associated 
together in a labor organization that the rights of the indi-
viduals to make contributions can have any practical meaning." 
239 11Regulation of Labor's Political Contributions and 
Expenditures: 'rhe British and American Experience," op.cit., 
p. 387: nif corporations and unions were both prohibited from 
making political contributions and expenditures, corporate 
interests could more easily raise money than labor interests, 
since the former could rely on large contributions from a 
relatively few individuals, while the latter must collect 
small amounts from many individuals. Furthermore, corporate 
interests are more adequately represented in the press and 
radio which are largely corporately owned and supported 
primarily by corporate advertiaing.n 
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which are nonprofit associations for the mutual benefit of 
their members and one of whose prime purposes, unlike 
corporations, is the securing of legislation beneficial to 
working people, their families, and the community, state, 
and nation. 
Despite the attempt to restrict labor union activity 
to collective bargaining, the Taft-Hartley Act has stimula-
240 
ted political activity. Organized labor has reacted to 
this union-restricting legislation by the establishment of 
permanent political agencies which utilize the existing 
241 
union field organization. The unions have mobilized 
their political power to forestall further attacks on the 
organization through which the workers aspire to improve 
their economic position. Every labor union is now partici-
pating in one or another political organization. Non-
political business unionism is a thing of the past. The 
long-range effects may well be similar to that of the Trade 
240 Harry A. Millis and Emily Clark Brown, From The 
Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley, p. 596. That this was inevit-
able was predicted by George W. Taylor in his Government 
Regulation of Industrial Relations, p. 270, that " ••• the 
Taft-Hartley Act cannot fail to induce a greater emphasis 
upon political activity by the labor movement. Major 
industrial-relations issues formerly settled exclusively at 
the negotiation table have been determined, for the time 
being at least, by legislation. Not economic power but 
political power is the key to securing changes in these 
terms of employment. And, of course, since the passage of 
the Taft-Hartley Act, a greater emphasis has been placed by 
unions upon the necessity for mobilizing labor's political 
power.» 
241 Lester, op.cit., p. 316. 
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Disputes and Trade Unions Act of 1926 in Great Britain; 
the stimulus Which that statute gave labor union political 
activity in England is being duplicated here. The seeds of 
a future Labor Party in the United States may have been 
242 
planted by the Taft-Hartley Act. 
But aside from the practical considerations for 
labor's desire to continue in political activity, these 
could be of no avail in the face of a law prohibiting such 
activity. The decision of the unions to continue pol itical 
activities despite Section 304 was the result of legal 
analysis of the law. On the basis of the Senate debate, 
The Bureau of National Affairs published their legal opinion 
243 
of Section 304 that the fo l lowing expenditures are forbidden: 
1. Publication in a union paper or house organ 
of a corporation of editorials or other comment 
in favor of or against a national political 
candidate unless such papers are sold for pro~it. 
2. Radio speeches for or against a national 
political candidate if the radio time is paid 
for by a labor organization or corporation. 
3. Publication by unions of pamphlets advising 
their members that a candidate has an antilabor 
record if the pamphlet is paid for out of union 
funds. 
4. Free distribution of newspapers of special 
editions designed to influence elections. 
242 Gerhard P. Van Arkel, nThe Taft-Hartley Act," 
April, 1948, Social Action magazine, Council for Social 
Action of the Congregational Christian Churches. 
243 The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., The~ 
Labor ~' p. 79. 
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5. Political advertisements paid by an 
organization such as the Chamber of Commerce 
(which Senator Taft says he 'thinks' is a 
corporation) from funds contributed by corpora-
tions, even though these funds were not contri-
buted primarily for political purposes. 
These legal aspects convinced the unions that the 
244 
law was unconstitutional. For example, the C.I.O. Legal 
245 
Department noted that in the Senate investigations con-
cerning alleged union violations of the Smith-Connally Act, 
the C.I.O. had distinguished political contributions from 
political expenditures, and had contended that while it was 
perfectly legal to prohibit union political contributions, 
goy law which attempted to prohibit union expenditures in 
connection with political campaigns would be unconstitu-
tional in violation of the rights of members of labor unions 
to exercise their freedom of the press, speech, and assembly, 
and that this viewpoint was supported by legal opinions of 
the Attorney General of the United States. The C.I.O's 
Legal Department pointed out that on the floor of the Senate, 
when debating the Taft-Hartley bill, Senator Taft specifi-
244 Gerhard P. Van Arkel, a member of the Massachusetts 
Bar and formerly General Counsel of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board, wrote that ttrt seems probable that this section 
will be held unconstitutional as an interference with the 
right of speech if interpreted to cover the stating of politi-
cal views by a labor organization ••• constitutional protections 
may surround a labor organization, as a 'citizen' which are 
not available to a corporation as a 'person' within the mean-
ing of the Constitution • . n An Analysis of the Labor Management 
Relations Act, 1947, p. 69. (American Bar-xisociation) 
245 C.I.O. Legal Department, "Analysis of the '!'aft-
Hartley Act," pp. 47-49. 
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cally stated that the new prohibition was intended to pre-
vent a labor union, in its regularly distributed newspaper, 
from publishing the voting records of members of Congress 
246 
when this is done in the course of a political campaign. 
In noting that this prohibition could also be applied 
to a discussion of political candidates at a local union 
meeting involving expenditures of union funds for rental, 
etc., dr the distribution of political pamphlets by the 
union in an election campaign, it was the legal opinion of 
247 
the C.I.O. General Counsel that: 
Labor organizations may independently expend 
their funds for the purpose of distributing to 
their membership and to the public the voting 
recorda or other statements of candidates for 
Federal political office. Such dissemination 
of information may be carried on through the 
radio, the union newspaper, or local union 
meetings. 
These activities reflect the exercise by the 
members of their rights of freedom of speech, 
press and assembly. For this reason they may 
not be abridged. 
Relying on the opinion of their Legal Department, 
the c.r.o. Executive Board, at ita meeting . in Washington on 
248 
June 27, 1947, adopted the following resolution: 
We propose, as good Americans, to fight the 
political restraints in this legislation. 
We would not merit the name of free Ameri-
cans if we acquiesced in a law which makes it 
246 Loc.cit. 
247 Loc.cit. 
248 Loc.cit. 
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a crime to exercise rights of freedom of 
speech, freedom of press, and freedom of 
assembly. We would betray a fundamental 
heritage of political liberty if we allowed 
ourselves to be gagged by the law. The 
Constitution remains the law of our land and 
we propose to enjoy its protection. We will 
not comply with the unconstitutional limita-
tions on political activity which are written 
into the Taft-Hartley Act. 
United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations. 
A test case was not long in coming. Under the name of c.r.o. 
President Philip Murray, page one of the weekly c.r.o. News 
of July 14, 1947, carried a three column statement urging 
the election of Judge Edward A. Garmatz in the Third Cong-
ressional District of Baltimore, Maryland. The editorial 
said that Judge Garmatz would work for the repeal of the 
Taft-Hartley Act. Murray asked all c.r.o. members in the 
district to vote for Garmatz for Congress in the special 
election and to bring others to do the same. According to 
the indictment drawn against both Murray and the c.r.o., an 
extra 1000 copies of the C.I.O. News were sent to Baltimore 
for distribution. Was Ivlr. Murray's letter "an expenditure 
in connection withn a federal election? 
On March 15, 1948, Judge Moore handed down the opin-
ion of the United States District Court, District of Columbia, 
dismissing the case brought by the government, and holding 
that Section 304 11 is an unconstitutional abridgment of free-
dom of speech, freedom of the press and freedom of assembly" 
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in violation of the guarantees of the First Amendment. 
Further, respecting the use of union funds for political 
objectives not in accord with minority views, the Court 
said that nrnherent in the idea of collective activity is 
the principle that it shall be exercised on behalf of the 
organization pursuant to the will of the majority of its 
membership. n United State)i· v. Congress of Industrial 
Organizations, 14 Labor Cases 64, 77 FSupp. 355 (1948). 
On an appeal by the government to the Supreme Court, 
United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, 
335 U.S. 106, 68 S.Ct. 1349, 92 L.Ed. 1849 (1948), four 
members held, in an opinion by Justice Reed, that the deci-
sion turned on the question whether the prohibition applied 
to the circumstances; they found that Section 304 does not 
cover such activities as were complained of here, that the 
publication in question did not violate the statute, and 
therefore that there was no occasion for deciding the consti-
tutional issue. Reed said that there was no allegation of 
free copies being printed, no Charge that distribution was 
to non-subscribers or non-purchasers or among citizens not 
entitled to receive the c.r.o. News. The law cannot be said 
to prevent such papers from editorially supporting candid-
249 
ates. If so, even a corporately owned religious paper 
249 Contrary to this opinion, the intent of the auth-
ors of Section 304 is found in the view expressed in Our New 
National Labor Policy--The Taft-Hartley Act And The Next --
Steps by Fred A. Hartley Jr., Foreword by-fiobert-x7 Taft, at 
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supporting a candidate on moral grounds would be in viola-
tion of Section 304. This could not have been the intent 
of Congress, Heed felt, in reviewing the Senate debate. 
Concurring, Justice Frankfurter expressed the view 
that as the issue raised went beyond the necessities of 
the case, it was proper for the Court to give the statute 
an allowable construction that fairly avoided the constitu-
tional question. 
Justice Rutledge, in whose opinion Black, Douglas, 
and Murphy, JJ., joined, concurred in the result but, in 
reviewing the Senate debate, came to another conclusion 
than Reed, J. Justice Rutledge insisted that this statute 
was obviously intended to cover the facts at hand and that 
the majority of the court 
sets aside the one clearly intended feature of 
the statute apart from ita general objectives. 
I doubt that upon any matter of construction 
page 99 where Mr. Hartley comments: *'The CIO attempted to 
violate the no-expenditure provisions of the law as applied 
to its newspaper, the CIO News. For my own part, I see no 
reason why the CIO News has-a-right to hide behind the honor-
able slogan of 'freedom of the press.• This labor union pub-
lication, in spite of its name, is not a newspaper in the 
accepted sense of the word. It is a highly inflammatory, 
completely biased weekly, with its own ax to grind. 11 Agreeing 
with Mr. Hartley's interpretation of the congressional intent 
is the comment in "Regulation of Labor's Political Contribu-
tions and Expenditures: The British and American Experience," 
19 University of Chicago Law Review 371, pp. 374, 377, that 
the Supreme Court's rejection of the source of funds test as 
to regular union publications 11was in the teeth of clear 
statements on the Senate floor by the sponsor of Section 304 
that the test should be applied in such situations." Thus, 
the comment observes at page 378, 11 the CIO case11 departed 
11from the language of the Section and from the test set out 
in legislative debate ••• " 
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the Court has heretofore so far presumed to 
override the plainly and incontrovertibly 
stated judgment of all participants in the 
legislative process with its own tortiously 
fashioned view. This is not construction 
under the doctrine of strict necessity. It 
is invasion of the legislative process by 
emasculation of the statute. The only justi-
fication for this is to avoid deciding the 
question of validity. 
Justice Rutledge believed that the statute is more 
broadly drawn than is necessary to reach the contended 
evils, that reasonable restrictions or regulations rather 
than total prohibitions could have been enacted, and there-
fore the statute is unconstitutional as an unjustifiable 
abridgment of the freedoms of the Firat Amendment: 
any asserted beneficial tendency of restric-
tions upon expenditures for publicizing poli-
tical views, whether of a group or of an indi-
vidual, is counter-balanced to some extent by 
the loss for democratic processes resulting 
from the free and full public discussion ••• The 
expression of block sentiment is and always 
has been an integral part of our democratic 
electoral and legislative processes. They 
could hardly go on without it. Moreover, to 
an extent not necessary now to attempt delimit-
ing, that right is secured by the guaranty of 
freedom of assembly, a liberty essentially 
coordinate with the freedoms of speech, the 
press, and conscience. 
A restriction upon political expenditures 
necessarily deprives the electorate, the per-
sons entitled to hear, as well as the author 
of t he utterance, whether an individual or a 
group, of the advantage of free and full dis-
cussion and of the right of free assembly for 
that purpose. 
Freedom of speech, etc., does not depend upon whether a 
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charge or payment was made for the publication, as the 
opinion of Justice Reed seemed to intimate. The elector-
ate must not be tl deprived of information, knowledge and 
opinion vital to its function" and even upon the construe-
tion placed on the statute by the majority, it is unconsti-
tutional: 
A statute which, in the claimed interest of 
free and honest elections, curtails the very 
freedoms that make possible exercise of the 
franchise by an informed and thinking elector-
ate and does this by indiscriminate blanketing 
of every expenditure made in connection with 
an election, serving as a prior restraint upon 
expression not in fact forbidden as well as 
upon what is, cannot be squared with the First 
Amendment. 
Commenting on the c.r.o. decision, the Bureau of 
250 
National Affairs reports that although the Supreme Court 
disappointed the labor unions in not ruling directly on the 
constitutionality of Section 304, all nine of the Justices 
agreed that the union was not guilty and four members of 
the Court would have held the provision banning political 
expenditures unconstitutional on its face. That the unions 
are probably correct in their firm belief that Section 304 
251 
is unconstitutional is the opinion expressed by Roland 
250 'l1he Bureau of National Affairs, The Taft-Hartley . 
Act After One Year, pp. 5, 10, 195. 
251 Also see "Regulation of Labor's Political Contri-
butions and Expenduturea: The British and American Exper-
ience," 19 University of Chicago Law Review 371, at page 378: 
"If followed literally, the prohibitions in Section 304 would 
probably be held unconstitutional." 
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E. Ginsburg in the Michigan Law Review for January, 1949, 
volume 47 1 pages 408-410. He believes that the unions may 
safely ignore Section 304: '''rhe result of the Court's 
decision is to leave the statute with little or no appli-
cation, because any attempt to apply it would raise grave 
doubts as to its constitutionality.u 
Reuther v. Clark. This predict.ion was proven accur-
ate in the cases which followed United States v. Congress 
of Industrial Organizations. As the Supreme Court had held 
in that case that the union had not violated Section 304 1 
and for that reason the Supreme Court found no necessity 
for passing upon the constitutionality of Section 304, 
union leaders decided to do everything they could think of 
to violate the law in order to test ita constitutional 
validity. Proceeding under the declaratory judgment stat-
utes which allow the federal courts to pass upon an issue 
before it has actually arisen if it appears inevitable that 
it will sufficiently fall within the constitutional rule of 
case or controversy, C.I.O. leader Walter . P. Reuther, 
Reuther v. Clark, United States District Court, District of 
Colurabia, 22 L.R.R.M. 2096, 14 Labor Cases 64503 ( 1948) 1 
brought an action against Attorney General Tom C. Clark to 
enjoin the enforcement of Section 304 on the basis that 
such political prohibition is unconstitutional. 
In his complaint, Walter P. Reuther alleged that it 
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is and has been the established policy and practice of his 
international union and its local unions to engage in cer-
tain political activities, and that these activities are 
forbidden by Section 304. Reuther went on to state that 
union funds had already been spent and would be spent in 
the 1948 election to secure support for candidates pledged 
to the repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act. Reuther alleged on 
information and belief that Attorney General Tom c. Clark 
had threatened to prosecute any union for making expendi-
tures for such purposes and that the Attorney General was 
preparing to institute criminal proceedings against the 
international union and its officers. Unless the court 
granted injunctive relief, Reuther argued, the union would 
be forced to defend many criminal prosecutions the cost of 
which would be ruinous and the resulting damages irrepar-
able. The union asked an immediate determination of the 
invalidity of Section 304 so as to be able to exercise its 
political rights at the forthcoming elections. 
The Court dismissed the complaint as follows: 
In our opinion the facts presented by the 
complaint are insufficient to justify the 
exercise of the equity powers of this court to 
enjoin the prosecution of acts in violation of 
the terms of the statute in question. In view 
of this conclusion, it follows that the court 
should not render a declaratory judgment con-
cerning the constitutionality of the statute. 
This is especially true in view of the admit-
ted deliberate violation of the law which may 
very well subject the plaintiffs to criminal 
prosecution, in which event they will have the 
opportunity of directly attacking the consti-
tutionality of the statute. 
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ynited States v. Painters Local Union No. 481. 
~hus, the unions had to await a conviction under Section 
304 in order to test its constitutionality. This opportun-
ity had apparently arrived when the United btates District 
Court of Connecticut, in United States v. Painters Local 
Union No. 481, 79 F.Supp. 516 (1949), held the union and 
its officers in violation of Section 304. In this case, 
Painters Local Union No. 481 had paid for a newspaper 
advertisement and radio broadcast opposing the candidacy of 
Senator Robert A. ~aft for the Republican nomination for 
president, and advocating the defeat of six Connecticut 
congressmen. The union had no financial or other direct or 
indirect interest in the newspaper or in the radio station. 
The union spent for these political purposes ~143.64, which 
payments were authorized by a special meeting of the union. 
The funds were drawn from the general treasury of the 
union, which was secured by dues and fees. On these facts, 
the district court sentenced the union to pay $200 on each 
of four counts, and the union president to pay $100 on each 
of two counts. 
The district court was reversed by the United States 
Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 172 F.2d 854, which 
ordered the dismissal of the indictment. In its decision 
reversing the lower court, the Court of Appeals relied on 
United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, 
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stating that 
We should bear in mind the ••• important con-
sideration that all the Justices of the Sup-
reme Court who participated in the CIO deci-
sion regarded the prohibition of the statute 
if applied to the facts of that case either 
as involving an undue abridgment of the 
rights of free speech, free press, and free 
assembly, or at best of exceedingly doubtful 
constitutionality. 
Justice Augustus Hand, speaking for the Court of Appeals, 
concluded that as it was only a u ••• relatively small union 
••• u which had made only 11 ••• trifling expenditures ••• 11 that 
"Under all the circumstances we are constrained to hold 
that the statute did not cover the publications effected by 
252 
the defendants in the case at bar.n 
Was this non-enforcement an application of the legal 
doctrine de minimus ~ curat lex, that the law does not 
care for, or take notice of, or concern itself with, very 
small or trifling matters? If so, it would be the first 
time it had been so applied to an explicit statutory malum 
prohibitum. If an act is positively illegal, being express-
ly forbidden by the legislative judgment, then in the absence 
of unconstitutionality the courts have no discretion but to 
252 Yet Fred A. Hartley Jr., at page 165 in his Our 
New National Labor Policy--The '.£!aft-Hartley Act And The Next 
Steps, Forword by Robert A.~t, wrote that Section 304 did 
cover the publications effected by the defendants in the case 
at bar, and that the decision of the district court holding 
the statute as covering these publications was "exactly in 
line with congressional intent." There can be little ques-
tion that the Court of Appeals chose to ignore the congress-
ional intent, as did the Supreme Court majority in United 
States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations. 
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enforce the provisions. But the Court of Appeals here did 
not enforce the provisions of Section 304. The conclusion 
can be only that either the Court considered Section 304 
unconstitutional or that the refusal to enforce the statute 
infringed upon the functions of Congress and constituted an 
253 
abuse of judicial power. 
Discussing the legal effects of United States v. 
Painters Local Union No. 481~ the Winter 1952 edition of 
the University of Chicago Law Review~ volume 19, at pages 
380 and 381, notes that, contrary to Senator Taft's prin-
ciple of 11minority protection," the Painters case accepts 
the principle of "majority rule. 11 More important, however, 
"By its broad extension of United States v • .2!2~ the 
Painters decision has largely emasculated Section 304. 
The limitation that distribution must be to union members 
has been eliminated ••• labor is probably free to indulge in 
almost every type of paid political propaganda under the 
rule of the Painters case. 11 As a result~ "The law is still 
uncertain and the constitutionality of Section 304 is still 
in doubt." 
253 The late eminent Supreme Court Justice Benjamin 
Nathan Cardozo, in his The Nature of The Judicial Process, 
page 129, has this to say about abuse of judicial power: "In 
countless litigations, the law is so clear that judges have 
no discretion ••• Judges have, of course, the power, though 
not the right, to ignore the mandate of a statute, and rend-
er judgment in despite of it ••• None the less, by that abuse 
of power, they violate the law. If they violate it will-
ftully, i.e., with guilty and evil mind, they commit a legal 
wrong, and may be removed or punished even though the judg-
ments which they have rendered stand." 
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United States v. Construction & General Lab. L. U. 
No. 264. Further doubt was cast over Bection 304 by United 
States v. Construction & General Lab. L. u. No. 264, 101 
F.Supp. 869, U.S.Dist.Ct.W.D.Iviissouri (1951), which reversed 
a lower court conviction of the local union and its officers 
for violation of Section 304. The Appeal Court held that 
the political activities of the labor union in making poli-
tical payments of at least $400, were not "contributions" or 
"expenditures" within Section 304. As this case is the very 
last word spoken by a federal court on Section 304, it 
should be helpful to look closely into the facts, and the 
reasoning of the decision. 
To summarize the facts, the local union had made two 
principal expenditures. First, payments were made to three 
union employees, two of whom were regularly on the payroll 
of the union, one for a long period of time, and all three 
of whom devoted a considerable portion of their time to 
political activities, such as the registration of voters 
and the general transportation of voters to the polls. 
Second, payments were devoted exclusively to the political 
interests and for the aid of one candidate for Congress, 
the president of the local union, Theodore Leonard Irving. 
The uncontradicted testimony was that the union spent money 
to secure election of Theodore Leonard Irving as Representa-
tive in Congress by registering voters, transporting voters 
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to the polls, and by the printing and distribution of poli-
tical literature of all varieties, including pamphlets, 
cards, matches, photographic posters on porches, and adver-
tisements on the back of Blue Line Cab Company cars reading 
"Leonard Irving for Congress." 
The Court asserted that efforts to secure registra-
tion of voters and their transportation to the polls was a 
public service in behalf of good government beneficial to 
all candidates irrespective of political party. What about 
the effort to elect Mr. Irving? Vfuile recognizing that the 
maxim of de minimus non curat lex does not apply in crimin-
al cases, the Court held that 11the evidence is entirely in-
sufficient to sustain the conviction ••• rt It reached this 
conclusion because uEach of the counts involves an excep-
tionally small amount, and ••• it is hard to conceive that 
the Congress had in mind when it enacted this particular 
l aw, that an uncertain, insignificant amount such as is in-
volved here should be considered as an expenditure and used 
as a basis for a criminal prosecution." Thus, the Court 
decision seems to be employing de minimus ~ curat lex 
at the same moment it is denying its validityl 
The Court argued that if it were the intention of 
Congress to prevent these activities, uthen any political 
activity of any person on the payroll of a labor organi-
zation, from its president to its janitor, would render 
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that Union and its principal officers liable ••• " If 
Section 304 were to be taken literally, the Court noted, it 
might prohibit the president of a labor organization from 
making a political speech in support of or in opposition to 
any candidate for federal office, if any of the expenses dur-
ing such time were paid by a labor organization. The Court 
said that the debates were not precise enough to determine 
11 just exactly what the Congress intended 11 by prohibiting 
political " expenditures 11 but the Court could not bring it-
sel f to "believe that the Congress, with ita vast lmowl edge 
of t h e practical application of ita acts, intended such a 
restriction as is sought to be placed upon labor unions as 
here." 
Of course, any intelligent reader of the debates 
(See Appendix) must reach the conclusion that this is pre-
cisely what the authors of Section 304 did intend. It 
strikes me that the key to the Court's decision is to be 
found in its statement that ttrf the Court were to determine 
that the Congress did intend such meaning of the word, then 
it would be necessary to pass upon the constitutionality of 
the statute ••• 11 and at page 875 where the Court wrote: 
Labor organizations have a right to engage 
in political activities just the same as any 
other group, and certainly the Congress has 
the right to at least oo ntrol the expenditures 
and contributions of such groups, just as it 
does those of political parties and corpora-
tions. But in exercising this prerogative, 
the Congress hasn't the constitutional power 
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to deprive them of the right of free speech, 
the right to express themselves in the choice 
of candidates and political ideals, and the 
right to engage in political activities as 
guaranteed them under the Bill of Rights. 
This was a clear statement by the Court that to interpret 
Section 304 as outlawing political activities by labor 
unions (as was intended by its authors} would be to make 
Section 304 unconstitutional. It is obvious that the judi-
ciary has not followed the policy considerations underlying 
the statute: "Considerable watering down of Section 304 by 
the courts has resulted in uncertainty as regards both 
254 
coverage and constitutionality ••• '' 
Thomas-Lesinski bill. Following the election of 
President Truman in 1948 and the Supreme Court ruling in 
United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, in 
1949 the Democratic Administration introduced the Thomas-
Lesinski bill which would have substantially repealed the 
Taft-Hartley Act. This bill was sponsored by Senator 
Elbert D. 'I'homas, Democrat of Utah, of the Labor and Public 
Welfare Committee of the Senate, and in the House by Repre-
sentative John Lesinski, Democrat of Michigan, Chairman of 
the Education and Labor Committee. Except for a few minor 
changes which almost everybody agreed were needed, the new 
bill would have restored the 1935 Wagner Act. Supporters 
254 "Regulation of Labor's Political Contributions 
and Expenditures: The British and American Experience," 
comment, Winter 1952, 19 University of Chicago Law Review 
371, p. 388. 
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of the Taft-Hart~ey Act said that although they would go 
along with certain amendments to their law~ they would 
stand by its basic principles. They opposed almost every 
section of the Thomas-Lesinski bill and stated that they 
would fight the proposal to permit unions to contribute 
to political candidates or party campaigns. However, 
while continuing to favor the ban on direct union contribu-
tions~ leading opponents of the proposed new law agreed to 
approve union political expenditures, including publicity 
255 
and public education. 
The Thomas-Lesinski bill came up for action first 
in the House. There Taft-Hartley ~riends got behind a sub-
stitute bill proposed by Representative John s. Wood, Demo-
crat of Georgia~ which would have repealed the Taft-Hartley 
Act in name only by re-enacting most of its provisions~ 
some of them in even more objectionable form. When it be-
came apparent that the Wood bill had strong support from 
Republicans and southern Democrats, an attempt was made to 
breru{ up the coalition with a third bill offered by Repre-
sentative Hugo s. Sims, Democrat of South Carolina. This 
bill~ backed by House Speaker Sam Rayburn, Democrat of 
Texas, but without President Truman's specific approval, 
did not make sufficient changes in the Taft-Hartley Act to 
255 The News-Tribune, April 22, 1949, "'rhe Administra-
tion's Labor Bill," p. lj C.I.O. Political Action Committee~ 
a speaker's book of facts, August 1952, pp. 250-252. 
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satisfy House liberals, many of whom spoke against it. 
Without a record vote, the Sims bill was defeated 
211-183. On a crucial roll call the House then voted 
217-203 to substitute the Wood bill for the Lesinski bill. 
The 217 votes consisted of 146 Republicans joined by 71 
Democrats, all from southern or border states. The 203 
votes were 180 Democrats, 22 Republicans, and one American 
Labor Party congressman. The next day, however, the pro-
labor forces were able to change enough votes to send the 
Wood bill back to the Labor Committee. The vote was 212-209. 
Voting for recommittal were 193 Democrats, 18 Republicans, 
and one American Laborite. Against recommittal were 147 
257 
Republicans and 62 southern Democrats. 
In the Senate, the Thomas-Lesinski bill was called up 
for action in June, 1949. It was immediately coni'ronted 
with a series of Republican-sponsored amendments which would 
have kept most of the Taft-Hartley Act. The debate lasted 
nearly a month and on all key issues the views of Senator 
Taft prevailed by narrow margins. Passed by a vote of 51-42, 
the Taft-amended Thomas-Lesinski bill was never considered 
258 
by the House Labor Committee. Although from the time of 
President Truman's election in 1948 to 1952 the unions con-
256 This report of the legislative action is taken 
from pages 250-252 of~ speaker's book of facts published 
by the C.I.O. in August, 1952. 
257 Loc.cit. 
258 Loc.cit. 
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tinued to seek total repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act as an 
unfair and unjust policy to weaken labor's economic and 
political rights, anti-labor forces were so strong that 
these efforts to repeal the legislation got no attention 
whatsoever. A coalition of Republicans and southern Demo-
crats blocked any changes in the Taft-Hartley Act. 
Later developments. With the victory of the Repub-
lican Party in the 1952 elections, prospects of substantial 
modifications in the taft-Hartley Act were eliminated, 
although before his death in 1953 Senator Taft himself advo-
cated no less than 16 important revisions in his law, and 
during the 195.2 campaign President Eisenhower pledged that 
the legislation would be amended to m~et many of labor's 
objections, particularly the provision preventing economic 
strikers from balloting on union representation while at 
the same time the "scabs 11 may case their votes on the issue 
of unionism. He has since submitted some proposals to 
Congress, but little action is expected and in any event 
there was nothing said about Section 304. In 1954, proposed 
amendments to the 'l1aft-Hartley Act which would have restored 
many of the policy and enforcement provisions of labor ~egi­
slation to the states, making in effect 48 labor laws, were 
returned to committee. Labor unions considered this a vic-
tory, as the amendments were regarded as even more objection-
able than the statute itself. 
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Consequences. Demands for repeal of the Taft-Hartley 
Act ~ovided a powerful incentive not just for securing the 
election of friendly candidates in regard to that single 
objective, but also in furnishing the necessary final real-
ization that permanent political act-ivities in general are 
absolutely essential to protect union rights and to promote 
labor's program. Further, as a result of the court's refus-
al to enforce the prohibition on union electoral expendi-
tures, probably reluctant judicial recognition of the uncon-
stitutionality of such a provision, legislative changes in 
regard to Section 304 were not needed to permit organized 
labor from legally engaging in determined political activi-
ties financed both directly from union treasuries and from 
individual contributions given personally by union members. 
As an illustration of the difficulty labor would have 
in paying for a political campaign solely by appeals for 
these personal donations, it has been pointed out that 
although the union election fund drives for "a buck a mem-
ber11 had a potential total of at least $15,000,000, the 
C.I.O.-P.A.C. had its best year in 1950 when it received 
259 
oontributions of $1,200,000 1950 was also a very good 
year for the A.F.L. 1 s L.L.P.E. which collected $600,000 in 
- ' 
that year. Of that $600,000 collected, the L.L.P.E. spent 
259 Peter Edson, ''Labor Union Campaign Funds, u 
Washington Views, p. 6, The News-Tribune, Wednesday, 
September 3, 1952. 
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260 
some $550,000 in the 1950 elections. The $1,800,000 
collected by the C.I.O. and the A.F.L. in 1950 represents 
only about one out of nine union members contributing their 
261 
dollar. However, the A.F.L. publishes a weekly tabloid 
newspaper and spends nearly $1,000,000 a year to sponsor 
their own radio commentator, Frank ~dwards. The C.I.O.-
P.A.C. headquarters operates with eighteen salaried employ-
ees doing research on congressional records for local 
campaigns, preparing speaker's handbooks, and similar 
activities. Printing takes most of the budget, such as the 
series of vest-pocket booklets on 11 52 Facts" of which over 
3,000,000 copies were circulated. The C.I.O.-P.A.C. divides 
its campaign money one-half for national and one-half for 
262 
congressional and state campaigns. 
In 1954, the A.F.L.-L.L.P.E. and C.I.O.-P.A.C. each 
raised more than $1,000,000 in campaign funds. Again, half 
of this $ 2,000,000 was used in national and half in local 
263 
elections. At $1 apiece, this would mean only about two 
million union members financially supporting political 
activity by direct personal contributions. However, finan-
260 Lester, op.cit., p. 316. 
261 Edson, Ibid. 
262 Loc.cit. 
263 Peter Edson, 11 Election Results Indicate Labor 
Vote Is Influential.n Washington, p. 4, The News-Tribune, 
Wednesday, January 26, 1955. 
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support and political support are two different things and 
analysis of the 1954 election indicates that most of the 
labor vote went to union-endorsed Democrats. An important 
factor was unemployment. Of the 21 seats in the United 
States House of Representatives which the Democrats took 
away from Republicans, 18 were in so-called "labor-surplus-n 
areas. The A.F.L.-L.L.P.E. claims credit for the election 
of 18 union-endorsed United States Senate candidates and 
154 union-endorsed candidates for the House. In Illinois, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, and Oregon, states where labor 
held at least the balance of power, Democrats were elected 
to the United States Senate. As compared with the Taft-
Hartley 80th Congress when organized labor could count only 
83 House and 25 Senate friends, in 1955 the A.F.L.-L.L.P. E. 
now lists 182 House and 41 Senate pro-labor members of 
264 
Congress. 
Union labor was responsible for the election of Demo-
cratic governors in New York, Connecticut, Michigan, and 
Pennsylvania. In all, the Democrats won 27 governorships, 
a gain of seven. Democrats took 545 seats away from Repub-
265 
licans in state legislature contests, and lost only six. 
Just what the labor vote influence was in these results is 
still under study but~ of course, while not all these Demo-
26 4 Lo c • ci t • 
265 Loc.cit. 
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cratic victories can be attributed to a labor vote, the 
general trend is considered so significant that for the 
first time Republican election analysts concede union 
political influence, that organized labor has learned 
gradually how to throw its po l itical weight around most 
effectively in national, state, and local elections. This 
is true in spite of the fact that only a little more than 
one-quarter of the 64 million workers in the United States 
civilian la. bor force belong to unions. ·rhus, the re are 
freely expressed Republican . opinions that if present tren ds 
co ntinue, union control of the Democratic Party is possible, 
or even a United States Labor Party. 'rhe Republicans are 
therefore now considering the problem of how to win more 
266 
union support. 
Meanwhile, labor has continued to cement even more 
strongly its already very close affiliation with the Demo-
cratic Party. In its resolution on pol itical action of 
De cember 8, 1954, the 16th Constitutional Convention of the 
C.I.O. asserted that Democratic successes in the 1954 state 
and congressional elections were a defeat for tax-favored 
oil companies, the utility interests, wealthy owners of 
timber and land resources, reactionary industrialists, 
large corporation stockholders, conservative big business-
men, greedy landlords, unscrupulous real estate operators, 
266 Loc.cit. 
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grasping bankers, assorted coupon clippers, certain million-
aires, and well-to-do individuals who had given the Republic-
267 
ana nunlimited campaign funds. n On the other hand, the 
c.r.o. saw the Democrats as representing liberal businessmen, 
independent farmers, working men and women, pro gressive 
professional people, forward-looking parents, ovmers of small 
268 
homes, and the average citizen generally. 
The C.I.O. Convention pledged continued support to 
candidates regardless of party who favored pro-labor programs 
and measures which the C.I.O. endorsed as in the public 
interest. The P .A.C. was directed to expand its activities, 
to work in conjunction with other union organizations, and 
in order to accomplish the c.r.o. policies 11 to cooperate with 
farmers, consumers, church groups, small businessmen, profes-
sional men, white collar workers, minority groups and all 
other groups and citizens genuinely devoted to the democratic 
269 
ideas of public service and welfare as is the c.r.o." The 
C.I.O.-P .A.C. was told to support progressives within both of 
the major parties "basing its judgments on platforms and rec-
270 
ords of performance. 11 lVIore emphasis was to be placed on 
"year-round politics at the ward, precinct, and neighborhood 
267 Political Action of the Week No. 50, December 13, 
1954, C.I.O.-P . A. C . 
268 Loc.cit. 
269 Loc.cit. 
270 Loc.cit. 
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levels so that our members can participate in the formula-
tion of the program and selection of liberal candidates of 
271 
ability and integrity. 11 The resolution promised "to 
carry forward the political action program of our organiza-
tion in our efforts to raise the standards of government to 
272 
higher levels of public service and responsibility." 
State Legislation and Decisions 
Although we have seen that most states have restric-
tiona directly or indirectly applying to organized labor's 
political activiti~s and campaign contributions, a much 
lesser number of jurisdictions have attempted to include a 
ttlittle Section 304 11 provision in their corrupt practices 
statutes. Indeed, where such legislation has been attempted, 
these efforts have failed largely on constitutional grounds. 
For example, Colorado's enactment forbidding political 
273 274 
expenditures by labor unions was invalidated. Like-
wise an Alabama law prohibiting both contributions and 
expenditures by a labor organization was struck down by the 
275 
Alabama Supreme Court. We have already seen the reason-
271 Loc.cit. 
272 Loc.cit. 
273 Colo.Stat.Ann., Ch. 97, sec. 94-(20) (Cum.Supp. 
1946); also see this thesis page 292, footnote 172. 
274 Kallenbach, Ibid; Killingsworth, Ibid. 
275 Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 
Alabama Supreme Court, 18 So.2d 810 (1944). 
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ing in the Texas case which held that the state has a right 
in the public interest to reasonably regulate the political 
276 
conduct of labor unions. In considering the Texas deci-
sion, reported in this thesis on pages 293-294, it must be 
remembered that it dealt only with contributions, and not 
with expenditures. In this respect it could not be regard-
ed as precedent for a Section 304 situation. 
The Massachusetts case. However, an opinion of the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has provided us 
with an excellent case in point concerning the validity of 
prohibitions such as Section 304. The Massachusetts Court 
was asked to order a writ of mandamus to issue commanding 
the Secretary of State not to submit to the voters of the 
Commonwealth an initiative referendum which would, if 
approved by the electorate, prohibit, among others, any 
11labor unions or any person acting in behalf thereof 11 to 
11 directly or indirectly give, pay, expend or contribute, 
any money or other valuable thing in order to aid, promote 
or prevent the nomination or election of any person to 
public office, or to aid, promote or antagonize the inter-
ests of any political party.,_ or to influence or affect the 
vote on any question submitted to the voters. 11 
276 Tex.Civ.Stat.Ann., Title 83, art. 5154a, sec. 49 
(Vernon, 1947), American Federation of Labor v. Mann, 98th 
District Court of Travis County (1944), Texas Court of Civil 
Appeals, 3rd Supreme Judicial District, No. 9446 (1945) 
L.R.R., XVI (1945) 307, 188 S.W.2d 276, 286 (1945). 
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The Court refused to permit the proposed law to be 
printed on the ballot for the next state election, holding 
in Bowe v. Secretary of the Connnonwealth, 320 Mass. 230, 
69 N. E.2d 115, 167 A.L.R. 1447 (1946), that if enacted it 
would be inoperative because in conflict with both the 
Federal Constitution and the Constitution of Massachusetts. 
The people should not be asked to perform a futile act. 
The Court said at page 252: 
One of the chief reasons for freedom of the 
press is to insure freedom, on the part of 
individuals and associations of individuals 
at least, of political discussion of men and 
measures, in order that the electorate at the 
polls may express the genuine and informed 
will of the people ••• Individuals seldom im-
press their views upon the electorate without 
organization. They have a right to organize 
into parties and even into what are called 
"pressure groups" for the purpose of advancing 
causes in which they be2ieve. They have a 
right to engage in printing and circulating 
their views, and in advancing their cause in 
public assemblies and over the radio. All 
this costs money, and if all use of money were 
to be denied them the result would be to 
abridge even to the vanishing point any 
effective freedom of speech, liberty of the 
press, and right of peaceable assembly. 
It remains to apply these principles to the 
proposed law under discussion. We do not 
doubt that labor unions, like individuals, may 
be curbed by corrupt practices acts and pre-
vented from dumping innnense sums of money into 
political campaigns. But under the proposed 
law the political activities of labor unions 
are not regulated or curbed but are substan-
tially destroyed. Deprived of the right to 
pay any sum of money for the rental of a hall 
in which to hold a public rally or debate, or 
for printing or circulating pamphlets, or for 
advertising in newspapers, or for buying radio 
- 355 -
time, a union could not carry on any substan-
tial and effective political activity. It 
could not get its message to the electorate. 
Its rights of freedom of the press and of 
peaceable assembly would be crippled ••• the 
proposed law is "inconsistent withu those 
rights, and consequently cannot be the subject 
of legislation by the popular initiative. 
The DeMille case. DeMille v. American Federation of 
Radio Artists, 31 Cal.2d 137, 187 P.2d 769, 175 A. L. R. 382 
(1947}, is extremely interesting in that it represents a 
complete reversal both in law and policy from Osborne v. 
Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, l Law Re. Ch. Div. 
163, l British Ruling Cases 56 (1909). In the California 
case, referred to earlier in this thesis in connection with 
277 
the congressional hearing at which Mr. DeMille testified, 
Cecil B. DeMille was a member of the American Federation of 
Radio Artists which had held a meeting to discuss a state 
referend'lUll entitled "Right to Employment" which, if adopted 
by the electorate, would outlaw both the closed shop and the 
union shop. At the union meeting, of which Mr. DeMille was 
notified but did not attend, a resolution was unanimously 
agreed upon declaring that the measures if passed would be 
detrimental to organized labor, and authorized the union's 
Board of Directors to take any action deemed proper and 
277 United Btates Congress, Senate, 80th Gong., lst 
Sess., February 14, 1947, Hearings before the Committee on 
Labor and Public Welfare, Labor Relations Program, Part 2, 
pp. 796-797; see this thesis pages 309-311. 
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necessary to de£eat it. Subsequently an assessment or $1.00 
per member was levied to be used in a campaign or public edu-
cation to bri ng about the de£eat or the proposition. The mem-
bers were given 30 days to pay the $1.00 at the end or which 
time suspension or union membership would become automatic. 
DeMille rerused to pay the assessment and was suspend-
ed. He sought an injunction which was denied. Going £rom 
the district court to the district appellate court, he lost 
a gain. He appealed, alleging, inter alia, that the union had 
no authority under its organic law to levy the assessment. 
The Cali£orni a Supreme Court, noting that opposition to the 
open shop has been a reature or the history or the labor 
movement, said that the objects of the union included e£forts 
" to secure proper legislation upon matters affecting their 
professions" and that this object covered opposition to con-
templ ated legislat i on which in the opinion of the members of 
the union would be inimical to their welfare individually or 
collectively. The Court then asserted that 
The articles of agreement, Constitution and 
by-laws of American Federation o£ Radio 
Artists, both National and Local constitute 
a contract with the members and are binding 
on the plaintiff ••• As that contract may pre-
scribe the ter.ms upon which membership in a 
union may be gained, so may it de£ine the 
conditions which will entail its loss. 
DeMill e further contended that the Levy of the assess-
ment and consequent suspension upon his refusal t9 pay it in-
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fringed his constitutional right of suffrage, freedom of 
speech, press, and assembly because his payment of the 
assessment would be an expression on his part contrary to 
his personal beliefs inasmuch as he favored the open shop. 
But the Court held: 
The member and the association are distinct. 
The union represents the common or group 
interests of its members as distinguished 
from their personal or private interest ••• 
Dues and assessments paid by members to an 
association become the property of the asso-
ciation and any severable or individual 
interest therein ceases upon such payment ••• 
As such property they are subject to dis-
bursement and expenditure by the association 
in pursuit of the lawful objects for which 
they were designated to be expended ••• The 
Local's declaration to pursue the objective 
and to authorize the raising of a fund for 
the purpose was expressed by the membership 
through democratic procedures ••• Mere dis-
agreement with the majority does not absolve 
the dissenting minority from compliance with 
action of the association taken through 
authorized union methods. And compliance--
here payment by the plaintiff of the assess-
ment--would not stamp his act as a personal 
endorsement of the declared view of the 
majority. Majority rule necessarily pre-
vails in all constitutional government 
including our federal, state, county, and 
municipal bodies, else payment of a tax 
levied for a duly authorized and proper 
objective could be avoided by the mere 
assertion of beliefs and sentiments opposed 
to the accomplishment thereof. In a govern-
ment based on democratic principles the 
benefit as perceived by the majority pre-
vails. And the individual citizen would 
raise but a faint cry of invasion of his 
constitutional rights should he seek to 
avoid his obligation because of a difference 
in personal views. A member of a voluntary 
association should not be permitted success-
fully a similar avoidance. 
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Finally, DeMill e argued that the action of the union 
deprived him of his right to work, and that the assessment 
was a 11 tax11 on his right to work. If the latter is true, 
the Court observed, so are union dues a utax." Mr. De] ille 
voluntarily chose not to pay a lawful union assessment. 
Automatic suspension was the consequence of his own choice. 
Thus, there was no invasion of any constitutional right. 
uHe possessed and, it is assumed, still possesses the means 
of affording his own relief.n--payment of $1.00. 
It would be difficult to find two cases so alike on 
their facts and yet so different in their philosophy as the 
Osborne and DeMille decisions. Yet the Court in the DeMille 
case refers to the Osborne judgment as being consistent with 
its ruling! Although the California court said that there 
were sufficientl y distinguish ing facts between the t wo cases, 
it seems impossible to discover the variance in the facts in 
each of the cases which would reconcile their radically 
different legal results. The DeMille court did not pass 
upon the constitutionality of Section 304 of the Taft-Hartley 
Act as this provision does not apply to state elections, and 
in any event does not prohibit political expenditures in 
connection with popular referendums whether state or federal. 
But in the states at least, the judicial reasoning in both 
the Massachusetts and DeMille cases represents the unanimous 
legal opinion that any political prohibition such as Section 
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304 cannot be upheld as consistent with constitutional 
rights. 
Related Legislation and Decisions 
Labor union liabilities. In reviewing the related 
court decisions concerning union rights and limitations in 
political activities, this writer found a number of cases 
which help shed legal light upon this problem. Schneider 
v. Local Union No. 60 1 116 La. 270, 114 Am. St. Rep. 549 1 
40 So. 700, 5 L.R.A. (N.S.) 891, 7 Ann. Cas. 868 (1905) 1 
held that a labor union could not expel, fine, threaten, or 
deprive of their livelihood any union member when the only 
reason for such action is that such union member accepted 
an appointment to a political position against the union's 
wishes or when a member of a public board refused to vote 
as the union desired. Any union rule so requiring is 
illegal. No citizen can be coerced into not accepting a 
public office and no public official can be coerced in the 
performance of his duty to the community at large. 
A similar result was reached in Spayd v. Ringing 
Rock Lodge No. 665 1 270 Pa. 67, 113 A. 70 1 14 A.L.R. 1443 
(1921}, where a by-law of the local union provided for 
expulsion of any member who used his influence to defeat an 
action of the governing body. The Court held that a citizen 
cannot surrender his constitutional rights by agreement with 
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others and that the by-law was void as infri nging upon the 
constitutional right of petition in so far as it authorized 
the expulsion of a union member for signing a petition to 
the legislature to repeal the "Full Crew" law, which law 
was favored by the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen. 
Labor union rights. On the other side of the coin, 
neither can an employer coerce his employees. In Vulcan 
Last Co. v. State, 194 Wis. 636, 217 N. W. 412 (1928), the 
company desired the city of Crandon to install waterworks 
in order that the company might have fire protection. The 
resolution passed the City Council by a vote of 9-1, the 
one negative vote being cast by an employee of the company. 
This employee was discharged at a meeting called by the 
company to explain its interest in the establishment of the 
waterworks system, and the other employees were told that 
any man who voted a gainst the interests of the company in 
the coming election on the question of issuing bonds to 
construct the waterworks would be discharged. The Vulcan 
Last Company was convicted under a state law forbidding any 
employer from influencing an election by threats of dis-
charge or reduction in wages, or promise of higher wages. 
The law protects "the right of every free man to cast his 
vote as the dictates of his conscience shall determine 
untrammeled by influence exerted by his employer." 
Likewise, Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Superior Court , 
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28 Cal.2d 481~ 153 P.2d 966, 177 P.2d 21, 166 A.L.R. 701 
(1945-1946), upheld a California statute forbidding employ-
ers from tending to control the political activities or the 
political affiliations of employees. Hague v. c.r.o., 307 
u.s. 496, 59 s.ct. 954, 83 L. Ed. 1423 (1939), ruled that 
municipal ordinances were unconstitutional which forbade 
the distribution of printed matter or required permits for 
the holding of public meetings. Thomas v. Collins, 323 
u.s. 516, 65 s.ct. 315, 89 L. Ed. 430 (1944), held that a 
Texas statute requiring labor organizers to get a license 
to solicit members was unconstitutional. These last two 
cases, while deciding in favor of labor's rights in ita 
pro-union propagandizing and in organizing the union, also 
have a direct bearing on the general rights of unions to 
engage in political activities. 
Communism in union cases. American Communications 
Assoc. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 70 S.Ct. 674, 94 L. Ed. 925, 
reh.den. 339 u. s . 990, 70 s.ct. 1017, 94 L. Ed. 1391 (1950), 
held that the non-Communist affidavits required under the 
Taft-Hartley Act were constitutional. This decision was 
reaffirmed on the same issue in Osman v. Douds, 339 U~S. 
846, 70 S.Ct. 901, 94 L.Ed. 1328 (1950). The basis for the 
law is to remove the obstructions to the free flow of com-
merce resulting from "political strikes" instigated by Com-
munists who had infiltrated the management or leadership of 
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labor unions. Congress may protect the public against a 
party, in this instance the Communist Party, which supports 
the policies of a foreign power believing in the violent 
overthrow of government to attain the Communist goal. 
National Labor Relations Board v. Highland Park N~g. 
Co., 341 U.S. 322, 71 S.Ct. 758, 95 L.Ed. 969 (1951), held 
that even though the officers of an affiliated union had 
filed the required non-Communist affidavits, the N.L.R.B. 
was not authorized to comply with the request of the 
affiliated union to issue an order requiring the employer 
to deal with the affiliated union when the officers of the 
parent union had not filed the affidavits, even though the 
parent union was regarded in labor circles as a federation 
rather than a national or international union. The purpose 
in requiring the non-Communist affidavit is to wholly bar 
from leadership in the American labor movement, at each and 
every level, adherents to the Communist Party and believers 
in the unconstitutional overthrow of our government. 
This reasoning applies as well on the state level, 
as in Weinstock v. Ladiskx1 197 Misc. 859 1 98 N.Y.S.2d 85 
(1950) 1 which held that a union may amend its constitution 
to expel Communist members. Public policy opposes Commun-
ism and the union has the right to protect itself from 
those who it believes will destroy the union or bring the 
union into disrepute. 
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Time off with ~ to vote. The latest case of 
significance for labor union political action is State of 
Missouri v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 240 S.W.2d 886 (1951), 
holding 4-3 that a state law requiring employers to allow 
time off with pay to vote on election day is a valid exer-
cise of police power violating no provision of the state or 
federal constitutions. The Supreme Court of the United 
States, in Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 u.s. 
421, 72 S.Ct. 405, 96 L. Ed. 469 (1952), with Justice 
Jackson dissenting, reaffirmed the decision of the state 
court and found the Missouri statute constitutional. Simil-
ar statutes have been upheld in New York and California, 
and stricken down in Illinois and Kentucky. Such laws are, 
of course, part of the effort of labor unions to secure the 
largest possible industrial vote for labor's program. 
Chapter Conclusions 
To briefly su¢marize this chapter, following the 
political prohibition of the 1910 Osborne judgment which 
prevented labor from lawful independent electoral action, 
Great Britain experimented with various legislative pro-
visions. Parliament first accepted the 1913 ncontracting-
out 11 statute restoring union political rights with exemp-
tion privileges for dissenting members. Largely in retal-
iation for the 1926 general strike, and as a result of the 
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rapid growth of the Labor Party, the Conservatives enacted 
the 1927 ttcontracting-in 11 law making it illegal for unions 
to raise a political fund without obtaining written consent 
from each member whose dues were to be so applied. This 
was an additional burden designed not just to hamper the 
political activities of the unions but thereby to put the 
Labor Party at a financial disadvantage. 
However, despite these difficulties, and perhaps 
even because of the stlllUlating of resentment against the 
vindictive 1927 Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act, labor 
continued to build its independent political strength. But 
union support for the Labor Party was certainly not caused 
by any legislation. Political action is primarily an 
effect, the result of an underlying economic basis combined 
with a realization of this need and the possibilities of 
self-advancement through combined effort. To the unions, 
politics was merely another aspect of their economic activi-
ties, that legislation is a desirable, sometimes necessary, 
supplement and bulwark of labor's industrial power. To the 
benefit of the unions and the Labor Party, 11 contracting-outn 
was restored in 1946 after the 1945 Labor Party victory. 
Conservatives returned to office in 1950, without a plural-
ity in the popular vote, and made no moves to again change 
the "contracting-out" status of the unions. 
In the United States, on both the economic and politi-
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cal fronts, a tremendous impetus to labor's industrial 
gr-owth and electoral activities was stimulated by the New 
Deal. While labor's political interest was nothing new, 
the 1924 LaFollette campaign for example, prior to 1936 it 
was not remarkable. Starting with the C.I.O.-P.A.C., how-
ever, the unions exerted ever-increasing political influ-
ence. Like the major parties, labor was not controlled by 
the 1940 Hatch Act and found it no great problem to avoid 
the 1943 Smith-Connally Act. The post-war wave of strikes 
in 1946 created an adverse public opinion toward unions 
which helped the Republicans to gain a majority in Congress 
and in 1947 the Taft-Hartley Act was passed over President 
Truman's veto. This legislation included Section 304 
amending the Federal Corrupt Practices Act to prohibit 
labor's electoral conduct. 
The addition of the word "expenditures" to the law 
forbidding labor union political "contributions" was 
intended to pr~hibit labor union political activities, even 
the publication of the voting records of candidates . "in 
connection with" a national election. In the words of 
Senator Taft, "Labor unions are supposed to keep out of 
politics to the same extent that corporations are supposed 
to keep out of politics. n But the C .I. 0 •. case unanimously 
exonerated the union. The Supreme Court majority found the 
statute not to cover a C.I.O. News political editorial 
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endorsing a candidate for Congress. Four Supreme Court 
Justices felt, however, that the statute did cover these 
facts and, further, that under these facts and on its face 
as a matter of law, Section 304 was an unconstitutional 
violation of the First Amendment. 
supsequent cases under Section 304 found that the 
law did not prevent labor unions from spending general 
union funds on such political activities as newspaper adver-
tisements and radio broadcasts, voter registration and 
transportation of voters to the polls, printing and distri-
bution of political literature of all varieties, including 
pamphlets, cards, matches, photographic posters on porches, 
and political advertisements on vehicles of public trans-
portation. It is apparent that the courts have simply 
either refused to enforce Section 304 or regard its practi-
cal a pplication as unconstitutional. 
State cases uphold this view. While prohibitions on 
"contributions" have been sustained, similar restrictions 
1 
-
on ''expenditures 11 have been striken down as inconsistent 
-- .. 
with the constitutional rights of free speech, press, and 
assembly. Especially strong on this point are the Massachu-
setts and DeMille cases. Other court decisions reveal that 
neither the union nor the employer may use direct or indir-
ect coercion to influence a citizen in the exercise of his 
free ballot or in his functions as a public official. How-
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ever, as a matter of public policy, Congress has the consti-
tutional power to bar members of the Communist Party from 
union leadership. Likewise, in the absence of legislation, 
the union may act on its own initiative to expel Communists 
from union membership. 
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EVALUATIVE CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Like any other group which engages directly or in-
directly in electoral campaigns, in both Great Britain and 
in the United States labor unions must, of course, comply 
with general legislation and judicial _decisions controlling 
or affecting all political activities. These include pub-
licity requirements and publicity pamphlets, expenditure 
. -
limitations as to amounts and purposes, the· restrictions on 
contributions, pr~tections for pu?lic employees, various 
illegal practices, and other miscellaneous provisions gov-
erning elections, particularly relating to the conduct of 
- - - . 
candidates, parties, committees, and their agents. While 
- -
not aimed specifically at organized labor, these laws 
equally apply to the political activities of the unions and 
their members. In our second chapter review discussing the 
s i gnificant history, provisions, and problems of these 
measures, we saw that the over-all corrupt practices regu-
latory programs have been fairly effective, but that the 
limitations. restrictions, and prohibitions in regard to 
campaign finance, contributions and expenditures, such as 
the 1940 Hatch Act, have largely failed because of legal 
inadequacies, practical avoidances, and lack of enforcement. 
Specifically concerning organized labor, until the 
middle of the nineteenth century the English common law 
conspiracy doctrines had declared labor unions to be unlaw-
ful. Once having overcome thi~ barrier, unions grew rapid-
ly, increased in economic strength, and soon turned their 
attention to politics. The rise of the Labor Party as the 
political arm of the unions led to efforts to limit these 
activities. Minority union members brought suits to pre-
vent political assessments being levied on them and on 
- . . . . 
other union members. The Osborne case held that political 
action is not a legitimate interest of the union movement. 
This decision was reversed by the British Parliament in 
1913 with a policy permitting labor union political action 
and political assessments on those union members who did 
not "contract-out" of the assessment. The Labor Party's 
strength increased rapidly until it came to challenge t he 
traditional Liberal and Conservative parties. 
The General Strike of 1926 gave the Conservatives 
their opportunity to enact the Trade Disputes and Trade 
Unions Act of 1927, the general provisions of which were 
very similiar to the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act in the United 
States. rn regard to political assessments, the 1927 Act 
required ''contracting-in~ Protection of the minority was 
the principal reason given in the debates for the new 
limitation. Opponents of the restriction argued that 
political action was a necessity for labor unions and that 
it should not be made more difficult by such a procedure. 
Although the immediate effect of the 1927 Act in Britain 
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was to cut the money available to the Labor Party, the 
long-range effect was to build up general pro-Labor Party 
sentiment and to promote individual membership apart from 
the union movement itself. 
The Labor Party won a clear-cut majority over both 
its opponents in 1945 and in 1946 changed the law back to 
the 1913 "contracting-out" statute. In 1948 the Labor 
Party's funds were doubled over 1944, both non-election 
years. Thus, while there seems to be a causal connection 
between the legal system permitted and the money available 
for labor's political activities, so long as there is an 
opportunity for democratic elections it appears that labor 
will find ways and means of making its voice heard. The 
Labor Party lost the last election in Great Britain after 
a period of socialization only because of a concentration 
of Labor Party support in industrial areas; the total vote 
throughout the nation gave a popular plurality to the Labor 
Party. 
In the United States, the courts at first followed 
the English conspiracy doctrines until 1842 when a shift 
began to the use of injunctions rather than holding the 
unions illegal as such. Early American labor parties did 
not continue, but agitation against the injunction led 
eventually to the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 and simi l iar 
state legislation. Although there had been some labor 
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union political activity previously, the New Deal Era g ave 
a new impetus to labor's political action and laws favorable 
to the union movement. The National Industrial Recovery Act 
and then the Wa gner Act g uaranteed labor's rights. The 
American Federa tion of Labor's nnon-partisan" policy was 
changing, and the ri.se of the Congress of rndustrial Organi-
z a tions gave further accent to labor's political action. 
As a consequence, efforts were made to limit these 
uni on activities. The 1943 Smith-Connally Act prohibited 
labor union 11 contributions 11 to federal election campaigns. 
This did not stop labor's political action. rnstead, t h e 
unions formed independent political committees, such as the 
c.r.o.-P.A.C., and campaigned successfully for there-
election of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. An investiga-
tion by Congress confirmed the fact that the 1944 polit i cal 
e xpe nditures did not violate the 194~ law against polit i cal 
co nt r ibutions. I~ . ~act, the investi g ators concluded that 
f ull and fre e discussion of political issues should be en-
couraged, that labor unions, unlike corporations, were not 
legal persons but were an aggregation of individuals like a 
church, fraternal org a n ization, or social group, and that 
t h e answer was not prohibition but publicizing of political 
expenditures. Therefore, the unions continued their politi-
cal activities in the interests of securing representation 
and legislation favorable to labor and the community. 
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Following the war, 1946 was the biggest strike year 
in American history to that time. The Republican congress-
ional victory in 1946 was attributed at least in part to 
the public reaction against unionism. Not only were the 
economic sections of the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act severely, if 
not vindictively, restrictive against labor, but through a 
continuation and expansion of the expiring Smith-Connally 
Act provision forbidding direct political contributions, 
attempted to prohibit labor's political activities. Under 
Section 304 the law was ~pplied to the use of union funds 
in federal primaries as well as elections and added to the 
contributions prohibition a ban on political expenditures. 
Passed by Congress over President Truman's veto, the Taft-
Hartley Act became the major issue of the 1948 cam.paign. 
Even though strong evidence exists to indicate that the 
veto was not supported by its maker, the unions endorsed 
the Democrats on their pledge to repeal the Taft-Hartley 
Act. Truman's election, _however, did not bring repeal be-
cause of a Republican-southern Democratic coalition and in 
1952 the Eisenhower victory swept away any likely prospects 
of an early legislative change in the Taft-Hartley Act. 
In test cases brought to the courts by the unions, 
. . . 
however, judicial changes in Section 304 negated the legi-
- .. -
slative intent and rendered the law ineffectual to reach 
the political activities of the unions. Although the cong-
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ressional debate clearly indicated a definite policy against 
the expenditure of union funds for any political purpose 
whatsoever, including political comment in labor union news-
papers or radio broadcasts sponsored out of general union 
funds, such a prohibition would be in violation of the First 
Amendment rights of free speech, press, and assembly. But 
the courts in a series of decisions have refused to find the 
law uncomstitutional. Instead, the judiciary has chosen by 
interpretation to leave Section 304 non-enforceable. It 
a ppears, ther~fore, tha~ insofar as Section 304 is concern~d, 
labor unions will remain active in politics. No doubt of 
this exists ih the states where the courts have consistently 
striken down attempted prohibitions on the political expendi-
tures of labor unions as unconstitutional. 
Aside from the right of labor unions to engage in 
political action which is guaranteed under our Constitution 
. . 
to any association of citizens which seeks change by peace-
ful, democratic methods, there is the question in the minds 
of many persons as to the desireability of labor unions 
including political programs along with their economic aims. 
We sometimes hear it debated as to whether labor unions 
should "go into politics." However, as a practical mat ter, 
it is rather pointless to debate whether unions should be 
politically active. The fact is that if they rea lly have no 
choice in the matter, then there are at least three compell-
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ing reasons why unions are almost automatically in politics. 
First, unions exist in a legal and political system 
which generally has been critical of union activities. From 
earliest times, the conspiracy suit and the ";injunction 
judge" have been a serious problem for unions. In order 
that unions may be able to engage in collective bargaining 
on more_ e!en te~ms, a minimu~ o~ political activity is 
essential. Second, certain union objectives which conceiv-
ably could be attained through collective bargaining can be 
achieved more quickly or more satisfactorily through legisla-
tion (which is of a permanent nature not subject to the give 
- - - - ' 
and take of the yearly union-management negotiations) as, 
for illustration, minimum wage and maximum hour laws, safety 
regulations, and the elimination ?f child labor. Third, 
some things can be obtained through legislation which cannot 
be obtained at all through collective bargaining. Unemp loy-
ment compensation and other forms of social insurance, ade-
quate housing and medical car~,. good public education, effec-
tive anti-depression measures--these and many other things 
cannot be negotiate_d separate~Y. wi ~h each employer, but must 
be established as matters of public policy and applied uni-
. .. . . 
formly throughout the community, state, or nation. 
0~ ~any justifica~~ons f~r laws _ r~stricting labor 
union contributions or expenditures for political purposes, 
perhaps the most consistently urged is that minority members 
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or the union are coerced into rinancial support or political 
objectives with which they are not in sympathy, that a union 
which spends money ror the election of a candidate is violat-
ing the rights or those individual union members who do not 
agree with the majority view. It is argued that the minor-
ity is being taxed through dues payments to rurther purposes 
or which they disapprove and that legislation such as Sec-
tion 304 is needed to protect union members holding politi-
cal opinions contrary to those or the union majority which 
votes the use of funds contributed by all union members to 
promote public acceptance or views opposed by some union 
members. The answer to this is that it is perrectly proper 
ror the union to act in what it regards as the legitimate 
interest or the majority or its members even though a minor-
ity may object to such a?tion. See the DeMille case at 
pages 356-360 or this paper. 
Where union elections and political expenditures are 
given democratic guarantees, the union member is protected. 
The minority always has the opportunity or converting more 
peop le to its point of view and or becoming the majority at 
some later time. If labor unions exist which are so con-
trolled as to abuse their economic and political power, 
le gislation could secure guarantees which would protect the 
democratic process within the union and which would require 
majority consent ror political expenditures. rr it is relt 
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that the absolute majority rule principle should not be 
applied to labor union political expenditures (as it does 
with the union shop provision requiring a worker to join 
the union after a 30-day period) then the dissenting minor-
ity could be protected, not by the blanket prohibitions of 
Section 304 which has proven to be a failure, but by either 
a "contracting-in" system which would require individual 
approval of the political expenditure, or by a "contracting-
out" system which would require individual disapproval. If 
American legislators are to be guided by the British exper-
ience, it seems that this latter alternative would be the 
. . . 
fairest and more practical solution. 
Further support for measures to prohibit labor union 
political activity is often grounded in the proposition 
.. -
that the law prohibiting business corporations from making 
political expenditures, or contributions to political part-
ies or candidates, in connection with a federal election 
should be applied equally to labor unions. It is said that 
the purity of elections and of official conduct should be 
preserved against the influence of unions as well as corp-
orations. But so long as there are individual stockholders 
who are able to make political contributions as large as 
most unions can afford to make, comparing union contribu-
tions to corporation contributions is not a sound analogy. 
This is even more obvious in the case of expenditures when 
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we consider the essential differences in kind between a 
1 
labor union and a business corporation. (See Remarks of 
Senator Pepper in Appendix) 
If the aim of such prohibitions on union political 
expenditures or contributions is to equalize political 
influence, then it could be argued logically that no indi-
vidual's political contribution could exceed the amount 
2 
which an average worker could afford to contribute. Or, 
inasmuch as the present ban on corporation contributions 
has not solved the problem of corporate wealth in election 
campaigns (although it has obscured its influence), a much 
more convincing case for _equality could be made for repeal-
ing the ban on corporations rather than for extending the 
ban to labor unions. If both corporations and labor unions 
were permitted to engage in political activity openly, 
legislation enforcing adequate publicity would give the 
voting public a list. of contributions and expenditures con-
stituting a very revealing picture of who really pays the 
-3 
political bills. Labor unions would have nothing to lose 
1 Another fundamental difference arises out of the 
fact that whereas a labor union must have machinery for 
ascertaining- the will -of the majority on many controversial 
problems, the business corporation usually lacks the machin-
ery for -determining varied -questions of policy by democratic 
methods. See Louise Overacker, Presidential Campaign Funds, 
p. 69~ rt should also b~ noted that votes in a corporation 
are per stockholder investment while in a labor union votes 
are per individual member. 
2 Florence Peterson, Survey of Labor Economics, p. 647. 
3 Louise Overacker, Presidential Campaign Funds, p. 69. 
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and much to gain from full political publicity of this kind, 
for the record will show that the people on Labor's side are 
4 
paying their political bills with dimes and dollars. 
On the other hand, we would have more revelations 
such as were reported by Thomas L. Stokes in the Boston 
Daily Globe of Saturday, July 3, 1954. In his Washington 
column on page ten, Mr. Stokes tells of the Senate vote "to 
continue the tax bonanza for the oil industry embodied in 
the 27i percent depletion allowance" which "is written off 
. - . 
before they begin to figure their taxes." Because of this 
law, many such taxpayers are paying little or nothing in 
taxes and are consequ~ntly not bearing their share of the 
burdens of government. This tax exemption, Stokes reveals, 
has permitted a legal raiding of the people's treasury, and 
accord;ng to Senator Paul Douglas, Democ~at of Illinois, 
its significance is that it is largely r~sponsible for the 
creation of "the Texas oil multi-millionaires" and to this 
extent gives th~m excess fund~ for political activity. 
Stokes quotes Douglas as claiming ~hat these Texas 
oil mill i onaires "now_ are attempting to dominate the poli-
tics of the United S tates" and that "th.ey constitute one of 
the largest sources of political financing and political 
propaganda at the present time." Douglas told the Senate 
- -
that Maine Republican Senator Margaret Chase Smith, recently 
4 Loc.cit. 
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renominated, had put a note on his desk "authorizing me to 
say that the Texas oil men went into the Maine primary and 
tried to defeat her." Commenting on the failure of the Sen-
ate to take a roll call vote on the oil depletion exemption, 
said Thomas L. Stokes: "No wonder so many Senators wanted 
to duck a record vote. Oil has cowed them." With adequate 
publicity of facts of this kind, it is difficult to believe 
that the average voting citizen would _elect candidates 
kno~m to be supported by such sources. 
Another argument favoring the validity of legislation 
prohibiting labor union political expenditures emphasises 
the dapgers from the influence or money in elections. It 
is said that democracy is subverted when powerful groups 
are permitted to exert a political influence out or propor-
tion to their numbers, and that such provisions as Section 
304 reduce the alleged undue and disproportionate influence 
of labor unions upon elections. However, even if Congress 
- . . -
could restrict free speech, rree press, and free assembly 
to strike at such an evil, not only has there been a failure 
to demonstrate any real danger to our democratic form of 
government in labor's political expenditures but, on the 
contrary, labor is enlarging democratic methods by promoting 
interest in the electoral procesa. Surely labor unions have 
as much right to be in politics as Texas oil millionaires. 
In its rlat ban on political contributions and 
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expenditures by unions, Section 304 fails to distinguish be-
tween abuse of power and the proper exercise of fundamental 
rights. If there are abuses in labor's political activities, 
it would seem more appropr i ate for Congress to take steps 
which meet the specific evils. If, for example, it is feared 
that labor's political spending leads to corruption, then a 
federal statute could be enacted directly affecting such 
practices. F urther, it has been suggested by congressional 
committees and recommended by others that requirements for 
adequate publicity of campaign contributions and expenditures 
would be of greater value than prohibitions. Not until such 
specific measures are found inadequa.te should there be any 
5 
broader, more restrictive, legislation by Congress. 
In answer to the constitutional objection to prohibi-
tions on union political activity, that it is in violation 
of the First Amendment g uarantees, freedom of speech, etc., 
supporters of the Taft-Hartley Act argue that the statute 
prohibits expenditures of money only, and does ~ot place any 
restrictions on the right of free speech itself. This con-
tention ignores the fact that ev~n in the eighteenth century, 
the exercise of free speech often involved the expenditure of 
-· . 
funds, as in political pamphleteering, and it is hardly to be 
· 5 Ibid, - pp. 64~68; "Regulatibn of Labor's Political 
Contributions and Expenditures: The British and American 
Experience," comment; 19 University of Chicago Law Review 
371, p. 388; "Section 304, Taft-Hartley Act: Validity of 
Restrictions 6ri -Union Political Activity," 57 Yale Law 
Journal 806, pp. 824-827. -- --
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supposed that the drafters of the Bill of Rights would have 
agreed to a ban on politic~l expenditures which would have 
put a restriction on such pamphleteering. 
Moreover, civil and political rights have become more 
complex since our early days. No longer is the right to 
speak encompassed by freedom to mount a cracker-barrel. In-
stead, many traditional concepts of the right of free speech 
are made anachronistic by modern techniques for reaching 
millions of people through such mass communication media as 
newspapers, radio, motion pictures, and television. Today 
the essence of free speech is free access to these channels 
of communication and this access is impossible without large 
expenditures of money. Therefore, in order to be free to 
speak effectively, the right to spend would seem to be 
deserving of the First Amendment protection, which is not 
restricted to individuals but also protects the rights of 
. . 6 
groups of individuals such as labor unions. 
In a democracy, if rational decisions are to be made, 
the electorate must have access to factual information and 
conflicting opinions from all groups. In addition to popu-
lation increases, the advent and development of new techni-
ques, channels, and areas of communication have caused a 
steep rise in political costs needed to provide the basic 
services of a successful election campaign. Large scale 
6 "Section 304~ Taft-Hartley Act: Validity of Restric-
tions on Union Political Activity," op.cit., pp. 515-816. 
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printing, direct mail distribution, newspaper advertise-
ments, bill boards, auditorium space, radio broadcasting 
time, motion pictures, and television--all have added to 
the expense of publicizing divergent viewpoints on politi-
cal issues. To the extent that political expenditures are 
curtailed, the eaucation of the public will suffer. 
The political activities of orsani~ed labor have 
given the individual wage earner an opportunity to partici-
pate in making the decisions that vitally affect him in his 
work and community life. More and more the unions have come 
to regard political activity as a necessary method of comple-
- -
menting economic action. The right of political action gives 
unions a powerful incentive to make gains through favorable 
labor legislation rather than through the techniques of 
economic strife and industrial warfare. Just as the indivi-
dual worker in combination with others can gain a certain 
equality of economic power with management which it is im-
possible for him to do singly, so also in the contention of 
-- -
powerful pressure groups for l~gislative recognition, the 
combined association of workers in political action is nee-
essary if the union member as an individual is to make his 
voice heard in the electoral and legislative process. There-
fore, any curtailing of unio~ political expenditures prevents 
by just that amount the worker from utilizing the channels of 
communication through which public opinion is formed and by 
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• 
just that amount makes government less responsive to the 
needs of the wage earner • 
The prohibition on labor's political expenditures, 
then, does not seem justifiable as sound policy in a democra-
cy, and the decision in United States v. Congress of Indus-
trial Organizations, and subsequent cases, give warning that 
Section 304 of the Taft-Hartley Act probably falls within 
the ban of the First Amendment. The loopholes in the section 
"read into it by judicial legislation, have resulted in a 
. - . . . 
substantial collapse of the prohibitive scheme ••• Prohibition 
more stringent than that left by the decisions would be of 
- . - 7 
doubtful constitut~onality." In the absence of the advocacy 
of force or violence, Congress may not forbid freedom of 
expression through free association. Aside from the problem 
. - ' 
of constitutionality, however, this issue will probably be 
. . - - . -- - . 
fought out largely ~ccording to_ one's degree of sympath¥ 
with labor 1 s political objectives. On the whole, as _a purely 
practical matter, those who oppose labor's objectives tend 
- . . 
to favor restrictions, whereas those who support labor's 
- . -
objectives oppose _ anY. _ ~uch _legislation. 
Several developments seem reasonably certain. Labor 
will have increasing influence on the selection of candidates 
and on the framing of party policies. This is already hap-
pening in Massachusetts where leaders in both the A.F.L. and 
? - "Regulation of Labor 1 s Political Contributions and 
Expenditures: The British and American Experience," op.cit., 
p. 384. 
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c.I.O. were official delegates to the 1952 Democratic Con-
vention. The 1954 Democratic state platform was partially 
written by labor representatives, and calls for the complete 
repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act. Within the labor movement 
there will be increasing emphasis on political activity as 
compared with collective bargaining. Especially will this 
be true as prosperity slides off its present peak. There 
will also be a greater effort on the part of labor unions 
to state their objectives in terms of broad concepts of 
public interest, and on this basis to appeal for the politi-
cal support of the middle class professional people, white-
collar workers, and the farmers. C.I.O. leaders in particu-
lar are concentrating their efforts on trying to demonstrate 
that in furthering the interests of the workers they are at 
the same time furthering the interests of the great majority 
of the community. 
One of the difficulties facing American labor not con-
fronted in Britain has been the division between the unions. 
It h as been pointed out that " ••• the persisting cleavag e be-
tween the A.F. of 1. and the C.I.O. continues to produce inter-
necine warfare and to dissipate labor's political influence. 
Until the breach between the two wings of the labor movement 
is healed, the full political strength of the labor movement 
. . . 8 
will still remain to be realized." Yet even as I am writing 
8 Merle Fainsod ·and Lincoln Gordon, Government and the 
American Economy, p. 39. --- ---
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these words, announcement is being made of plans agreed 
upon for a merger of the two great labor organizations~ 
This combination will include the unification of the C.I.O.-
P.A.C. and the A.F.L.-L.L.P.E. for concentrated political 
action. Eventually, independent union groups such as the 
coal miners and the railway brotherhoods may become members 
of this labor merger. In any event, there will be a deeper 
intensification and a broader extension of labor's political 
influence in both the electoral and legislative process. 
Whether labor's political activities will lead to the 
formation of a third party in this country, as the Labor 
Party in Great Britain rose to challenge the Liberal and 
Conservative parties, _is a question for st~dy and specula-
tion not within the subject of this thesis. It seems to be 
the general view of most observers, however, that there are 
sufficient differences peculiar to the two countries to make 
such a development unlikely in the United States. Barring 
unforseen events, it is more probable that the labor unions 
will come to be the dominant influence in the Democratic 
Party. Actually, without the impetus offered by a united 
labor movement, that trend has already been taking place 
very visibly. Control of the Democratic Party would save 
labor the effort of building its own party. It should be 
remembered that any third party runs into a large hard core 
of traditional partisanship, including the union members. 
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To summarize the points covered in this thesis dir-
ectly affecting organized labor, it can be said that the 
increased economic and political power of labor unions, both 
in Great Britain and the United States, led to efforts to 
curb this power. The policy considerations were much the 
same in both countries and, although different solutions 
were experimented with, prohibitive legislation has been a 
. . 
failure. In Britain, labor emerged stronger than before, 
organized its own political p~rty, and now attracts more 
than half of the popular vote. In our own country, Section 
304 has proven ineffective! Our experience with the Hatch, 
Smith-Connally, and Taft~Hartley Acts demonstrates conclu-
sively that present limitations do not limit and present 
- - . 
prohibitions do not prohibit. Aside from the legal question, 
it can be argued that American democracy demands freedom of 
discussion and active participation by all groups in the 
electoral and legislative process. 
Issues of the desireability of political action should 
. . . . .. 
be resolved within the union membership itself rather than 
by legislation. The issue which appears to be raised when a 
labor union uses its funds for political purposes is no more 
unique than the issue which appears to be raised when a farm 
group, or a business group, or a veterans organization uses 
9 
its funds for similiar purposes. We cannot logically ban 
9 Louise Overacker, Presidential Campaign Funds, p. 
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10 
one unless we are ready to ban all. Labor's right of poli-
tical participation, however, may be reasonably regulated to 
eliminate actual abuses. Thus, where the worker is obliged 
to belong to a union, it is justifiable policy to protect the 
dissenting union member through "contracting-out." We should 
see that democratic procedures within unions are guaranteed, 
that labor union political activity is the result of a demo~ 
cratic decision, that an authorized vote has been taken, and 
that the union makes an accounting to both its membership and 
to the public. 
As a substitute to prohibitive legislation such as 
Section 304 of the Taft-Hartley Act, the alternative of the 
effectiveness of widespread publicity as to the amounts and 
sources of all campaign contributions and expenditures should 
be the guiding principle of any regulatory program. Also, 
legislators should abandon futile attempts to distinguish be-
tween "political" expenditures and so-called "educational" 
expenditures, and require the publicity laws to apply to all 
11 
"opinion-moulders." Further, we must not overlook the 
10 Loc.cit. Standing alone, this view of Dr. Over-
acker is correct. But I would offer certain reservations, 
considering her query at page 60 in Presidential Campaign 
Funds, whether corporations have the same right as labor 
unions to make direct political expenditures. It should be 
borne in mind by the reader that there is a difference in 
kind between a corporation and a labor union. Legally, it 
should not be supposed that business enterprises operated 
for a profit are entitled to the same political rights as 
groups of citizens organized for mutual benefit. 
11 Overacker, Presidential Campaign Funds, p. 9. 
- 388 -
other measures suggested in the body of this thesis, includ-
ing governmental sharing of the cost of campaigning through 
official election bulletins printed and mailed as a public 
service to all registered voters. Aside from campaign fin-
ance, it is to be assumed of course that the proper over-all 
conduct of elections will be fully provided for in corrupt 
practices statutes with sufficient penalties for any viola-
tions. 
With these practical and legal supplements, publicity 
should be found inadequate to prevent alleged abuses before 
any further attempts are made at restrictive laws. We must 
recognize that labor union political action is an important 
necessity if we are to have full democratic political parti-
cipation in the processes of government. Finally, it is 
important, and also good common sense, for organized labor 
to realize that rights and duties are concomitant, that 
responsibility must accompany power, that the unions should 
take the initiative in drafting comprehensive legislation 
providing for the protection of the minority union member, 
guaranteeing democratic procedures within the union, and 
12 
requiring campaign fund publicity. This sort of union 
statesmanship would be frank recognition of their responsi-
bilities to their membership and to the public. It would be 
12 Real publicity would include compulsort pre-primary 
and pre-election newspaper publication of all income and dis-
bursement statements of all political accounts filed by the 
candidates, parties, and committees. 
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convincing evidence that organized labor is ready to assume 
its new responsibilities that inevitably flow from its poli-
13 
tical activities. 
13 Overacker, Presidential Campaign Funds, pp. 70-71. 
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APPENDIX 
Senate Debate On Section 304 Of ~he Taft-Hartley Act (93 Cong,Rec. 6436-6448, 6522-6524; June 5-6, 1947) 
Application of Section 304 
Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, the conference report 
on the labor bill is on the desks of all the Senators. 
The only major additions to the bill, as I see them, 
deal with matters which the Senate has approved in 
other measures. I refer particularly to the section 
having to do with the Corrupt Practices Act, which limits 
contributions by labor organizations for political 
purposes. 
As to the prohibition of political contributions 
by labor unions, it should be remembered that after the 
expiration of the Smith-Connally Act, on June 30, the 
current prohibition of political contributions by labor 
unions will cease to be a part of the Federal law unless 
new legislation is enacted. The Senate passed the 
Smith-Connally Act and approved it, with that provision 
in it, by a 2-to-1 vote. 
Mr. PEPPER. Has the Senator concluded his discussion 
on the conference report relating to the prohibition of 
political activities? 
Mr. TAFT. Yes. 
Union Newspapers 
Mr. PEPPER. I have noted that the Senator did not 
refer to the action which I understand the conference 
committee took prohibiting . expenditures by labor organiza-
tions and, of course, expenditures by corporations, for 
political purposes. The way the provision now reads, as 
related to labor organizations, as I see on page 67 of the 
report, it is unlawful for any labor organization to make 
expenditures and contributions in connection with primary 
electfons and political conventions. Under the conference 
agreements expenditubes and contributions in connection 
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with premiary elections, olitical conventions, and caucuses 
are made unlawful to the same extent as those made in 
connection with the elections themselves. 
I wish to ask the Senator, if T may, this question: 
Would the newspaper called Labor, which is published by the 
Railway Labor Executives, be permitted to put out a special 
edition of the paper, for example, in support of PresideBt 
Truman, if he should be the Democratic candidate for the 
Presidency next year, and in opposition to the Senator from 
Ohio, if he should be the Republican nominee for the 
Presi dency, stating that President Truman was a friend of 
labor and that the Senator from Ohio was not friendly to 
labor? Would that be called a political expenditure on the 
part o-f the labor organization? 
Mr. TAFT. It it were supported by union funds 
contributed by union members as union dues it would be a 
violation of the law, yes. If the paper called Labor is 
operated independently, if it der.ives its money from its 
subscribers, then of course there would be no violation. 
The prohibition is against a labor organization using its 
funds either as a contribution to a political campaign 
or as a direct expenditure of funds on its own behalf. 
Mr. PEPPER. Has the committee given consideration 
to whether or not that kind of a prohibition would be a 
denial of the ~reedom of the press to a newspaper wh i ch 
might happen to be owned by a labbr organization? 
Mr. TAFT. It is not a denial of the freedom of 
the press. We have long prohibited corporations from 
contributing money to political campaigns. The conference 
report simply writes into the corporation provision a 
similar provision affecting labor organizations. 
Mr. PEPPER. Does the Senator from Ohio mean to 
tell the Senate that a corporation owning a newspaper 
cannot have a free editorial policy to oppose candidates 
and to oppose political parties according to its own 
judgement. 
Mr. TAFT. Not if it used its corporate funds for 
that purpose. 
Mr. PEPPER. Does the Senator know how a newspaper 
published by a corporation can get any money to provide 
editorials for the paper if it does not get it from the 
corporate treasury? 
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Mr. TAFT. They get their money from advertising. 
They are business concerns operating newspapers. So far 
as I know no one has ever thought that a corporation could 
publish a pamphlet for one candidate as against another 
without viDlating the Corrupt Practi~es Act. 
Mr. PEPPER. I wonder if the Senator, upon 
reflection, really means that the newspapers of this 
country which are owned by corporations connot publish an 
extra paper if they want to oppose some candidate or 
cannot put out a whole special edition giving their view 
about a political party or a political candidate. That is 
one of the civil rights in this country. Does not the 
Senator know that it would be unconstitutional to try to 
deprive a corporation owning a newspaper of the right of 
freedom of the press? If that be the correct premise --and 
I think it cannot be denied that it is--is not the Senator 
denying to the labor organization which may happen to own a 
newspaper the right to the same freedom of the press to 
support or oppose candidates and political parties which 
other newspapers enjoy? Yet the Senator from Ohio says 
that the newspaper Labor, published by the 21 railway 
labor executives, would not be permitted to publish a 
statement saying it supported President Truman and 
opposed eandidate Taft, or vice versa. I say that would 
be a deprivation of the freedom of the press. 
Mr. TAFT. No; I said that union funds could not 
be used for that purpose. They could conduct a newspaper 
if they wanted to, just as a corporation can conduct a 
newspaper. But why should a labor organization be able 
to publish pamphlets or special newspapers against one 
candidate or in favor of another candidate, using funds 
which that organization collected from the union members? 
That is what happened in the State of Ohio. The 
PAC is a separate organization which raises its own funds 
for political purposes, and does so perfec·tly properly. 
The Smith-Connally Act prohibited the making of contribu-
tions by unions to the PAC, yet those unions took the 
position that they could use their funds for the publica-
tion of pamphlets for or against candidates throughout that 
election, and they evaded the entire law by saying that was 
not a eontributLon--not even an indirect contribution--to 
the candidate who received the benefit of that procedure. 
That is what this provision of Mhe House bill is intended 
to reach, if it be agreed t :o. 
Mr. PEPPER. Mr. President, I call the attention of 
the Senator from Ohio to the following practice of the 
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railway labor executives in the past: If a certain 
candidate was unfriendly to the interests of labor, they 
would publish a special edition of their paper and would 
put that special edition into circulation in the area 
where that candidate was running for office, and would 
place it in the hands of labor-union members and also in 
the hands of the public generally. 
Mr. TAFT. That is exactly what they should not be 
allowed to do. 
Mr. PEPPER. Very well; I want it definitely 
understood that the Senator from Ohio intends to outlaw 
that privilege on the part of labor. Now that I have 
made that clear---
Mr. TAFT. It is perfectly clear. rt is perfectly 
clear that union funds are not to be used to interfere in 
political campaigns and with political candidates, either 
1fi favor of one candidate or against another. 
Mr. BARKLEY. Suppose the particular publication 
referred to by the Senator from Florida is published and 
paid for by subscriptions paid to the publication by the 
membership of that railway labor organization? 
Mr. TAFT. That will be perfectly lawful. That is 
the way it should be done. 
Mr. BARKLEY. And suppose it is not paid for by 
union funds collected from the various labor unions? 
Mr. TAFT. That will be perfectly proper. 
Mr. BARKLEY. The Senator from Ohio referred to the 
law prohibiting the making of direct or indirect contribu-
tions by corporations as a justification for making the same 
provision in the case of labor unions. Let us consider the 
publication of a corporation which, day after day, takes a 
position against one candidate and in favor of another 
candidate, and does so in its editorials. The editorials 
occupy space in that newspaper or publicati9n, and the 
space --· costs a certain amount of money. Is that a direct or 
an indirect contribution to a campaign; and if it is 
neither, what is it? 
Mr. TAFT. I do not think it is either a direct or 
an indirect contribution. I do not think it is an 
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expenditure of the sort prohibited, because it seems to me 
it is simply the ordinary operation of the particular 
corporation's busine ss. 
Mr. BARKLEY. None of us have ever assumed that the 
Corrupt Practices Act prevented a newspaper from writing 
editorials for or against any candidate. 
Mr. TAFT. That is correct. 
Mr. BARKLEY. Yet the Senator from Ohio is saying 
that the law is applicable to corporations, and is saying 
that that is a basis for doing the same thing with respect 
to labor organizations which may publish newspapers. 
Mr. TAFT. In my opinion, the word ''contribution" 
covers the direct expenditure of money for .the same purpose. 
But in order to make that matter perfectly clear, the House 
inserted the word "expenditure" in this measure. 
Mr. BALL. I know of one newspaper in my section of 
the country which makes a practice of printing hundreds of 
thousanda of special reprints and sending them into various 
states, to influence the elections. I think that is 
prohibited, just as the practice ; 6f the labor paper to 
which the Senator from Florida has referred--the sending of 
a special edition of 200,000 or more copies into a State--
would also be prohibited. 
Mr. TAFT. I would say the word "expenditure" does 
not mean the sale of newspapers for their worth. If they 
are sold to subscribers and if the newspaper is supported 
by subscriptions, then:~ I would not say that constituted 
such an expenditure. But if the newspapers were given 
away--even an ordinary newspaper--T think that would 
violate the Corrupt Practices Act. That act would be 
violated, it seems to me, if such a newspaper were given 
away as a political document in favor of a certain 
candidate. I think that would have been so under the 
present law, and I think we make it more clearly so, 
perhaps, by this measure. 
Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. President, let me ask the Senator 
this question: Let us suppose a labor organization 
publishes a newspaper for the information and benefit of 
its members, and let us suppose that it is published 
regularly, whether daily or weekly or monthly, and is paid 
for from a fund created by the payment of dues into the 
organization it represents. Let us assume that the 
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newspaper is not sold on the streets, and let us assume 
further that a certain subscription by the month or by the 
year is not charged for the newspaper. Does the Senator 
from Ohio advise us that under this measure such a 
newspaper could not take an editorial position with 
respect to any candidate for public office, without 
violating this measure? 
Mr. TAFT. If it is supported by union funds, I do 
not think it could. 
Mr. BARKLEY. So if there is a labor organization 
which is publishing a newspaper--not as a political 
newspaper,but for the benefit of its members--and if the 
expenses of that publication and distribution are paid from 
the ~unds raised ·by means of the payment of dues, and if 
all members of the union understand that a certain portion 
of their dues goes to the publication of that newspaper, 
then in order for that newspaper to take any position with 
respect to any candidate, it would have to charge a 
subscription by the month or by the year in order that it 
might express its views in that respect; is that so? 
Mr. TAFT. I am inclined to think so. 
Mr. BALL. In the case of most union papers, as I 
understand, the subscriptions from the union members are 
callected along with the dues, but they are an earmarked 
portion of the due~ ~ which the union collects and remits to 
the paper in the form of subscription. I take it that 
would be in a different category f r om the case where the 
union mak~ a blanket subscription and an appropriation out 
of union dues. 
Mr. TAFT. I think if the paper is, so to speak, 
a going concern, it can take whatever position it wants to. 
Mr. PEPPER. Suppose there were a case where a 
number of corporations associated themselves together into 
an organization we will call the National Manufacturers 
Association, and suppose the funds of that organization 
are altogether contributed by corporate memberships. Is 
that organization under this section, forbidden to publish 
any pamphlet, or send any telegrams, or make any telephone 
calls, or incur any expenditures, in respect to any 
political election or any party, or any candidate, or any 
caueus, or any convention? 
Mr. TAFT. I think it would be. It would be a 
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general conspiracy, I think, and would be a clear violation 
by all the corporations which contributed the money. Such 
an association could receive money by direct contributions 
from individual members, just as the CIO-PAC can properly 
operate as a political organization, raising its funds from 
individual members. In the same way the National Manufac-
turers Association could do the same thing. But no corpo-
ration could contribute to the National Manufacturers 
Association and no labor union could contribute to the PAC. 
Mr. PEPPER. The Senator is using the word 
"contribute". My reason for emphasizing this matter is 
that the conference committee has added two very important 
and I think very significant words. The old law, the 
Smith-Connally law, which has been reenacted, prohibited 
only contributions, but the proposed law prohibits a 
contribution "or expenditure" without any definition of 
"expenditure". That means a dollar, or 50 cents, or $500 
or $1000. 
Suppose a labor union felt that a candidate for 
office was unfair to ._;tabor, and that labor union wished to 
put out a pamphlet tp advise its members about the labor 
record of the candidate. I askr the Senator from Ohio 
whether that would be forbidden as an expenditure by a 
labor organization in respect to a candidate or an election, 
under the proposed act? 
Mr. TAFT. Yes, I think it would be. 
Mr. PEPPER. So a workingman's organization would be 
deprived of the power even of advising its membership of 
the antilabor record of a man who might be a candidate for 
public office? 
Mr. TAFT. Correct. What would the law mean if a 
corporation or a labor organization were prohibited from 
contributing to candidate X, but in spite of that, could 
issue its own papers, could print itw own pamphlets, and 
issue them in behalf of candidate X? 
Mr. PEPPER. The Senator is overlooking the dis-
tinction that exists in every corrupt practice act that I 
know anything about. When in our several stayes we run 
forfue office of Senator we are limited in the amount or 
contributions we personally make, or are responsible for, 
but if I have a friend in the southern part of the State 
who wants to put out some pamphlets for me, and distribute 
them over the community, he has a perfect right to do so. 
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Mr. TAFT. If t he Senator had had a friend who was 
a corporation and had done that, the corporation officials 
would have been in jail long ago. 
Mr. PEPPER. Yes; but if one of the corporations 
owns a newspaper, dir e ctly or indirectly, that is just 
what they are doing all the time. 
Mr. TAFT. They have been able to sell legitimate 
newspapers and distribute them without question. They do 
not distribute corporation funds for that purpose. 
Mr. BARKLEY. But suppose the National Association 
of Manufacturers, out of the funds contributed to it, 
bought a page is a newspaper, and advertised for or against 
some candidate indirectly; and when r say "indirectly" I 
mean use the space in order to advocate certain things 
advocated by some candidates or opposed by other candidates, 
without mentioning the names of the candidates. I recall 
that last summer there were widespread advertisements in the 
newspapers of the United States, consisting of whole pages. 
I do not know to what extent they affected anyone's vote, 
but they definitely had an indirect effect, and I -have no 
doubt that they cost hundreds of thousands of dollars. Was 
that a violation of the law. 
Mr. TAFT. The question there would be whether or 
not it was in connection with a Federal election. 
Mr. BARKLEY. Those advertisements were very 
skillfully drawn, and they had no specific reference to 
anyone's candidacy. 
Mr. TAFT. The ~uestion would be whether it was in 
connection with such an election. 
Mr. MAGNUSON. The International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters have a newspaper, which they have published for 
many years. It has a circulation of probably 200,000. It 
is distributed bo members. On the newsstand, no price 
appears on it. No advertisements are accepted. Under this 
regulation, would they be prohibited in the future from 
mentioning in their editorial columns, for their. regular 
circulation, without adding anything additional, the support 
of a certain candidate or a certain political party? 
Mr. TAFT. We discussed that. If the union sdltnply 
takes the union funds and publishes a newspaper and uses it 
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as a political organ in an effort to elect or to defeat one 
man that is prohibited. 
Mr. MAGNUSON. Teamsters' unions publish newspapers 
dealing with matters in which such unions are interested. 
The same is true of other unions. If the pending measure 
becom~a law, from now on such unions will be prohibited 
from advocating in their newspapers the support of any 
political candidates. 
Mr. TAFT. That is correct, unless they sell the 
papers they publish to their members, if the members decide 
to buy them. 
Union radio broadcasts 
M. PEPPER. Does what the Senator has aaid in the 
past also apply to a radio speech? If a national labor 
union, for example, should believe that it was in the 
public interest to elect the Democratic Party instead of 
the Republican Party, or vice versa, would it be forbidden 
by this proposed act to pay for any radio time, for 
anybody to make a speech that would express to the people 
the point of view of that organization? 
Mr. TAFT. If it contributed itw own funds to get 
somebody to make the speech, I would say they would 
violate the law. 
Mr. PEPPER. If they paid for the radio time? 
Mr. TAFT. If they are simply giving the time, I 
would say not; I would say that is in the course of their 
regular business. 
Mr. PEPPER. ~~at I mean is this: I was not assuming 
that the radio station was owned by the labor organization. 
Suppose that in the 1948 campaign, Mr. William Green, as 
President of the American Federation of Labor, should believe 
it to be in the interest of his membership to go on the radio 
and support one party or the other in the national election, 
and should use American Federation of Labor funds to pay for 
the radio time. Would that be an expenditure which is 
forbidden to a labor organization under the .-statute? 
Mr. TAFT. Yes. 
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Mr. MAGNUSON. Let us consider the teamsters. 
Suppose they have a weekly radio program, as, indeed, they 
hgve had for a long time back. Or let us say the AFL has 
such a radio program. Let us assume I am running for 
office and they ask me to be a guest on their program. 
Suppose T talk on the subject of labor and do not 
advocate my own candidacy. Nevertheless I am on that 
program. My name is being advertised and I am being heard 
by many thousands of people. Would that be an unlawful 
cmntribution to my candidacy? 
Mr. TAFT. If a labor organization is using the 
funds provided by its membership through payment of union 
dues to put speakers on the radio for Mr. X against Mr. Y 
that should be a violation of the law. 
Mr. MAGNUSON. They are not paying me anything. 
They have asked me to be a guest. 
Mr. TAFT. I understand, but they are paying for the 
time orl the air. Of course, in each case there is a 
ques~ion of fact to be decided. I cannot answer various 
hypotheses without knowing all the circumstances. But in 
each case the question is whether or not a union or a 
corporation is making a contribution or expenditure of funds 
to elect A as against B. Labor unions are supposed to keep 
out of politics in the same way that corporations are 
supposed to keep out of politics. 
Mr. MAGNUSON. Let us take the reverse situation. 
Suppose the General Electric Co. asked me to be its guest 
on its Sunday afternoon houb to talk about electrical 
matters. I am running for office at the time. I am 
introduced on their program. 
Mr. TAFT. Oh, I do not think that would be a 
contribution. 
Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, if the Senator will 
yield, let me ask him another question. All the funds of 
labor unions come from the dues paid by their members. All 
the activities of the unions are based upon expenditures of 
funds provided by dues. That money is in the union's 
treasury. If the pending bill should become law it -would 
mean that 11 labor organs which are now in existence 
would, from now on, be prohibited from participating in a 
campaign, favoring a candidate, mentioning his name, or 
endorsing him for public office? 
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Mr. TAFT. No; I do not think it means that. The 
union can issue a newspaper, and can charge the members 
for the newspaper, that is, the members who buy copies of 
the newspaper, and the union can put such matters in the 
newspaper if it wants to. The union can separate the 
payment of dues from the payment for a newspaper, if its 
members are willing to do so, that is, if the members are 
wjlling to subscribe to that kind of a newspaper, I 
presume the members would be willing to do so. A union 
can ppblish such a newspaper, or unions can do as was 
done last year, organize something like the PAC, a 
political organization, and receive direct contributions, 
just so long as members of the union know what they are 
contributing to, and the dues which they pay into the 
union treasury are not used for such purpose. 
Mr. MAGNUSON. I think all union members know that a 
part of their dues in these cases go for the publication of 
some labor organ. 
Whether Section 304 is valid 
Mr. TAFT. Yes. How fair is it? We will a~sume 
that 60 percent of a union's employees are for a Republican 
candidate and 40 percent are for a Democratic candidate. 
Does the Senator think the union members should be forced 
to contribute, without being asked to do so specifically, 
and without having a right to withdraw their payments, to 
the election of someone whom they do not favor? Assume the 
paper favors a Democratic candidate whom they oppose or a 
Repuliican candidate whom they oppose. Why should they be 
forced to contribute money for the election of someone to 
whose election they are opposed? If they are asked to 
contribute directly to the support of a newspaper or to the 
support of a labor political organization, they know what 
~heir money is to be used for and presumably approve it. 
From such contribution the organization can spend all the 
money it wants to with respect to such matters. But the 
prohibition is against labor unions using their members' 
dues for political purposes, which is exactly the same 
as the prohibition against a corporation using its 
stockholders' ~oney for political purposes, and perhaps 
in violation of the wishes of many of its stockholders. 
Mr. MAGNUSON. Let me ask the Senator from Ohio a 
further question. Would the provision in any way deny the 
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right of a religious organization to publish pamphlets in 
behalf of a candidate because, let us say, the organiza-
tion supported him on moral grounds? 
Mr. TAFT. If the organization is a corporation, I 
assume it could not do so directly. If the organization 
publishes religious papers that it can sell, that is all 
right; but the organization cannot take the church 
members' money and use it for the purpose of trying to 
elect a candidate or defeat a candidate, and they should 
not do so. 
Mr. MAGNUSON. Would the Anti-Saloon League, for 
example, be prohibited from issuing pamphlets against a ·. 
political candidate? 
Mr. TAFT. An~ unincorporated organization can 
collect money from individuals tor almost any purpose, 
and if the individuals who pay the money agree, the money 
can be used for purposes designated by the organization. 
There is no prohibition against using such money for 
political purposes. 
Mr. MAGNUSON. My point is that all other 
organizations except corporations and labor unions can 
use the dues of their membership to publish any sort of 
pamphlet or publication on behalf of a candidate for 
public office. 
Mr. TAFT. Yes, that is correct, and if any abuses 
arise with respect to other organizations we can extend the 
provision of law to the other groups. 
Mr. TAYLOR. We are not going to permit a labor 
union to print the voting records of Senators. How are 
people to find out how we voted? 
Mr. TAFT. Surely the Senator has something 
besides labor organizations in the State of Idaho. He 
must have other friends. Any individual friends of the 
Senator can publish the same thing. The question merely 
is whether in political campaigns we are going to permit 
labor unions or corporations to use funds which they have 
accumulated for some other purpose to elect or defeat a 
presidential candidate. 
Mr. BALL. I do not think there is a single thing 
in the bill which prohibits any union or corporation or 
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anyone else from printing any public official's voting 
record. That is not a campaign for or against a 
candidate. It is simply the printing of public 
information. 
Mr. TAFT. I was thinking of the way most of the 
labor organizations are on record. They do not, as a 
rule, merely print facts. 
Mr. BALL. The Senator was thinking of the PAC. 
Mr. TAFT • Yes • 
Mr, PEPPER. I wish to ask the Senator from Ohio 
whether he agrees with the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. Ball), 
who*used its funds to disseminate the voting record of a 
candidate for office; during the time of the campaign, 
that would not be unlawful. 
Mr. TAFT. I think it would depend upon all the 
circumstances in the case. It it was merely a bare 
statement of actual facts and simply direct quotations 
of what the man had said in the course of certain 
speeches on certain subjects, and was not colored in any 
way I would rather agree with the Senator from Minnesota. 
But I think it would depend, in each case, on the 
character of the publication. 
Mr. PEPPER. Of course, the language is "In 
connection with". The provision does not contain any 
statement as to whether the statement is colored or not. 
The words simply ··are "any expenditures in connection with 
an election." I do not see how the Senator could say that 
the public~tion of a voting record, in the midet of a 
campaign, was not an expenditure in the midst of an 
election. 
Mr. TAFT. That is not a very practical question, 
because no one would do just that. Either it is an 
argument for him or against him, or it is not. 
Mr. MURRAY. I should like to inquire what wbuld 
be the situation in a case .in which an industrial 
organization has a chain of newspapers which obviously are 
operated for political purposes, and which have a deficit 
at the end of each year, which is made up by the 
corporation, the newspaper being used for purposes of 
advancing the political interests of the corporation, 
influencing elections, and advocating the election of 
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certain favored candidates. What would be the situation 
in such a case, under the provision of the bill we have 
been considering? 
Mr. TAFT. · I think that corporation had better be 
careful. It is a more difficult case to prove, as the 
Senator realizes, because the contribution is indirect. 
But if I were an attorney for such a corporation, I would 
advise that corporation to be very ~areful and that it 
might very easily be found to be violating the law. 
Mr. MURRAY. But of course it is obvious that the 
unions would be at a great disadvantage under this bill, 
because these large conporations control all the weekly 
newspapers thoughout a State, by placing lucratiNe 
advertisements with them. That is a practice in Montana 
and many other States. The corporations can give 
contracts for advertising purposes to all the weekly 
newspapers, and thus can have their support in the 
elections and in the campaign involving economic issues. 
Under this provision, the unions will be entirely 
confined to publishing newspapers that do not carry any 
information or propaganda advancing their interests. 
Mr. TAFT. Probably the Senator from Montana aaw 
that the American Federation of Labor has announced the 
spending of $1,500,000. So it is not wholly without fundx 
to advertise in opposition to the measure which is now 
before the Senate. 
So apparently large sums of money are available on 
both sides. 
Mr. MAqNUSON. Much has been said to the effect 
that the purpose of this measure is to equalize the 
opportunities of corporations and labor unions. The 
provision we are now considering makes the situation 
entirely unequal, as the Senator from Montana has pointed 
out. As he has stated, a string of newspapers is operated 
in his State, and most of them operate at a deficit. In 
many cases the deficit is made up by a large corporation 
that is up to its ears in politics all the time. Those 
newspapers can be published for 365 days a year and can 
be absolutely under the direct control of that large 
corporation, and can make deprecatory statements about 
the candidates for public office, and can do so as much 
as they wish to, whereas the union, which obtains its 
funds only from dues paid by the union members, will not 
be able to engage in such activities. 
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Mr. MORSE. I can well imagine why the politicians 
who are so strong for this bill want to prevent labor unions 
from participating in political campaigns. However, such 
attempts to weaken the political strength of labor will only 
serve to make the workers of' this country more convinced 
than ever that they must take a very active part in politics 
if' they are to protect their rights and f'reedoms. 
Remarks 2of' Senator Pepper 
Mr. PEPPER. Mr. President, if' the Senator will 
yield to me for a moment, let me say that the provisions 
of this measure overlook the essential dif'f'erences between 
corporations and labor unions. A corporation is a person, 
but i t not a citizen, under the law& of' the United States. 
A corporation is entitled to the protection of' its property, 
but it cannot vote, because it is not a citizen, in the 
sense that a person is a citizen. A labor union is not a 
corporation, it is simply an unincorporated association of' 
people. In legal character, it is no diffe r ent from a 
lodge, or a church, or the WCTU, or any other organization 
of' human beings who get together to f'urther their common 
good. Therefore, when labor unions are working together, 
through their own instrumentalities, they are simply 
working for the furtherance of the welfare of citizens 
of this country; and citizens were not created to make 
money. That is the reason why corporations were created. 
Mr. President, this prohibition, therefore, is 
denying to citizens of this Nation the right of f:ree press, 
the right of' f'ree speech, the right of' disseminating 
information of public value. It is a chain upon the 
citizen's activity, and we well know that these labor 
organizations are composed of working people. They do 
not have people who are their members who can contribute 
hundreds of thousands or millions of' dollars to political 
campaigns. They have to do it collectively. So they are 
denied the privilege of' collective expression in political 
campaigns and are being discriminated against in favor of 
the corporations of the country. 
Again, Mr. President, the Senator from Ohio is 
considering a group of citizens banded together for their 
common benefit as he would consider a corporation created 
for profit, and he is treating the person Who is a citizen 
like the heartless corporation that may be consldeeed a 
synthetic person. 
Mr. Presidant, the bill presents an anomalous 
situation. I ' think it denie~ the right of free press, I 
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think if a labor union, as an unincorporated association 
of citizens, wants to endorse a political candidate, if it 
wants to put out a special edition of its newspaper to 
appeal to the American people to vote for the candidate, 
the union should have the right to do so, and a denial of 
that right is a denial of a constitutional right of which 
Congress cannot deprive anyohe. 
The union is not a corporation. A corporation does 
not have the right of a citizen to vote. Citizens have the 
right to vote. If a group of citizens should want to pay 
dues to their union and say to its president, "Use this 
money to pay someone to speak for us, to protect labor 
against this calumny" the provision of the bill would deny 
that privilege. I claim that is a denial of the right of a 
citizen to give his money to a common fund to protect his 
political and economic rights. 
I do not want to impugn anyone's personal motives in 
any sense of the word, but I say that since labor, since the 
working people of this country, became articulate under the 
administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, since they learned 
to work together to meet the danger and menace of slush 
funds which corporations can find a way to put into the 
hands of a favorite, there has been a dettermined effort on 
the part ' of certain individuals in Congress, as well as 
outside, to strike down the power of workers acting 
cooperatively through their unions. I cannot but regard 
the provision in the bill to which I am addressing myself as 
an expression of that sentiment. It has the effect of 
stifling and suppressing the legitimate political activity 
of a substantial part of the citizenry of America. 
Mr. President, there are 15,000,000 labor union 
members in America. If there are four members to each 
family, which is the average American family, these union 
members are the spokesmen and bread winners for 60,000,000 
Americans. So, to do anything which will impair their 
right as citizens to write and to speak their views about 
their Government is a denial not only of labor's rights, 
but a denial of the fundamental constitutional -right of the 
citizenry of this land. 
The laboring people are poor people. They do not 
have in their membership rich sotckholders, rich executives. 
They do not have large expense accounts which they can pad 
and use in political campaigns. They do not own the 
newspapers of America as, by and 1arge, corporations do, 
80 percent of which consistently fought Franklin D. Roosevelt. 
They cannot work through corporate machinery and exercise 
its many and multitudinous pressuresto achieve their ends. 
If they do anything they have got to work togather through 
the instrumentality through which alone they can cooperate, 
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their unions, and if that power can be struck down, the 
poli.tical manifestations of the masses of the people of 
America can be strangled, and when they are taken 
advantage of, they ~- 11 be unable to protest effectively 
in the political forum. 
A study of some of the past presidential elections 
will disclose how much the duPonts contributed to the 
Republican campaigns, how much the General Motors Corp., 
President Sloan and others, contributed. Such a study will 
reveal how much the Rockefellers and the other great rich 
families of America who owa the corporations of America or 
dominate them, contributed. Oh, they will still have a full 
war chest to contribute to the Grand Old Party when election 
time comes, Mr. President. Of course it will cost them a 
little less if the workers are so strangled so they cannot 
put up some contributions. The large contributors will gain 
a little from the enactment of this provision. 
Mr. KTLGORE. May I suggest that the Senator from 
Florida go one step further and discuss the question of 
the annual bonuses paid out in election years to directors 
and high-ranking officials of corporations. Every one 
knows the way they get around the prohibition against 
corporate contributions, by simply declaring bonuses to 
ce r tain officials, which can be used for political 
purposes. That loophole has not been closed, I may 
suggest to the Senator from Florida. 
Mr. PEPPER. Chess is a fairly complicated game, 
but there will never be on any chess board as many means 
by which to attain an objective as there are corporate 
devices by which to achieve the objective the Senator 
from West Virginia has spoken of. 
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An Abstrac t of a 'l'he s is: 
LEGibLA'l' ION iU\lD J UDiciAL Dbc i::iiOl'H:i cOnTROLLI.llj G 
THE POLI TicAL AcTi viTI Eb OF LAbOR U.r4 IO .i~ G l.d 
GREAT HRI'I'All\i AND THE U1HTED bTATEb 
By Frederick W. Parkhurst Jr. 
The principal purpose of this thesis is to analyze 
the successes or failures, the legal and practical consequences 
of a ttempted lim~tations or prohibitions in Great Britain and 
in the United btates, federal and state, on political a ctivities 
in general, and specifically on the politica l activities of 
l abor unions. This is done by a study of sources including 
judicial decisions; statutes; official documents; le gisla tive 
debates , hearings, and committee reports; books; l aw reviev.r 
a rticles; various pamphlets; newspapers; general information; 
and the writer 1 s know·ledge and personal experience . The subject 
matte r has been divided into three main sections as follo~s : 
The first chapter rev i ews the historical ba ckground 
and the development of l abor union political ac tivities and 
objectives in Grea t Br i tain and the United ::> tates, t ogether 
with certain comparisons. It is noted that in the United btates 
labor unions engage in three k inds of political activities--
·support of candidates, promotion of legislation , and participa-
tion in administration. In Great Hritain, l abor adds to this 
list by sponsoring its own Labor Party financed by union funds . 
The chapter concludes with a discussion of l abor's political 
potentials, touching upon whether American unions will also 
sponsor a Labor Party or continue to worl-\:- within the Demo crat ic 
Party. 
The second chapter considers those gener al controls 
over electoral conduct w-hich, while not a i med specifically at 
the unions, apply to all political activities. TheBe " corrupt 
practice s " provisions include publicity requir ements and 
publici t y pamphlets, expenditure limitat ions as to amounts and 
pur poses , the r estrictions on contributions, protections for 
public employees, various illegal practices, illLd other 
miscellaneous provisions governing elections, pa rticularly 
relating to the conduct of candidates, parties, coimnittees, and 
their agents. It is pointed out that l aws r egula ting party 
finance have been l a rgely ineffective, and t hat adequate 
publicity would be more beneficial. 
The third chapter details the specific control s 
a ttempting to limit or prohibit the political a ctivities of 
organized labor in Great ~ritain and the United btates , the 
development of these controls, their history and provisions , 
and the practical results of these attempt s. As in t he ca se of 
many of the general controls dealt with in the second chapter , 
these specific controls have also l a r gely fai l ed and agai n is 
show:fl some of the per t inent reasons why these attempts have not 
been as effective as originally conce ived by their authors . 
Pa rticularly has this been true v:i th the courts 1 r efusa.l to 
enfor ce the political prohibitions of the Taft~Hartley Act's 
bection 304. 
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The findings of the thesis are swMaarized and 
evaluated in the fourth chapter. It is concluded that labor 
lli~ions are by necessity almost automatically in politics, that 
l abor's political activities make a very definite contribution 
to democratic electoral and legislative processes, that prohi-
bitions have failed on several grounds including constitutional-
ity, and that among other recommendations the alternative of 
effective publicity should be the guiding principle of any 
regulatory program. At the same time, labor unions must assume 
the responsibilities of political statesmanship vvhich ac comp any 
its ever-increasing political activit ies and progr ams . 
Although the Bibliography lists vrell over one 
hundred fifty sources, all of which have been referred to in 
the text of the thesis, there has been no previous extensive 
concentration of the scope of this paper and the writer hopes 
to have made a useful examination of a fascinating but as yet 
unsettled problem. The Append i x is a transctipt of the oenate 
question-and-answer debate on l::lection 304. It not only 
contains many of the arguments for and against labor union 
political activities, more of which were reported in grea ter 
deta il in the thesis proper, but also is valuable for as certa in-
ment o:f the legislative intent. However1' this intent has not 
been recognized by the courts. 
Frederick W. Parkhurst Jr. 
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